Military Tribunal, In the matter of:
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just referred again to the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissar Buerkel in July 1939, which outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership following the retirement of Reinthaller. some of the contacts with the Reich Government, that is, the German Government, in the following terms. I quote from page 4 of the English text of that report, and I believe from page 4 of the German text: "In August some further arrests took place . . ."
THE PRESIDENT: Which document are you on?
MR. ALDERMAN: That is the Rainer Report, which is 812-PS.
"In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which were, apart from the Gauleaders (or Gauleiters), also Globocnik and Rainer. Schattenfroh then claimed, because of an Instruction received from the imprisoned Leopold, to have been made deputy country leader. A group led by engineer Raffelsberger had at this time also established connection with departments of the Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, German Racial Agency, etc.) and made an attempt to formulate a political motto in the form of a program for the fighting movement of Austria." a little later in 1936. I quote from page 6 of the English text, and I think page 5 of the German text:
"The principles of the construction of the organization were: The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple manner and without compromise, according to the principle of organizing an elite to be available to the illegal land-party council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal chances should be used without revealing any tics with the illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the illegal party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at the top of the party leadership. All connections with the party in Germany were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the Fuhrer. These said that the German state should officially be omitted from the creation of an Austrian NSDAP; and that auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, etc. should be established in the foreign countries bordering Austria.
"Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer SeyssInquart, who had connection with Dr. Wachter which originated from Seyss-Inquart's support of the July uprising. On the other side Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and especially well-established relations with Christian-Social politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the 'Styrian Heimatschutz' (home defense) and became a party member when the entire 'Styrian Heimatschutz' was incorporated into the NSDAP. Another personality who had a good position in the legal field was Col. Glaise-Horstenau who had contacts with both sides. The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of these two persons."
the Austrian Nazis during this period of keeping quiet and awaiting developments. They were maintaining their secret contacts with Reich officials, and using foreign personalities such as Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart. The Nazis made good use of such figures, who were more discreet in their activities and could be referred to as nationalists. They presented, supported, and obtained consideration of demands which could not be negotiated by other Nazis like Captain Leopold. January 1937, when he was made counsellor of state. But Rainer, describing him as a trustworthy member of the Party through the ranks of this "Styrian Heimatschutz", points him out as one who strongly influenced the agreement of July 11, 1936. The strategic principle of that agreement will be cons idered a little later. Rainer's report, as I have said before, was hardly likely to over-emphasize the significance of Seyss-Inquart's contribution. well to trust Seyss-Inquart is indicated by the next document. I propose to offer in evidence document 2219-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA 62. This is a letter dated 14 July 1939, addressed to Field Marshal Goo ring. The document is a typed carbon copy of the letter. It ends with the Hell Hitler termination, and it is not signed, but we think it was undoubtedly written by the defendant Seyss-Inquart. It was the carbon copy found among Seyss-Inquart's personal files, and such carbon copies kept by authors of letters usually are not signed. On the first page of the letter there appears a note in English, not indicated in the partial English translation, reading, "Air Mail, 15 July, 1515 hours, Berlin, brought to Goering's office". The main text of the letter consists of a pica for intercession in behalf of Muehlmann whose name we shall meet later and who, unfortunately, got into Buerckel's bad graces.
I shall quote the extract part of the document which has been translated into English, and which starts, I believe, on page 7 of the German text:
Sir:
ing: I know that I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final decisions are at stake.
At this time of pro nounced activism (aktivismus) this will certainly be regard ed as a fault in my personality.
Yet I know that I cling That is Greater Germany (Grossdeutschland) and the FUEHRER.
somewhere and ready to go into action. This, after all, was also the development until the year 1938.
Until July December 1931.
I probably would have been an undisputed, I would not have done any more for the union.
I told my use whatever not had he desired.
I told myself that this Austria was worth a mass.
I have stuck to this attitude the Jewny, in short, against everything in Austria.
The doubtedly have led to political annihilation; it would have in the days of March 1933.
I have been fully conscious of able party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness.
I have to him--to Field Marshal Goering.
I think that suffices to effect the aim of Anschluss.
I offer document 2240-PS as Exhibit USA 68.
This document is a letter from Von Papen to Hitler, dated July 27, 1935.
It consists of a report entitl ed "Review and Outlook One Y ear After the Death of Chancellor Dollfuss."
After reviewing the success that the the letter, beginning on page 1 - 146 of the German text:
"National socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian ideology.
If to-day it is contended in Austria that the N.S.D.A.P. is only a centralized Reich German about in a different way.
But when the creation of the people's community in the Reich will be completed, National units beyond the borders.
Spiritual progress in regard to tendency.
If this recognition would one and for all be the New Austria.
A Nurnberg Party Day designated as "The German Day" as in old times and the proclamation of a national socialistic peoples' front, would be a stirring event for all beyond the borders of the Reich.
Such attacks pamphlet about the "Anschlusss": The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not be at all.
National Socialism must win it or it will perish, if it is unable to solve this task' Germans outside the border of Germany.
Von Papen was work Austria.
The German Government did more than keep up a groups.
It employed the psychological inducement of providing assurances that it had no designs on Austrian independence. If Austria could find hope for the execution of those assurances, she could find her way clear to the granting of concessions and obtain relief from the economic and internal measures.
I offer Document 2247-PS in evidence as Exhibit USA 64. It is a letter from Von Papen while in Berlin to Hitler, dated Hay 17, 1935.
Von Papen's letter indicated to Hitler that a forthright, credible statement by Germany, reassuring Austria, would be most useful for German diplomatic purposes and for the improvement of relationships between Austria and German groups in Austria. forces against Starhemberg, the Vice-Chancellor of Austria, who was backed by Mussolini. He hoped to persuade Schuschnigg to ally his forces with the NSDAP in order to emerge victorious ever Starhemberg. Von Papen indicates that he obtained this idea from Captain Leopold, leader of the illegal National Socialists in Austria. second page.
This is Von Papen writing to "Mein Fuehrer", Hitler.
"I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg and his Christian-Social forces, who are opposed to a home front dictatorship, against Starhemberg. The possibility of thwarting the measures arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should be afforded him, in such a way that he would submit the offer to the government of a definite German-Austrian compromise of interests. According to the convincing opinion of the Leader of the NSDAP in Austria, Captain Leopold, the totalitarian principle of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the beginning by a combination of that part of the Christian elements which favors the Greater Germany ideas and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes the national independence of Austria and guarantees full freedome to the Austrian national opposition, then as a result of such a compromise the Austrian government would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of these forces. A further consequence of this step would be the possibility of the participation of Germany in the Danube Pact, which would take the sting out of its acuteness due to the settlement of relations between Germany and Austria. Such a measure would have a most beneficial influence on the European situation and especially on our relationship with England. One may object, that Mr. Schuschnigg will hardly be determined to follow such a pattern, that he will rather in all probability immediately communicate our offer to our opponents.
Of course, one should first of all explore the possibility of setting Schuschnigg against Starhemberg through the use of "go betweens". The possibility exists. If Mr. Schuschnigg finally says "no" and makes our offer known in Rome, then the situation would not be any worse, but, on the contrary, the efforts of the Reich government to make peace with Austria would be revealed -- without prejudice to other interests. Therefore, even in the case of refusal this last attempt would be an asset. I consider it completely possible, that in view of the farspread dislike of the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian course and in view of the sharp tensions within the federal government (that is Bundersreigierung), Mr. Schuschnigg will grasp this last straw -always under the supposition that the offer could not be interpreted as a trap by the opponents, but that it boars all the mark of an actually honest compromise with Austria. Assuming success of this stop, we would again establish our active intervention in Central European politics, which, as opposed to the French-Czech and Russian political maneuvers, would be a tremendous success, both morally and practically. Since there are two weeks left to accomplish very much work in the way of explorations and Conferences, an immediate decision is necessary. The Reich Army Minister (Reichswehrminister) shares the opinion presented above and the Reich Foreign Minister (Reichsaussenminister) wanted to discuss it with you my Fuehrer.
"Signed, Papen." of Austria's independence. As he put it, Germany had nothing to lose, with what it could always call a more effort at peace and she might be able to convince Schuschnigg to establish an Austrian coalition government, with the NSDAP. If she did this, she would vastly strengthen her position in Europe. Finally Papen urged haste. to von Papen's suggestion, and assorted: "Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an Anschluss."
The British will present a document covering that speech. I merely wanted to use one sentence at this point. It is a sentence quite well-known to history. and to note that for a complexity of reasons, Papen suggested and Hitler announced a policy completely at variance with their intentions, which had been, and continued to be, to interfere in Austria's internal affairs and to conclude an Anschluss. statement that "tomorrow or the day after" Germany would fall upon Austria. I invite the Court's attention to the version appearing in the "Volkische Beobachter SD," that is South Germany, 2 to 3 May 1936, page 2, and translated in our document 2367-PS. notice of that statement, in that well-known speech.
misleading sense, that is, that he would not actually fall upon Austria "tomorrow or the day after tomorrow." For the conspirators well knew that the successful execution of their purpose required for a while longer the quiet policy they had been pursuing in Austria. between Ambassador Bullitt and the defendant, von Neurath, on 18 May, 1936. This document unfortunately again appears in your document books in German, as due to an error, it has not been mimeographed in English. German counsel have the German copies. reading in German, a marked copy of a German translation.
"I called on von Neurath, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on May 18 and had a long talk on the general European situation."
"Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until the Rhineland had been digested. He explained that he meant that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French and Belgium frontiers, the German Government would do everything possible to prevent, rather than encourage, an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia.
"Quoting: 'As soon as our fortifications are constructed, and the countries of Central Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory at will, all those countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop,' he said."
"Von Neurath then stated that no understanding had been reached between Germany and Italy and admitted that the demonstrations of friendship between Germany and Italy were mere demonstrations without basis in reality. He went on to say that at the present time he could see no way to reconcile there were three chief reasons why the German Government was urging the the conflicting interests of Germany and Italy in Austria.
He said that Austrian Nazis to remain quiet at the present time:
"The first was that Mussolini had today, the greater part of his Army mobilized on the Austrian border, ready to strike and that he would certainly strike if he should have a good excuse.
"The second reason for urging Austrian Nazis to remain quiet for the present was that the Nazi movement was growing stronger daily in Austria. The youth of Austria was turning more and more towards the Nazis and the dominance of the Nazi Party in Austria was inevitable and only a question of time.
"The third reason was that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French border, an involvement of Germany in war with Italy might lead to a French attack on Germany." diplomatic position was vastly improved over 1934, a fact which influenced Austria's willingness to make concessions to Germany and come to terms. English text; that is document 1760 PS.
"Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave Germany an opportunity to take more positive stops in the direction of the Nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given Austria assurance of support of the most definite character against external German regression, and on one occasion by mobilizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German aggressive action, which had been planned against Austria, embarked on her Abyssinian adventure. This and the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in Europe. It is quite obvious that after Italy had launched her Abyssinian adventure, she was no longer in any position to counter German aggressive moves against Austria."
there were three chief reasons why the German Government was urging the the conflicting interests of Germany and Italy in Austria.
He said that Austrian Nazis to remain quiet at the present time:
"The first was that Mussolini had today, the greater part of his Army mobilized on the Austrian border, ready to strike and that he would certainly strike if he should have a good excuse.
"The second reason for urging Austrian Nazis to remain quiet for the present was that the Nazi movement was growing stronger daily in Austria. The youth of Austria was turning more and more towards the Nazis and the dominance of the Nazi Party in Austria was inevitable and only a question of time.
"The third reason was that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French border, an involvement of Germany in war with Italy might lead to a French attack on Germany." diplomatic position was vastly improved over 1934, a fact which influenced Austria's willingness to make concessions to Germany and come to terms. English text; that is document 1760 PS.
"Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave Germany an opportunity to take more positive stops in the direction of the Nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given Austria assurance of support of the most definite character against external German regression, and on one occasion by mobilizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German aggressive action, which had been planned against Austria, embarked on her Abyssinian adventure. This and the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in Europe. It is quite obvious that after Italy had launched her Abyssinian adventure, she was no longer in any position to counter German aggressive moves against Austria."
This weakening of Austria helped to pave the way for the Pact of July 11, 1936. On July 11, 1936, the Governments of Austria and Germany concluded an accord. That will be offered in evidence also by the British Delegation. of the fact that such an accord was entered into. The formal part of the agreement of July 11, 1936, will also be proved by our British colleagues. For convenient reference, it will be found in the document which the British will offer, TC-22, and the substance of it is also contained on pages 11 and 12 of Mr. Messersmith's affidavit, 1760-PS. a great triumph for Austria. It contains a confusing provision to the effect that Austria in its policy, especially with regard to Germany, would regard herself as a German state, but the other two provisions clearly state that Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of Austria and that it regards the inner political order of Austria, including the question of Austria and National Socialism, as an internal concern of Austria upon which it, Germany, will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence. But there was much more substance to today's events than appears in the text of the accord. I refer to Mr. Messersmith's summary as set forth on page 12 of his affidavit, 1760-PS, as follows:
"Even more important than the terms of the agreement published in the official communique, was the contemporaneous informal understanding, the most important provisions of which were that Austria would: (1) Appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor's confidence but friendly to Germany, to positions in the Cabinet: (2) with the devised means to give the National opposition a role in the political life of Austria within the framework of the Patriotic Front; and (3) with amnesty for all Nazis, save those convicted of the most serious offenses." This amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of Deutsche Nazionale into the Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment of Justice Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and of Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without portfolio.
by Kurt von Schuschnigg, Foreign Chancellor of Austria, executed at Nurnberg, Germany, on 19 November, 1945. I offer this as Exhibit USA 66. The Defendants have received German translations of that evidence.
MR. LATERNSER: (Defense Counsel) In the name of the accused, Seyss-Inquart, I should like to protest against the production of the written evidence by the witness, Schuschnigg, and for the following reasons: Today, when the resolution was announced, in respect of the use to be made of the written evidence of Mr. Messersmith, the Court was of the opinion that in a case of very great importance, that possibly it would take a different view of the matter. In respect of the Austrian conflict, for which Schuschnigg is the most important witness, it was the witness who at the time of his office of Federal Chancellor was affected. As it is a case of such an important witness, the principle of direct evidence must be adhered to in order that the Court is in a position to ascertain the actual truth in this case. The accused and his Defense Counsel would feel prejudiced in his defense. I must, therefore, keep to this viewpoint as it is to be assumed that the witness, von Schuschnigg, will be able to confirm certain facts which are in favor of the accused, Seyss-Inquart. that the written evidence of the witness, von Schuschnigg, be not admitted.
THE PRESIDENT: If you have finished, the Tribunal will hear Mr. Alderman.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, at this point I am simply proposing to offer this affidavit for the purpose of showing the terms of the secret understanding between the German and Austrian Governments in connection with this accord.
It is not for any purpose to incriminate the Defendant, Seyss-Inquart, that it is being offered at this point.
MR. LATERNSER: May I add to my application that the witness, von Schuschnigg, on the 19 of November, 1945, was heard in Nurnberg and that if an interrogation on the 19 of November was possible, that such a short time later it ought to be possible, especially as the interrogation before this Court is of especial importance to the accused.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess now to consider this question.
(Whereupon, at 1515 a short recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the objection to the affidavit of Schuschnigg and upholds the objection. apply to do so. Equally the defense, if they wish to call Schuschnigg as a witness, can apply to do so. In the event of Schuschnigg not being able to be produced the question of affidavit-evidence by Schuschnigg being given will be reconsidered.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, in view of the strategy and tactics of the Nazis' concessions as indicated in the portion of the Messersmith affidavit that I read, substantial concessions were made by Austria to obtain Germany's diplomatic formal assurance of Austrian independence and non-intervention in Austrian external affairs. and as Mr. Messersmith pointed out in 1934 dispatch to the United States State Department quoted on pages twelve to thirteen of his affidavit:
"Any prospect that the National Socialists might come to power would make it more difficult to obtain effective police and judicial action against the Nazis for fear of reprisals by the future Nazi Government against those taking action against Nazis even in the line of duty. The preservation of external peace in Austria was less independent upon Germany's living up to its obligation under the accord.
Next, Germany's continuing program of weakening the Austrian Government. In the pact of 11 July 1936 Germany agreed not to influence directly or indirectly the external affairs of Austria, including the matter of Austrian National Socialism. I quote from Document 812-PS, which is exhibit U.S.A. 61, the report of Gauleiter Reiner to Commissioner Buerckel, all of which was forwarded to the defendant Seyss-Inquart at page six of the English and I believe also page six of the German version.
"At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian National Socialists should do.
Meanwhile Hinterleitner was arrested, and Doctor Rainer became his successor and leader of the Austrian party. On 16 July 1936 Doctor Rainer and Globocnik visited the Fuehrer at the Obersalzburg where they received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Fuehrer. On 17 July 1936 all illegal Gauleiters met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions for carrying out the fight. At this same conference the Gauleiters received organizational instructions from Globocnik and Hiedler."
I am skipping a paragraph in the German version. "Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Fuehrer named Lt. Gen. (Gruppenfuehrer) Keppler as chief of the mixed commission which was appointed, in accordance with the state treaty of 11 July 1936, to supervise the correct execution of the agreement. At the same time Keppler was given full authority by the Fuehrer for the party in Austria. After Keppler was unsuccessful in his efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked together with Doctor Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaller as leader of the peasants, Kaltenbrunner (that is the defendant Kaltenbrunner in this case) as leader of the SS, and Doctor Jury as deputyleader of the Austrian party, as well as with Glaise-Herstenau and Seyss-Inquart."
A new strategy was developed for the Austrian Nazis. Mr. Messersmith describes briefly--and I quote from page thirteen of his affidavit, 1760-PS: "The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded happenings." Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under the leadership of a certain Captain Leopold who it was known definitely was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program was now to form an organization through which the Nazis could carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in Austria. There are several organizations which had a legal basis, but which were simply a device by which the Nazis in Austria could organize and later seek inclusion as a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was the Ostmarkische Verein, the Union of the East Mark, the sponsor of which was the Minister of the Interior, Glaise-Horstenau. Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau and pro-Nazi Neustadter Stuermer, this organization was declared legal by the court.