Of course, one should first of all explore the possibility of setting Schuschnigg against Starhemberg through the use of "go betweens". The possibility exists. If Mr. Schuschnigg finally says "no" and makes our offer known in Rome, then the situation would not be any worse, but, on the contrary, the efforts of the Reich government to make peace with Austria would be revealed -- without prejudice to other interests. Therefore, even in the case of refusal this last attempt would be an asset. I consider it completely possible, that in view of the farspread dislike of the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian course and in view of the sharp tensions within the federal government (that is Bundersreigierung), Mr. Schuschnigg will grasp this last straw -always under the supposition that the offer could not be interpreted as a trap by the opponents, but that it boars all the mark of an actually honest compromise with Austria. Assuming success of this stop, we would again establish our active intervention in Central European politics, which, as opposed to the French-Czech and Russian political maneuvers, would be a tremendous success, both morally and practically. Since there are two weeks left to accomplish very much work in the way of explorations and Conferences, an immediate decision is necessary. The Reich Army Minister (Reichswehrminister) shares the opinion presented above and the Reich Foreign Minister (Reichsaussenminister) wanted to discuss it with you my Fuehrer.
"Signed, Papen." of Austria's independence. As he put it, Germany had nothing to lose, with what it could always call a more effort at peace and she might be able to convince Schuschnigg to establish an Austrian coalition government, with the NSDAP. If she did this, she would vastly strengthen her position in Europe. Finally Papen urged haste. to von Papen's suggestion, and assorted: "Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an Anschluss."
The British will present a document covering that speech. I merely wanted to use one sentence at this point. It is a sentence quite well-known to history. and to note that for a complexity of reasons, Papen suggested and Hitler announced a policy completely at variance with their intentions, which had been, and continued to be, to interfere in Austria's internal affairs and to conclude an Anschluss. statement that "tomorrow or the day after" Germany would fall upon Austria. I invite the Court's attention to the version appearing in the "Volkische Beobachter SD," that is South Germany, 2 to 3 May 1936, page 2, and translated in our document 2367-PS. notice of that statement, in that well-known speech.
misleading sense, that is, that he would not actually fall upon Austria "tomorrow or the day after tomorrow." For the conspirators well knew that the successful execution of their purpose required for a while longer the quiet policy they had been pursuing in Austria. between Ambassador Bullitt and the defendant, von Neurath, on 18 May, 1936. This document unfortunately again appears in your document books in German, as due to an error, it has not been mimeographed in English. German counsel have the German copies. reading in German, a marked copy of a German translation.
"I called on von Neurath, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on May 18 and had a long talk on the general European situation."
"Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until the Rhineland had been digested. He explained that he meant that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French and Belgium frontiers, the German Government would do everything possible to prevent, rather than encourage, an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia.
"Quoting: 'As soon as our fortifications are constructed, and the countries of Central Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory at will, all those countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop,' he said."
"Von Neurath then stated that no understanding had been reached between Germany and Italy and admitted that the demonstrations of friendship between Germany and Italy were mere demonstrations without basis in reality. He went on to say that at the present time he could see no way to reconcile there were three chief reasons why the German Government was urging the the conflicting interests of Germany and Italy in Austria.
He said that Austrian Nazis to remain quiet at the present time:
"The first was that Mussolini had today, the greater part of his Army mobilized on the Austrian border, ready to strike and that he would certainly strike if he should have a good excuse.
"The second reason for urging Austrian Nazis to remain quiet for the present was that the Nazi movement was growing stronger daily in Austria. The youth of Austria was turning more and more towards the Nazis and the dominance of the Nazi Party in Austria was inevitable and only a question of time.
"The third reason was that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French border, an involvement of Germany in war with Italy might lead to a French attack on Germany." diplomatic position was vastly improved over 1934, a fact which influenced Austria's willingness to make concessions to Germany and come to terms. English text; that is document 1760 PS.
"Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave Germany an opportunity to take more positive stops in the direction of the Nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given Austria assurance of support of the most definite character against external German regression, and on one occasion by mobilizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German aggressive action, which had been planned against Austria, embarked on her Abyssinian adventure. This and the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in Europe. It is quite obvious that after Italy had launched her Abyssinian adventure, she was no longer in any position to counter German aggressive moves against Austria."
there were three chief reasons why the German Government was urging the the conflicting interests of Germany and Italy in Austria.
He said that Austrian Nazis to remain quiet at the present time:
"The first was that Mussolini had today, the greater part of his Army mobilized on the Austrian border, ready to strike and that he would certainly strike if he should have a good excuse.
"The second reason for urging Austrian Nazis to remain quiet for the present was that the Nazi movement was growing stronger daily in Austria. The youth of Austria was turning more and more towards the Nazis and the dominance of the Nazi Party in Austria was inevitable and only a question of time.
"The third reason was that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French border, an involvement of Germany in war with Italy might lead to a French attack on Germany." diplomatic position was vastly improved over 1934, a fact which influenced Austria's willingness to make concessions to Germany and come to terms. English text; that is document 1760 PS.
"Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave Germany an opportunity to take more positive stops in the direction of the Nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given Austria assurance of support of the most definite character against external German regression, and on one occasion by mobilizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German aggressive action, which had been planned against Austria, embarked on her Abyssinian adventure. This and the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in Europe. It is quite obvious that after Italy had launched her Abyssinian adventure, she was no longer in any position to counter German aggressive moves against Austria."
This weakening of Austria helped to pave the way for the Pact of July 11, 1936. On July 11, 1936, the Governments of Austria and Germany concluded an accord. That will be offered in evidence also by the British Delegation. of the fact that such an accord was entered into. The formal part of the agreement of July 11, 1936, will also be proved by our British colleagues. For convenient reference, it will be found in the document which the British will offer, TC-22, and the substance of it is also contained on pages 11 and 12 of Mr. Messersmith's affidavit, 1760-PS. a great triumph for Austria. It contains a confusing provision to the effect that Austria in its policy, especially with regard to Germany, would regard herself as a German state, but the other two provisions clearly state that Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of Austria and that it regards the inner political order of Austria, including the question of Austria and National Socialism, as an internal concern of Austria upon which it, Germany, will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence. But there was much more substance to today's events than appears in the text of the accord. I refer to Mr. Messersmith's summary as set forth on page 12 of his affidavit, 1760-PS, as follows:
"Even more important than the terms of the agreement published in the official communique, was the contemporaneous informal understanding, the most important provisions of which were that Austria would: (1) Appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor's confidence but friendly to Germany, to positions in the Cabinet: (2) with the devised means to give the National opposition a role in the political life of Austria within the framework of the Patriotic Front; and (3) with amnesty for all Nazis, save those convicted of the most serious offenses." This amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of Deutsche Nazionale into the Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment of Justice Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and of Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without portfolio.
by Kurt von Schuschnigg, Foreign Chancellor of Austria, executed at Nurnberg, Germany, on 19 November, 1945. I offer this as Exhibit USA 66. The Defendants have received German translations of that evidence.
MR. LATERNSER: (Defense Counsel) In the name of the accused, Seyss-Inquart, I should like to protest against the production of the written evidence by the witness, Schuschnigg, and for the following reasons: Today, when the resolution was announced, in respect of the use to be made of the written evidence of Mr. Messersmith, the Court was of the opinion that in a case of very great importance, that possibly it would take a different view of the matter. In respect of the Austrian conflict, for which Schuschnigg is the most important witness, it was the witness who at the time of his office of Federal Chancellor was affected. As it is a case of such an important witness, the principle of direct evidence must be adhered to in order that the Court is in a position to ascertain the actual truth in this case. The accused and his Defense Counsel would feel prejudiced in his defense. I must, therefore, keep to this viewpoint as it is to be assumed that the witness, von Schuschnigg, will be able to confirm certain facts which are in favor of the accused, Seyss-Inquart. that the written evidence of the witness, von Schuschnigg, be not admitted.
THE PRESIDENT: If you have finished, the Tribunal will hear Mr. Alderman.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, at this point I am simply proposing to offer this affidavit for the purpose of showing the terms of the secret understanding between the German and Austrian Governments in connection with this accord.
It is not for any purpose to incriminate the Defendant, Seyss-Inquart, that it is being offered at this point.
MR. LATERNSER: May I add to my application that the witness, von Schuschnigg, on the 19 of November, 1945, was heard in Nurnberg and that if an interrogation on the 19 of November was possible, that such a short time later it ought to be possible, especially as the interrogation before this Court is of especial importance to the accused.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess now to consider this question.
(Whereupon, at 1515 a short recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the objection to the affidavit of Schuschnigg and upholds the objection. apply to do so. Equally the defense, if they wish to call Schuschnigg as a witness, can apply to do so. In the event of Schuschnigg not being able to be produced the question of affidavit-evidence by Schuschnigg being given will be reconsidered.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, in view of the strategy and tactics of the Nazis' concessions as indicated in the portion of the Messersmith affidavit that I read, substantial concessions were made by Austria to obtain Germany's diplomatic formal assurance of Austrian independence and non-intervention in Austrian external affairs. and as Mr. Messersmith pointed out in 1934 dispatch to the United States State Department quoted on pages twelve to thirteen of his affidavit:
"Any prospect that the National Socialists might come to power would make it more difficult to obtain effective police and judicial action against the Nazis for fear of reprisals by the future Nazi Government against those taking action against Nazis even in the line of duty. The preservation of external peace in Austria was less independent upon Germany's living up to its obligation under the accord.
Next, Germany's continuing program of weakening the Austrian Government. In the pact of 11 July 1936 Germany agreed not to influence directly or indirectly the external affairs of Austria, including the matter of Austrian National Socialism. I quote from Document 812-PS, which is exhibit U.S.A. 61, the report of Gauleiter Reiner to Commissioner Buerckel, all of which was forwarded to the defendant Seyss-Inquart at page six of the English and I believe also page six of the German version.
"At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian National Socialists should do.
Meanwhile Hinterleitner was arrested, and Doctor Rainer became his successor and leader of the Austrian party. On 16 July 1936 Doctor Rainer and Globocnik visited the Fuehrer at the Obersalzburg where they received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Fuehrer. On 17 July 1936 all illegal Gauleiters met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions for carrying out the fight. At this same conference the Gauleiters received organizational instructions from Globocnik and Hiedler."
I am skipping a paragraph in the German version. "Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Fuehrer named Lt. Gen. (Gruppenfuehrer) Keppler as chief of the mixed commission which was appointed, in accordance with the state treaty of 11 July 1936, to supervise the correct execution of the agreement. At the same time Keppler was given full authority by the Fuehrer for the party in Austria. After Keppler was unsuccessful in his efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked together with Doctor Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaller as leader of the peasants, Kaltenbrunner (that is the defendant Kaltenbrunner in this case) as leader of the SS, and Doctor Jury as deputyleader of the Austrian party, as well as with Glaise-Herstenau and Seyss-Inquart."
A new strategy was developed for the Austrian Nazis. Mr. Messersmith describes briefly--and I quote from page thirteen of his affidavit, 1760-PS: "The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded happenings." Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under the leadership of a certain Captain Leopold who it was known definitely was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program was now to form an organization through which the Nazis could carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in Austria. There are several organizations which had a legal basis, but which were simply a device by which the Nazis in Austria could organize and later seek inclusion as a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was the Ostmarkische Verein, the Union of the East Mark, the sponsor of which was the Minister of the Interior, Glaise-Horstenau. Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau and pro-Nazi Neustadter Stuermer, this organization was declared legal by the court.
to which the situation in Austria had disintegrated as a result of the underground and open Nazi activities directed from Germany.
At this point I offer in evidence Document 2246-PS as Exhibit U.S.A. 67, a captured German document which is a report from von Papen to Hitler dated September 1, 1936.
This document is most interesting because it indicates von Papen's strategy after July 11, 1936, for destroying Austria's independence. Von Papen had taken a substantial step forward with the agreement of July 11.
It should be noted, incidentally, that after that agreement he was promoted from Minister to Ambassador. Now his tactics were developed in the following term; I quote the last three paragraphs of his letter of September 1, 1936, to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. Those three paragraphs are all joined as one paragraph in the English text.
"The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti-National Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected prior to the conference on the abolishing of the Control of Finances at Geneva. The Chancellor of the League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau of his intention to offer him the portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior. As a guiding principle 'Marschroute' (that is the German word; that is the 'Route of March') I recommend on the tactical side continued, patient, psychological treatment with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime. The proposed conference on economic relations, taking place at the end of October, will be a very useful tool for the realisation of some of our projects. In discussion with Government officials as well as with leaders of the illegal party--Leopold and Schattenfroh--who conform completely with the agreement of July 11. (I think that should be a comma.) I am trying to direct the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative representation of the movement in the Fatherland front, but nevertheless refraining from putting National-Socialists in important positions for the time being. However, such positions are to be occupied only by personalities having the support and the confidence of the movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau."
Citing Papen. To recapitulate this report by von Papen to Hitler discloses the following plan:
(a) Obtaining a change in personnel in the Austrian Ministry of (b) Obtaining corporative representation of the Nazi movement (c) Not putting avowed National-Socialists in important (d) Using economic pressure and patient psychological treatment (MR. ALDERMAN SPEAKING) My next subject is "Germany's Diplomatic Preparations for the Conquest of Austria."
consisted of weakening that country externally and internally by removing its support from without as well as by penetrating within. This program was of the utmost significance, especially since, as the Court will remember, the events of 25 July 1934 inside Austria were over-shadowed in the news of the day by the fact that Mussolini had brought his troops to the Brenner Pass and poised there as a strong protector of his Northern neighbor, Austria. and steady increase in the pressure needed to acquire control over that country, required removal of the possibility that Italy or any other country would come to its aid. But the foreign policy program of the conspiracy for the weakening and isolation of Austria was integrated with their foreign policy program in Europe generally. for a moment from the presentation of evidence bearing on Austria alone and to consider with the Tribunal the general foreign policy program of the Nazis. It is not my intention to examine this subject in any detail. Historians and scholars exhausting the archives will have many years of exploring all the details and ramifications of European diplomacy during this fateful decade. highlights of the Nazi's diplomatic preparation for war. Document No. 2385 PS, a second affidavit of George S. Messersmith executed on 30 August 1945 at Mexico City. This has been made available to the defendants in German, as well as in English.
This is a different affidavit from Document No. 1760 PS which was executed August 28th. This second affidavit, which I offer as Exhibit U.S.A.68, consists of a presentation of the diplomatic portion of the program of the Nazi party. To a considerable extent it merely states facts of common knowledge, facts that many people who are generally well-informed already know. It also gives us facts which are common knowledge in the circle of diplomats or of students of foreign affairs. It consists of some 11 mimeographed pages, single-spaced. I read from the third paragraph in the affidavit, beginning with the third paragraph:
"As early as 1933, while I served in Germany, the German and Nazi contacts which I had in the highest and secondary categories openly acknowledged Germany's ambitions to dominate Southeastern Europe from Czechoslovakia down to Turkey. As they freely stated, the objective was territorial expansion in the case of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The professed objectives in the earlier stages of the Nazi regime, in the remainder of Southeastern Europe, were political and economic control and they did not at that time speak so definitely of actual absorption and destruction of sovereignty. Their ambitions, however, were not limited to Southeastern Europe. From the very beginnings of 1933, and even before the Nazis came into power, important Nazis speaking of the Ukraine freely said that "it must be our granary" and that "even with Southeastern Europe under our control, Germany needs and must have the greater part of the Ukraine in order to be able to feed the people of greater Germany". After I left Germany in the middle of 1934 for my post in Austria, I continued to receive information as to the German designs in Southeastern Europe. In a conversation with von Papen shortly after his appointment as German Minister to Austria in 1934, von Papen frankly stated to me that "Southeastern Europe to Turkey is Germany's Hinterland and I have been designated to carry through the task of bringing it within the fold.
Austria is the first on the program." As I learned through my diplomatic colleagues, von Papen in Vienna and his colleague von Mackensen in Budapest, were openly propagating the idea of the dismemberment and final absorption of Czechoslovakia as early as 1935."
Then, skipping a short paragraph, I resume:
"Immediately after the Nazis came into power, they started a vast rearmament program. This was one of the primary immediate objectives of the Nazi regime. As a matter of fact, the two immediate objectives of the Nazi regime, when it came into power, had to be, and were, according to their own statements frequently made to me, first, to bring about the complete and absolute establishment of their power over Germany and the German people, so that they would become in every respect willing and capable instruments of the regime to carry through its ends; and second, the establishment of a tremendous armed power within Germany in order that the political and economic program in South-eastern Europe and in Europe could be carried through by force if necessary, but probably by a threat of force. It was characteristic that in carrying through this second aim, they emphasized from the very outset the building of an overpowering air force. Goering and Milch often said to me or in my presence that the Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position and the weapon which could be developed the most rapidly and in the shortest time."
Skipping to the end of that paragraph, and resuming at the next:
"At the same time that this rearmament program was in progress, the Nazi regime took all possible measures to prepare the German people for war in the psychological sense. Throughout Germany, for example, one saw everywhere German youth of all ages engaged in military exercises, drilling, field maneuvers, practicing the throwing of hand grenades, etc. In this connection I wrote in an official communication in November 1933, from Berlin as follows.
. . . . 'Everything that is being done in the country today has for able to meet all comers.
The military spirit is constantly growing.
It cannot be otherwise. The leaders of Germany today have no desire of complete compliance with German desires and ambitions.
Hitler and essential.
They are preparing their way so carefully that there is necessary means to carry through their objects . . .'" One further sentence following that I quote:
"Military preparation and psychological preparation were coupled with diplomatic preparation designed to so disunite and isolate their intended victims as to render them defenceless against German aggression." field loomed large. France was the dominant military power on the continent. She had a system of mutual assistance in the West and in the East. guaranteed the territorial status quo in the West. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Rumania were allied in the Little Entente and each, in turn, was united with France by Mutual Assistance Pacts. Since 1922, France and Poland and likewise been allied against external aggression. Italy had made plain her special interest in Austrian independence. existing alliances and understandings, to create divisions among the members of the Little Entente and the other Eastern European powers. economic gain for cooperating with Germany. To some of these countries she offered extravagant promises of territorial and economic rewards. She offered Corinthia to Austria, to Yugoslavia. She offered part of Czechoslovakia to Hungary and part to Poland.
She offered Yugoslav territory to Hungary, at the same time that she was offering land in Hungary to Yugoslavia.
As Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit that is 2385-PS, at page 5:
"Austria and Csechoslovakia were the first on the German program of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to woo neighbors of these countries with the promises of a share in the loot. To Yugolsavia in particular they offered Corinthia. Concerning the Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the time:
'. . The major factor in the internal situation in the last week refugees in Yugoslavia.
. . There is very little doubt but that power in Austria . . The Nazi seed sown in Yugoslavia had been suf who went to Yugoslavia in the days following July 25.
' "Germany made like promises of teritorial gains to Hungary and to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their acquiescence in the proposed simemberment of Czechoslovakia.
As I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, von Papen and von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935, were spreading the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all.
"The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate object. I recall the Yugolsav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or 1935, that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later gave me the same information.
"I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made these promises were not only the died-in-the-wool Nazis but more conservative Germans who already had begun to willingly lend themselves to the Nazi program. In an official dispatch to the Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I wrote as follows:
'. . Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are "diplomats of the old school."
They are in fact servile instruments of the regime are able to work more effectively.
They are able to sow discord just the regime.
' In other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these division and increase its own aggressive strength by using as its agents in making these promises, men who on outward appearances, were merely conservative diplomats. It is true that Nazis openly scoffed at any notion of international obligations, as I shall show in a moment. It is true that the real trump in Germany's hand was its rearmament and more then that, its willingness to go to war. And yet the attitude of the various countries was not influenced by these considerations alone. always completely rational. We tend to believe what we want to believe. And if an apparently substantial and conservative person, like defendant Von Neurath, for example, is saying these things, one might be apt to believe them, or at least, to act upon that hypothesis. And it would be the more impressive if one were also under the impression that the person involved was not a Nazi and would not stoop to go along with the designs of the Nazis.