The marchers were met at the Chancellery by Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart, who addressed them and unveiled a memorial cabinet from the Reichsstatthalterei, the Standarte. That is the SS organization which made the original attack and which marched on this occasion four years later. From the Reichsstatthalterei the Standarte marched from the Old Reich Broadcasting Center, from which false news of the resignation of Dolfus has been broadcast, and there unveiled a second memorial tablet. Steinhausen, the present police president of Vienna, is a member of the SS Standarte 89." please, today is rubble, like so much of Nuernberg, but we found a photograph of it in the National Library in Vienna. I should like to offer that photograph in evidence, taken on this occasion four years later, the Nazi wreath encircling the plaque, the memorial tablet, and with a large wreath of flowers with a very distinct Swastika Nazi symbol laid before the wreath. I offer that photograph in evidence, identified as our 2968-PS. I offer it as Exhibit USA 60. You will find that in the document book, and I know of no more interesting or shocking document that you could look at. We call that murder by ratification, celebrating a murder four years later. erected to celebrate this sinister occasion reads: "One hundred fifty-four German men of the 89th SS Standarte stood up here for Germany on July 26, 1934. Seven found dead at the hands of the hangman." The Tribunal may notice that the number 154 at the top of the plaque is concealed in the photograph by the Nazi wreath surrounding the plaque.
I must confess that I find myself curiously interested in this tablet and in the photograph which was taken and carefully filed. The words chosen for this marble tablet, and surely we can presume that they were words chosen carefully, tell us clearly that the men involved were not more malcontent Austrian revolutionaries, but were regarded as German men, were members of a prior military organization, and stood up here for Germany. In 1934 Hitler repudiated Doctor Reiss because he dragged the German Reich into an internal Austrian affair without any reason. In 1938 Nazi Germany proudly identified itself with this murder, took credit for it,and took responsibility for it. Further proof in the conventional sense, it seems to us, is hardly necessary. 1936. In considering the activities of the Nazi conspirators in Austria between July 25, 1934 and November 1937, there is a distinct and immediate point, the act of July 11, 1936. Accordingly, I shall first review developments in the two year period, July 1934 to July 1936.
First, the continued aim of eliminating Austria's independence, with particular relation to the defendant von Papen's conversation and activity. The first point that should be mentioned is this. The Nazi conspirators pretended to respect the independence and sovereignty of Austria, notwithstanding the aim of Anschluss stated in Mein Kampf. But in truth and in fact they were working from the very beginning to destroy the Austrian State. von Papen in this regard is provided in Mr. Messersmith's affidavit from which I have already quoted, and I quote now from Page 9 of the English copy, the second paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number?
MR. ALDERMAN: 1760-PS, USA 57.
"That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was confirmed to me by Franz von Papen when he arrived in Vienna as German Minister. It will be recalled that he accepted this assignment as German Minister even though he know that he had been marked for execution in the St. Bartholomew's massacre on June 30, 1934. When, in accordance with protocol, he paid me a visit shortly after his arrival in Vienna, I determined that during this call there would be no reference to anything of importance, and I limited the conversation strictly to platitudes which I was able to do as he was calling on me in my office.
I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for several weeks in order to make it clear to von Papen that I had no sympathy with and on the other hand was familiar with the objectives of his mission in Austria. When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted me with 'Now you are in my Legation and I can control the conversation.'
"In the baldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the borders of Turkey, was Germany's natural hinterland, and that he had been charged with the mission of facilitating German economic and political control over all this region for Germany. He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the other states to the South and South East. He said that he intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end. He said that he was telling me this because the German Government was bound on this objective of getting this control of Southeastern Europe and there was nothing which could stop it, and that our own policy and that of France and England was not realistic.
"The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say, and of course I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless shocked to have him speak so baldly to me, and when he finished I got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely smiled and said, of course this conversation was between us and that he would, of course, not be talking to others so clearly about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives."
the last paragraph at the bottom of the page:
"On the surface, however, German activities consisted principally of efforts to win the support of prominent and influential men through insidious efforts of all kinds, including the use of the German Diplomatic Mission in Vienna and its facilities and personnel.
"Von Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and on a lavish scale. He approached almost every member of the Austrian Cabinet, telling them, as several of them later informed me, that Germany was bound to prevail in the long run, and that they should join the winning side if they wished to enjoy positions of power and influence under German control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave solemn assurance that Germany would respect Austrian independence and that all that she wished to do was to get rid of elements in the Austrian Government like the Chancellor, Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr and others, and replace them by a few 'nationally-minded' Austrians, which of course meant Nazis. The whole basic effort of von Papen was to bring about Anschluss.
"In early 1935, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, informed me that in the course of a conversation with von Papen, the latter had remarked 'Yes, you have your French and English friends now and you can have your independence a little longer.' The Foreign Minister, of course, told me this remark in German, but the foregoing is an accurate translation. The Foreign Minister told me that he had replied to von Papen 'I am glad to have from your own lips your own opinion which agrees with what your chief has just said in the Saar and which you have taken such pains to deny.' Von Papen appeared to be terribly upset when he realized just what he had said and tried to cover his statements, but according to Berger-Waldenegg, kept constantly getting into deeper water.
"Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some successes, particularly with men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long favored the "Grossdeutschum" idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly disturbed by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience or scruple, von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his wife as ardent and devout Catholics to overcome the fears of these Austrians in this respect."
May I inquire if the Court expects to take a short recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We will adjourn now for ten minutes.
(Whereupon at 11:40 a.m., a short recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wishes to make it clear, if I did not make it clear when I spoke before, that if defense counsel wishes to put interrogatories to Mr. Messersmith upon his affidavit they may submit such interrogatories to the Tribunal in writing for them to be sent to Mr. Messersmith to answer.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Defense attorney for the defendant Doenitz.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I do not know whether my question has yet been answered or whether it has been made known to the President of the Court.
In the testimony of Mr. Messersmith, Doenitz' name was mentioned. It appears on Page 4 of the German version. I should like to read the whole paragraph:
"Admiral Karl Doenitz was not always in an amicable frame of mind. He was not a National Socialist when the National Socialists came to power"-
THE PRESIDENT: This passage was not read in evidence, was it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, only the name was mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think the name was mentioned, because this part of the affidavit was not read.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The name was read, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; go on.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: "Nevertheless, he became one of the first high officers in the Army and Fleet and was in complete agreement with the concepts and aims of National Socialism."
As an introduction to this paragraph, Mr. Messersmith said, on Page 2, the last sentence before the Number 1-
THE PRESIDENT: Which page are you on?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I am reading out of Document 1760.
THE PRESIDENT: Page what?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Page 2, last sentence before the Number 1.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: "Among those whom I saw frequently and to whom I have reference in many of my statements were the following."
Then after Number 16 Doenitz' name appears. My client has informed me that he has heard the name Messersmith today for the first time; that he does not know the witness Messersmith, has never seen him, nor has he every spoken with him. Court to state when and where he spoke to the defendant Doenitz.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that the affidavit is admissible in evidence, that its purportive value will of course be considered by the Tribunal, and the defendants' counsel have the right, if they wish, to submit interrogatories for the examination of Messersmith, and of course defendants will have the opportunity of giving evidence when their turn comes, when Admiral Doenitz, if he thinks it right, will be able to deny the statements of the affidavit.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Thank you.
MR. ALDERMAN: I want to call the Court's attention to a slight mistranslation into German of one sentence of the Messersmith affidavit. In the German translation the word "nicht" crept in when the negative was not in the English.
The English statement was: "I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for several weeks in order to make it clear to von Papen that I had no sympathy with and on the other hand was familiar with the objectives of his mission in Austria."
The German text contains the negative: "Und dass ich anderseits nicht mit seiner Berufung und Zielen in Oesterreich vertraut war." The "nicht" should not be in the German text. preparedness. The wiles of defendant von Papen represented only one part of the total program of Nazi conspiracy. At the same time Nazi activities in Austria, forced underground during this period, were carried on.
Mr. Messersmith's affidavit at Pages 9 and 10, the English text, discloses the following. Reading from the last main paragraph on Page 9:
"Nazi activities, forced underground in this period, were by no means neglected. The Party was greatly weakened for a time as a result of the energetic measures -
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. The French translation isn't coming through.
MR. ALDERMAN: Apparently it is a mechanical difficulty and not the interpretation.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you try again then?
MR. ALDERMAN: I am informed that the French line is electrically dead and that it will take some little time to restore it.
THE PRESIDENT: We think it could be translated to the French members of the Tribunal, but we feel there may be some difficulty with the shorthand writers.
MR. ALDERMAN: That would be the main difficulty, yes, unless the she hand writer could take one of the transcripts in one of the other languages and put it into French.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, that seems to be possible.
MR. ALDERMAN: The French Prosecutor may object at not being able to hear. object at not being able to understand the proceedings, but that the French press is present and he has an interest in the French press understanding what is going on.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn then.
(Whereupon a short recess was taken.)
MR. ALDERMAN: I was just reading from the bottom of page 9 of the Messersmith affidavit:
"Nazi activities, forced underground in this period, were by no means neglected. The Party was greatly weakened for a time as a result of the energetic measures taken against the Putsch and as a result of the public indignation. Reorganization work was soon begun. In October 1934 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me the following memorandum, which he told me had been supplied to the Austrian Government by a person who participated in the meeting under reference."
I quote the first paragraph of the memorandum:
"A meeting of the chiefs of the Austrian National Socialist Party was held on the 29th and 30th of September, 1934, at Bad Aibling in Bavaria."
Then, skipping four paragraphs and resuming on the fifth one:
"The agents of the Party Direction in Germany have received orders in every Austrian district to prepare lists of all those persons who are known to actively support the present Government and who are prepared closely to cooperate with it.
"When the next action against the Government takes place these persons are to be proceeded against just as brutally as against all those other persons, without distinction of party, who are known to be adversaries of National Socialism.
"In a report of the Party leaders for Austria the following principles have been emphasized:
"A. The taking over of the power in Austria remains the principal duty of the Austrian National Socialist Party. Austria has for the German Reich a much greater significance and value than the Saar. The Austrian problem is the problem. All combat methods are consecrated by the end which they are to serve.
"B. We must, on every occasion which presents itself, appear to be disposed to negotiate, but arm a t the same time for the struggle. The new phase of the struggle will be particularly serious and there will be this time two centers of the terror, one along the German frontier and the other along the Yugoslav frontier."
I now proceed with the next paragraph of the affidavit:
"The Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. Although it was taken back some miles further from the Austrian frontier, it remained undissolve in spite of the engagement which had been taken to dissolve it. The Austrian Government received positive information to this effect from time to time which it passed on to me and I had direct information to the dame effects from reliable persons coming from Germany to Vienna who actually saw the Legion."
corraborated by a report of one of the Austrian Nazis. It contains three parts. First, there is a letter dated August 22, 1939 from Mr. Rainer, then Gauleiter at Salzburg, to the defendant SeyssInquart, then Austrian Reich Minister. That letter encloses a letter dated July 6, 1939, written by Mr. Rainer to Reich Commissar, Gauleiter Josef Buerckel.
DR. LATERNSER: (Attorney for the defendant Seyss-Inquart): I object to the presentation of the letters contained in document No. 812. Of course, I cannot object to the presentation of this evidence to the extent that this evidence is to prove that these letters were actually written. However, if these letters are to serve as proof for the correctness of their contents, then I must object to the use of these letters, for the following reason. Particularly, the third document is a letter which, as is manifest from its contents, has a particular bias, for this reason, that in this letter it is explained to what extent the Austrian Nazi Party participated in the Anschluss. letter cannot serve as proof for the facts brought forth in it, particularly since the witness Rainer, who wrote this letter, is available as a witness and, as we have discovered, is at present in Nurnberg. to prove the correctness of its contents, because the witness who can testify to that is, at the present time, in Nurnberg.
THE PRESIDENT : The Tribunal will hear Mr. Alderman in answer to what has been said.
Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal has not as yet read the letter.
MR. ALDERMAN: No. I think perhaps it would be better to read the letter before we argue about the significance of its contents.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, are you relying Upon the letter as evidence of the facts stated in it?
DR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Who is the letter from, and who is it to?
MR. ALDERMAN: The first letter is from one Mr. Rainer who was, at that time, Gauleiter at Salsburg, to the defendant Seyss-Inquart -
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: -- then Reich Minister of Austria. to Reich Commissar and Gauleiter Josef Buerckel. In that letter, in turn, Rainer enclosed a report on the events in the NSDAP of Austria from 1933 to March 11, 1938, the day before the invasion of Austria. to bring to the attention of the Tribunal before it passes upon the admissibility.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think that the defendant's counsel is really challenging the admissibility of the document; it is the contents of the document.
MR. ALDERMEN: Yes. On that, in the first place, we are advised by defendant's counsel that this man Rainer is in Nurnberg. I would assume he is there. these communications is the truth. However, it seems to us that the communications themselves, as contemporaneous reports by a Party officer at the time, are much more probated evidence than anything that he might testify before you today.
DR. LATERNSER: I have already said that this letter has those characteristics, that it is biased.
that it tends to emphasize and decorate the participation of the Austrian Nazi party on the Anschluss. Therefore, I must object to the use of this letter as objective evidence, that it was not written with the thought in mind that the letter would be used as evidence before a court. If he had known that, the letter undoubtedly would have been formulated differently.
I believe that the witness is in Nurnberg. In that case -- a principle which is a basis for all trial procedure -- the witness should be presented to the Court personally, particularly since, in this case, the difficulties that pertain to the question of Messersmith do not here pertain.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that the letters are admissible. They were written to and received by the defendant Seyss-Inquart. The defendant can challenge the contents of the letters by his evidence. ant to apply to the Tribunal for leave to call Rainer in due course. He can then challenge the contents of these letters, both by the defendant Seyss-Inquart's evidence and by Rainer's evidence. The letters themsleves are admitted.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I agree quite fully with the statement that if it had been known that these letters were to be offered in evidence in a court of justice, they very probably would have been differently written. That applies to a great part of the evidence that we shall offer in this case. And I would say that if the photographer who took the photograph of the Memorial Plaque had known that his photographs would be introduced in evidence in a conspiracy case, he probably never would have snapped the shutter. to prepare a short history of the role of the Party. Perhaps I had better read the covering letter, addressed to the defendant SeyssInquart:
"Dear Dr. Seyss:
"I have received your letter of 19 August, 1939, in which you asked me to inform you what I know of those matters which, among others, are the subject of your correspondence with Buerckel.
"I do not wish to discuss sundry talks and all that, what has been brought to my notice in the course of time by different people. I wish to clarify essentially my own attitude.
"On the 5th of July, 1939, I was asked by telephone by the Reich Commissioner Gauleiter Buerckel if I was in possession of the memorandum of Globus regarding the events of March. I told him that I do not have this memorandum and that I never possessed a single part of it, that I furthermore, did not then participate in the matter and do not know its content. Because of official requests by Buerckel, I have entrusted him with a report accompanied by a letter written on the 6th July.
"If Buerckel now writes to you that certain statements were confirmed by me, I feel obliged to entrust you with a copy each of my copies of those two documents, which were only written in single originals. I shall specially inform Buerckel of this. I connect this with the declaration, that I have given -- apart from those written explanations -- no confirmations, declarations, or criticisms whatsoever regarding you and your attitude and that I have authorized nobody to refer to any statements of mine.
"Since the beginning of our collaboration I have always expressed and represented forcefully my ideas regarding yourself and my opinion of your personality. This conception of mine was the very basis of our collaboration. The events of February and March have not changed this, especially since considered the political success of the 11th March merely as a confirmation of the intentions and convictions which have equally induced both of us to collaborate.
"As far as Globus is concerned, you are fully aware of his species, which I judged always and in every situation only by its good side. I believe that you have already talked to Globus about the occurrences between the 11th of March 1938 and today; and I am convinced that he will tell you everything that is bothering him, if you will speak to him about this matter, as is your intention.
"With best regards and Heil Hitler!
"Yours, Friedl Rainer." to show that the Party as a whole is entitled to the glory which is excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart. to Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel:
"We saw in March and April how a false picture about the actual leadership conditions developed from this fact which could not be corrected in spite of our attempts to that effect. This was an important factor for the varying moods of Globocnik who hoped especially from you that you would emphasize for Hitler and also for the public the role of the party during the events preceding 12 March 1938. I limited myself to address this verbal and written declaration to party member Hess, and furthermore to secure the documents from the March days. In addition, I spoke at every available opportunity about the fight of the party. I did not undertake steps to give just credit to other persons for the glory which was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart; and I would not do that, primarily because I appear as a beneficiary, and furthermore, because I believe that I would not gladden Hitler by doing so. I am also convinced that Dr. Seyss-Inquart did not act crookedly, and furthermore that Hitler does not want to commit an act of historical justice by special preference to his person, but that he is attracted to him personally. It really is of no great account to Hitler if this or that person was more or less meritorious, in this sector of the great fight of the movement.
Because, in the last analysis, by far the greatest part is to be ascribed only to him; he alone will be considered by history as the liberator of Austria. I, therefore, considered it best to accept existing conditions and look for new fertile fields of endeavor in the party.
"If I should be asked to describe -- without personal interest -the role of the party according to my best conviction, I am ready to do so at any time. For this reason I promised yesterday to submit to you again a short summary, and to make it available for your confidential use. Of this letter and of this abbreviated description I retain the sole copy.
"Heil Hitler! Rainer." Seyss-Inquart, and he is fixed with knowledge of the contents of all of them. notice, that Seyss-Inquart was the original Quisling. It so happened that the Norwegian Seyss-Inquart gave his name to posterity as a meaningful name, but all Quislings are alike. likely to be tendentious, as counsel says, or to be prejudiced in favor of the defendant Seyss-Inquart's contribution to the Anschluss. It tends, on the contrary, to show that Seyss-Inquart was not quite so important as he might have thought he was. Even so, Rainer gives Seyss-Inquart credit enough. Party in Austria and of its reconstruction. I now quote the second and third paragraphs of the report, appearing on pages 3 and 4 of the English text of 812-PS, which is United States Exhibit 61; and I believe it is on pages 1 and 2 of the original German of the report of Bericht, which is the third part of the document:
"Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with the July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was right, the execution of it was faulty. The result was a complete destruction of the organization; the loss of entire groups of fighters through imprisonment or flight into the 'Alt-Reich';"-the old kingdom-- "and with regard to the political relationship of Germany to Austria, a formal acknowledgment of the existence of the Austrian State by the German Government. With the telegram to Papen, instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships between the two States, the Fuehrer had liquidated the first stage of the battle; and a new method of political penetration was to begin. By order of the Fuehrer the Landesleitung Munich was dissolved, and the party in Austria was left to its own resources.
"There was no acknowledged leader for the entire party in Austria. Now leaderships were forming in the nine Gaus. The process was again and again interrupted by the interference of the police; there was no liaison between the formations, and frequently there were two, three or more rival leaderships. The first evident, acknowledged speaker of almost all the Gaus in Autumn 1934 was engineer Reinthaller (already appointed Landesbauernfuehrer-- leader of the country's farmers-- by Hess). He endeavoured to bring about a political appeasement by negotiations with the Government, with the purpose of giving the NSDAP legal status again, thus permitting its political activities. Simultaneously, Reinthaller started the reconstruction of the illegal political organization, at the head of which he had placed engineer Neubacher." including the defendant von Papen, and the Austrian Nazis; the use by the Austrian Nazis of front personalities. Organization in Austria which should be borne in mind.
Austrian Nazis adrift--as indicated in the document I have just read--in fact, as we shall show, German officials, including von Papen, maintained secret contact with the Austrian Nazis in line with Hitler's desires. German officials consulted and gave advice and support to the organization of the Austrian Nazis. organization in Austria, organizing for the eventual use of force in a so-called emergency. But, in the meantime they deemed it expedient to act behind front personalities, such as the defendant Seyss-Inquart, who had no apparent taint of illegality in his status in Austria.
Mr. Messersmith relates, in his affidavit, that he got hold of a copy of a document outlining this Nazi program. I quote from page 8 of document 1760-PS, our serial number USA-57, the following:
"For two years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria, Very few terroristic acts occurred during the remainder of 1934 and, as I recall, in 1935, and most of 1936; this inactivity was in accordance with directives from Berlin as direct evidence to that effect, which came to my knowledge at that time, proved. Early in January, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a document which I considered accurate in all respects, and which stated "--quoting from that document:
"The German Minister here, von Papen, on the occasion of his last visit to Berlin, was received three times by Chancellor Hitler for fairly long conversations, and he also took this opportunity to call on Schacht and von Neurath. In these conversations the following instructions were given to him:
"During the next two years nothing can be undertaken which will give Germany external political difficulties. On this ground, everything must be avoided which could awaken the appearance of Germany interfering in the internal affairs of Austria. Chancellor Hitler will, therefore, also for this reason, not endeavor to intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis in the National Socialist Party in Austria, although he is convinced that order could be brought into the Party at once through a word from him. This word, however, he will, for foreign political reasons, give all the less, as he is convinced that the, for him, desirable ends may be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor Hitler declared to the German Minister here, this does not indicate any disinterestedness in the idea of Austria's independence. Also, before everything, Germany cannot for the present withdraw Party members in Austria, and must, therefore, in spite of the very real exchange difficulties, make every effort to bring help to the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria.
"As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht finally gave the authorization that from then on 200,000 marks a month were to be set aside for this end (support of National Socialists in Austria). The control and the supervision of this monthly sum was to be entrusted to Engineer Reinthaler, who, through the fact that he alone had control over the money, would have a definite influence on the Party followers.
In this way it would be possible to end most quickly and most easily the prevailing difficulties and divisions in the Austrian National Socialist Party.
"The hope was also expressed to Herr von Papen that the recently authorized foundation of German 'Ortsgruppen' of the National Socialist Party in Austria (made up of German citizens in Austria) would be so arranged as not to give the appearance that Germany is planning to interfere in Austrian internal affairs." 1939 outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership squabbles following the retirement of Reinthaler.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think this would be a convenient time to break off until 2 o'clock?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn, then.
(Whereupon at 1245 hours the Tribunal was adjourned, to reconvene at 1400 hours on the same day.)