You can answer that. You can give your explanation later.
A Yes. Wait a moment. did, except the purely military one on the invasion of the Soviet Union? here, and the Adjutant General Schmundt told me, "You can be most successful if you try to influence the Fuehrer personally when you are alone with him and tell him what you think", but this is so important that I have to state it. on the occasion of his first interrogation, where I had not had a chance to intervene, he had been tortured. That was the first time that I heard thatanywhere in Germany anybody was tortured. There is a letter from Gessler about that -- that I tell him immediately, " I am going to the Fuehrer at once and tell him, because I can not imagine that he knows about that". Gessler asked me -- and he confirms this in that letter-that for goodness sake not to go to the Fuehrer now because that would endanger his, Gessler's, life. I said I would guarantee that nothing would happen to him and that I would still try to approach the Fuehrer. When I was informed in April that he was in Berlin, which was under heavy attack, I tried, day after day by calling admiral Voss over the telephone, to approach the Fuehrer. That wasno longer possible, and after I received that information, together with my wife I walked to the lake which wasbehind our house and tore off my Party Emblem and threw it into the lake. I told that to admiral Voss, too, but I could not tell it to the Fuehrer anymore. That can be seen from the letter which Dr. Gessler wrote, and I would have liked to have him as a witness, but his state of health did not permit it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Thank you, my Lord.
THE WITHESS: It was not my first protest. Those were not my words.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other cross examination? BY COLONEL POKROVSKY: testified that during your service as Commander in Chief of the Navy you twice made application to resign. The first time you tried to resign was in November 1938 when you were dealing with construction of the Navy and Hitler was not pleased with your plans, and the second time was when Hitler, without your knowledge, permitted his adjutant, who was the navy officer, to marry a certain woman. Isn't that so? mentioned. Once was in 1937, and 1 believe also in 1935 when I was not feeling quite well, but these were two typical examples to show how such things came about. persuaded you not to resign. forever.
Q In fact, you resigned only in January 1943, isn't that so?
A Yes indeed; in practice, yes. Then, during the war I believed that I could not quit the Navy which was already in such a difficult situation, and I believe I enjoyed a certain confidence that I could be useful. resignation, that it seemed to you then that Hitler, at that particular moment, wanted to got rid of you.
Is that so? concerning his previous judgments, that maybe he wanted to get rid of me, and that therefore that was a favorable moment to leave. Hitler.
A Yes. I mentioned his name. I informed the Fuehrer of that in writing, and also said that in case he wanted to emphasize submarine warfare Admiral Doenitz was the highest authority in that field.
Q And doesn't it seem to you, after your answers to my questions, that the answer which you gave to the attorney Laternser on the 18th of May when you mentioned the absolute impossibility of resigning from the General Staff, was not a proper answer? It was possible to resign, wasn't it?
A Yes. Here, of course, there were two prerequisites. The first was that Hitler himself did not like me any more, but I found out about that and therefore it was not insubordination.
I just quit my office for some reason. the change to take place under peaceful conditions so that the Navy would not suffer from it. If I had quit with a conflict, then that would have had a very bad consequences for the Navy, because a certain schism would have been caused between the Navy and Hitler, and I had to try to preserve unity, particularly at that critical moment during the war.
Q I would like you to understand my question correctly. I am not asking you about the prerequisites which might have been required for granting an application for resignation. I am asking you a question in principle:
Was it possible or was it impossible to resign? You resigned, after all. You resigned from your post as Commander in Chief of the Navy. "If that is the way you judge me yourself, then there is no sense in my continuing to work with you." That was the favorable situation at that time which made it permissible for me to ask him to have me released. But what one insubordinate. That had to be avoided, and I was too much of a soldier to do anything like that. question.
Now I will pass on to the next question. You maintain that all the time you were striving towards normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, is that correct?
A I'm sorry; I can't understand. have the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union be quite normal, isn't tha so? common policy with Russia. Friday, in 1939 you already had knowledge of the fact that Hitler intended to attack the Soviet Union. statements from Hitler himself that he was thinking of a war with Russia under certain circumstances, and then in the directive he mentioned one of these prerequisites, one of these circumstances. He did not say to me that under all circumstances he wanted to wage war, but that we had to be prepared, as it says Paragraph 1, and before the crushing of England we might have to fight against Russia. And from September on I began to make suggestions.
Q Wasn't there a case of an incident when you maintained that the explanations which had been given by official governmental organs or agencies relative to the causesfor an attack on the Soviet Union produced on you the impression of being propaganda, and in fact they were quite repulsive in their effect?
A The propaganda made by Hitler made an impression? I didn't quite get that the OKW and the Foreign Ministry explained to the German people the reasons for attacking the Soviet Union in such a way that it impressed you as being propaganda, and the total effect was revolting or repulsive. Don't you remember it? the broadcasts, the things emanating from the Foreign Office? Yes, that was propaganda. It was used in order to make the German people understand the stak of that war.
Q I would like you to take a look at one document. This is a document written by you, and I would like you to tell us whether in this document is written exactly the subject matter of my question, what I was asking you about.
A "The propagandistic and political publications issued at the beginning of the war by the Foreign Office and the High Command of the Armed Forces, which explained the broach of the pact on the basis of perpetrations of the Soviet Union, were received by the people as well as by the armed forces with very little belief, because they showed so clearly that they were propaganda for a certain purpose and were repulsive." Goebbels.
Q In connection with this question, I have another question for you. Am I to understand you inthis way, that your divergence of opinion with Hitler in regard to the question of foreign policy, and in particular in regard to the question of aggressive wars, was less strongly defined than your difference of opinion about the question of the marriage of a certain naval officer?
A No, they were in entirely different fields. These military questions with political decisions remained with the Fuehrer. I tried very strongly to influence him in questions of morals also, but I did not send him a written ultimatum of any kind because in that matter that would have been quite non-military. I did not have the final decision; he had it; whereas in the case of Albrecht, it was my decision and I signed that which I had to sign and that which I was entitled to sign.
Q You are saying now that this is not a question of morals. Doesn't it seem to you that an unprovoked attack on a country with which Germany had a non-aggression treaty, don't you think that such a question is always connected with the question of morals?
A Of course; that is what I said myself. But in spite of that, as Senior Officer of the Navy, I was not in a position to threaten with my resignation at that moment. I was too much of a soldier to have done anything myself, that I could have left my Navy at a moment like that. court room you testified that your speech which was delivered by you on the 12th of march, 1939 -- that is Speech 169 of the Russian document -- in the Raeder document book -- the speech where youpraised Hitler and Hitler's policies -- you mentioned that this speech was in accord with your true opinion. Is it so or is it not?
A No, that is not correct. I said that we had had the experience that the Communists and news, from 1917 to 1920, had undermined our force of resistance and that, therefore, it could be understood that, as a National Socialist government, in a certain way, had taken measures against both of them in order to reduce their infouence, which was an exaggerated one. That was the sense of my testimony, and the further steps which could be taken I have mentioned in no way. speech which you delivered on the 12th of March, 1939, that this speech was fully in accord with your ideas and you -
A Yes, it was or I wouldn't have said it. It was in accord insofar as I had to recognize that the National Socialist government in some manner had to reduce that influence, and as I said yesterday, the National Socialist government had issued the Nurnberg Law, which I did not approve of their extremes; but in the case of an attitude of that kind taken by the government, it was not possible that in the course of a public speech, which I gave on orders of that government, I should state different opinions which would have been my own; that was necessary within the framework-
THE PRESIDENT: Will you be able to finish in a very few moments? It is now five minutes past five.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: It seems to me, My Lord, that only about ten minutes will be sufficient for me. I have only about threeor four more questions left.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. to the motives which made you deliver the speech. It was important for me that you would confirm what you said, and that is that this speech was in accord with your views and ideas. Now I will pass on to the next question. do I pronounce his name correctly? Is it Fricke or Fricker? of Leningrad. Do you know what document I mean or must this document be shownto you?
A No. I know that document very well.
Q This directive was published with your consent?
A I did not give a specific order for it but that wasn't necessary. May I just briefly explain how it worked out?
A Quite briefly, yes. I had requested Hitler, when I heard that he intended in the course of the war to attack Leningrad, that the port installations should be spared because they would be useful for us later. We had two bases which had to be spared on account of the British air attacks in the Balkans, and shortly before that date which you have mentioned Admiral Fricke had been at the Fuehrer's headquarters and there, with the Fuehrer, in my absence, he had discussed these matters and the Fuehrer had explained that plan of the shelling of Petersburg with these words, these very exaggerated words which were then passed on in the document. The Havy itself had absolutely nothing to do with the shelling of Leningrad. We received no orders for that. We were only interested in that one matter which I mentioned, that the shipy ards and port installations should be spared.
The Fuehrer had informed Fricke that unfortunately he was not in a position to do that because the shelling or bombing by airplanes could not be directed quite so precisely. What mattered for us was that he shoul inform Admiral Karls that Leningrad, in case it should be taken, could not be used as a base, and General Admiral Karls thereupon had to withdraw the preparations which had already started by getting German workers ready, and probably also machinery which was intended to be used in Leningrad late The Navy had to know that and, as it is said in the document, the so-called Quartermaster (??) Department of the Navy had to know about it, and that was why Admiral Fricke passed on that paper. Unfortunately, he refuted his present statement so far as the whole affair concerned us, because we had nothing to do with the shelling. He had these statements repeated in that paper. The responsibility in the sense that he approved it, he did not assume by doing os; not at all. He only believed that he had to repeat the wording of the order of Hitler and pass it on. The Navy had nothing to do with it. It was not necessary to pass it on, and unfortunat and very clumsily, that expression by Hitlerwas entered in that document; but nothing happened as a consequence of that and that document was not passed on to Admiral Von Carls. That is the whole story.
Q It seems to me the question is becoming more complicated. I asked you a simple question. Your Chief of Staff, Chief of Operations, published a directive. Did you know about the directive? letter had not been presented to me and that shows that it was not considered to be very important. It wasn't a directive for any operation to start or anything important. It was just a directive that, in the field of bases, was supposed to be done had to be withdrawn, and nothing happened as a consequence. So about that document passed on by General Fricke nothing happened. It was absolutely superfluous. cities of the soviet Union. You are talking in this document about razing the city to the ground and you maintain now that it is more or less of a trifling question, that this question wouldn't mean anything as far as being of importance.
Do you want us to believe you in that?
A Of course. It is not a question of the shelling of Leningrad, with which we had nothing to do, but the minor question which concerned us, that was the question as to whether we would later found a naval base there and whether we needed labor and machines for that purpose. That was my main issue. I was not referring to the shelling of Petersburg. and to draw the necessary conclusions both from this document and from your testimony.
How I have one last question for you. Onthe 28th of August, 1945, in Moscow, didn't you write an affidavit as to the reasons for Germany's defeat?
COLONEL POKROVSKY: My Lord, we submit this document to the Tribunal in the form of excerpts, USSR Exhibit No. 460. In order to save time I would like you to hear several excerpts from this document, from this affidavit. and we will place it before the Tribunal and you can say whether it was correctly read into the record and whether you acknowledge and confirm it. "My Attitude Towards Adolph Hitler and the Party. The fatal influence on the fate of the German State." Did you find this place?
DR. KRANZBUEFLER: May I ask to be given a copy so that I can follow?
BY COLONEL POKROVSKY:
Q "Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable ambition were his main peculiarities; running after popularity and showing off, untruthfulness, impracticability, and selfishness, which were not restrained for the sake of State or People. He was outstanding in his greed, wastefulness, and coarse and unsoldier ly manner."
Then, a little further on: "It is my conviction that Hitler realized very soon his character, but took advantage of him, if it filled his purpose, and burdened him with every new task in order to avoid his becoming dangerous to the Fuehrer."
On page 24 of your document, you give another characteristic; "The Fuehre attached importance to the fact that his relations to me seemed normal and good He know I was well thought of in all the really important circles of the German people, and that he generally had greath faith in me." Of Dortmueller, Schacht and the others, this cannot be said, nor of Von Ribbentrop, Goebbels, Himmler and Dr. Ley.
A But there is something missing. In the same way, as for instance, Neurath you cannot include; Schacht, Dortmueller, and others, who were standing on the other side.
Q Evidently it was not correctly translated to you. Perhaps I read this place into the record.
Now, on Page 27, this place is underlined in pencil: "Doenitz's strong political inclination -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing) I think the Tribunal could read this themselve if the defendant says that it is true that he wrote it. Probably Dr. Siemers cocheck it over and see that there are no inaccuracies.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: Very well, My Lord. Then I shall have the opportunity to give a very brief question. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY: with pencil, where the paragraph deals with Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl Will you confirm that?
A What shall I do about it? and what you saw just now in this paragraph. I would like to hear an answer from you.
Do you acknowledge all this?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I quite agree with the suggestion by the Tribunal, but I should like to ask only that the entire document be submitted. I have only short excerpts before me, and I would be grateful if I could see the entire document. I assume that Colonel Pokrovsky agrees to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, one part of the document having been put in evidence, you can refer to the remainder of the document. You can put the remainder of the document in, if you want to.
THE WITNESS: I said that at the time I tried to understand the cause for our collapse. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY:
A Yes. On the whole, I certainly agree with these statements. But I should like to add that I wrote these things under entirely different conditions. I do not like to go into detail, and I never expected that that would ever become public. These were notes for myself and for my own judgment. also be entered on the transcript; that is, right after the statement about Field marshal Keitel. I would indicate to Field Marshal Keitel that I should like to emphasize that I intended to express that his manner towards the Fuehrer made it possible for him to get along with him for a long time, because if anybody else had been in that position, who every day or every other day had a conflict with the Fuehrer, then the words for the entire armed forces would not have been possible. statement.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution has no further questions to ask the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT : Have you got the document before you? Is that the origin document you had before you?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Is that in your handwriting?
THE WITNESS: No, it is typewritten. But it is signed by me.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the document can be handed to Dr. Siemers.
Dr. Siemers. do you want to re-examine beyond putting in that document? document?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, on account of the cross-examination made by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, I should like to re-examine, and I should like to ask for permis sion to do that after I have read this document. I can submit that document af ter my re-examination.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, the thought occurs to me with respect to this document, do I understand that the Tribunal will order copies to be distributed to all of the defense counsel? There are matters with respect to the refendants that the counsel might want to examine about. They might be surprise
THE PRESIDENT: I thought it was fair that Dr. Siemers should see the document.
MR. DODD: Yes. I have no objection to that. But my point is that in document, there is reference to defendants other than the defendant represented by Dr. Siemers. And at a later date, if this document is not made known to the either by the reading of it or by the turning over of it in translated form, they may claim surprise, and lack of opportunity to examine on it.
THE PRESIDENT: I think some photostatic copies of the document should I made so that all the defendants referred to therein may be acquainted with the terms of the document.
MR DODD: I just thought I would make that suggestion.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 21 May 1946 at 1000 hours.)
1000-1700. Lord Justice Lawrence presiding. BY DR. SIEMERS: put the following questions to you in re-examination. Sir David was talking about the fact that before 1933 you had carried out rearmament behind the backs of the leaders of the Party in Germany. I think that question, as such, has beer clarified, but there is one supplementary question. On whom did it depend just what was submitted to the Reichstag?
A The Reichswehr Minister, Reichs Minister for Defense. He at that time was a member of the government and my direct superior. I had to submit everything to him which I wished to deal with.
Q And his name was Groener, wasn't it?
DR. SIEMERS: May I draw the Tribunal's attention to the extract which I have submitted as Raeder's Exhibit No. 3, according to which Article 50 order is that the Reich President is giving all orders and decrees even where the armed forces are concerned. For their validity decrees even where the armed forces are concerned. For their validity decrees require to be countersigned by the Chancelor or the Minister concerned and by the act of countersigning responsibility is accepted. In this, our case, the Reichsminister was competent as the Reichs Minister, and anything that was done afterwards was a matter for the government to decide. Sir David has read to you Document C 17. It is the index of a document written by Oberst Scherf, called The History of the German Navy from 1919 to 1939. as this book ever written?
AAs far as I know, only the index was compiled. I assume that if anything had been written, then it would first of all have been put before me. But I have never heard of that at all.
DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that the American Prosecution, at the time when they submitted the document, pointed out that as far as they know the book was not written. BY DR. SIEMERS: I want you to tell me. Defendant, when did you learn of this index? terday. May I come back to one question put by Sir David, On page 1 Sir David had been reading that and it was pointed out that in every sphere of rearmament of the Navy that long before the 16th of March, 1935; the Versailles Treaty had been violated so far as the letter and certainly as far as the spirit is concerned and that at least violations had been prepared. Then Sir David asked you: Do you want to say that this is untrue? Your answer was, or rather you answered but you didn't quite finish your reply because it never became quite clear what you said in the German or the English record. I want you to tell me why you are of the opinion that Assmann was not quite right in this respect?
A It is an utter exaggeration. First of all, violations as have been proved here in detail were mostly of a very minor nature and the small deviations may have given the impression that there were many. Secondly, in the important parts, we never fulfilled the Versailles Treaty: in fact, we remained below the figures granted. The question of the very, very small and useless defense which we were allowed to have -- Assmann's representations are just an exaggeration.
Q What are you trying to say, therefore, is tha Assmann's expressions in practically every sphere of rearmament were wrong? there were so many points which, however closely examined, would turn out to be very minor and that, therefore, the important points of rearmament, that is to say construction of large ships, there the Navy did not violate the Treaty, no. the fact that you had a great deal of confidence in Assmann. I have nothing to say against it, but over and above it I would like to put a supplementary question to you. Did you have that much confidence in him, that, in your opinion, Assmann could pass a proper legal judgment? Was he a legal man?
A No. Assmann was a naval officer who wasn't being used at the front any more and who was a very clever writer. He had written a few volumes about the First World War. He was writing very well, but even volumes regarding the First Naval War were corrected a great deal by the persons concerned by it; but against him and his ability to write history nothing can be said.
Q Grand Admiral, I think you remember this document from yesterday. Is it a final historical work? Is it a finally corrected edition?
A No. So far as I know, he hadn't got that far. He was making summaries and extracts from war diaries and the records he had.
Q Assmann has written:
"If, considering the situation, there were preparations in 1935 for the construction of twelve 275-ton submarines, six 750-ton submarines, and four 900-ton submarines, and from 1936 preparations for six 550-ton submarines, then one will have to consider the strategic considerations which existed at that time." later forty proposed submarines -- by no means built, just proposed. Are these figures correct in your opinion?
A In my opinion they are. The only thing I'm not sure about is the 900-ton type; I can't quite explain that. I can't remember that at that time we were building 900-ton boats. then came the 740-ton boats. Perhaps he is thinking of those when he says 900 tons. We didn't actually build 900-ton boats. I want to repeat because it needs clarification.
"Germany, particularly where U-boat construction is concerned, has adhered the least to the limitations of the Anglo-German Treaty. Considering the size of the boats already under order, there will be by 1938 fifty-five submarines. In fact, 118 were completed or ordered."
I want to remind you that here was the note No. 6 in the original referring to a letter to the Chief of the Naval Budget Department of the year 1942, where presumably the budget had references to the construction of submarines as the years went by. I believe that these figuresneed to be clarified. submarines were in accordance with the London agreement; that is to say, in accordance with the forty-five per cent agreed in 1935. You probably haven't got the exact figure in mind, but is that roughly correct?
A Yes, that's probably right.
Q And now, the figure 118. That, according to material at my disposal, has also good reasons behind it.
That is the figure which corresponds to the one hundred per cent tonnage of submarines. If we had 118 submarines, then our submarine equipment corresponded to that of Britain at that time.
A Yes, it is correct; and it is also correct that we included these further boats in the budget and had ordered them on the 30th of December. We had seen Admiral Cunningham and his friends in Berlin and had brought about a friendly agreement, in accordance with the contract or the agreement, thinking that we could build one hundred per cent. The remark read at the beginning, namely, that we had committed both violations in this sphere, is perfectly untrue. Until the beginning of the war we have only built such U-boats as were allowed to build; that is to say, forty-five per cent first, and later one hundred per cent. That was a great mistake that we did it.
Q Grand Admiral, you've just said that it was an untruth. I think that, even if Sir David used that word against you, one oughtn't to pass such sharp judgment against Assmann. Did you think, Grand Admiral, that there was a legal error on his part when he was writing down these details and that he wasn't really thinking of what you've just told us had happened; namely, that in 1938 there had been an agreement between England and Germany, according to which Germany could now build one hundred per cent?
A That is very probably. When I said "untruth", I meant incorrectness hundred per cent was planned from the beginning and that Germany had the right at any time to increase to one hundred per cent, provided that it notified Great Britain. The notification is presumably what you described, witness; that is the negotiation with Admiral Cunningham? 31st of December.
THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant saying that there was a notification to Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of December, 1938? Is that what you said; that there was a notification to Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of December, 1938?
THE WITNESS: Admiral Cunningham came to Berlin, to this friendly negotiation which had been provided for in the agreement. On that 30th of December we arranged with him that from now on, instead of forty-five per cent, one hundred per cent would be built.
THE PRESIDENT: Was that an oral arrangement or a written one?
THE WITNESS: It was a conference between the Chief of Staff, Naval Command Staff, Admiral Cunningham, and certain other individuals, and I can't say for certain today, but I'm pretty certain that minutes were taken.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Mr. President, unfortunately, I haven't been able to place any written material. I only know from Raeder Exhibit No. 11 that the agreement of 1935, according to which Germany could increase the tonnage, and the agreement of 37, according to which Germany had the duty to notify them of such treaties. Generally, in such drastic changes, the written system was chosen, although in my opinion it wasn't necessarily a duty in this case. Negotiations, as the witness said, did take place.
A Yes. May I, perhaps, add that apart from the submarine problems, the question of two heavy cruisers was also settled, which we had, also, originally dropped when we only wanted to build three, and now we were asking that we should have their agreement to build the other two, to which we were entitled. That was also agreed upon in accordance with the agreement.
Q Document 340 wasput before you yesterday; it is US 51. You will find it in the British document book 10-A on page 104. I want to put one sentence from that document to you again, which hasnot been quoted by the Prosecution, neither in November nor yesterday. It appears under figure "2" and "c". That is document book 10-A, page 104. And there, under figure "2" and "c" there is the following statement -- and I want to add that this is the question of sanctions and the possible preparation of a defense against sanctions in 1935. I quote from "2-c":
"First of all, I prohibit any practice or preparations."
THE PRESIDENT: That is not 10-A, 104.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. Elwyn Jones has just been kind enough to point out to me the English translation. It appears from it that, although I have also got the English translation before me, that there are two documents C-340; one has one page and the other has two. One hasn't got a heading and is dated "Berlin, 25th of October, 1933". In my opinion -
THE PRESIDENT: That is the one on page104?
DR. SIEMERS: No, on page 104 there is, I just heard from Mr. Elwyn Jones, the other document, C 140, which has the heading, "Directive for the Armed Forces in Case of Sanctions."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and the date of it is 25 January 1933?
DR SIEMERS: 25 October, 1935; but that is an error. It is 1933.
MR. ELWYN JONES: There appears to be another document which is not in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Not in the book?
MR. ELWYN JONES: Not in the book.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, perhaps I may point out that the Prosecution have presented the document, the other C 140, US 51. That must be the one I have referred to because it tallies with the record; I mean the record of the session of 27 November. There will be the document to which I have just now referred.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it C 140 or C 141?
DR. SIEMERS: C 140, the same number, and that is the same as USA 51.
Mr. President, perhaps to simplify it, I may later, after today's session, submit the 140 to German and English.
THE PRESIDENT: You can read the document now and you can settle with Mr. Elwyn Jones about the proper notation of the document, whether it should be C 140 or whatever the exhibit number ought to be.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well, sir. BY DR. SIEMERS: the defense against sanctions is mentioned. I shall now read a further sentence to you, and I quote, to begin with, "For the time being, I prohibit all practical preparations." Would it be right, therefore, that in 1933 nothing whatever was prepared by you in the Navy? allowed to be done, in accordance with this order. This is merely a a caution on the Fuehrer's part in the event that the opponent might do anything following his measures.