corraborated by a report of one of the Austrian Nazis. It contains three parts. First, there is a letter dated August 22, 1939 from Mr. Rainer, then Gauleiter at Salzburg, to the defendant SeyssInquart, then Austrian Reich Minister. That letter encloses a letter dated July 6, 1939, written by Mr. Rainer to Reich Commissar, Gauleiter Josef Buerckel.
DR. LATERNSER: (Attorney for the defendant Seyss-Inquart): I object to the presentation of the letters contained in document No. 812. Of course, I cannot object to the presentation of this evidence to the extent that this evidence is to prove that these letters were actually written. However, if these letters are to serve as proof for the correctness of their contents, then I must object to the use of these letters, for the following reason. Particularly, the third document is a letter which, as is manifest from its contents, has a particular bias, for this reason, that in this letter it is explained to what extent the Austrian Nazi Party participated in the Anschluss. letter cannot serve as proof for the facts brought forth in it, particularly since the witness Rainer, who wrote this letter, is available as a witness and, as we have discovered, is at present in Nurnberg. to prove the correctness of its contents, because the witness who can testify to that is, at the present time, in Nurnberg.
THE PRESIDENT : The Tribunal will hear Mr. Alderman in answer to what has been said.
Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal has not as yet read the letter.
MR. ALDERMAN: No. I think perhaps it would be better to read the letter before we argue about the significance of its contents.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, are you relying Upon the letter as evidence of the facts stated in it?
DR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Who is the letter from, and who is it to?
MR. ALDERMAN: The first letter is from one Mr. Rainer who was, at that time, Gauleiter at Salsburg, to the defendant Seyss-Inquart -
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: -- then Reich Minister of Austria. to Reich Commissar and Gauleiter Josef Buerckel. In that letter, in turn, Rainer enclosed a report on the events in the NSDAP of Austria from 1933 to March 11, 1938, the day before the invasion of Austria. to bring to the attention of the Tribunal before it passes upon the admissibility.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think that the defendant's counsel is really challenging the admissibility of the document; it is the contents of the document.
MR. ALDERMEN: Yes. On that, in the first place, we are advised by defendant's counsel that this man Rainer is in Nurnberg. I would assume he is there. these communications is the truth. However, it seems to us that the communications themselves, as contemporaneous reports by a Party officer at the time, are much more probated evidence than anything that he might testify before you today.
DR. LATERNSER: I have already said that this letter has those characteristics, that it is biased.
that it tends to emphasize and decorate the participation of the Austrian Nazi party on the Anschluss. Therefore, I must object to the use of this letter as objective evidence, that it was not written with the thought in mind that the letter would be used as evidence before a court. If he had known that, the letter undoubtedly would have been formulated differently.
I believe that the witness is in Nurnberg. In that case -- a principle which is a basis for all trial procedure -- the witness should be presented to the Court personally, particularly since, in this case, the difficulties that pertain to the question of Messersmith do not here pertain.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that the letters are admissible. They were written to and received by the defendant Seyss-Inquart. The defendant can challenge the contents of the letters by his evidence. ant to apply to the Tribunal for leave to call Rainer in due course. He can then challenge the contents of these letters, both by the defendant Seyss-Inquart's evidence and by Rainer's evidence. The letters themsleves are admitted.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I agree quite fully with the statement that if it had been known that these letters were to be offered in evidence in a court of justice, they very probably would have been differently written. That applies to a great part of the evidence that we shall offer in this case. And I would say that if the photographer who took the photograph of the Memorial Plaque had known that his photographs would be introduced in evidence in a conspiracy case, he probably never would have snapped the shutter. to prepare a short history of the role of the Party. Perhaps I had better read the covering letter, addressed to the defendant SeyssInquart:
"Dear Dr. Seyss:
"I have received your letter of 19 August, 1939, in which you asked me to inform you what I know of those matters which, among others, are the subject of your correspondence with Buerckel.
"I do not wish to discuss sundry talks and all that, what has been brought to my notice in the course of time by different people. I wish to clarify essentially my own attitude.
"On the 5th of July, 1939, I was asked by telephone by the Reich Commissioner Gauleiter Buerckel if I was in possession of the memorandum of Globus regarding the events of March. I told him that I do not have this memorandum and that I never possessed a single part of it, that I furthermore, did not then participate in the matter and do not know its content. Because of official requests by Buerckel, I have entrusted him with a report accompanied by a letter written on the 6th July.
"If Buerckel now writes to you that certain statements were confirmed by me, I feel obliged to entrust you with a copy each of my copies of those two documents, which were only written in single originals. I shall specially inform Buerckel of this. I connect this with the declaration, that I have given -- apart from those written explanations -- no confirmations, declarations, or criticisms whatsoever regarding you and your attitude and that I have authorized nobody to refer to any statements of mine.
"Since the beginning of our collaboration I have always expressed and represented forcefully my ideas regarding yourself and my opinion of your personality. This conception of mine was the very basis of our collaboration. The events of February and March have not changed this, especially since considered the political success of the 11th March merely as a confirmation of the intentions and convictions which have equally induced both of us to collaborate.
"As far as Globus is concerned, you are fully aware of his species, which I judged always and in every situation only by its good side. I believe that you have already talked to Globus about the occurrences between the 11th of March 1938 and today; and I am convinced that he will tell you everything that is bothering him, if you will speak to him about this matter, as is your intention.
"With best regards and Heil Hitler!
"Yours, Friedl Rainer." to show that the Party as a whole is entitled to the glory which is excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart. to Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel:
"We saw in March and April how a false picture about the actual leadership conditions developed from this fact which could not be corrected in spite of our attempts to that effect. This was an important factor for the varying moods of Globocnik who hoped especially from you that you would emphasize for Hitler and also for the public the role of the party during the events preceding 12 March 1938. I limited myself to address this verbal and written declaration to party member Hess, and furthermore to secure the documents from the March days. In addition, I spoke at every available opportunity about the fight of the party. I did not undertake steps to give just credit to other persons for the glory which was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart; and I would not do that, primarily because I appear as a beneficiary, and furthermore, because I believe that I would not gladden Hitler by doing so. I am also convinced that Dr. Seyss-Inquart did not act crookedly, and furthermore that Hitler does not want to commit an act of historical justice by special preference to his person, but that he is attracted to him personally. It really is of no great account to Hitler if this or that person was more or less meritorious, in this sector of the great fight of the movement.
Because, in the last analysis, by far the greatest part is to be ascribed only to him; he alone will be considered by history as the liberator of Austria. I, therefore, considered it best to accept existing conditions and look for new fertile fields of endeavor in the party.
"If I should be asked to describe -- without personal interest -the role of the party according to my best conviction, I am ready to do so at any time. For this reason I promised yesterday to submit to you again a short summary, and to make it available for your confidential use. Of this letter and of this abbreviated description I retain the sole copy.
"Heil Hitler! Rainer." Seyss-Inquart, and he is fixed with knowledge of the contents of all of them. notice, that Seyss-Inquart was the original Quisling. It so happened that the Norwegian Seyss-Inquart gave his name to posterity as a meaningful name, but all Quislings are alike. likely to be tendentious, as counsel says, or to be prejudiced in favor of the defendant Seyss-Inquart's contribution to the Anschluss. It tends, on the contrary, to show that Seyss-Inquart was not quite so important as he might have thought he was. Even so, Rainer gives Seyss-Inquart credit enough. Party in Austria and of its reconstruction. I now quote the second and third paragraphs of the report, appearing on pages 3 and 4 of the English text of 812-PS, which is United States Exhibit 61; and I believe it is on pages 1 and 2 of the original German of the report of Bericht, which is the third part of the document:
"Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with the July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was right, the execution of it was faulty. The result was a complete destruction of the organization; the loss of entire groups of fighters through imprisonment or flight into the 'Alt-Reich';"-the old kingdom-- "and with regard to the political relationship of Germany to Austria, a formal acknowledgment of the existence of the Austrian State by the German Government. With the telegram to Papen, instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships between the two States, the Fuehrer had liquidated the first stage of the battle; and a new method of political penetration was to begin. By order of the Fuehrer the Landesleitung Munich was dissolved, and the party in Austria was left to its own resources.
"There was no acknowledged leader for the entire party in Austria. Now leaderships were forming in the nine Gaus. The process was again and again interrupted by the interference of the police; there was no liaison between the formations, and frequently there were two, three or more rival leaderships. The first evident, acknowledged speaker of almost all the Gaus in Autumn 1934 was engineer Reinthaller (already appointed Landesbauernfuehrer-- leader of the country's farmers-- by Hess). He endeavoured to bring about a political appeasement by negotiations with the Government, with the purpose of giving the NSDAP legal status again, thus permitting its political activities. Simultaneously, Reinthaller started the reconstruction of the illegal political organization, at the head of which he had placed engineer Neubacher." including the defendant von Papen, and the Austrian Nazis; the use by the Austrian Nazis of front personalities. Organization in Austria which should be borne in mind.
Austrian Nazis adrift--as indicated in the document I have just read--in fact, as we shall show, German officials, including von Papen, maintained secret contact with the Austrian Nazis in line with Hitler's desires. German officials consulted and gave advice and support to the organization of the Austrian Nazis. organization in Austria, organizing for the eventual use of force in a so-called emergency. But, in the meantime they deemed it expedient to act behind front personalities, such as the defendant Seyss-Inquart, who had no apparent taint of illegality in his status in Austria.
Mr. Messersmith relates, in his affidavit, that he got hold of a copy of a document outlining this Nazi program. I quote from page 8 of document 1760-PS, our serial number USA-57, the following:
"For two years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria, Very few terroristic acts occurred during the remainder of 1934 and, as I recall, in 1935, and most of 1936; this inactivity was in accordance with directives from Berlin as direct evidence to that effect, which came to my knowledge at that time, proved. Early in January, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a document which I considered accurate in all respects, and which stated "--quoting from that document:
"The German Minister here, von Papen, on the occasion of his last visit to Berlin, was received three times by Chancellor Hitler for fairly long conversations, and he also took this opportunity to call on Schacht and von Neurath. In these conversations the following instructions were given to him:
"During the next two years nothing can be undertaken which will give Germany external political difficulties. On this ground, everything must be avoided which could awaken the appearance of Germany interfering in the internal affairs of Austria. Chancellor Hitler will, therefore, also for this reason, not endeavor to intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis in the National Socialist Party in Austria, although he is convinced that order could be brought into the Party at once through a word from him. This word, however, he will, for foreign political reasons, give all the less, as he is convinced that the, for him, desirable ends may be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor Hitler declared to the German Minister here, this does not indicate any disinterestedness in the idea of Austria's independence. Also, before everything, Germany cannot for the present withdraw Party members in Austria, and must, therefore, in spite of the very real exchange difficulties, make every effort to bring help to the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria.
"As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht finally gave the authorization that from then on 200,000 marks a month were to be set aside for this end (support of National Socialists in Austria). The control and the supervision of this monthly sum was to be entrusted to Engineer Reinthaler, who, through the fact that he alone had control over the money, would have a definite influence on the Party followers.
In this way it would be possible to end most quickly and most easily the prevailing difficulties and divisions in the Austrian National Socialist Party.
"The hope was also expressed to Herr von Papen that the recently authorized foundation of German 'Ortsgruppen' of the National Socialist Party in Austria (made up of German citizens in Austria) would be so arranged as not to give the appearance that Germany is planning to interfere in Austrian internal affairs." 1939 outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership squabbles following the retirement of Reinthaler.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think this would be a convenient time to break off until 2 o'clock?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn, then.
(Whereupon at 1245 hours the Tribunal was adjourned, to reconvene at 1400 hours on the same day.)
Military Tribunal, In the matter of:
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just referred again to the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissar Buerkel in July 1939, which outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership following the retirement of Reinthaller. some of the contacts with the Reich Government, that is, the German Government, in the following terms. I quote from page 4 of the English text of that report, and I believe from page 4 of the German text: "In August some further arrests took place . . ."
THE PRESIDENT: Which document are you on?
MR. ALDERMAN: That is the Rainer Report, which is 812-PS.
"In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which were, apart from the Gauleaders (or Gauleiters), also Globocnik and Rainer. Schattenfroh then claimed, because of an Instruction received from the imprisoned Leopold, to have been made deputy country leader. A group led by engineer Raffelsberger had at this time also established connection with departments of the Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, German Racial Agency, etc.) and made an attempt to formulate a political motto in the form of a program for the fighting movement of Austria." a little later in 1936. I quote from page 6 of the English text, and I think page 5 of the German text:
"The principles of the construction of the organization were: The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple manner and without compromise, according to the principle of organizing an elite to be available to the illegal land-party council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal chances should be used without revealing any tics with the illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the illegal party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at the top of the party leadership. All connections with the party in Germany were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the Fuhrer. These said that the German state should officially be omitted from the creation of an Austrian NSDAP; and that auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, etc. should be established in the foreign countries bordering Austria.
"Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer SeyssInquart, who had connection with Dr. Wachter which originated from Seyss-Inquart's support of the July uprising. On the other side Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and especially well-established relations with Christian-Social politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the 'Styrian Heimatschutz' (home defense) and became a party member when the entire 'Styrian Heimatschutz' was incorporated into the NSDAP. Another personality who had a good position in the legal field was Col. Glaise-Horstenau who had contacts with both sides. The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of these two persons."
the Austrian Nazis during this period of keeping quiet and awaiting developments. They were maintaining their secret contacts with Reich officials, and using foreign personalities such as Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart. The Nazis made good use of such figures, who were more discreet in their activities and could be referred to as nationalists. They presented, supported, and obtained consideration of demands which could not be negotiated by other Nazis like Captain Leopold. January 1937, when he was made counsellor of state. But Rainer, describing him as a trustworthy member of the Party through the ranks of this "Styrian Heimatschutz", points him out as one who strongly influenced the agreement of July 11, 1936. The strategic principle of that agreement will be cons idered a little later. Rainer's report, as I have said before, was hardly likely to over-emphasize the significance of Seyss-Inquart's contribution. well to trust Seyss-Inquart is indicated by the next document. I propose to offer in evidence document 2219-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA 62. This is a letter dated 14 July 1939, addressed to Field Marshal Goo ring. The document is a typed carbon copy of the letter. It ends with the Hell Hitler termination, and it is not signed, but we think it was undoubtedly written by the defendant Seyss-Inquart. It was the carbon copy found among Seyss-Inquart's personal files, and such carbon copies kept by authors of letters usually are not signed. On the first page of the letter there appears a note in English, not indicated in the partial English translation, reading, "Air Mail, 15 July, 1515 hours, Berlin, brought to Goering's office". The main text of the letter consists of a pica for intercession in behalf of Muehlmann whose name we shall meet later and who, unfortunately, got into Buerckel's bad graces.
I shall quote the extract part of the document which has been translated into English, and which starts, I believe, on page 7 of the German text:
Sir:
ing: I know that I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final decisions are at stake.
At this time of pro nounced activism (aktivismus) this will certainly be regard ed as a fault in my personality.
Yet I know that I cling That is Greater Germany (Grossdeutschland) and the FUEHRER.
somewhere and ready to go into action. This, after all, was also the development until the year 1938.
Until July December 1931.
I probably would have been an undisputed, I would not have done any more for the union.
I told my use whatever not had he desired.
I told myself that this Austria was worth a mass.
I have stuck to this attitude the Jewny, in short, against everything in Austria.
The doubtedly have led to political annihilation; it would have in the days of March 1933.
I have been fully conscious of able party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness.
I have to him--to Field Marshal Goering.
I think that suffices to effect the aim of Anschluss.
I offer document 2240-PS as Exhibit USA 68.
This document is a letter from Von Papen to Hitler, dated July 27, 1935.
It consists of a report entitl ed "Review and Outlook One Y ear After the Death of Chancellor Dollfuss."
After reviewing the success that the the letter, beginning on page 1 - 146 of the German text:
"National socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian ideology.
If to-day it is contended in Austria that the N.S.D.A.P. is only a centralized Reich German about in a different way.
But when the creation of the people's community in the Reich will be completed, National units beyond the borders.
Spiritual progress in regard to tendency.
If this recognition would one and for all be the New Austria.
A Nurnberg Party Day designated as "The German Day" as in old times and the proclamation of a national socialistic peoples' front, would be a stirring event for all beyond the borders of the Reich.
Such attacks pamphlet about the "Anschlusss": The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not be at all.
National Socialism must win it or it will perish, if it is unable to solve this task' Germans outside the border of Germany.
Von Papen was work Austria.
The German Government did more than keep up a groups.
It employed the psychological inducement of providing assurances that it had no designs on Austrian independence. If Austria could find hope for the execution of those assurances, she could find her way clear to the granting of concessions and obtain relief from the economic and internal measures.
I offer Document 2247-PS in evidence as Exhibit USA 64. It is a letter from Von Papen while in Berlin to Hitler, dated Hay 17, 1935.
Von Papen's letter indicated to Hitler that a forthright, credible statement by Germany, reassuring Austria, would be most useful for German diplomatic purposes and for the improvement of relationships between Austria and German groups in Austria. forces against Starhemberg, the Vice-Chancellor of Austria, who was backed by Mussolini. He hoped to persuade Schuschnigg to ally his forces with the NSDAP in order to emerge victorious ever Starhemberg. Von Papen indicates that he obtained this idea from Captain Leopold, leader of the illegal National Socialists in Austria. second page.
This is Von Papen writing to "Mein Fuehrer", Hitler.
"I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg and his Christian-Social forces, who are opposed to a home front dictatorship, against Starhemberg. The possibility of thwarting the measures arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should be afforded him, in such a way that he would submit the offer to the government of a definite German-Austrian compromise of interests. According to the convincing opinion of the Leader of the NSDAP in Austria, Captain Leopold, the totalitarian principle of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the beginning by a combination of that part of the Christian elements which favors the Greater Germany ideas and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes the national independence of Austria and guarantees full freedome to the Austrian national opposition, then as a result of such a compromise the Austrian government would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of these forces. A further consequence of this step would be the possibility of the participation of Germany in the Danube Pact, which would take the sting out of its acuteness due to the settlement of relations between Germany and Austria. Such a measure would have a most beneficial influence on the European situation and especially on our relationship with England. One may object, that Mr. Schuschnigg will hardly be determined to follow such a pattern, that he will rather in all probability immediately communicate our offer to our opponents.