A What shall I do about it? and what you saw just now in this paragraph. I would like to hear an answer from you.
Do you acknowledge all this?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I quite agree with the suggestion by the Tribunal, but I should like to ask only that the entire document be submitted. I have only short excerpts before me, and I would be grateful if I could see the entire document. I assume that Colonel Pokrovsky agrees to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, one part of the document having been put in evidence, you can refer to the remainder of the document. You can put the remainder of the document in, if you want to.
THE WITNESS: I said that at the time I tried to understand the cause for our collapse. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY:
A Yes. On the whole, I certainly agree with these statements. But I should like to add that I wrote these things under entirely different conditions. I do not like to go into detail, and I never expected that that would ever become public. These were notes for myself and for my own judgment. also be entered on the transcript; that is, right after the statement about Field marshal Keitel. I would indicate to Field Marshal Keitel that I should like to emphasize that I intended to express that his manner towards the Fuehrer made it possible for him to get along with him for a long time, because if anybody else had been in that position, who every day or every other day had a conflict with the Fuehrer, then the words for the entire armed forces would not have been possible. statement.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution has no further questions to ask the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT : Have you got the document before you? Is that the origin document you had before you?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Is that in your handwriting?
THE WITNESS: No, it is typewritten. But it is signed by me.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the document can be handed to Dr. Siemers.
Dr. Siemers. do you want to re-examine beyond putting in that document? document?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, on account of the cross-examination made by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, I should like to re-examine, and I should like to ask for permis sion to do that after I have read this document. I can submit that document af ter my re-examination.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, the thought occurs to me with respect to this document, do I understand that the Tribunal will order copies to be distributed to all of the defense counsel? There are matters with respect to the refendants that the counsel might want to examine about. They might be surprise
THE PRESIDENT: I thought it was fair that Dr. Siemers should see the document.
MR. DODD: Yes. I have no objection to that. But my point is that in document, there is reference to defendants other than the defendant represented by Dr. Siemers. And at a later date, if this document is not made known to the either by the reading of it or by the turning over of it in translated form, they may claim surprise, and lack of opportunity to examine on it.
THE PRESIDENT: I think some photostatic copies of the document should I made so that all the defendants referred to therein may be acquainted with the terms of the document.
MR DODD: I just thought I would make that suggestion.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 21 May 1946 at 1000 hours.)
1000-1700. Lord Justice Lawrence presiding. BY DR. SIEMERS: put the following questions to you in re-examination. Sir David was talking about the fact that before 1933 you had carried out rearmament behind the backs of the leaders of the Party in Germany. I think that question, as such, has beer clarified, but there is one supplementary question. On whom did it depend just what was submitted to the Reichstag?
A The Reichswehr Minister, Reichs Minister for Defense. He at that time was a member of the government and my direct superior. I had to submit everything to him which I wished to deal with.
Q And his name was Groener, wasn't it?
DR. SIEMERS: May I draw the Tribunal's attention to the extract which I have submitted as Raeder's Exhibit No. 3, according to which Article 50 order is that the Reich President is giving all orders and decrees even where the armed forces are concerned. For their validity decrees even where the armed forces are concerned. For their validity decrees require to be countersigned by the Chancelor or the Minister concerned and by the act of countersigning responsibility is accepted. In this, our case, the Reichsminister was competent as the Reichs Minister, and anything that was done afterwards was a matter for the government to decide. Sir David has read to you Document C 17. It is the index of a document written by Oberst Scherf, called The History of the German Navy from 1919 to 1939. as this book ever written?
AAs far as I know, only the index was compiled. I assume that if anything had been written, then it would first of all have been put before me. But I have never heard of that at all.
DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that the American Prosecution, at the time when they submitted the document, pointed out that as far as they know the book was not written. BY DR. SIEMERS: I want you to tell me. Defendant, when did you learn of this index? terday. May I come back to one question put by Sir David, On page 1 Sir David had been reading that and it was pointed out that in every sphere of rearmament of the Navy that long before the 16th of March, 1935; the Versailles Treaty had been violated so far as the letter and certainly as far as the spirit is concerned and that at least violations had been prepared. Then Sir David asked you: Do you want to say that this is untrue? Your answer was, or rather you answered but you didn't quite finish your reply because it never became quite clear what you said in the German or the English record. I want you to tell me why you are of the opinion that Assmann was not quite right in this respect?
A It is an utter exaggeration. First of all, violations as have been proved here in detail were mostly of a very minor nature and the small deviations may have given the impression that there were many. Secondly, in the important parts, we never fulfilled the Versailles Treaty: in fact, we remained below the figures granted. The question of the very, very small and useless defense which we were allowed to have -- Assmann's representations are just an exaggeration.
Q What are you trying to say, therefore, is tha Assmann's expressions in practically every sphere of rearmament were wrong? there were so many points which, however closely examined, would turn out to be very minor and that, therefore, the important points of rearmament, that is to say construction of large ships, there the Navy did not violate the Treaty, no. the fact that you had a great deal of confidence in Assmann. I have nothing to say against it, but over and above it I would like to put a supplementary question to you. Did you have that much confidence in him, that, in your opinion, Assmann could pass a proper legal judgment? Was he a legal man?
A No. Assmann was a naval officer who wasn't being used at the front any more and who was a very clever writer. He had written a few volumes about the First World War. He was writing very well, but even volumes regarding the First Naval War were corrected a great deal by the persons concerned by it; but against him and his ability to write history nothing can be said.
Q Grand Admiral, I think you remember this document from yesterday. Is it a final historical work? Is it a finally corrected edition?
A No. So far as I know, he hadn't got that far. He was making summaries and extracts from war diaries and the records he had.
Q Assmann has written:
"If, considering the situation, there were preparations in 1935 for the construction of twelve 275-ton submarines, six 750-ton submarines, and four 900-ton submarines, and from 1936 preparations for six 550-ton submarines, then one will have to consider the strategic considerations which existed at that time." later forty proposed submarines -- by no means built, just proposed. Are these figures correct in your opinion?
A In my opinion they are. The only thing I'm not sure about is the 900-ton type; I can't quite explain that. I can't remember that at that time we were building 900-ton boats. then came the 740-ton boats. Perhaps he is thinking of those when he says 900 tons. We didn't actually build 900-ton boats. I want to repeat because it needs clarification.
"Germany, particularly where U-boat construction is concerned, has adhered the least to the limitations of the Anglo-German Treaty. Considering the size of the boats already under order, there will be by 1938 fifty-five submarines. In fact, 118 were completed or ordered."
I want to remind you that here was the note No. 6 in the original referring to a letter to the Chief of the Naval Budget Department of the year 1942, where presumably the budget had references to the construction of submarines as the years went by. I believe that these figuresneed to be clarified. submarines were in accordance with the London agreement; that is to say, in accordance with the forty-five per cent agreed in 1935. You probably haven't got the exact figure in mind, but is that roughly correct?
A Yes, that's probably right.
Q And now, the figure 118. That, according to material at my disposal, has also good reasons behind it.
That is the figure which corresponds to the one hundred per cent tonnage of submarines. If we had 118 submarines, then our submarine equipment corresponded to that of Britain at that time.
A Yes, it is correct; and it is also correct that we included these further boats in the budget and had ordered them on the 30th of December. We had seen Admiral Cunningham and his friends in Berlin and had brought about a friendly agreement, in accordance with the contract or the agreement, thinking that we could build one hundred per cent. The remark read at the beginning, namely, that we had committed both violations in this sphere, is perfectly untrue. Until the beginning of the war we have only built such U-boats as were allowed to build; that is to say, forty-five per cent first, and later one hundred per cent. That was a great mistake that we did it.
Q Grand Admiral, you've just said that it was an untruth. I think that, even if Sir David used that word against you, one oughtn't to pass such sharp judgment against Assmann. Did you think, Grand Admiral, that there was a legal error on his part when he was writing down these details and that he wasn't really thinking of what you've just told us had happened; namely, that in 1938 there had been an agreement between England and Germany, according to which Germany could now build one hundred per cent?
A That is very probably. When I said "untruth", I meant incorrectness hundred per cent was planned from the beginning and that Germany had the right at any time to increase to one hundred per cent, provided that it notified Great Britain. The notification is presumably what you described, witness; that is the negotiation with Admiral Cunningham? 31st of December.
THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant saying that there was a notification to Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of December, 1938? Is that what you said; that there was a notification to Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of December, 1938?
THE WITNESS: Admiral Cunningham came to Berlin, to this friendly negotiation which had been provided for in the agreement. On that 30th of December we arranged with him that from now on, instead of forty-five per cent, one hundred per cent would be built.
THE PRESIDENT: Was that an oral arrangement or a written one?
THE WITNESS: It was a conference between the Chief of Staff, Naval Command Staff, Admiral Cunningham, and certain other individuals, and I can't say for certain today, but I'm pretty certain that minutes were taken.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Mr. President, unfortunately, I haven't been able to place any written material. I only know from Raeder Exhibit No. 11 that the agreement of 1935, according to which Germany could increase the tonnage, and the agreement of 37, according to which Germany had the duty to notify them of such treaties. Generally, in such drastic changes, the written system was chosen, although in my opinion it wasn't necessarily a duty in this case. Negotiations, as the witness said, did take place.
A Yes. May I, perhaps, add that apart from the submarine problems, the question of two heavy cruisers was also settled, which we had, also, originally dropped when we only wanted to build three, and now we were asking that we should have their agreement to build the other two, to which we were entitled. That was also agreed upon in accordance with the agreement.
Q Document 340 wasput before you yesterday; it is US 51. You will find it in the British document book 10-A on page 104. I want to put one sentence from that document to you again, which hasnot been quoted by the Prosecution, neither in November nor yesterday. It appears under figure "2" and "c". That is document book 10-A, page 104. And there, under figure "2" and "c" there is the following statement -- and I want to add that this is the question of sanctions and the possible preparation of a defense against sanctions in 1935. I quote from "2-c":
"First of all, I prohibit any practice or preparations."
THE PRESIDENT: That is not 10-A, 104.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. Elwyn Jones has just been kind enough to point out to me the English translation. It appears from it that, although I have also got the English translation before me, that there are two documents C-340; one has one page and the other has two. One hasn't got a heading and is dated "Berlin, 25th of October, 1933". In my opinion -
THE PRESIDENT: That is the one on page104?
DR. SIEMERS: No, on page 104 there is, I just heard from Mr. Elwyn Jones, the other document, C 140, which has the heading, "Directive for the Armed Forces in Case of Sanctions."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and the date of it is 25 January 1933?
DR SIEMERS: 25 October, 1935; but that is an error. It is 1933.
MR. ELWYN JONES: There appears to be another document which is not in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Not in the book?
MR. ELWYN JONES: Not in the book.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, perhaps I may point out that the Prosecution have presented the document, the other C 140, US 51. That must be the one I have referred to because it tallies with the record; I mean the record of the session of 27 November. There will be the document to which I have just now referred.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it C 140 or C 141?
DR. SIEMERS: C 140, the same number, and that is the same as USA 51.
Mr. President, perhaps to simplify it, I may later, after today's session, submit the 140 to German and English.
THE PRESIDENT: You can read the document now and you can settle with Mr. Elwyn Jones about the proper notation of the document, whether it should be C 140 or whatever the exhibit number ought to be.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well, sir. BY DR. SIEMERS: the defense against sanctions is mentioned. I shall now read a further sentence to you, and I quote, to begin with, "For the time being, I prohibit all practical preparations." Would it be right, therefore, that in 1933 nothing whatever was prepared by you in the Navy? allowed to be done, in accordance with this order. This is merely a a caution on the Fuehrer's part in the event that the opponent might do anything following his measures.
day in the cross examination your preparations that you were supposed to have made in this connection were held against you.
DR. SIEMERS: I now come to document c 189, which is USA 44. I beg to apologize for troubling the Tribunal in that I am asking them, if possible, to look at the document again. It is contained in document book Raeder No. 10 page 14, and, incidentally, Sir David re-submitted it yesterday. BY DR. SIEMERS: "against Britain". There under Figure 2 it says, "The C. in C. expresses the opinion that later on the fleet must anyhow be developed to oppose England and that, therefore, from 1936 onward, the largest ships must be armed with 35 cm. guns like the "King George" class." Would this mean that in connection with this remark, you were using the plans of Britain in connection with the "King George" class?
THE PRESIDENT: The reference came through wrong. It came through to me 10, page 14. It is not 10, page 14.
DR. SIEMERS: My Lord, I find it on page 66. I beg to apologize. Is my figure correct now? In my English document book it was on page 14, but--
THE PRESIDENT: It is 66 or 68 in my copy.
DR. SIEMERS: And from there, Mr. President, I have just quoted Figure 2.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. BY DR. SIEMERS: that you were considering the 35 cm. guns used in connection with the "King George" class by the British Admiralty? nearly as possible which of the larger calibre of guns was being used by other navies. I said yesterday that, to start with, we would be using the French gunboats as a sample, but later on we discovered that the British went up to 35 cm., and I must rely on figures that were actually existing for a possible war and one always went as high as possible.
Q Would I be right, therefore, If I said that the expression "against Britain" in this connection and grammatically according to German language usage is not correct and that it should have said "with reference to England"?
A Yes, it should have said "with reference to England". I said yesterday that it would be quite contradictory if just before the conclusion of the pact I were to say something like that.
THE PRESIDENT: That was fully gone into in cross examination, and the defendant stated his explanation of the words used. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q From document C 190 Sir David has put something to you. It is the conversation on 2 November 1934 aboard the "Emden" which took place between you an Hitler. He told that you in a conference between you and Goering and Hitler said that he considered the expansion of the navy in the planned manner an absolute life necessity since war could not be conducted unless the navy were to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia. It was said that this should be understood to mean that the navy was planning for a war and was to look after the or imports, and that this was an aggressive plan. Are you of the opinion that the British navy was not planned to safeguard imports to England or for the event of war and was not equipped accordingly?
Q Six submarines are mentioned in this document. Considering that figure may I ask you to tell me the number of submarines that Germany should have in order to conduct an aggressive war? that.
DR. SIEMERS: From a document. Mr. President, which was yesterday submit D 806, I want to quote, apart from the second paragraph which has been quoted, the first paragraph and put it to the witness. It is D 806, GB 462, submitted yesterday toward the middle of the day. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q There it says, "Reference: Submarine Construction Program. On 27 October 1936 decision made regarding the exploitation of the still available U-boat tonnage according to the fleet agreement 1935 and regarding the immediate ordering of new construction of U-41 to U-51."
ines which recording to the fleet agreement of 1935 you were entitled to?
about Austria and Czechoslovakia. Since that subject has been gone into in detail, I shall confind myself to just one question: Hitler? Were you especially asked for your advice in foreign political matters by him? tasks, unless you consider the duties which I had to fulfill in Bulgaria and Hungary after my resignation. intentions of aggression against Czechoslovakia at that time. I think the question ought to be whether there were intentions for an aggressive war.
In connection with that, you have been asked about Goering's threat of bombardment of Prague, and you quite rightly admitted that such a bombing would be a threat. Sir David, of course, cited it as being near to aggressive war, but in order to be quite clear, I want you to tell the Tribunal when you learned of this planned bombing. conversation. I heard no announcement and I knew nothing else of it.
Q So that before the occupation you knew nothing of it? altogether.
DR. SIEMERS: Then there is the document C-100, Mr. President. It was presented yesterday under the number GB-464.
THE PRESIDENT: I have it as No. 463.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon; 463. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q From that document I want to quote to you from page 10. It is page 6 of the attached document. I want to put the following sentence to you. I quote:
"Fuehrer asks whether there were any special wishes of the Navy with reference to bases on Dutch-Belgian Coast. Commander in Chief Navy says no since bases are within reach of British coast and are therefore useless as submarine bases."
Was that your opinion regarding the question?
THE PRESIDENT: Where, exactly, are you reading from? Your pages aren't the same as ours. With reference to the Roman numerals, for instance Sir David quoted from Paragraph IV.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg to apologize, Mr. President, but the German copy is very difficult to read. My copy consists of seven pages, and then there is an attached document regarding the report to the Fuehrer on the 6th of November 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: You have got Roman numerals in it, haven't you? Haven? you got the passage that Sir David read, Paragraph IV?
DR. SIEMERS: I can't see any Roman numerals here, I'm afraid, but I will have a look at the English text.
THE PRESIDENT: It is in the English text. It is on page 5, No. IV:
"Decision of the Fuehrer is made in favor of a western offensive beginning very shortly..." and so on.
DR. SIEMERS: Apparently, Mr. President, Hr. Elwyn Jones is right. He says that the part which I have just been reading wasn't contained in the English translation, but it is part of the photostat copy of the original. The English translation only contains the first part of the document, and not that report to the Fuehrer of November 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better read it then.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. It is Figure 6 of that enclosure:
"Fuehrer asks Commander in Chief Navy whether special wishes of Navy exist regarding bases on Dutch-Belgian coast. Commander in Chief Navy says no, since bases are within reach of the British coase and are therefore useless as submarine bases." BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q According to this, Mr. Witness, you were not in favor of an occupation of Belgian and Dutch bases, nor did you in any way occupy yourself with this question. as the Navy was concerned, could not offer any useful bases since all forces would be within reach of the British.
That is why I was disinterested in Belgium and such places. Oslo Embassy, expressing the view that the danger of a British occupation of Norway was hardly very great, and that such actions were only being taken by Germany.
I have only one question on that. Did the Embassy in Oslo, that is to say Brauer, know the information that Admiral Canaris was supplying to you?
A I can't tell you that on my part. I was never in direct contact with Dr. Brauer, only with the naval attache, but I must add that Dr. Brauer had only been in Oslo for a comparatively short period, and that apparently he wasn't as well informed as he should have been. Also, statements by Norwegian ministers weren't properly appreciated by him.
Q Wasn't there an order from Hitler that the Foreign Office should not be informed regarding plans concerning Norway? Reich Foreign Minister himself was informed very late.
Q In other words, the Ambassador could not have had Canaris' information through military sources.
Q Then there were several documents, D-844 and D-845. It was put to you from those that there was no danger in Scandinavia. Was the information that you received at the time different?
THE PRESIDENT: All this was gone into yesterday, and the witness gave the same answer.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe that the following has to be mentioned though. BY DR. SIEMERS: in the territorial waters off Norway? have taken place a few days earlier.
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing); Dr. Siemers, the only purpose of re-examination is to bring out matters which are favorable to your client which have not been raised in cross examination, that is to say, to explain anything which has not been given in cross examination. He has given his account in cross examination. It is no good putting it to him again in re-examination, We have heard it.
DR. SIEMERS: I think that on this particular point there was one explanation missing. BY DR. SIEMERS: 1936, and how the legal situation regarding submarine warfare would have been influenced, which is a somewhat difficult question, and it is difficult to answer it in two seconds, You have mentioned aircraft. Can't you supplement your statement?
A Yes, because I had forgotten the most important point. At that time there was strong opposition against me, and the important point is that the sighting of ships at sea by aircraft was something quite new and had been developed very efficiently. Location was developed very rapidly during the war, Submarines could very quickly be located and very quickly hunted.
Dietmann, may I, with the Tribunal's permission, make a formal application? In this affidavit, there is the following sentence:
THE PRESIDENT: Dietmann, you mean?
DR. SIEMERS: GB-474
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dietmann's affidavit.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Dietmann's affidavit. There is the sentence, the last sentence which was read yesterday: "It is my personal opinion that the highest formation of the Navy in Kiel and other locations in Germany had knowledge of these dreadful things."
THE PRESIDENT: Had knowledge or must have had? It seems to me it is in the translation "must have had knowledge."
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I haven't got the German and I don't know how the original is worded. I only have the English translation. It isn't quite clear to me how the German version was worded
THE PRESIDENT: Is the document put in/the original Germa or is it put in in the English? The deposition is in German presumably.
DR. SIEMERS: I presume that originally the statement was in German. The copy I have states that this is a translation and of course it is English but I haven't seen the German original.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, there must have been a German copy for the witness yesterday. I don't know whether or not it is the original. I didn't see it but I assume it was.
THE PRESIDENT: It isn't the case that the deposition was made in German, then translated into English and then translated back into German, was it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, that is why I assume it was the original. I am sorry it was made. I haven't got the original document in front of me but I assume that was so. I will find out in a moment for you.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What is the point, Dr. Siemers.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe that this sentence should be struck from the document.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean, you are asking to have it struc out or what?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you have to say, Sir David
SIR DAVID MAXELL FYFE: My Lord, the witness sets out fully the fact in the preceding paragraph of the affidavit and then it is true that he introduces the sentence "By my personal opinion..." but the gist of the statement is that from these fact which I have stated"...the highest formations of the Navy in Kiel and in other places in Germany must have had knowledge of these terrible conditions."---a man who has been working in that detachment of the German navy and knows the communication between that detachment and the headquarters, is in a position to say whether headquarters would have knowledge from the facts he has stated. In his inference, that has a greater probative value than the inference which the Court can draw. The objection to the statement of a matter of opinion is where the witness gives his opinion on a matter on which the court is equally capable of drawing its opinion from the same facts but the importance of that statement is that he is saying "working in the bow and being familiar with the chain of command and communications," and I say that anyone at Kiel must have been able to learn from these facts what was going on at these places -- so that is the narrow point, whether his special knowledge entitles him to express a view which the Court, without that special knowledge, would not be in a position to draw.
THE PRESIDENT: But ought he not theoretically to state all the facts and if he does state all the facts, then the Tribunal will be in the same position as he is to form a judgment and it is for the Tribunal to form the judgment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, that is exactly the point to which I was addressing my argument, that there is an additional fact, that because he was working there, was part of the chain of naval command and he is speaking of the knowledge of the naval command from the point of view of somebody who was work ing in it and therefore he has on that point his opinion as to the sources of knowledge, and the necessity of constructive knowledge is an additional fact.