He saw a possibility and was prepared to take all that direction.
I took the Ambassador at once into the Reich agreed and said we should call the Duce by telephone.
A telephone waited outside.
We did that immediately, whereupon Mussolini called circumstances I would like to go there also.
Then I suggested that I could take Herr von Neurath with me.
He also agreed.
friendship. I had personal conversations with M. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain, and I was very happy afterwards, sincerely happy,
Q Before that was the annexation of Austria to Germany. What these measures?
Tribunal personally I felt a great affinity to Austria; that I spent the greatest part of my youth on a Austrian Castle; that my father, during the old monarchy had beenin favor of a closer connection in the future of the German country of Austria with Germany; that he always spoke about that, since he was convinced that this Reich, meaning Austria, would not keep together for a long time. experiencedthe revolution and the collapse of the Habsburg Empire. The German countries, including Sudeten Germany, convened at that time in Vienna in the parlament, declared themselves free of any influence of the dissolved Austrian monarchy and stated, including the representatives of the Sudetenland, that Austria was a part of the German Reich, as much as I remember under the then Social Democratic Chancellor Renner. This statement by the Austrian German people to be in the future a part of Germany was changed by the peace treaty of St. Germain and prohibited by the victorious nations. Neither for myself nor for any other German was that of importance. It was of matter, of course, that the elements would be created that a union between the two brother nations of purely German blood should take place. When we came to power, of course, and as I have said before, this was an integral part of German policy. of Austria were no deception but they were considered very seriously because at first he did not see any other possibility. I myself was much more radical in that direction and I asked him repeatedly not to make any definite statements on the Austrian question. He, however, believed that he had to take a great concern regarding Italy. Germany had come to power also the National Socialist Party in Austria grew more and more. This party, however, before the coming to power in Germany, had existed in Austria as wel l as the source of the National Socialist Party which can be found in Sudeten Germany. The Party in Austria was therefore not a fifth column for the Anschluss because the annexation was demanded originally and always by the Austrian people themselves. If, therefore, the idea of the Anschluss did not exist so clearly with the then Austrian Government, then it was not for the reason that they did not want to go with Germany but because the form of government of National Socialism was incompatible with the form of government in Austria at that time.
mentioned by the Prosecution in its charges. These tensions had to exist because there were people who accepted the thought of annexation, of Anschluss with Germany and the government did not. This resulted in political fights. That we were on the side of the National Socialists as far as our sympathies were concerned is evident, particularly since the Party in Austria was persecuted. Many of them were put into camps, which were exactly the same thing as concentration camps only under different names. of Habicht. I did not know him before, I met him once later. He, before the Dollfuss case, made believe to the Fuehrer that the Austrian Army had decided to undertake something on their own in order to force the government into the Anschluss or to overthrew it. He wanted to know if this would be the case if the Party in Austria would go with them. If the Austrian Army would do anything like that the Fuehrer, of course, said that the Party should support it. But the whole thing was a deception because not the Austrian Army was against the Austrian Government or determined to do anything against the government but a so-called Wehrmacht Standarte, a unit which consisted of former members, discharged members of the Austrian Army and had joined the Party. With this deceptive maneuver Mr. Habicht undertook his actions in Vienna. I was then in Beyreuth with the Fuehrer. He called Habicht and told him that he had given him the wrong information and had deceived him. meant a serious situation as far as the National Socialists were concerned and also with regard to Italy. Italy mobilized five divisions at that time and sent them to the Brenner Pass. The Fuerher desired a quick appeasement. That was the reason why he had asked Herr von Papen to go as an extraordinary ambassador to Vienna and to strive for a quick peace of the political atmosphere there.
the course of the years, that is to say, that a purely German country such as Austria would not have been influenced strongly from the German Government side but by the Italian Government. May I remind you of the statement of Mr. Churchill, that Austria is practically a branch of Italy. Germany and made it clear Italy would be the country which would do something against such annexation. Therefore, besides the internal appeasement as to the relations between Germany and Austria by Herr von Papen, the Fuehrer also had tried to bring about a change in the attitude of Mussolini concerning this question. For this reason a short time after he went to Vienna -- maybe it was before, at any rate he attempted to bring about a different attitude. common in a philosophic sense between fascism and National Socialism, the annexation of our brother people was much more important than that coordination and if it was not possible to do it with Mussolini we would have to do it against him. Then the Italian-Ethiopian war started, the sanctions against Italy and here visible but not too clearly Germany was offered, if she would take part in the sanctions, that certain concessions would be made in the Austrian question. That was a difficult decision for the Fuehrer to make, to declare himself finally against Italy and achieve the Anschluss by these means or to secure Italy's attitude to his own attitude and to exclude Italy as an opponent of the Anschluss. I suggested to him at that time, in view of the somewhat vague offer regarding Austria from English-French circles, to try and find out first who was behind this offer and whether indeed both governments would be approachable on this point and could give assurances, that is to say, assurances in this direction, that this would be considered an internal German affair and not some vague assurances of a general nature.
My suspicions proved right, that we could not get any clear assurances and under these circumstances, it was opportune to exclude Italy as the main opponent to the Anschluss because of the fact that we did not join any sanctions against Italy, and so on.
for a union of these Germans should go beyond all objections of difficulties between the two present governments, and that could not be done simply by the fact of the government of the German Reich's ceding and joining Germany with Austria, but the Anschluss had to be executed sooner or later.
Then came the agreement of Berchtesgaden. I was not present at that time. I did not even agree to it because I opposed any definite statement which would continue that indecisive condition. For me, the complete union of all Germans was the only solution I could accept. then Chancellor Schuschnigg had called. This plebescite as an impossibility. I will overlook the influence of the Berchtesgaden agreement, but the way this plebescite was supposed to take place was unique in history. One could only answer by "yes". Each one could vote as often as he wanted, five times, six times, seven times. If he tore up the slip of paper, that was counted as yes, and so on. That is not really very interesting. system of Schuschnigg had utilized these opportunities sufficiently there could only be a positive majority for Schuschnigg. That whole thing was a farce.
We opposed that. First a member of the Austrian Government who was at that moment in Germany, General von Glaise-Horstenau, was flown to Vienna in order to make clear to Schuschnigg or Seyss-Inquart -- who since Berchtesgaden, had been in the cabinet of Schuschnigg -- that Germany would never tolerate this provocation. At the same time, troops which were stationed near the Austrian border were alerted.
That was on Friday, I believe, the 11th. On that day, I was in the Reichschancellory with the Fuehrer and we were alone in the room. I received the telephone information that Glaize-Horstenau had arrived and turned over our demands clearly, and that these things were now being discussed. Then, as far as I remember, the answer came that the plebescite would not take place, and Schuschnigg agreed with that solution.
At that moment I had a feeling that new the situation had started to glide, and that now, finally, the possibility which we had waited for existed, of bringing about the entire and total solution, and from that moment on I must take one hundred per cent responsibility for all further happenings, because it was less the Fuehrer than myself who at that time decided about the speed, and I even overruled objections by the Fuehrer and brought everything to its final development.
My telephone conversations have been read here. I demanded spontaneously, without having spoken to the Fuehrer about it, the immediate retirement of Chancellor Schuschnigg. When this was granted, I put my next demand, so that now the whole matter was ripe for the annexation, and, as it is well known, it took place.
The only thing -- and I don't say this because it is important for me in the course of this trial -- which I did not cause personally -- and that only because I did not know the personalities involved, but *---*ing the last days it was mentioned by the prosecution -- was the following: I sent a list of ministers through. That is to say, I named those members who at first would be considered desirable as members of an Austrian government by our side. I knew Seyss-Inquart, and it was clear to re that he should get the Chancellorship. Then I named Kaltenbrunner for security. I did not know Kaltenbrunner, and that if one of the two things in which the Fuehrer intervened in giving me a few names. Also I gave the name of Fischboeck for the unimportant Ministry of Economics without knowing him. brother-in-law, Dr. Hueber, as Minister of Justice, but not because he was my brother-in-law. He was already Austrian Minister of Justice. He had been in the cabinet of Dr. Seidle. He was not a member of the Party at that time, but he came out of the ranks of the Heimwehr and it was important to me to have one of that part with whom we had initailly worked, and with whom we had fought at times. I wanted to have one of them in the cabinet, and I wanted to have my interests secured so that everything now would develop in the sense of a total Anschluss, because at that time already plans appeared to the extent that the Fuehrer only, as the head of the German Reich, should at the same time be the head of German Austria, but otherwise there should be a separation. That I considered intolerable. The hour of decision had came and we had to make the best use of it.
Ribbentrop who was in London at that tine, I stressed that the ultimatum had not been put by ourselves but by Seyss-Inquart. That was absolutely true. Legally, in fact, of course I put it, but that telephone conversation was heard on the English side and I had to conduct a diplomatic conversation, and I have never heard yet that diplomats in such cases say later how it was in fact, but they always stress how it was de jure, and why should I be an exception there? he ask the British Government to name British personalities in whom they had full confidence, and I would make everything available to make sure that these people could travel throughout Austria in order to see for themselves that the Austrian people, in overwhelming majority, wanted this Anschluss and greeted it with enthusiasm.
talked about the fact that these events had already taken place on Friday. The Sunday before, in Styria, a main section of the country -- an internal part -- annexation had taken place. But there already the people had declared themselves in favor of the Anschluss and stated that they wanted to have nothing to do with the Viennese Government.
Q I have just handed you a record of that conversation. Would you like to look at it? than the documents, that only these parts are read where I point out that the British Government should as soon as possible send to Austria people in whom they have confidence, in order that they may see for themselves. Second, that we are going to hold a plebiscite according to the Charter of the Saar Plebiscite, and that whatever the result may be, we shall acknowledge that. I could promise that all the more, as it was known to me, and clear, that an overwhelming majority would vote in favor of the Anschluss.
Now I come to the decisive part of the march of the troops. That was the second point, where the Fuehrer and I were not of the same opinion. the new Government of Seyss-Inquart that they wanted the troops for pacification of the country. I was against it, and I would like to be understood, not against the march into Austria; I was for the march under all circumstances. It touched only the reasoning. Here a distinction must be carefully made. Certainly it was possible. At one point General Neustadt said there could be disturbances, because some of the Austrian Marxists who once before had started an armed uprising were still armed. That, however, was not of such a decisive nature. It was of the greatest importance that immediately German troops should march into Austria in order to stave off any desire of the neighbor who would wish to inherit only one single Austrian village. was not quite stated, although I had worked on him the year before in that direction. The Italians were still looking for the East Tyrol. The five divisions along the Brenner -- well, I did not forget about these.
The Hungarians talked too much about the Burgenland. The Yugo-Slavs once mentioned some thing abut Thuringia, but I believe that I made it clear to them that that was crazy. march of the German troops into Austria, under the motto "The Anschluss has taken place; Austria is a part of Germany," and therefore in its spirit automatically and completely under the protection of the German Reich and its Armed Forces. The Fuehrer did not want to stress this demonstration and finally had me communicate with Seyss-Inquart to send a telegram, once we were in agreement about the main points. I told Seyss-Inquart that he didn't have to send a telegram,, that he could tell me by telephone. That was the reason that the consent of Mussolini came only at 11:30 at night. It is well known what a relief that brought to the Fuehrer. went to the Air Force Club, where I had been visited several weeks before. I mention this because here also that has been described as a maneuver of deception. The invitation for that had been sent out at a time when not even the Berchtesgaden conference had as yet taken place. There I met almost all the diplomats. I immediately spoke to Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador, talked to him for two hours, explained all the reasons to him again, and also asked him to tell me. And I asked Ribbentrop the same some time later, "Which nation has been damaged in any way by our union with Austria? From whom have we taken anything and whom have we harmed?" within the German Reich, had been together for centuries, and only by political construction, the later monarchy, they had been separated. business in the Reich. At that time I prohibited the return of the Austrian Legion to Austria -- that was a group of people who had to leave Austria during the fighting period, of the party -- because I did not want to have any disturbances. Secondly, however, I also made sure that north of the Danube, that is to say,between the Czechoslovak border and the Danube, only one battalion should march through the villages, so that Czechoslovakia should see from that that this was only an Austro-German affair.
That battalion had to march through there so that the towns north of the Danube should also take part in the jubilation.
In this connection, and finally, I want to stress two points:
If Mr. Messersmith in his long affidavit has expressed, I had before the Anschluss made various visits to Yugoslavia and Hungary in order to gain the cooperation of both these nations for the Anschluss, and if he declares that I had promised to Yugoslavia portions of Thuringia, then in answer to this statement I can say that I do not understand them at all. My visits in Yugoslavia and throughout the other Balkan countries were designed to improve the conditions, particularly economic relations, trade relations, which were very important for me with respect to the four-yearplan, and if at any time Yugoslavia had demanded one single village of Thuringia, I would have said that on such a point I would not even answer, because if any country is German from the roots then that is Thuringia.
The second point: Here in the indictment the expression "aggressive war against Austria" is used. Aggressive war is conducted by shooting, dropping bombs and soon; but here only me thing was dropped -- and that was flowers. But maybe, the Prosecution wants it understand differently. And there I could agree. I personally have always stated that I would do anything to make sure that the Anschluss should not disturb the peace,but that in the long run if we should not be permitted to effect the annexation in order to make possible for theseGermans to return to Germany I would also resort to war.
Austria. And I would like to close with this statement, that here, not as much the Fuehrer, but I personally an prepared to take the full and entire responsibility for everything that has happened. had a conversation with Dr. Massny, the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia. On this occasion you are supposed to have made a statement. What about that conversation?
A I am grateful that I finally can say something about this "word of honor" that I supposedly gave, which was mentioned during the last month, so that I can finally speak about it frankly. After I had spoken to Sir Neville Henderson and returned to the rest of the party, the Czechoslovakian Ambassador, Dr. Massny, came to me, very excited, shaking, and he asked me, what had happened that night and whether we intended also to march into Czechoslovakia. I gave him a short explanation and said, "No, it is only the question of the annexation of Austria; it has absolutely nothing to do with your country, especially so if you keep away from it entirely." time he came back even more excited, and I had the impression that in his excitement he could not even understand me clearly any more. I told him then, in presence of others, "Your Excellency, listen carefully now. I give you my personal word of honor that this is a question of the annexation of Austria only and that not a single German soldier will come anywhere near the Czechoslovakian border. You take care now that on the side of Czechoslovakia there be no mobilization which might tend to create any disturbance."
At no time did I tell him, "I give my word of honor that for all time we will never have anything to do with Czechoslovakia." particular event. I gave him the explanation, because I had already expressed, before that, that the solution of the Sudeten problem would be necessary at some time. I would never have given my word of honor for a final solution, and it would not have been possible for me, because before that I had already made the statement in a different direction. At that time and in connection with the Austrian events, I only assured him that Czechoslovakia at that time would not be touched. I could give him my word of honor on my best conscience, because at that time no decisions had been taken about the Czechoslovakian or the Sudeten problems. Hitler and President Hacha. Were you present during that conversation? And what was your part in it? Czechoslovakia. After Munich -- that is to say, after the agreement of Munich and the solution of the Sudeten German problem, between the Fuehrer and some of his collaborators -- a decision had been taken to mean that if there should be renewed difficulties after the agreement of Munich or from the occupation of these zones, certain measures of precaution had to be taken by military authorities, because after the occupation of the zones the troops who had been in readiness for the "Case Gruen" had been dembobilized. But a development could take place which at any moment could become extremely dangerous for Germany. by the Russian press, for instance, the Russian broadcasts, to the agreement of Munich and to the occupation of the Sudeten areas. One could not use stronger words. A connection between Prague and Moscow had existed for a long time. Prague, disappointed by the agreement of Munich, could not strengthen its ties with Moscow. We saw signs of that, particularly in the Czech officers' corps. We received information about that. And since there were possibilities of danger from that side, directives had been issued to the various military instances to take precautions.
That order has nothing to do with an intention to occupy, after a short time, all the rest of Czechoslovakia.
for him to let things go on. There was an increasing menace for During that time I had met many Englishmen.
I had recognized I sent a letter back by courier.
Maybe it is among the many tons of documents that have been captured.
I would understand if it would not be submitted.
In this letter I explained to the that he could stand it.
Then probably Mr. Churchill would come in, and the Fuehrer knew Churchill's attitude toward Germany.
Thirdly, I thought I could tell him the following. I believed would excite Czechoslovakia as well as other countries.
I was penetration of Czechoslovakia would only be a matter of tine.
That and sovereignty, we should not counteract that in any way.
On the
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time for us to break off?
(A recess was taken.)
DR. STAHMER: Will you continue, please?
THE WITNESS: Yes. I had to go to Berlin at very short notice.
of the same day. I reported verbally to the Fuehrer what I had emphasized earlier in my letter.
The Fuehrer pointed out that he had things were not in keeping with the Pact of Munich.
He said that he from Czechoslovakia:
Czechoslovakia would now be utilized for Russian air bases.
So he said he was determined to do away with that present at the Reich Chancellory too.
President Hacha arrived and first of all talked with the Reich Foreign Minister.
Later on he went to see the Fuehrer, who greeted him briefly.
First of all, the two of them conversed alone; then we were called in.
Subsequently I possible.
I told him it wouldn't help us at all to object. The was quite impossible.
And in that connection I made the statement that I was sorry if I had to bomb beautiful Prague.
The intention to bomb Prague did not exist, nor was there an order of that kind.
Even if all times have been broken without that bombing.
But such a pointer
BY DR. STAHMER:
Q Did you accompany the Fuehrer to Prague?
A No, I did not accompany him to Prague. I was a little angry.
Q Why were you angry?
Q Did other powers join the occupation of Czechoslovakia?
A Yes. Poland occupied the Olsa territory.
anti German demonstrations in Prague, was to take place. It has What is more, I remember what the facts really were.
It wasn't discussed in that sense and couldn't have been done in that way, as solution of that problem.
But the possibility which could lead to necessitate immediate action on Germany's part under all circumstances, arms to them; so threatening was the situation.
On the strength of understood here.
It wasn't us who wanted to have the Ambassador assassinated.
We said that the possibility of such an assassination in the sense that economic goods were taken away; to the contrary armament potential in Germany.
That means orders were sent there to a considerable degree.
Over and above that we even created Germany.
I believe that this is a complete error. The traffic system for Germany.
The entire south-eastern traffic from the Balkans went Odeberg and Berlin.
And since the canal had not been completed the outside but took the shortest way.
We would have been crazy if we had weakened that traffic system.
I can assume only one reason, and that government report as being old.
But that we dismantled new for old is were taken over by the German state is incorrect.
It is naturally a justified.
For that country German currency was introduced, and that "by me" means that on the one hand we acquired shares which gave us a holding in private economic enterprise; and furthermore, by the In that connection the Reich Works Hermann Goering appeared on the scene there too, since they took over a considerable share of the Skoda Works so as to utilize that and their industrial power in their own program just as any of the other industries of Germany.
Protectorate, the total economic capacity of the then Protectorate must have been included in the total economic potential of Germany. Chancellory, of which one Colonel Hoszbach prepared a protocol, a record, and that has been referred to as the last will. It has been the subject of this trial repeatedly, and may I ask you for a short explanation on what significance that conference had. I am going to have that document shown to you for you to have a brief glance at it. It is 386-PS.
A This document has already been shown to me here, yes. I know it approximately as far as contents are concerned. This document plays an important part in the Indictment, since it has appeared under the heading "Last will of the Fuehrer." This word is, in fact, used in one part of this last record, and it is used by Hoszbach. this. Hoszbach was the adjutant of the Fuehrer. He was the chief adjutant. As such, he was present during that conference, and he took notes. Five days later, as I have since ascertained, he then prepared this record on the strength of those notes he made. This is, therefore, a record which contains all the mistakes which are bound to occur during such a record which is made without a stenographer, and which under certain circumstances can represent opinions of the person concerned or opinions or conceptions of his. It contains a number of expressions, as I have said before, which I will take exactly were what the Fuehrer has said repeatedly, but there are other points which I can say do not represent the Fuehrer's way of expressing himself. of which had nothing to do with or even had the hint of what has been stated, that I must point out the sources of mistakes in this connection.
As far as the word "testament" is concerned, this contradicts completely what conceptions the Fuehrer had.