You must not forget that such election fights and speeches took place between political representatives of our Party and clergymen who were representatives of those Parties which were closely tied to the Church. that a more violent faction--if I may use that expression in this connection--did not forget this fight, and they, in their turn, were once more transferring the fight to yet another level. But the Fuehrer's attitude was that the churches should be given the possibility of developing and existing. which gradually is absorbing more or less the majority of the whole German nation, and which now, in its active political part, also contains the politically active persons of Germany, in spite of the leadership principle does not create the same conceptions everywhere. The speed, the methods, the attitude, are always different, and such large movements, even if they are authoritatively led, must contain certain groups which are the result of certain problems, and if I am to name the group in this connection, which within the pledge of churches still represented a political, I won't say danger, but undesirable institution, then that was a group in which two personalities became predominant, Himmler on one side and Bormann, particularly later--much later than Himmler--on the other side.
Himmler's motives were less of a political than mystical nature. As far as Bormann is concerned, his aims were much more clear-cut. It was clear too, that from among a large group of gauleiters, one or another might be more keenly interested in that fight against the Church. There were a number of Gaus whore everything was in fine shape so far as the churches were concerned, and there were others where there was a keen fight against the churches. to demonstrate my attitude and to have a certain calming influence.
Thus, in the Prussian Ministerial Council I called in certain men in whom I had a great deal of confidence, including a high Protestant and a high Catholic priest. always been a member of the church, and as far as functions which you carry out in church are concerned, such as marriage, christening, and funerals, they have always been carried out in my house by the church. this fight of opinions who were too weak to know what they should do. My view was to show them that the second man in the State went to church, that he had himself christened, that he had himself married, that he had himself confirmed, so when they saw that, they would do that as wall. From the number of letters which I received as a result, I could see that I had done the right thing.
As time went by, in other spheres as 'well as this, the situation became more critical, and on one other occasion during the early years of this war, I had a discussion on it with the Fuehrer. I told him that we should now concern ourselves with the fact that every German was doing his duty and that every soldier was bravely going to his death if need be, and if, in that connection, his religious belief could be of assistance to him, be he of this or that religion, that could only be an advantage. The Fuehrer agreed absolutely. I was in the Air Force and deliberately had no clergyman parties of my own. I was of the opinion that every member of the Air Force should go to the priest in whom he had the most confidence.
That was continually communicated to the soldiers. As far as the church was concerned, I told them that I considered praying a good thing, "But you should pray in the churches and not in the barracks."
In that manner I eliminated from the Air Force any religious upset, and I insured complete liberty of conscience for everyone. the reason. It happened during the last two or three years of the war. This may be due to the fact that in some of the occupied territories the clergymen and that was particularly the case in Polish districts and Czech districts -- were strongly nationalist representatives and that here clashes arose between those on the political level with those on the religious level, which in turn, of curse, would affect the churches. Anyway, I do not know whether this was one of the reasons, but I can consider that it probably was. to the churches. In fact, he told me on one occasion that in certain things even as a leader you cannot assert yourself completely, if certain necessities are unclarified, and religious belief as far as the reconstruction of the churches is concerned, will probably be talkedabout and thought about a great deal. But he said he himself neither thought that he was to be a church reformer nor did he feel that anyone of his political leaders should be active on that level. and the occupied territories, as you said -- Poland and Czecho-Slovakia -- were taken to concentration camps. Do you know anything about that? concentration camps. The case of Niemoeller was common knowledge. I don't want to go into it in detail, because it is well known the later years when the fight increased, for making political speeches in the churches. They were criticizing measures of the State and Party, and depending on the severity of that criticism the police would then interfere. clergymen, that as long as they talked in church they should be allowed to say what they wanted; but if they made political speeches outside the churches then he could interfere and proceed against them just as he would in connection with any other people who were opposed to the State. A number of clergymen who went very far in their criticism were not arrested.
have heard about it; and I said earlier on, that this did not occur on the church level, because they were clergymen, but that it occurred because they were in their point of view strongly nationalist and consequently often were involved in actions hostile to the occupied forces.
Q The Party program included two points. The first was the Jewish problem. What was your basic attitude towards that? me under all circumstances to refer to certain principles and conations. After Germany's collapse in 1918, Jewry became supremely prominent in Germany, in all sectors of life, but particularly the political picture; in general culturally, but particularly in the political field. The fighting men came back from the front. They had nothing. They faced nothing, and now they saw a large number of the Jewish element who had come in during the war from Poland and the East, in positions, particularly economic positions. It is known that under the influence of the war and its business and demobilization, considerable possibilities existed of doing business. There was inflation, deflation -- with all that, enormous transfers, shifting of weight of capital, had taken place. and more appeared in public, so that they invited certain comparisons: the figures they represented, the positions they controlled, in comparison to the German people generally -- add to this that particularly that the party which had been turned down for their anti-national attitude also had a number of Jewish leader who were in no proportion to the total number o f Jews. always considered German. There all the Social Democrat leaders were practically exclusively Jews. They played a very considerable part in politics, particularly in connection with the left-wing parties, and they also became very prominent in the press and political life. all national conceptions and ideals took place. I only remind you of all the publications, articles, which dragged things into the mud; I remind you of the disproportion in the field of art which was also carried out in that way; I remind you of those that lowered morale at the front and flung mud at the ideal of the brave soldier.
In fact, I could quote endless examples of such articles, books, representations and so forth which would lead too far afield, and I am in fact not too well informed on the subject; but anyway, all that caused a defensive attitude, a defensive movement, which was by no means created through National Socialism but which had existed before. prominent after the war when the influence of Jewry became so prominent and predominant. so differently from the German field, that here too there was a considerable split. Add to that, particularly in economy, in the economic field, disregarding the Western industry, there occurred an almost exclusive lead of Jewry and that that lead was in the hands of elements who were even condemned by the old Jewish families in the country. by a few simple people. As far as I know, when it was drafted Adolf Hitler wasn't even participating or not yet even in leadership. When that program was drafted, that point was included in it, which at that time was much in the foreground amongst large sections of the German people, as a defensive point. So that before that, there had been the Raeterepublic; the murder of hostages had taken place. You must understand that this, as a program created in Munich by simple people, would contain that point as a defensive measure. were prominent in the lead, and therefore when the program became known, the Party laughed at. But a concentrated attack of the entire Jewish press and Jewish-influenced press took place, which was directed against the movement. Everywhere Jewry was in the lead in the fight against National Socialism. In the press, be it in politics, be it in the cultural life -- wherever it was -- National Socialism was ridiculed; be it in the economic sphere he who was a National Socialist would not get a position, or the National Socialist business-man could not get supplies or advertising.
These are conditions that became prominent at the time. It all resulted in a strong defensive attitude on the part of the Party.
It led right at the beginning to an increase in influence which had originally not been intended in their program. The program wished one thing very clearly: That Germany should be led by Germans. And it was desired that the leadership and the forming of Germany's political state should be conducted by German people who could reflect the sentiments of the German people much more than people of a different race. Originally it was merely proposed to exclude Jewry from politics and the leadership of the State.
Later on the cultural field was added to that, and that was because of the very strong fight which had developed particularly in that sphere between Jews on one side and National Socialism on the other.
Jews and Jewry, I would still be in a position to quote papers, books, periodicals and features on the side of the opponents which are insults that can not in any way be equalled or excelled upon. All that would obviously lead to a deep controversy. Jews who had taken part in the world war and who had been decorated were considered, and theyremained unaffected by measures directed against Jews in civil service. sphere, later on the cultural sphere. The Nurnberg laws had the purpose of clarifying the separation of races, and in particular to define the conception of a mixed person for the future, since the idea of the half Jew or the quarter Jew led to continuous differences and a muddle. personal discussions with the Fuehrer regarding the conception of mixed persons and that I pointed out to the Fuehrer that once Germans and Jews were clearly separated, it would be possible to have yet another category between the two which in turn would be an unclarified section of the German people which would not stand on the same level with the other Germans. I suggested to him that here, by a general order, the conception of the person of mixed race should be excluded and that these people should be put on the same footing as other Germans. and he was adopting a perfectly positive attitude to my ideas. In that direction he had, in fact, given certain preparatory orders. After that the stormy days of the Sudeten crisis, Czechoslovakia, occupation of the Rhineland, Poland, arose, and the question of the mixed people moved into the background, but at the beginning of the war the Fuehrer told me that he was prepared to give this thing a positive solution, but only after the war.
The Nurnberg laws were to exclude for the future that conception of people of mixed race.
Consequently, it was planned in the penal paragraphs of the Nurnberg laws that never the women but always the man should be punishable, no matter whether the man was German or Jewish. The German woman or the Jewess could not be punished. After that quieter times came, and the Fuehrer always had the view that for the time being Jews should be admitted, not into the leading positions in the economy, but certainly in positions in the economy. Continuously increasing emigration should help to solve that problem. In spite of the continuous differences and disquiet which arose in the economic field, the Jews, therefore, remained untouched in their economic positions. later on did not really take place until the events of 1938 and then more so after the war had started, but here, once more, there was one group who was more radical, as far as the Jewish question was concerned, to whom the Jewish question was more in the foreground than to other groups of that movement. of National Socialism can be understood in various ways, and the various points of the program were of more importance to one and of less to another. In other words, one considered the point which was to make Germany strong and free as the most important one. Another might say that the Jewish point was the most important.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off? Dr. Stahmer, can you inform the Tribunal how much longer you think the defendant Goering will be in the examination in chief?
DR. STAHMER: I think that we shall finish in the course of tomorrow morning.
THE PRESIDENT: That is a very long time.
DR. STAHMER: I shall do my best to shorten it. I shall be anxious to shorten it.
(A recess was taken) BY DR. STAHMER:
Q What was your participation in the Nurnberg Laws of 1935? time when the Reichstag met here in Nurnberg, I announced these laws simultaneously with the law concerning the new banner, the Reich flag. Jewish race was part of the plan of aggressive war. and the destruction of the Jewish race was not originally planned. November 1938?
A I should like to refer to that briefly. I gathered yesterday, from the cross-examination of the witness Koerner, that a misunderstanding had arisen here. On the 9th of November the march on the Hall of Field Marshals (Feldherrnhalle) was celebrated. This march was repeated every year; the leaders of the movement met on that occasion. Koerner referred to that when he said that everybody came to Munich. It was the custom that after the march was over practically everybody met at the Town Hall in Munich for dinner, at which the Fuehrer was also present. since I used to utilize my stay in Munich on that occasion to attend to various other matters in the afternoon. Neither did I take part in that dinner on that occasion, nor did Koerner. He and I left in the evening in my special train and went to Berlin. As I heard later when the investigation was carried out, on the occasion of that dinner and after the Fuehrer left, Goebbels announced that the seriously wounded secretary of the Embassy in Paris had died of his wounds, and a certain amount of excitement occurred. As a result, apparently Goebbels used words concerning reprisals, and in his way he was probably the most outstanding representative of the anti-Semitic section. He probably gave the cause for the following events, but that was after the Fuehrer had left.
I myself heard of the events when I returned to Berlin. To start with, the ticket collector of my carriage told me that he had seen strange people at Halle. Half an hour later I called on my adjutant, who reported to me that riots had taken place during the night, that Jewish businesses had been smashed and plundered, and that synagogues had been set on fire. That was all I could gather at the time. He didn't know any more himself. through to the Gestapo. I demanded a report of the events of that night. That is the report which has been referred to here, and which was made to me by the Chief of the Gestapo, Heydrich, with reference to the events as far as he knew thorn at the time when, in the evening of the following day I heard about it. I told him, then and there, having in the meantime heard that Goebbels had certainly been strongly involved as the originator, I told the Fuehrer that it was impossible for me to have such events take place, particularly at that time, that I was very much concerned, in connection with the Four Year Plan, to concentrate the entire economic field, and that I had in the course of speeches to the nation, asked that each bit of metal, each rusty nail, every bit of scrap metal, should be collected and utilized. I said that it was impossible that a man who was not responsible for that sphere of influence should complicate and disturb my extremely difficult economic task by destroying so many economic values, on the one hand, and, on the other, introducing so much disturbance into the economic life. generally agreed with me. He agreed that such events were not to take place and must not be allowed to take place. I pointed out to him, too, that shortly after the Munich agreement such matters would assume unfavorable foreign political proportions.
In the afternoon I had another discussion with the Fuehrer. In the meantime Goebbels had been to see him, to whom I had also expressed over the telephone in unmistakable terms what my conception was.
I used extremely severe words. I told him particularly, at the time, that I was not anxious to suffer the consequences of his uncontrolled actions and pay the bill for them, so far as the economic sector was concerned. then he changed his mind. Just what Goebbels told him and just how far he referred to the excited methods to the Fuehrer, or how far he mentioned urgent questions, I don't know, but at any rate the Fuehrer's views were not the same as they were on the occasion of my first complaint.
Whilst we were talking, Goebbels joined us. He had been in the house. He started his usual talk, that it could not be tolerated, that this was the second or third murder in foreign countries committed by a Jew against a National Socialist, and it was on that occasion that he first made the suggestion that a fine should be imposed upon the Jews. He wished that the Gaue should collect such a fine themselves, and he demanded an almost incredibly high figure. be a fine, then the Reich must collect it. I said, "Mr. Goebbels has the most Jews in Berlin, and he would therefore not be the suitable person to do such a thing, since he is the most interested party. Apart from that, if such measures are to be taken, then only the sovereign state has the right to carry them out." was settled upon. I pointed out to the Fuehrer that under certain circumstances that figure would have repercussions upon the taxation income of the state. Following that, the Fuehrer wished and ordered that now the economic solution was to be carried through, so that there would be no further causes of similar events. In the first place, the obvious and visible Jewish businesses should be aryanized, in particular, department stores. Continuous difficulties arose over them, due to the fact that the employees and civil servants of the Ministries, who could only do their shopping between 6 and 7 in the evening, were often going to those stores, and had certain difficulties because of that.
He ordered, in large terms, what should be done. the officials concerned to be present. Unfortunately, the Fuehrer had demanded that a commission should be appointed and that Goebbels should be present at it. He was, in fact, there, and I said that he had nothing to do with economic questions. The discussion was very lively. We were all irritated during that meeting. Following that, I had the economic laws drafted and used them later on. sphere, such as restriction of travel, restriction of residence, prohibition from entering certain spots, were not issued by me since they did not belong in my sphere of influence, and since I had not any corresponding orders. They were issued later on in the sphere of influence of the Police and not by me, and certain alleviations were brought about through my interference. both a verbal and written order from the Fuehrer to carry out these laws and issue them, I assume full and absolute responsibility for these laws, which bear my signature, because I have published them and consequently I am responsible. I do not propose to hide in any way behind the Fuehrer order.
Q Another matter. What were the reasons that the Disarmament Conference was cancelled and that we left the League of Nations? states who, after completion of disarmament on the part of Germany had also taken upon themselves the duty to disarm, did not carry that out; the second point was that we ascertained that there was a lack of any preparedness or any willingness to meet justified German applications for revisions in any way; thirdly, that there were repeated violations against the Treaty of Versailles and against the statues of the League of Nations, on the part of other states, Poland, Lithuania, and so on, which, on the part of the League of Nations, were criticized but not terminated, and accepted as an accomplished facts, fourth, that all complaints on the part of Germany regarding the question of minorities, though discussed and well-meaning advice given, were imparted to the states in question, but nothing was done to rectify the position.
Q Why did Hitler decide to rearm and reintroduce the draft?
Conference, it simultaneously announced its clear-cut decision to the leading powers concerned, which was to achieve general disarmament. historically known; restriction to a certain number of men of the armed forces, limitation to certain arms, abolish fighting arms, including bombs, and various other points. Each one of these proposals was refused and did not come up for general discussion or consideration. that the other parties were not willing to disarm but that they, on the contrary, were intending otherwise, and that the powers in East Russia were carrying out rearmament, it became necessary, for the securing of our most vital interests and these of the German people and its survival and security, for us also to make ourselves free of the ties and to rearm in such a way as was now necessitated by the interests and security of the Reich. That was the first condition for the necessity of re-introducing the draft. in rearmament? the question of rearmament. In spite of that, I did arrange for certain basic conditions. I immediately enlarged production. I increased air traffic over and above the actual necessities so as to be able to train a larger number of pilots. who left the armed forces, the Wehrmacht, so as to enter commercial flying and to learn to fly there. of the most essential conditions for the security of my nation that protection in the air should be achieved. words, a fighter force, might suffice, but upon reflection I realized -and I want to emphasize what the Witness Fieldmarshal Kesselring said on that subject--that a fighter force alone for defensive purposes would be lost, and that even a defensive air force must contain bombers so that it can be used offensively against the enemy air force on the ground.
developed. In the beginning rearmament proceeded slowly. Everything had to be done, since nothing existed in the way of air rearmament. after we had had repeated refusals to our proposals, to declare to the world openly that we were creating an air force, and that I had already created a certain basis for that. This took place in the form of an interview which I gave to a British correspondent. that we confined ourselves to what we called a risky Air Force. There were risks that came into it, because if an opponent who was to attack Germany should know that he wouldmeet some air force which was by no means strong, if he on his own part were in any way decisive, then this would involve a risk. Witness Bodenschatz, where I said that we must put ourselves on the basis of rearming from that moment, and that money mattered nothing, where I said I would take responsibility for overdrawing the budget. if the aircraft production on one side was made to work at maximum speed and with maximum effort, and if, on the other hand, the training program was simultaneously carried out with the greatest possible speed. Other states had not disarmed, but here and there they had neglected their air forces, and they were catching up lost ground, and considerable discussions took place, in England, about modernizing and increasing the air force, while feverish activities were taking place in Russia, so that we had clearevidence. I shall refer to the question of Russia and their air force later. to Germany and asked for Support, particularly in the air. We must not forget that France with his troops was stationed in Africa.
He could not get across since the fleet was in the hands of the Communists, or, as they called themselves at the time, the Revolutionary Government.
The decisive factor was that the troops came to Spain. The Fuehrer thought about the matter. I urged him to give it support under all circumstances; One, to prevent further spreading of Communism in that theater; and, secondly, so as to have an opportunity to try my young air force on that occasion in one or the other technical aspects. transport fleet and a number of experimental units of fighters, bombers , and anti-aircraft guns, down to Spain. In that way I had an opportunity to ascertain under combat conditions whether the material had been developed appropriately. I saw to it that there was a continuous flow. In other words, new people continuously went and the others were recalled. creation of a large section of new industries. It didn't help me to build a string Air Force and not to have any petrol for it. Here, too, therefore, I had to force the construction of the necessary industrial works. There were other auxiliary industries, aluminum, for instance. And since I had created the Air Force for the security of the Reich, and since the tools of war should be modernized as the most important share of building up the armed forces, I had the duty as Supreme Commander to do everything to develop it to its absolute peak. I had to make a maximum effort, therefore, to get to work, and that is what I did. two-engine bombers, et cetera. The witnesses made statements to the best of their knowledge and ability, but they could only talk about certain small factors, and they gave their opinion from their point of view. Solely responsible, was I, and I am. I was Supreme Commander and the minister responsible for that rearmament. I was technically responsible. I was responsible for training. I was responsible for the spirit of the Air Force.
If at the beginning and at that stage I didn't build any four-engine bombers, then it wasn't because I had certain qualms or was worried that they might be interpreted as being an aggressive Air Force.
That this might be held against me would not have disturbed me for one minute. My only reason was because technical and production conditions were not at the time existing. As far as my industry was concerned, that bomber had not been developed, at any rate not so that I could use it. Secondly, I was still short of aluminum, and every semi-expert knows justhow much aluminum a four-engine bomber absorbs or how much aluminum you need for a fighter or for a fast two-engine bomber, and how many you can build. potential opponents in a war to start with: Are the technical conditions for the meeting of an attack against Germany all right? The chief opponent I had to think about was Russia, but of course England, France and Italy had to be considered since it was my duty to consider all possibilities.
As far as the European theatre of war was concerned, I was satisfied to have bombers which could operate against the important centers of re-armament or any one accumulation of airpower.
In other words, to start with, I didn't need anything more than those aircraft which would enable me to do that; but in my speech to the aircraft industry there is no doubt I desired most urgently to have a bomber which, loaded withthe necessary bombs, could fly to America and back. might enter into war against Germany I could also reach the American armament industry. In other words, it wasn't that I didn't want them. I even, as far as I remember, created a competition for the best bomber capable of flying at great height and at great speed and large distances. Even before the beginning of the war we were developing propellerless aircraft. In fact, summing up, I would heartily say that I did everything that was possible under the then prevailing technical and production situation that was necessary to rebuild and re-arm a strong airforce. Under the technical realizations of the time, which would lead us to believe that five years later new advances, technical and tactical, would be made, I made my decision. situation would develop, would be strong enough to protect the nation and would be strong enough to deal blows against the enemy of Germany. It is perfectly correct, as Mr. Justice Jackson asked, whether the speedy elimination of Poland and France was due to the fact that the German airforce acted on modern principles and contributed so much. That was the decisive and factual condition. On the other hand, though this does not concern me, the superiority of the American airforce assured the Allied victory. control of raw materials in April 1934? day before yesterday with regard to the gradual rise of my person and the inclusion of it into the economic Reich.
The origin was the agriculture crisis in 1935. In the early summer of 1936 the then Minister of War, von Blomberg, met the then Economic Minister and President of the Reich, Schacht, and they came to me and asked me whether I was prepared to back a suggestion of theirs they wanted to take to the Fuehrer, which proposed the use of raw material and foreign currency control. It was agreed that I did not appear as an economic expert.
I was not, but wer were concerned with the difficulties due to shortage of foreign currency which continuously arose because of our heavy demands. We were concerned with finding and accumulating raw materials and we knew that some one was necessary who was capable of taking measures which were not easily understandable to the nation and which would be backed by his authority. Secondly, it was realized that in this sphere, though not as an expert, I could use my energy as the driving power. Party. He was not a member of the Party. He was on excellent terms with the Fuehrer and myself but not so much with the members of the Party, and the danger arose that the appropriate measures might not be understood. In this connection we must assume that I was the right man to cover him up towards the Party.
That is how that situation arose. But since I, as Airminister, was interested in raw materials I came into the picture more and more on my own initiative. The differences between agriculture and economy about foreign currency were increasing, so that I had to make my own decisions and introduce even more severe measures. Consequently, I entered into the economic field more and more and it became my chief work to accumulate the necessary raw material to ascertain the aim of re-armament and economy. That, in turn, brought about the 4-Year Plan.
Q What was the aim of the 4-Year Plan?
A It was the aim of the 4-Year Plan to achieve two objectives: One, the economy as far as possible, and particularly in the agriculture sector, should be made secure against any crisis; two, that in the event of a war Germany should be able to withstand its effect as far as possible. In other words, it was necessary, firstly, to increase agriculture as far as possible and direct it appropriately, and direct the market, thus accumulating stocks that way, and also by negotiating with foreign countries; and secondly, to establish which raw materials that had been imported up to then could be found in Germany proper, produced there and created there. What raw materials that were difficult to import could be replaced by others which were more easily obtainable In other words, briefly, as far as the agriculture sector was concerned, there should be utilization of every proper square kilometer; it should be properly regulated and directed according to the necessities of producing food.