A No, please may I make a statement concerning that? I should like to say something, even if you don't put a question to me. It isn't right. and the following dates in 1941, a number of intensifications took place on the part of the United States, which I mentioned this morning, from the document which I had before me. Therefore, it was clear that I, on behalf of the Command of the Navy, which was supposed to conduct a most effective naval war, urged that also with respect to the United States stops should be taken which were permissible according to international law. At least, that one should start slowly taking these stops; and first of all, that one should no more respect that 300-mile limit, but go as far as the three-mile limit, where according to existing international law it was possible to attack. That is to say, not against international law, but it was just discontinuing certain favorable conditions which we had granted the United States.
Q There isno dispute between us. I was just establishing that point. the Grand Admiral Doenitz the Prosecution has demanded of us that we should not treat certain neutrals better than others. We should treat them equally; that is to say, we should have to sink them, no matter whether we wanted to do so. The second thing, it was a matter of course that a justified suggestion on my part had been rejected by the Fuehrer if, according to the political situation, I was of the opinion that at that time he did not desire any intensification towards the United States.
Q Now, I want you to come to quite a different point. Do you say that you did not knew anything about the extermination of Jews in the Eastern territories? it, And, may I add for explanation, that Hitler took a man like myself, who in his opinion he knew would not have spoken under any circumstances about such things, because he had to be afraid that on my part there would be serious objections. I have explained the other day why I used the word "just" in my memorial speech. I was obliged to do so. But that had nothing to do at all with extermination of Jews. About the Jewish matter -only was informed when Jews, who were well known to me usually friend of my parents, approached me and told me that they were about to be evacuated from Berlin. And then I intervened for them. On thos occasions I was told, when I asked that they should be evacuated into cities where ghettos had been established -- A ghetto for me always was a district in a city where all the Jaws lived together.
Q I have asked you, did you know or did you not. You could have answered that yes or not. I want you to answer about a certain -been asked and every man in my position or in the ideology that we had says the same, that he doesn't know anything about it. Then, for that reason, I should like to explain that one did not hear about these facts because individual civilians certainly didn't talk to you about that because they were always afraid that they would get into difficulties if they talked about these things at all. The Fuehrer did not speak about it. With Himmler I had no relations, and with other agents of the Gestapo I didn't have any contact either. I didn't know anything about it. the East Baltic Coast. Is this right that you had the naval chief command, and then the Flag Officer Talin and, under him, you had a command at Libau; is that right? Was that your chain of command?
A I didn't understand that. chief command, Flag Officer Talin, and an attachment under him at Libau?
A I assume that depends on the various matters. If those were matters of operations, then it had to do with the group commander east or north; and as far as matters of organization were concerned, then it might have gone about the station chief of the Baltic Sea. at Libau; had you not? oath by one of the naval employees at Libau.
This witness says:
"Deposition on oath of WALTER KURT DIETMANN."
And then it says:
"I was Naval-Administration Inspector and officer in charge of the Naval Quartermaster Stores in Liban in Latvia.
"I held this position from the beginning of August 1941 to the end of March 1942.
"The Jewish population of Libau at that time was supposed to be about 7,000 people.
"Up to the end of March 1942 many thousands of those had already been 'evacuated' by the Gestapo and the Latvian police.
"Evacuated was the local expression for the annihilation of these people.
"All Jews were registered. When a new lot was evacuated it happened in the following way:
"The Latvian Police fetched the Jews out of their houses, put them on lorries and drove them to the Naval Port about six to seven kilometers outside the town. Later on these people had to march and were not taken any more in lorries to that place.
"In the Naval Port these people were then shot with machineguns. This was done by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police. The police, of course, got their orders from the German Gestapo.
"I personally didn't witness these incidents but comrades told me all about them.
"Some of the Jews before they were shot worked for the Navy.
"About 80,100 people worked in the Quartermaster Stores every "About 100,150 people worked in the Town major's Office every "About 50 people worked at the local Naval Building Office "Through these contacts and through personal visits of Jewsin their houses I heard a lot regarding these terrible happenings in Libau during these months.
"I personally went to my superior, Festungs-Intendant Dr. Lancelle, and before that I also went to another superior, the officer in charge of the Hospital Administration Mueller, both were Naval Administration Officials. I pointed out to them these already mentioned awful happenings.
The answer I got was that they couldn't do anything and that things like that were best overlooked.
"The assistant Naval Administration Officer (Marine Veraltungs-Assistant) Kurt Traunecker accompanied a transport of clothing from Kiel to Libau. He stayed a few weeks in Libau and he definitely disapproved of the conditions there regarding the annihilation of the Jews.
"He then went back to Kiel to the Local Quartermaster Stores. There again he showed his disapproval of what he had seen and thereupon was ordered to appear at the Naval Administration Headquarters (Marine Intendantur). Whom he saw there, I don't know, but it was made clear to him that these occurrences were not true, and therefore he should not talk about them any more, otherwise he would get into serious trouble.
"My personal opinion isthat the higher formations of the Navy in Kiel and in other places in Germany must have had knowledge of these terrible conditions." on the East Coast of the Baltic and with these things happening, that nobody reported to you that the Jews were being slaughtered by the thousands in the Eastern territories; are you saying it? this? Had you an efficient staff? You said you had an efficient staff.
A That is a question which doesn't belong here. Of course I had only efficient officers around me. But here we dealt with things which were not done by the navy. It says here that in all places it was the police and so on. I even was in Libau once and I was told that the only thing about that matter that was peculiar was that in Libau, contrary to their habits, otherwise, the Jews were craftsmen, an that, therefore, they were doing useful work there. That was the only thing that I had heard about it About any extermination of any kind, that I can't say. I was there the year after it was occupied.
Q Were you there in 1941 or 1942?
A I said just now that I don't know just exactly; I have to look it up somewhere.
It was the year after it was occupied. It didn't say here that anything was reported. It is said only that it was discussed in the Navy-Intendantur. Of course I would have intervened if I would have heard about it.
Q You think you would? Well, I'll leave that. Now, tell me about the commander order of the 18th of October, 1942 and you passed it on to your various divisions of the Navy; did you not?
Q Did you approve of it?
A I did not recommend it, but I passed it on. I have to make a statement if you want to know how I thought about it.
Q Well, that's not what I'm asking you. I'm asking you -- first answer my question -- did you approve of an order to shoot commandoes or to hand them over to the SD to be shot; did you? Fuehrer, such as it came into my hands, I passed it on with the remark as to how far it has to be passed on and how it has to be returned; all that had been ordered by Hitler in detail. From me it was only essential that in one of the first paragraphs it said the basis on which this order was given, and the reasons why Hitler considered deviation from International Law justified. One had to add to that. was informed that on the occasion of the commando enterprise of the British and France, the prisoners are sent from the labor service who were working along the coasr, had been shackled with a noose around their neck and the other and around the leg, so that when the leg weakened, the noose around their neck -
Q Well, answer this: Did you approve of the order or not? You haven't answered it yet. Did you approve of the order?
A I say again, no. I say I did not approve. I did not recommend it. I said that twice already. I just passed it on because it was an order from my superior, and then it had to be added in one of the last paragraphs where it said that that order should not be applied in case of operations, and there I ordered that we in the navy should stress this point because that was our major field of activity.
But I say "no" on account of that order which you saw some good reasons to object to the Fuehrer. And I would like to state that very clearly as a soldier I was not in a position to go to my supreme commander and chief of state and to tell him,"Show me your evidence for that order"; that would have been mutiny and could not have been done under any circumstances.
a great deal in this trial, which you must have listened to, was the case of naval men coming in with a two man torpedo, trying to sink the "Tirpitz". Do you remember that case? Surely you can answer that Yes or No, because either you remember or you do not. We have discussed it about six times.
A Yes, I remember. If I remember I will say Yes. You don't have to assume the contrary. General, or Admiral Inspector, of the German Navy, that there was started a Kommando der Kleinkampfverbaende, under Vice Admiral Helmut Heir, which included in its command one-man torpedoes, one-man U-boats, explosive motor boats, and had personnel, starting at about 5,000 and rising, I think, as for as 16,000? Did you know that there was a Kommando in the Navy, Kommando der Kleinkampfverbaende? Did you know that?
A Yes, that I knew of course. That was quite open. thousands of personnel in that Kommando that was dealing with ne-man and two-man torpedoes and explosive motor boats? Would you have approved if we had shot them ut of hand? not have to do anything about, I can not give any information.
Q If you don't want to answer, it is good enough for me. I will point it out to the Tribunal in due course.
A But you interruptedme again. I should like to make a second point after what I said first. Secondly, these units fought quite openly, just below the coast and had no murderous instruments or instruments for sabotage with them, so they were fighters just like the fighters in a submarine. so I will not argue.
I want you to point to one ether point. Was it under your orders that the log on the"Athenia" was falsified? Wasit by your direct Order?
A No, not at all. I have explained the other day here that my order was, first, absolute secrecy upon the order of the Fuehrer; secondly, politically, it will be dealt with by the OKM -- third, there was a third point; I will find it in a second. I do not intend to punish the commander because he acted in good faith and committed an error. That is what I ordered. I did not order anyt hing further concerning that.
Q Do you know under whose orders the log was falsified? I am very anxious to know. The log was falsified. I have asked the defendant Doenitz. He can not tellme. He has put in an affidavit that the matter was to be left to you, and now I am asking you whether you can tellme. I think the commander is dead, as far as I remember, so he can not tell me. Do you say that you can not tell me under whose orders the log of the submarine U-30 that sank the "Athenia" was falsified? did not bother with such details. I did not order such details. The other day here -- I don't know whether Admiral Wagner said that who did it was mentioned. I assumed that it was within the flotilla.
Q Tell me just this about the "Athenia". You told us the other day that you gave these orders and then washed your hands of the matter. Nearly a month later -
Q You had nothing to do with it. Nearly a month later the Propaganda Ministry put out this suggestion, I think you said on Hitler's orders that the "Athenia" had been sunk by Churchill. Did you not feel that it was your duty as Grand Admiral and head of the German Navy to make any protests against this disgraceful, lying suggestion that the First Lord of the British Admiralty had deliberately sent to their deaths a lot of British and American subjects? Did you not think it was your duty to do, that? any idea about it. I felt terrible about it when the First Lord of the Admiralty was attacked in that undignified way, but I could not change anything.
it.
Q Did you translate your indignation into actions? That is what I am asking.
A Into what kind of action?
A That Hitler shout cause Goebbels to deny that article? That Hitler would not do if he himself had caused the article.
Q I want to get it clear. You did nothing when you knew that von Blomberg and von Fritsch, who were old friends and comrades of yours, had been framed up by sections of these Nazi plotters; you did nothing about that? You did nothing to protest against the treatment meted out to von Blomberg or von Fritsch? You did nothing, did you? You have said yourself this morning that I did not know at that time. Later when I was informed further, I put the whole picture together. At that time I was not in a position to assume that such methods would be at allpossible. I just want to get it quite clear that the first time in your life that you were moved to protest was, I think, in March, 1945, when you saw the actual marks of torture on the hand of your friend, Herr Gessler, and at that time Soviet troops were over the Oder and the Allies were over the Rhine, and that was the first time that you made any protest when you took off your Party Golden Emblem, wasn't it? That was the first protest you ever made in your naval, military, political career; is that right?
A No. When Dr. Gessler, who in spite of my objections had been kept for several months in a concentration camp, returned from the concentration camp and informed me, he was in a very poor condition. In spite of my request in August, at the time when he was sent to the concentration camp and at which time I had asked the Fuehrer through Admiral Wagner that he be questioned quickly because he was certainly innocent in connection with the -
You can answer that. You can give your explanation later.
A Yes. Wait a moment. did, except the purely military one on the invasion of the Soviet Union? here, and the Adjutant General Schmundt told me, "You can be most successful if you try to influence the Fuehrer personally when you are alone with him and tell him what you think", but this is so important that I have to state it. on the occasion of his first interrogation, where I had not had a chance to intervene, he had been tortured. That was the first time that I heard thatanywhere in Germany anybody was tortured. There is a letter from Gessler about that -- that I tell him immediately, " I am going to the Fuehrer at once and tell him, because I can not imagine that he knows about that". Gessler asked me -- and he confirms this in that letter-that for goodness sake not to go to the Fuehrer now because that would endanger his, Gessler's, life. I said I would guarantee that nothing would happen to him and that I would still try to approach the Fuehrer. When I was informed in April that he was in Berlin, which was under heavy attack, I tried, day after day by calling admiral Voss over the telephone, to approach the Fuehrer. That wasno longer possible, and after I received that information, together with my wife I walked to the lake which wasbehind our house and tore off my Party Emblem and threw it into the lake. I told that to admiral Voss, too, but I could not tell it to the Fuehrer anymore. That can be seen from the letter which Dr. Gessler wrote, and I would have liked to have him as a witness, but his state of health did not permit it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Thank you, my Lord.
THE WITHESS: It was not my first protest. Those were not my words.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other cross examination? BY COLONEL POKROVSKY: testified that during your service as Commander in Chief of the Navy you twice made application to resign. The first time you tried to resign was in November 1938 when you were dealing with construction of the Navy and Hitler was not pleased with your plans, and the second time was when Hitler, without your knowledge, permitted his adjutant, who was the navy officer, to marry a certain woman. Isn't that so? mentioned. Once was in 1937, and 1 believe also in 1935 when I was not feeling quite well, but these were two typical examples to show how such things came about. persuaded you not to resign. forever.
Q In fact, you resigned only in January 1943, isn't that so?
A Yes indeed; in practice, yes. Then, during the war I believed that I could not quit the Navy which was already in such a difficult situation, and I believe I enjoyed a certain confidence that I could be useful. resignation, that it seemed to you then that Hitler, at that particular moment, wanted to got rid of you.
Is that so? concerning his previous judgments, that maybe he wanted to get rid of me, and that therefore that was a favorable moment to leave. Hitler.
A Yes. I mentioned his name. I informed the Fuehrer of that in writing, and also said that in case he wanted to emphasize submarine warfare Admiral Doenitz was the highest authority in that field.
Q And doesn't it seem to you, after your answers to my questions, that the answer which you gave to the attorney Laternser on the 18th of May when you mentioned the absolute impossibility of resigning from the General Staff, was not a proper answer? It was possible to resign, wasn't it?
A Yes. Here, of course, there were two prerequisites. The first was that Hitler himself did not like me any more, but I found out about that and therefore it was not insubordination.
I just quit my office for some reason. the change to take place under peaceful conditions so that the Navy would not suffer from it. If I had quit with a conflict, then that would have had a very bad consequences for the Navy, because a certain schism would have been caused between the Navy and Hitler, and I had to try to preserve unity, particularly at that critical moment during the war.
Q I would like you to understand my question correctly. I am not asking you about the prerequisites which might have been required for granting an application for resignation. I am asking you a question in principle:
Was it possible or was it impossible to resign? You resigned, after all. You resigned from your post as Commander in Chief of the Navy. "If that is the way you judge me yourself, then there is no sense in my continuing to work with you." That was the favorable situation at that time which made it permissible for me to ask him to have me released. But what one insubordinate. That had to be avoided, and I was too much of a soldier to do anything like that. question.
Now I will pass on to the next question. You maintain that all the time you were striving towards normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, is that correct?
A I'm sorry; I can't understand. have the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union be quite normal, isn't tha so? common policy with Russia. Friday, in 1939 you already had knowledge of the fact that Hitler intended to attack the Soviet Union. statements from Hitler himself that he was thinking of a war with Russia under certain circumstances, and then in the directive he mentioned one of these prerequisites, one of these circumstances. He did not say to me that under all circumstances he wanted to wage war, but that we had to be prepared, as it says Paragraph 1, and before the crushing of England we might have to fight against Russia. And from September on I began to make suggestions.
Q Wasn't there a case of an incident when you maintained that the explanations which had been given by official governmental organs or agencies relative to the causesfor an attack on the Soviet Union produced on you the impression of being propaganda, and in fact they were quite repulsive in their effect?
A The propaganda made by Hitler made an impression? I didn't quite get that the OKW and the Foreign Ministry explained to the German people the reasons for attacking the Soviet Union in such a way that it impressed you as being propaganda, and the total effect was revolting or repulsive. Don't you remember it? the broadcasts, the things emanating from the Foreign Office? Yes, that was propaganda. It was used in order to make the German people understand the stak of that war.
Q I would like you to take a look at one document. This is a document written by you, and I would like you to tell us whether in this document is written exactly the subject matter of my question, what I was asking you about.
A "The propagandistic and political publications issued at the beginning of the war by the Foreign Office and the High Command of the Armed Forces, which explained the broach of the pact on the basis of perpetrations of the Soviet Union, were received by the people as well as by the armed forces with very little belief, because they showed so clearly that they were propaganda for a certain purpose and were repulsive." Goebbels.
Q In connection with this question, I have another question for you. Am I to understand you inthis way, that your divergence of opinion with Hitler in regard to the question of foreign policy, and in particular in regard to the question of aggressive wars, was less strongly defined than your difference of opinion about the question of the marriage of a certain naval officer?
A No, they were in entirely different fields. These military questions with political decisions remained with the Fuehrer. I tried very strongly to influence him in questions of morals also, but I did not send him a written ultimatum of any kind because in that matter that would have been quite non-military. I did not have the final decision; he had it; whereas in the case of Albrecht, it was my decision and I signed that which I had to sign and that which I was entitled to sign.
Q You are saying now that this is not a question of morals. Doesn't it seem to you that an unprovoked attack on a country with which Germany had a non-aggression treaty, don't you think that such a question is always connected with the question of morals?
A Of course; that is what I said myself. But in spite of that, as Senior Officer of the Navy, I was not in a position to threaten with my resignation at that moment. I was too much of a soldier to have done anything myself, that I could have left my Navy at a moment like that. court room you testified that your speech which was delivered by you on the 12th of march, 1939 -- that is Speech 169 of the Russian document -- in the Raeder document book -- the speech where youpraised Hitler and Hitler's policies -- you mentioned that this speech was in accord with your true opinion. Is it so or is it not?
A No, that is not correct. I said that we had had the experience that the Communists and news, from 1917 to 1920, had undermined our force of resistance and that, therefore, it could be understood that, as a National Socialist government, in a certain way, had taken measures against both of them in order to reduce their infouence, which was an exaggerated one. That was the sense of my testimony, and the further steps which could be taken I have mentioned in no way. speech which you delivered on the 12th of March, 1939, that this speech was fully in accord with your ideas and you -
A Yes, it was or I wouldn't have said it. It was in accord insofar as I had to recognize that the National Socialist government in some manner had to reduce that influence, and as I said yesterday, the National Socialist government had issued the Nurnberg Law, which I did not approve of their extremes; but in the case of an attitude of that kind taken by the government, it was not possible that in the course of a public speech, which I gave on orders of that government, I should state different opinions which would have been my own; that was necessary within the framework-
THE PRESIDENT: Will you be able to finish in a very few moments? It is now five minutes past five.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: It seems to me, My Lord, that only about ten minutes will be sufficient for me. I have only about threeor four more questions left.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. to the motives which made you deliver the speech. It was important for me that you would confirm what you said, and that is that this speech was in accord with your views and ideas. Now I will pass on to the next question. do I pronounce his name correctly? Is it Fricke or Fricker? of Leningrad. Do you know what document I mean or must this document be shownto you?
A No. I know that document very well.
Q This directive was published with your consent?
A I did not give a specific order for it but that wasn't necessary. May I just briefly explain how it worked out?
A Quite briefly, yes. I had requested Hitler, when I heard that he intended in the course of the war to attack Leningrad, that the port installations should be spared because they would be useful for us later. We had two bases which had to be spared on account of the British air attacks in the Balkans, and shortly before that date which you have mentioned Admiral Fricke had been at the Fuehrer's headquarters and there, with the Fuehrer, in my absence, he had discussed these matters and the Fuehrer had explained that plan of the shelling of Petersburg with these words, these very exaggerated words which were then passed on in the document. The Havy itself had absolutely nothing to do with the shelling of Leningrad. We received no orders for that. We were only interested in that one matter which I mentioned, that the shipy ards and port installations should be spared.
The Fuehrer had informed Fricke that unfortunately he was not in a position to do that because the shelling or bombing by airplanes could not be directed quite so precisely. What mattered for us was that he shoul inform Admiral Karls that Leningrad, in case it should be taken, could not be used as a base, and General Admiral Karls thereupon had to withdraw the preparations which had already started by getting German workers ready, and probably also machinery which was intended to be used in Leningrad late The Navy had to know that and, as it is said in the document, the so-called Quartermaster (??) Department of the Navy had to know about it, and that was why Admiral Fricke passed on that paper. Unfortunately, he refuted his present statement so far as the whole affair concerned us, because we had nothing to do with the shelling. He had these statements repeated in that paper. The responsibility in the sense that he approved it, he did not assume by doing os; not at all. He only believed that he had to repeat the wording of the order of Hitler and pass it on. The Navy had nothing to do with it. It was not necessary to pass it on, and unfortunat and very clumsily, that expression by Hitlerwas entered in that document; but nothing happened as a consequence of that and that document was not passed on to Admiral Von Carls. That is the whole story.
Q It seems to me the question is becoming more complicated. I asked you a simple question. Your Chief of Staff, Chief of Operations, published a directive. Did you know about the directive? letter had not been presented to me and that shows that it was not considered to be very important. It wasn't a directive for any operation to start or anything important. It was just a directive that, in the field of bases, was supposed to be done had to be withdrawn, and nothing happened as a consequence. So about that document passed on by General Fricke nothing happened. It was absolutely superfluous. cities of the soviet Union. You are talking in this document about razing the city to the ground and you maintain now that it is more or less of a trifling question, that this question wouldn't mean anything as far as being of importance.
Do you want us to believe you in that?
A Of course. It is not a question of the shelling of Leningrad, with which we had nothing to do, but the minor question which concerned us, that was the question as to whether we would later found a naval base there and whether we needed labor and machines for that purpose. That was my main issue. I was not referring to the shelling of Petersburg. and to draw the necessary conclusions both from this document and from your testimony.
How I have one last question for you. Onthe 28th of August, 1945, in Moscow, didn't you write an affidavit as to the reasons for Germany's defeat?
COLONEL POKROVSKY: My Lord, we submit this document to the Tribunal in the form of excerpts, USSR Exhibit No. 460. In order to save time I would like you to hear several excerpts from this document, from this affidavit. and we will place it before the Tribunal and you can say whether it was correctly read into the record and whether you acknowledge and confirm it. "My Attitude Towards Adolph Hitler and the Party. The fatal influence on the fate of the German State." Did you find this place?
DR. KRANZBUEFLER: May I ask to be given a copy so that I can follow?
BY COLONEL POKROVSKY:
Q "Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable ambition were his main peculiarities; running after popularity and showing off, untruthfulness, impracticability, and selfishness, which were not restrained for the sake of State or People. He was outstanding in his greed, wastefulness, and coarse and unsoldier ly manner."
Then, a little further on: "It is my conviction that Hitler realized very soon his character, but took advantage of him, if it filled his purpose, and burdened him with every new task in order to avoid his becoming dangerous to the Fuehrer."
On page 24 of your document, you give another characteristic; "The Fuehre attached importance to the fact that his relations to me seemed normal and good He know I was well thought of in all the really important circles of the German people, and that he generally had greath faith in me." Of Dortmueller, Schacht and the others, this cannot be said, nor of Von Ribbentrop, Goebbels, Himmler and Dr. Ley.
A But there is something missing. In the same way, as for instance, Neurath you cannot include; Schacht, Dortmueller, and others, who were standing on the other side.
Q Evidently it was not correctly translated to you. Perhaps I read this place into the record.
Now, on Page 27, this place is underlined in pencil: "Doenitz's strong political inclination -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing) I think the Tribunal could read this themselve if the defendant says that it is true that he wrote it. Probably Dr. Siemers cocheck it over and see that there are no inaccuracies.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: Very well, My Lord. Then I shall have the opportunity to give a very brief question. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY: with pencil, where the paragraph deals with Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl Will you confirm that?