There should be direction of animal breeding. Reserves should be accumulated for the times of need in the economic sector. We were concerned with the creation of industries supplying raw materials. Although there was sufficient coal, its production would have to be increased considerably; and it was necessary for raw material of another kind--iron. in the event of a crisis in this field, the most disasterous situation could have arisen. I can quite understand that from the purely financial business point of view it was all right, but nevertheless we had to attempt to utilize our iron ores which were in existence, though perhaps it was a worse quality than that which Sweden produced, and we had to try to coordinate that industry and have them try to work with that German ore. did not attempt the utilization. Following that I founded the iron works which was given my name. I originally founded it to deal with any ore that was produced on German soil and to leave it at the disposition of the largest metal industry created. There were aluminum works and various other works, and then came the development of the so-called synthetic material industry, which was necessary to replace raw materials which could only be obtained from abroad and under difficult circumstances; and to that, as far as the textile industry was concerned, this also concerned the reorganization of I. G. Farben. the question of labor, and coordination was necessary here too. An important industry had to have workers and less important industries had to dispense with them. The direction of that pre-war labor problem, which was merely effective internally in Germany before the war, was another task of the 4-Year Plan and its division of labor. anofficial organization, and for two months after Schacht left, I took over the economic ministry and fitted the 4-Year Plan into it and merely retained a very small staff with which I carried out the task, with the assistance of the ministries concerned.
aggressive war? economic crisis and toprocure her against a blockade in the event of war, and of course to create the conditions through the 4-Year Plan which were necessary for re-armament. That was one more of its more important tasks.
Q How did the occupation of the Rhineland occur? a long-prepared affair. What had been discussed previously has not concerned with the occupation of the Rhineland but was the case of an attack against Germany and what the mobilization in the Rhineland would have to be.
The Rhineland occupation occurred for two reasons. The balance which was created through the Pact of Locarno had been disturbed in the rest of Europe, because a new factor had arisen through the assistance arrangement between France and Russia, with their then extremely strong-armed forces. Secondly, there was the Russian-Czechoslovakian mutual agreement, which created a condition which removed the excuse for Locarno as far as we were concerned. Thus, such a threat to Germany had occurred or,shall we say, the possibility of such a threat that it would have been a neglect of duty on the part of the government if we had not done everything to insure the security and safety of the Reich in this connection. But we used sovereign rights of a sovereign state, the Reich, and liberated ourselves from the dishonorable duty not to have a part of the Reich under our jurisdiction, and thus that important part of the Reich was taken under our protection, which was, first of all, carried out against extreme fortification.
The construction of such defense and strong fortification system, which is considerable, is only justified if that juncture is regarded as a final and definite one.
If I had the intention to alter my frontiers within the near future, then it would never be possible or advisable to create such an enormously expensive enterprise as was the construction of the Western Wall. This was done -- and that I want to emphasize particularly -- from the beginning with a positively defensive aid and a defensive measure -- it was securing the western borders of the Reich against a threat, which became apparent by the new constellation of powers and forces. The pacts with Russia had become a threat to Germany. The actual occupation and the decision carried out was done on very short notice. The troops who marched into the Rhineland were of such small numbers and that is a historical fact, that they were merely a taken occupation force. The air force would not enter the left Rhine territory at all since no ground organization was available. It entered the so-called "demilitarized territory" right of the Rhine, and that is all. In other words, it was that the Rhineland was practically flooded by large numbers of troops but as I said before, there were a few battalions and a few artillery batteries who moved in and with that, carrying out the points of the program and put on record that the Rhineland had come back to the sovereignty of the sovereign German Reich and will in the future be protected accordingly.
Q What were Hitler's aims when he created the Council for the Reich Defense and when he issued the Reich Defense Law? portant part here. Please, understand me, but I believe that in these months it has been talked about more than it has ever been able to talk since it was originated. To start with, it is called "Reichsverteidigungsrat" and that is the Council for the Defense of the Reich and not Council for the attack. It is such an obvious matter of necessity. It exists in every other country in some form or other, may it be of the same name or a different one but to start with, there was a Committee for the Reich Defense before we came into power and that Committee fought for the Reich defense; there were representatives from all the ministries for the purpose of carrying out preparation for organization which would automatically become necessary in the case of any conflict, but it a war, or be it possibility of a war, or be it a war between other States upon our borders, where the question of guarding our neutrality would come into play;at any rate, these are current measures which referred to the mobilization and factors which would have to have been utilized, and how traffic problems would be solved -- in fact, all these matters which I need not refer to in detail since they are so obvious.
between the representatives of the ministries and were attended by the representatives of the ministry of war. The Council for the Reich Defense was created, first of all, when the armed forces came into their own, but it remained on paper. I think I was Deputy Chairman -- I don't even known -- I heard about that but I assure you, under my oath, I assure you under my oath that at no time and at no date did I participate in a single meeting when the Council for the Defense of the Reich was called together as such. These conferences, which were necessary for the Defense of the Reich, were held in a completely different form and in accordance with the necessities of the situation. Naturally, there were conferences about the defense of the Reich but in the shape of Council for the defense of the Reich, no, it existed, I think on paper, but it never met. But even if it had met, then that would only be logical since this concerns defense and not attack. The Reich Defense law, or rather the Ministerial Council for the Reich Defense,which is probably what you mean, that was created only one day before the outbreak of the war. Since the Council for the Reich Defense did in fact not exist, then, if the Ministerial Council for the Reich Defense is not to be considered the same as, for instance, the War Cabinet that was formed in England when the war broke out, or perhaps in other States. To the contrary, that Ministerial Counsel for the Reich Defense was -- by using abbreviated procedure -- to carry out the necessary war laws and war measures and it was to relieve the Fuehrer, to a considerable extent, who was in fact concerned with the military lead in the military field. The Ministerial Council -- it should therefore start with all these laws which I don't want to mention in detail and which are normal at the beginning of a war in any country. The early period, we met three or four times and after that not at all. I didn't have the time after that, too, and to abbreviate the procedure, these laws were rather circulated and then issued, and one or one and a half years afterwards -- I cannot remember the exact time the Fuehrer placed the issuance of laws before in his own hands and I became an advisor of certain laws, in my capacity of Ministerial Counsel, and that was in the later years practically discontinued.
In practice, that Ministerial Council did, I do not think, meet again after 1940.
Q The prosecution has presented a document No. 2261-PS. In that document a Reich Defense Law of the 21 May 1935 is mentioned which, by order of the Fuehrer, was originally drafted. I shall have that document shown to you and, please, will you explain your views on it?
Q Would you please state your views? a mobilization caused a Reich Defense Law to be prepared in 1935. The decision or resolution was passed in the Reich Cabinet and that law applied to the case of a mobilization. In fact, it was replaced when mobilization occurred, by the law I have mentioned -- referred to the Ministerial Council of the Defense of the Reich. In that law of that date, before the Four Year Plan, 1935, that law appointed the Plenipotentiary for Economy for the event of mobilization and also a Plenipotentiary for Administration; in other words, if a war occurs, then the total administration was to be concentrated with one minister and all the departments concerning the economy and armament were to be drawn together with another minister. One plenipotentiary for administration appeared more or less before -- did not appear before mobilization. The Plenipotentiary for Economy, on the other hand, -- this title was made publicly known -- was to commit his tasks immediately. That was indeed necessary, from that you can probably gather, and explanation for the reason when the Four Year Plan was created, there was inevitable friction between the Plenipotentiary for Economy and the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan. Both of them were more or less working on similar tasks. When, therefore, in 1936, I was given the task to take care of the Four Year Plan, the activities of the Plenipotentiary for Economy ceased at that time.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, ought I to stop now with the questions?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think that would be a good time.
(A recess was taken from 1245 to 1400 hours) Germany, on 14 March 1946, 1400 to 1700.
Lord BY DR. STAHMER:
Q Repeatedly a word was used here "Reichsforschungsrat," Reich Research Council, what kind of an institution was that? get in there an entirely German research department so far as it was important for armament. Unfortunately, that was done much too late. The purpose was to avoid parallel researches, and useless research, but the concentration of research with a view of problems important for the war. I became President of the Reichs Research Council, and established the directive for research in the sense which I have mentioned.
Q Inconnection with that research was the office of the Airforce? different, and it had nothing to do with either research on the one hand, or effort on the other hand. The expression was sort of camouflaged, for when we came to power there was a considerable confusion in the technical part of the surveying of important information, therefore, I founded the Research Office at first. That is an institution where all technical devices for the surveyance of radio, telephone, and all other technical communication institutions would be provided. Since I was only Minister of Aviation I could only do it on my own accord, and I used this camouflage in question. The whole machinery was set up only to take care of the foreign mission, important personalities who had telephones and telegraph connections with foreign countries, and Washington, and to decode their messages, and to leave the utilization to the various departments, as that office had no agent, or no service of information of their own. It was purely a technical office to take care of broadcasts, telephone conversations whereever it was ordered, of telegrams, and less utilization in the information to the department concerned.
In this connection I may stress that I have read much about the communication by Mr. Messerschmidt, who has been mentioned here for quite sometime, he was the main source for such information to us. which was created a short time after seizure of power? Marshal von Blomberg, and simultaneously, or so, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Colonel General von Fritsch retired, that is, to say, the Fuehrer retired him. The coincidence of both of the retirements in the years of the Fuehrer showed a disadvantage of the procedure of the Wehrmacht, the desire to offset this change in the Wehrmacht to theoutside. He said he wanted first to change the foreign minister so that change alone would make a strong impression abroad to the interest that a directive would control or direct military affairs. At that time I protested to the Fuehrer about that. In a long personal -lengthy personal conversation I asked not to consider a change in the foreign ministry. He, however, believed he would have to insist upon it. Neurath. The Fuehrer intended to keep Herr von Neurath, for he had the greatest esteem for him in the cabinet. I, personally, have always expressed my respect for Herr von Neurath. Only in order to create no reduction in the prestige of von Neurath, a proposal was made by myself to the Fuehrer. I told him in order to make it appear abroad that von Neurath had not quite retired from foreign policy, I would propose to appoint him chairman of the Secret Cabinet Council. There was no such cabinet for conferences in existence, but the expression would sound where it really would sound quite nice, and anybody could have some idea of what it may mean. The Fuehrer said, "But we can not make him a chairman of this when we have no conference." Thereupon I said, "Then we will make one," and offhand I marked down names of several persons, and of how little important I gave this idea, you may know I was one of the last on that list. policy, and when I returned I told my friends I think that this was very natural, but the Fuehrer had done little about the council from the foreign ministry, and certainly none at all from the council, he wanted to have no work for this.
I declare under oath that this cabinet council atno time, not even for one single minute that can be, not even for a constitution, met; of some members, I don't know them, even know they were members.
Q When was the Reich Cabinet in session last?
The Fuehrer did not think much of Cabinet meetings. The agenda was concerned took place.
The Ministers thought, very rightly so, that it made their work difficult.
A solution was found since I, under the name "Four Year Plan," called the Ministers together more political decisions taken of any importance.
For instance, the war, these things were never discussed in the Cabinet.
I know how
Q What part did you have in the Munich Pact of September 1938?
circumstances, which had to be attained. However, both of us agreed Furthermore, in my conversations with M. Boeret, I had the same position.
I told everybody else, publicly and personally, that former Government.
We will not recognize them. So here, also, there ordered for any eventuality.
As a politician, I was extremely glad about all attempts to find a peaceful solution.
I recognize that at Minister made all efforts.
However, the situation on the day before It was about 6.30 or 7 o'clock in the morning when the Italian Ambassador, Atolico, called me up.
He had to see me immediately on orders from Mussolini.
It was about the solution of the Sudeten problem.
I told him he should go and see the Foreign Minister. He I met him, as much as I recall, at 9 o'clock in the morning, assure a meeting as soon as possible between Germany, Adolph Hitler; England, Prime Minister Chamberlain; France, Prime Minister Daladier;peacefully.
He saw a possibility and was prepared to take all that direction.
I took the Ambassador at once into the Reich agreed and said we should call the Duce by telephone.
A telephone waited outside.
We did that immediately, whereupon Mussolini called circumstances I would like to go there also.
Then I suggested that I could take Herr von Neurath with me.
He also agreed.
friendship. I had personal conversations with M. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain, and I was very happy afterwards, sincerely happy,
Q Before that was the annexation of Austria to Germany. What these measures?
Tribunal personally I felt a great affinity to Austria; that I spent the greatest part of my youth on a Austrian Castle; that my father, during the old monarchy had beenin favor of a closer connection in the future of the German country of Austria with Germany; that he always spoke about that, since he was convinced that this Reich, meaning Austria, would not keep together for a long time. experiencedthe revolution and the collapse of the Habsburg Empire. The German countries, including Sudeten Germany, convened at that time in Vienna in the parlament, declared themselves free of any influence of the dissolved Austrian monarchy and stated, including the representatives of the Sudetenland, that Austria was a part of the German Reich, as much as I remember under the then Social Democratic Chancellor Renner. This statement by the Austrian German people to be in the future a part of Germany was changed by the peace treaty of St. Germain and prohibited by the victorious nations. Neither for myself nor for any other German was that of importance. It was of matter, of course, that the elements would be created that a union between the two brother nations of purely German blood should take place. When we came to power, of course, and as I have said before, this was an integral part of German policy. of Austria were no deception but they were considered very seriously because at first he did not see any other possibility. I myself was much more radical in that direction and I asked him repeatedly not to make any definite statements on the Austrian question. He, however, believed that he had to take a great concern regarding Italy. Germany had come to power also the National Socialist Party in Austria grew more and more. This party, however, before the coming to power in Germany, had existed in Austria as wel l as the source of the National Socialist Party which can be found in Sudeten Germany. The Party in Austria was therefore not a fifth column for the Anschluss because the annexation was demanded originally and always by the Austrian people themselves. If, therefore, the idea of the Anschluss did not exist so clearly with the then Austrian Government, then it was not for the reason that they did not want to go with Germany but because the form of government of National Socialism was incompatible with the form of government in Austria at that time.
mentioned by the Prosecution in its charges. These tensions had to exist because there were people who accepted the thought of annexation, of Anschluss with Germany and the government did not. This resulted in political fights. That we were on the side of the National Socialists as far as our sympathies were concerned is evident, particularly since the Party in Austria was persecuted. Many of them were put into camps, which were exactly the same thing as concentration camps only under different names. of Habicht. I did not know him before, I met him once later. He, before the Dollfuss case, made believe to the Fuehrer that the Austrian Army had decided to undertake something on their own in order to force the government into the Anschluss or to overthrew it. He wanted to know if this would be the case if the Party in Austria would go with them. If the Austrian Army would do anything like that the Fuehrer, of course, said that the Party should support it. But the whole thing was a deception because not the Austrian Army was against the Austrian Government or determined to do anything against the government but a so-called Wehrmacht Standarte, a unit which consisted of former members, discharged members of the Austrian Army and had joined the Party. With this deceptive maneuver Mr. Habicht undertook his actions in Vienna. I was then in Beyreuth with the Fuehrer. He called Habicht and told him that he had given him the wrong information and had deceived him. meant a serious situation as far as the National Socialists were concerned and also with regard to Italy. Italy mobilized five divisions at that time and sent them to the Brenner Pass. The Fuerher desired a quick appeasement. That was the reason why he had asked Herr von Papen to go as an extraordinary ambassador to Vienna and to strive for a quick peace of the political atmosphere there.
the course of the years, that is to say, that a purely German country such as Austria would not have been influenced strongly from the German Government side but by the Italian Government. May I remind you of the statement of Mr. Churchill, that Austria is practically a branch of Italy. Germany and made it clear Italy would be the country which would do something against such annexation. Therefore, besides the internal appeasement as to the relations between Germany and Austria by Herr von Papen, the Fuehrer also had tried to bring about a change in the attitude of Mussolini concerning this question. For this reason a short time after he went to Vienna -- maybe it was before, at any rate he attempted to bring about a different attitude. common in a philosophic sense between fascism and National Socialism, the annexation of our brother people was much more important than that coordination and if it was not possible to do it with Mussolini we would have to do it against him. Then the Italian-Ethiopian war started, the sanctions against Italy and here visible but not too clearly Germany was offered, if she would take part in the sanctions, that certain concessions would be made in the Austrian question. That was a difficult decision for the Fuehrer to make, to declare himself finally against Italy and achieve the Anschluss by these means or to secure Italy's attitude to his own attitude and to exclude Italy as an opponent of the Anschluss. I suggested to him at that time, in view of the somewhat vague offer regarding Austria from English-French circles, to try and find out first who was behind this offer and whether indeed both governments would be approachable on this point and could give assurances, that is to say, assurances in this direction, that this would be considered an internal German affair and not some vague assurances of a general nature.
My suspicions proved right, that we could not get any clear assurances and under these circumstances, it was opportune to exclude Italy as the main opponent to the Anschluss because of the fact that we did not join any sanctions against Italy, and so on.
for a union of these Germans should go beyond all objections of difficulties between the two present governments, and that could not be done simply by the fact of the government of the German Reich's ceding and joining Germany with Austria, but the Anschluss had to be executed sooner or later.
Then came the agreement of Berchtesgaden. I was not present at that time. I did not even agree to it because I opposed any definite statement which would continue that indecisive condition. For me, the complete union of all Germans was the only solution I could accept. then Chancellor Schuschnigg had called. This plebescite as an impossibility. I will overlook the influence of the Berchtesgaden agreement, but the way this plebescite was supposed to take place was unique in history. One could only answer by "yes". Each one could vote as often as he wanted, five times, six times, seven times. If he tore up the slip of paper, that was counted as yes, and so on. That is not really very interesting. system of Schuschnigg had utilized these opportunities sufficiently there could only be a positive majority for Schuschnigg. That whole thing was a farce.
We opposed that. First a member of the Austrian Government who was at that moment in Germany, General von Glaise-Horstenau, was flown to Vienna in order to make clear to Schuschnigg or Seyss-Inquart -- who since Berchtesgaden, had been in the cabinet of Schuschnigg -- that Germany would never tolerate this provocation. At the same time, troops which were stationed near the Austrian border were alerted.
That was on Friday, I believe, the 11th. On that day, I was in the Reichschancellory with the Fuehrer and we were alone in the room. I received the telephone information that Glaize-Horstenau had arrived and turned over our demands clearly, and that these things were now being discussed. Then, as far as I remember, the answer came that the plebescite would not take place, and Schuschnigg agreed with that solution.
At that moment I had a feeling that new the situation had started to glide, and that now, finally, the possibility which we had waited for existed, of bringing about the entire and total solution, and from that moment on I must take one hundred per cent responsibility for all further happenings, because it was less the Fuehrer than myself who at that time decided about the speed, and I even overruled objections by the Fuehrer and brought everything to its final development.
My telephone conversations have been read here. I demanded spontaneously, without having spoken to the Fuehrer about it, the immediate retirement of Chancellor Schuschnigg. When this was granted, I put my next demand, so that now the whole matter was ripe for the annexation, and, as it is well known, it took place.
The only thing -- and I don't say this because it is important for me in the course of this trial -- which I did not cause personally -- and that only because I did not know the personalities involved, but *---*ing the last days it was mentioned by the prosecution -- was the following: I sent a list of ministers through. That is to say, I named those members who at first would be considered desirable as members of an Austrian government by our side. I knew Seyss-Inquart, and it was clear to re that he should get the Chancellorship. Then I named Kaltenbrunner for security. I did not know Kaltenbrunner, and that if one of the two things in which the Fuehrer intervened in giving me a few names. Also I gave the name of Fischboeck for the unimportant Ministry of Economics without knowing him. brother-in-law, Dr. Hueber, as Minister of Justice, but not because he was my brother-in-law. He was already Austrian Minister of Justice. He had been in the cabinet of Dr. Seidle. He was not a member of the Party at that time, but he came out of the ranks of the Heimwehr and it was important to me to have one of that part with whom we had initailly worked, and with whom we had fought at times. I wanted to have one of them in the cabinet, and I wanted to have my interests secured so that everything now would develop in the sense of a total Anschluss, because at that time already plans appeared to the extent that the Fuehrer only, as the head of the German Reich, should at the same time be the head of German Austria, but otherwise there should be a separation. That I considered intolerable. The hour of decision had came and we had to make the best use of it.
Ribbentrop who was in London at that tine, I stressed that the ultimatum had not been put by ourselves but by Seyss-Inquart. That was absolutely true. Legally, in fact, of course I put it, but that telephone conversation was heard on the English side and I had to conduct a diplomatic conversation, and I have never heard yet that diplomats in such cases say later how it was in fact, but they always stress how it was de jure, and why should I be an exception there? he ask the British Government to name British personalities in whom they had full confidence, and I would make everything available to make sure that these people could travel throughout Austria in order to see for themselves that the Austrian people, in overwhelming majority, wanted this Anschluss and greeted it with enthusiasm.
talked about the fact that these events had already taken place on Friday. The Sunday before, in Styria, a main section of the country -- an internal part -- annexation had taken place. But there already the people had declared themselves in favor of the Anschluss and stated that they wanted to have nothing to do with the Viennese Government.
Q I have just handed you a record of that conversation. Would you like to look at it? than the documents, that only these parts are read where I point out that the British Government should as soon as possible send to Austria people in whom they have confidence, in order that they may see for themselves. Second, that we are going to hold a plebiscite according to the Charter of the Saar Plebiscite, and that whatever the result may be, we shall acknowledge that. I could promise that all the more, as it was known to me, and clear, that an overwhelming majority would vote in favor of the Anschluss.
Now I come to the decisive part of the march of the troops. That was the second point, where the Fuehrer and I were not of the same opinion. the new Government of Seyss-Inquart that they wanted the troops for pacification of the country. I was against it, and I would like to be understood, not against the march into Austria; I was for the march under all circumstances. It touched only the reasoning. Here a distinction must be carefully made. Certainly it was possible. At one point General Neustadt said there could be disturbances, because some of the Austrian Marxists who once before had started an armed uprising were still armed. That, however, was not of such a decisive nature. It was of the greatest importance that immediately German troops should march into Austria in order to stave off any desire of the neighbor who would wish to inherit only one single Austrian village. was not quite stated, although I had worked on him the year before in that direction. The Italians were still looking for the East Tyrol. The five divisions along the Brenner -- well, I did not forget about these.
The Hungarians talked too much about the Burgenland. The Yugo-Slavs once mentioned some thing abut Thuringia, but I believe that I made it clear to them that that was crazy. march of the German troops into Austria, under the motto "The Anschluss has taken place; Austria is a part of Germany," and therefore in its spirit automatically and completely under the protection of the German Reich and its Armed Forces. The Fuehrer did not want to stress this demonstration and finally had me communicate with Seyss-Inquart to send a telegram, once we were in agreement about the main points. I told Seyss-Inquart that he didn't have to send a telegram,, that he could tell me by telephone. That was the reason that the consent of Mussolini came only at 11:30 at night. It is well known what a relief that brought to the Fuehrer. went to the Air Force Club, where I had been visited several weeks before. I mention this because here also that has been described as a maneuver of deception. The invitation for that had been sent out at a time when not even the Berchtesgaden conference had as yet taken place. There I met almost all the diplomats. I immediately spoke to Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador, talked to him for two hours, explained all the reasons to him again, and also asked him to tell me. And I asked Ribbentrop the same some time later, "Which nation has been damaged in any way by our union with Austria? From whom have we taken anything and whom have we harmed?" within the German Reich, had been together for centuries, and only by political construction, the later monarchy, they had been separated. business in the Reich. At that time I prohibited the return of the Austrian Legion to Austria -- that was a group of people who had to leave Austria during the fighting period, of the party -- because I did not want to have any disturbances. Secondly, however, I also made sure that north of the Danube, that is to say,between the Czechoslovak border and the Danube, only one battalion should march through the villages, so that Czechoslovakia should see from that that this was only an Austro-German affair.
That battalion had to march through there so that the towns north of the Danube should also take part in the jubilation.
In this connection, and finally, I want to stress two points:
If Mr. Messersmith in his long affidavit has expressed, I had before the Anschluss made various visits to Yugoslavia and Hungary in order to gain the cooperation of both these nations for the Anschluss, and if he declares that I had promised to Yugoslavia portions of Thuringia, then in answer to this statement I can say that I do not understand them at all. My visits in Yugoslavia and throughout the other Balkan countries were designed to improve the conditions, particularly economic relations, trade relations, which were very important for me with respect to the four-yearplan, and if at any time Yugoslavia had demanded one single village of Thuringia, I would have said that on such a point I would not even answer, because if any country is German from the roots then that is Thuringia.
The second point: Here in the indictment the expression "aggressive war against Austria" is used. Aggressive war is conducted by shooting, dropping bombs and soon; but here only me thing was dropped -- and that was flowers. But maybe, the Prosecution wants it understand differently. And there I could agree. I personally have always stated that I would do anything to make sure that the Anschluss should not disturb the peace,but that in the long run if we should not be permitted to effect the annexation in order to make possible for theseGermans to return to Germany I would also resort to war.