I myself heard of the events when I returned to Berlin. To start with, the ticket collector of my carriage told me that he had seen strange people at Halle. Half an hour later I called on my adjutant, who reported to me that riots had taken place during the night, that Jewish businesses had been smashed and plundered, and that synagogues had been set on fire. That was all I could gather at the time. He didn't know any more himself. through to the Gestapo. I demanded a report of the events of that night. That is the report which has been referred to here, and which was made to me by the Chief of the Gestapo, Heydrich, with reference to the events as far as he knew thorn at the time when, in the evening of the following day I heard about it. I told him, then and there, having in the meantime heard that Goebbels had certainly been strongly involved as the originator, I told the Fuehrer that it was impossible for me to have such events take place, particularly at that time, that I was very much concerned, in connection with the Four Year Plan, to concentrate the entire economic field, and that I had in the course of speeches to the nation, asked that each bit of metal, each rusty nail, every bit of scrap metal, should be collected and utilized. I said that it was impossible that a man who was not responsible for that sphere of influence should complicate and disturb my extremely difficult economic task by destroying so many economic values, on the one hand, and, on the other, introducing so much disturbance into the economic life. generally agreed with me. He agreed that such events were not to take place and must not be allowed to take place. I pointed out to him, too, that shortly after the Munich agreement such matters would assume unfavorable foreign political proportions.
In the afternoon I had another discussion with the Fuehrer. In the meantime Goebbels had been to see him, to whom I had also expressed over the telephone in unmistakable terms what my conception was.
I used extremely severe words. I told him particularly, at the time, that I was not anxious to suffer the consequences of his uncontrolled actions and pay the bill for them, so far as the economic sector was concerned. then he changed his mind. Just what Goebbels told him and just how far he referred to the excited methods to the Fuehrer, or how far he mentioned urgent questions, I don't know, but at any rate the Fuehrer's views were not the same as they were on the occasion of my first complaint.
Whilst we were talking, Goebbels joined us. He had been in the house. He started his usual talk, that it could not be tolerated, that this was the second or third murder in foreign countries committed by a Jew against a National Socialist, and it was on that occasion that he first made the suggestion that a fine should be imposed upon the Jews. He wished that the Gaue should collect such a fine themselves, and he demanded an almost incredibly high figure. be a fine, then the Reich must collect it. I said, "Mr. Goebbels has the most Jews in Berlin, and he would therefore not be the suitable person to do such a thing, since he is the most interested party. Apart from that, if such measures are to be taken, then only the sovereign state has the right to carry them out." was settled upon. I pointed out to the Fuehrer that under certain circumstances that figure would have repercussions upon the taxation income of the state. Following that, the Fuehrer wished and ordered that now the economic solution was to be carried through, so that there would be no further causes of similar events. In the first place, the obvious and visible Jewish businesses should be aryanized, in particular, department stores. Continuous difficulties arose over them, due to the fact that the employees and civil servants of the Ministries, who could only do their shopping between 6 and 7 in the evening, were often going to those stores, and had certain difficulties because of that.
He ordered, in large terms, what should be done. the officials concerned to be present. Unfortunately, the Fuehrer had demanded that a commission should be appointed and that Goebbels should be present at it. He was, in fact, there, and I said that he had nothing to do with economic questions. The discussion was very lively. We were all irritated during that meeting. Following that, I had the economic laws drafted and used them later on. sphere, such as restriction of travel, restriction of residence, prohibition from entering certain spots, were not issued by me since they did not belong in my sphere of influence, and since I had not any corresponding orders. They were issued later on in the sphere of influence of the Police and not by me, and certain alleviations were brought about through my interference. both a verbal and written order from the Fuehrer to carry out these laws and issue them, I assume full and absolute responsibility for these laws, which bear my signature, because I have published them and consequently I am responsible. I do not propose to hide in any way behind the Fuehrer order.
Q Another matter. What were the reasons that the Disarmament Conference was cancelled and that we left the League of Nations? states who, after completion of disarmament on the part of Germany had also taken upon themselves the duty to disarm, did not carry that out; the second point was that we ascertained that there was a lack of any preparedness or any willingness to meet justified German applications for revisions in any way; thirdly, that there were repeated violations against the Treaty of Versailles and against the statues of the League of Nations, on the part of other states, Poland, Lithuania, and so on, which, on the part of the League of Nations, were criticized but not terminated, and accepted as an accomplished facts, fourth, that all complaints on the part of Germany regarding the question of minorities, though discussed and well-meaning advice given, were imparted to the states in question, but nothing was done to rectify the position.
Q Why did Hitler decide to rearm and reintroduce the draft?
Conference, it simultaneously announced its clear-cut decision to the leading powers concerned, which was to achieve general disarmament. historically known; restriction to a certain number of men of the armed forces, limitation to certain arms, abolish fighting arms, including bombs, and various other points. Each one of these proposals was refused and did not come up for general discussion or consideration. that the other parties were not willing to disarm but that they, on the contrary, were intending otherwise, and that the powers in East Russia were carrying out rearmament, it became necessary, for the securing of our most vital interests and these of the German people and its survival and security, for us also to make ourselves free of the ties and to rearm in such a way as was now necessitated by the interests and security of the Reich. That was the first condition for the necessity of re-introducing the draft. in rearmament? the question of rearmament. In spite of that, I did arrange for certain basic conditions. I immediately enlarged production. I increased air traffic over and above the actual necessities so as to be able to train a larger number of pilots. who left the armed forces, the Wehrmacht, so as to enter commercial flying and to learn to fly there. of the most essential conditions for the security of my nation that protection in the air should be achieved. words, a fighter force, might suffice, but upon reflection I realized -and I want to emphasize what the Witness Fieldmarshal Kesselring said on that subject--that a fighter force alone for defensive purposes would be lost, and that even a defensive air force must contain bombers so that it can be used offensively against the enemy air force on the ground.
developed. In the beginning rearmament proceeded slowly. Everything had to be done, since nothing existed in the way of air rearmament. after we had had repeated refusals to our proposals, to declare to the world openly that we were creating an air force, and that I had already created a certain basis for that. This took place in the form of an interview which I gave to a British correspondent. that we confined ourselves to what we called a risky Air Force. There were risks that came into it, because if an opponent who was to attack Germany should know that he wouldmeet some air force which was by no means strong, if he on his own part were in any way decisive, then this would involve a risk. Witness Bodenschatz, where I said that we must put ourselves on the basis of rearming from that moment, and that money mattered nothing, where I said I would take responsibility for overdrawing the budget. if the aircraft production on one side was made to work at maximum speed and with maximum effort, and if, on the other hand, the training program was simultaneously carried out with the greatest possible speed. Other states had not disarmed, but here and there they had neglected their air forces, and they were catching up lost ground, and considerable discussions took place, in England, about modernizing and increasing the air force, while feverish activities were taking place in Russia, so that we had clearevidence. I shall refer to the question of Russia and their air force later. to Germany and asked for Support, particularly in the air. We must not forget that France with his troops was stationed in Africa.
He could not get across since the fleet was in the hands of the Communists, or, as they called themselves at the time, the Revolutionary Government.
The decisive factor was that the troops came to Spain. The Fuehrer thought about the matter. I urged him to give it support under all circumstances; One, to prevent further spreading of Communism in that theater; and, secondly, so as to have an opportunity to try my young air force on that occasion in one or the other technical aspects. transport fleet and a number of experimental units of fighters, bombers , and anti-aircraft guns, down to Spain. In that way I had an opportunity to ascertain under combat conditions whether the material had been developed appropriately. I saw to it that there was a continuous flow. In other words, new people continuously went and the others were recalled. creation of a large section of new industries. It didn't help me to build a string Air Force and not to have any petrol for it. Here, too, therefore, I had to force the construction of the necessary industrial works. There were other auxiliary industries, aluminum, for instance. And since I had created the Air Force for the security of the Reich, and since the tools of war should be modernized as the most important share of building up the armed forces, I had the duty as Supreme Commander to do everything to develop it to its absolute peak. I had to make a maximum effort, therefore, to get to work, and that is what I did. two-engine bombers, et cetera. The witnesses made statements to the best of their knowledge and ability, but they could only talk about certain small factors, and they gave their opinion from their point of view. Solely responsible, was I, and I am. I was Supreme Commander and the minister responsible for that rearmament. I was technically responsible. I was responsible for training. I was responsible for the spirit of the Air Force.
If at the beginning and at that stage I didn't build any four-engine bombers, then it wasn't because I had certain qualms or was worried that they might be interpreted as being an aggressive Air Force.
That this might be held against me would not have disturbed me for one minute. My only reason was because technical and production conditions were not at the time existing. As far as my industry was concerned, that bomber had not been developed, at any rate not so that I could use it. Secondly, I was still short of aluminum, and every semi-expert knows justhow much aluminum a four-engine bomber absorbs or how much aluminum you need for a fighter or for a fast two-engine bomber, and how many you can build. potential opponents in a war to start with: Are the technical conditions for the meeting of an attack against Germany all right? The chief opponent I had to think about was Russia, but of course England, France and Italy had to be considered since it was my duty to consider all possibilities.
As far as the European theatre of war was concerned, I was satisfied to have bombers which could operate against the important centers of re-armament or any one accumulation of airpower.
In other words, to start with, I didn't need anything more than those aircraft which would enable me to do that; but in my speech to the aircraft industry there is no doubt I desired most urgently to have a bomber which, loaded withthe necessary bombs, could fly to America and back. might enter into war against Germany I could also reach the American armament industry. In other words, it wasn't that I didn't want them. I even, as far as I remember, created a competition for the best bomber capable of flying at great height and at great speed and large distances. Even before the beginning of the war we were developing propellerless aircraft. In fact, summing up, I would heartily say that I did everything that was possible under the then prevailing technical and production situation that was necessary to rebuild and re-arm a strong airforce. Under the technical realizations of the time, which would lead us to believe that five years later new advances, technical and tactical, would be made, I made my decision. situation would develop, would be strong enough to protect the nation and would be strong enough to deal blows against the enemy of Germany. It is perfectly correct, as Mr. Justice Jackson asked, whether the speedy elimination of Poland and France was due to the fact that the German airforce acted on modern principles and contributed so much. That was the decisive and factual condition. On the other hand, though this does not concern me, the superiority of the American airforce assured the Allied victory. control of raw materials in April 1934? day before yesterday with regard to the gradual rise of my person and the inclusion of it into the economic Reich.
The origin was the agriculture crisis in 1935. In the early summer of 1936 the then Minister of War, von Blomberg, met the then Economic Minister and President of the Reich, Schacht, and they came to me and asked me whether I was prepared to back a suggestion of theirs they wanted to take to the Fuehrer, which proposed the use of raw material and foreign currency control. It was agreed that I did not appear as an economic expert.
I was not, but wer were concerned with the difficulties due to shortage of foreign currency which continuously arose because of our heavy demands. We were concerned with finding and accumulating raw materials and we knew that some one was necessary who was capable of taking measures which were not easily understandable to the nation and which would be backed by his authority. Secondly, it was realized that in this sphere, though not as an expert, I could use my energy as the driving power. Party. He was not a member of the Party. He was on excellent terms with the Fuehrer and myself but not so much with the members of the Party, and the danger arose that the appropriate measures might not be understood. In this connection we must assume that I was the right man to cover him up towards the Party.
That is how that situation arose. But since I, as Airminister, was interested in raw materials I came into the picture more and more on my own initiative. The differences between agriculture and economy about foreign currency were increasing, so that I had to make my own decisions and introduce even more severe measures. Consequently, I entered into the economic field more and more and it became my chief work to accumulate the necessary raw material to ascertain the aim of re-armament and economy. That, in turn, brought about the 4-Year Plan.
Q What was the aim of the 4-Year Plan?
A It was the aim of the 4-Year Plan to achieve two objectives: One, the economy as far as possible, and particularly in the agriculture sector, should be made secure against any crisis; two, that in the event of a war Germany should be able to withstand its effect as far as possible. In other words, it was necessary, firstly, to increase agriculture as far as possible and direct it appropriately, and direct the market, thus accumulating stocks that way, and also by negotiating with foreign countries; and secondly, to establish which raw materials that had been imported up to then could be found in Germany proper, produced there and created there. What raw materials that were difficult to import could be replaced by others which were more easily obtainable In other words, briefly, as far as the agriculture sector was concerned, there should be utilization of every proper square kilometer; it should be properly regulated and directed according to the necessities of producing food.
There should be direction of animal breeding. Reserves should be accumulated for the times of need in the economic sector. We were concerned with the creation of industries supplying raw materials. Although there was sufficient coal, its production would have to be increased considerably; and it was necessary for raw material of another kind--iron. in the event of a crisis in this field, the most disasterous situation could have arisen. I can quite understand that from the purely financial business point of view it was all right, but nevertheless we had to attempt to utilize our iron ores which were in existence, though perhaps it was a worse quality than that which Sweden produced, and we had to try to coordinate that industry and have them try to work with that German ore. did not attempt the utilization. Following that I founded the iron works which was given my name. I originally founded it to deal with any ore that was produced on German soil and to leave it at the disposition of the largest metal industry created. There were aluminum works and various other works, and then came the development of the so-called synthetic material industry, which was necessary to replace raw materials which could only be obtained from abroad and under difficult circumstances; and to that, as far as the textile industry was concerned, this also concerned the reorganization of I. G. Farben. the question of labor, and coordination was necessary here too. An important industry had to have workers and less important industries had to dispense with them. The direction of that pre-war labor problem, which was merely effective internally in Germany before the war, was another task of the 4-Year Plan and its division of labor. anofficial organization, and for two months after Schacht left, I took over the economic ministry and fitted the 4-Year Plan into it and merely retained a very small staff with which I carried out the task, with the assistance of the ministries concerned.
aggressive war? economic crisis and toprocure her against a blockade in the event of war, and of course to create the conditions through the 4-Year Plan which were necessary for re-armament. That was one more of its more important tasks.
Q How did the occupation of the Rhineland occur? a long-prepared affair. What had been discussed previously has not concerned with the occupation of the Rhineland but was the case of an attack against Germany and what the mobilization in the Rhineland would have to be.
The Rhineland occupation occurred for two reasons. The balance which was created through the Pact of Locarno had been disturbed in the rest of Europe, because a new factor had arisen through the assistance arrangement between France and Russia, with their then extremely strong-armed forces. Secondly, there was the Russian-Czechoslovakian mutual agreement, which created a condition which removed the excuse for Locarno as far as we were concerned. Thus, such a threat to Germany had occurred or,shall we say, the possibility of such a threat that it would have been a neglect of duty on the part of the government if we had not done everything to insure the security and safety of the Reich in this connection. But we used sovereign rights of a sovereign state, the Reich, and liberated ourselves from the dishonorable duty not to have a part of the Reich under our jurisdiction, and thus that important part of the Reich was taken under our protection, which was, first of all, carried out against extreme fortification.
The construction of such defense and strong fortification system, which is considerable, is only justified if that juncture is regarded as a final and definite one.
If I had the intention to alter my frontiers within the near future, then it would never be possible or advisable to create such an enormously expensive enterprise as was the construction of the Western Wall. This was done -- and that I want to emphasize particularly -- from the beginning with a positively defensive aid and a defensive measure -- it was securing the western borders of the Reich against a threat, which became apparent by the new constellation of powers and forces. The pacts with Russia had become a threat to Germany. The actual occupation and the decision carried out was done on very short notice. The troops who marched into the Rhineland were of such small numbers and that is a historical fact, that they were merely a taken occupation force. The air force would not enter the left Rhine territory at all since no ground organization was available. It entered the so-called "demilitarized territory" right of the Rhine, and that is all. In other words, it was that the Rhineland was practically flooded by large numbers of troops but as I said before, there were a few battalions and a few artillery batteries who moved in and with that, carrying out the points of the program and put on record that the Rhineland had come back to the sovereignty of the sovereign German Reich and will in the future be protected accordingly.
Q What were Hitler's aims when he created the Council for the Reich Defense and when he issued the Reich Defense Law? portant part here. Please, understand me, but I believe that in these months it has been talked about more than it has ever been able to talk since it was originated. To start with, it is called "Reichsverteidigungsrat" and that is the Council for the Defense of the Reich and not Council for the attack. It is such an obvious matter of necessity. It exists in every other country in some form or other, may it be of the same name or a different one but to start with, there was a Committee for the Reich Defense before we came into power and that Committee fought for the Reich defense; there were representatives from all the ministries for the purpose of carrying out preparation for organization which would automatically become necessary in the case of any conflict, but it a war, or be it possibility of a war, or be it a war between other States upon our borders, where the question of guarding our neutrality would come into play;at any rate, these are current measures which referred to the mobilization and factors which would have to have been utilized, and how traffic problems would be solved -- in fact, all these matters which I need not refer to in detail since they are so obvious.
between the representatives of the ministries and were attended by the representatives of the ministry of war. The Council for the Reich Defense was created, first of all, when the armed forces came into their own, but it remained on paper. I think I was Deputy Chairman -- I don't even known -- I heard about that but I assure you, under my oath, I assure you under my oath that at no time and at no date did I participate in a single meeting when the Council for the Defense of the Reich was called together as such. These conferences, which were necessary for the Defense of the Reich, were held in a completely different form and in accordance with the necessities of the situation. Naturally, there were conferences about the defense of the Reich but in the shape of Council for the defense of the Reich, no, it existed, I think on paper, but it never met. But even if it had met, then that would only be logical since this concerns defense and not attack. The Reich Defense law, or rather the Ministerial Council for the Reich Defense,which is probably what you mean, that was created only one day before the outbreak of the war. Since the Council for the Reich Defense did in fact not exist, then, if the Ministerial Council for the Reich Defense is not to be considered the same as, for instance, the War Cabinet that was formed in England when the war broke out, or perhaps in other States. To the contrary, that Ministerial Counsel for the Reich Defense was -- by using abbreviated procedure -- to carry out the necessary war laws and war measures and it was to relieve the Fuehrer, to a considerable extent, who was in fact concerned with the military lead in the military field. The Ministerial Council -- it should therefore start with all these laws which I don't want to mention in detail and which are normal at the beginning of a war in any country. The early period, we met three or four times and after that not at all. I didn't have the time after that, too, and to abbreviate the procedure, these laws were rather circulated and then issued, and one or one and a half years afterwards -- I cannot remember the exact time the Fuehrer placed the issuance of laws before in his own hands and I became an advisor of certain laws, in my capacity of Ministerial Counsel, and that was in the later years practically discontinued.
In practice, that Ministerial Council did, I do not think, meet again after 1940.
Q The prosecution has presented a document No. 2261-PS. In that document a Reich Defense Law of the 21 May 1935 is mentioned which, by order of the Fuehrer, was originally drafted. I shall have that document shown to you and, please, will you explain your views on it?
Q Would you please state your views? a mobilization caused a Reich Defense Law to be prepared in 1935. The decision or resolution was passed in the Reich Cabinet and that law applied to the case of a mobilization. In fact, it was replaced when mobilization occurred, by the law I have mentioned -- referred to the Ministerial Council of the Defense of the Reich. In that law of that date, before the Four Year Plan, 1935, that law appointed the Plenipotentiary for Economy for the event of mobilization and also a Plenipotentiary for Administration; in other words, if a war occurs, then the total administration was to be concentrated with one minister and all the departments concerning the economy and armament were to be drawn together with another minister. One plenipotentiary for administration appeared more or less before -- did not appear before mobilization. The Plenipotentiary for Economy, on the other hand, -- this title was made publicly known -- was to commit his tasks immediately. That was indeed necessary, from that you can probably gather, and explanation for the reason when the Four Year Plan was created, there was inevitable friction between the Plenipotentiary for Economy and the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan. Both of them were more or less working on similar tasks. When, therefore, in 1936, I was given the task to take care of the Four Year Plan, the activities of the Plenipotentiary for Economy ceased at that time.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, ought I to stop now with the questions?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think that would be a good time.
(A recess was taken from 1245 to 1400 hours) Germany, on 14 March 1946, 1400 to 1700.
Lord BY DR. STAHMER:
Q Repeatedly a word was used here "Reichsforschungsrat," Reich Research Council, what kind of an institution was that? get in there an entirely German research department so far as it was important for armament. Unfortunately, that was done much too late. The purpose was to avoid parallel researches, and useless research, but the concentration of research with a view of problems important for the war. I became President of the Reichs Research Council, and established the directive for research in the sense which I have mentioned.
Q Inconnection with that research was the office of the Airforce? different, and it had nothing to do with either research on the one hand, or effort on the other hand. The expression was sort of camouflaged, for when we came to power there was a considerable confusion in the technical part of the surveying of important information, therefore, I founded the Research Office at first. That is an institution where all technical devices for the surveyance of radio, telephone, and all other technical communication institutions would be provided. Since I was only Minister of Aviation I could only do it on my own accord, and I used this camouflage in question. The whole machinery was set up only to take care of the foreign mission, important personalities who had telephones and telegraph connections with foreign countries, and Washington, and to decode their messages, and to leave the utilization to the various departments, as that office had no agent, or no service of information of their own. It was purely a technical office to take care of broadcasts, telephone conversations whereever it was ordered, of telegrams, and less utilization in the information to the department concerned.
In this connection I may stress that I have read much about the communication by Mr. Messerschmidt, who has been mentioned here for quite sometime, he was the main source for such information to us. which was created a short time after seizure of power? Marshal von Blomberg, and simultaneously, or so, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Colonel General von Fritsch retired, that is, to say, the Fuehrer retired him. The coincidence of both of the retirements in the years of the Fuehrer showed a disadvantage of the procedure of the Wehrmacht, the desire to offset this change in the Wehrmacht to theoutside. He said he wanted first to change the foreign minister so that change alone would make a strong impression abroad to the interest that a directive would control or direct military affairs. At that time I protested to the Fuehrer about that. In a long personal -lengthy personal conversation I asked not to consider a change in the foreign ministry. He, however, believed he would have to insist upon it. Neurath. The Fuehrer intended to keep Herr von Neurath, for he had the greatest esteem for him in the cabinet. I, personally, have always expressed my respect for Herr von Neurath. Only in order to create no reduction in the prestige of von Neurath, a proposal was made by myself to the Fuehrer. I told him in order to make it appear abroad that von Neurath had not quite retired from foreign policy, I would propose to appoint him chairman of the Secret Cabinet Council. There was no such cabinet for conferences in existence, but the expression would sound where it really would sound quite nice, and anybody could have some idea of what it may mean. The Fuehrer said, "But we can not make him a chairman of this when we have no conference." Thereupon I said, "Then we will make one," and offhand I marked down names of several persons, and of how little important I gave this idea, you may know I was one of the last on that list. policy, and when I returned I told my friends I think that this was very natural, but the Fuehrer had done little about the council from the foreign ministry, and certainly none at all from the council, he wanted to have no work for this.
I declare under oath that this cabinet council atno time, not even for one single minute that can be, not even for a constitution, met; of some members, I don't know them, even know they were members.
Q When was the Reich Cabinet in session last?
The Fuehrer did not think much of Cabinet meetings. The agenda was concerned took place.
The Ministers thought, very rightly so, that it made their work difficult.
A solution was found since I, under the name "Four Year Plan," called the Ministers together more political decisions taken of any importance.
For instance, the war, these things were never discussed in the Cabinet.
I know how
Q What part did you have in the Munich Pact of September 1938?
circumstances, which had to be attained. However, both of us agreed Furthermore, in my conversations with M. Boeret, I had the same position.
I told everybody else, publicly and personally, that former Government.
We will not recognize them. So here, also, there ordered for any eventuality.
As a politician, I was extremely glad about all attempts to find a peaceful solution.
I recognize that at Minister made all efforts.
However, the situation on the day before It was about 6.30 or 7 o'clock in the morning when the Italian Ambassador, Atolico, called me up.
He had to see me immediately on orders from Mussolini.
It was about the solution of the Sudeten problem.
I told him he should go and see the Foreign Minister. He I met him, as much as I recall, at 9 o'clock in the morning, assure a meeting as soon as possible between Germany, Adolph Hitler; England, Prime Minister Chamberlain; France, Prime Minister Daladier;peacefully.