55,000 Jews are said to have been exterminated according to this report, and of this number, 10,000 in Minsk on 28 and 29 July alone. The defendant Strauch vehemently denies that such events actually did take place; I have submitted a whole series of statements which confirm that: (Strauch Doc. Book I e, German page 10a, 12, 19, 25a, 34a, Exhibit 6, 7, 8, 11, 15); from them may be seen the cross contradiction between the tenor and contents of the Kube letter and the actual conduct of Kube.
"As though to refute its own incriminating document, the Prosecution has introduced a report about Kube in which his personality, his attitude towards the Fuehrer order, the Security Police and their leaders is so evident that his letter of 31 July 1942 may be interpreted only as an attempt to mislead, which can be explained by his vulnerable position. In this report about Kube, such misleading letters are explicitly mentioned, and on this subject the following is said (page 10 of the original): "In what he says and writes in which he takes a position on the Jewish question, I see only a means of protecting himself for the future." In the face of these statements, the value of the Kube letter vanishes as evidence; this document which the prosecution so especially singled out in its presentation of documents by reading it in its entirety is completely nullified? It is however, rendered completely valueless by the statement, which I have also proved with documents, the Kube's operations against the Jews in the 10 weeks before 31 July 1942 are only a figment of his imagination. In Strauch Document Book No. II pages 28037, Exhibit 18 from the "Reports from the Occupied Eastern territories" No. 1 of 1 May 1942 to No. 15 of 7 August 1942, I have quoted all the passages in excerpts which are concerned with the events and the situation in White Ruthenia.
There is not one word in these reports, which extend over the period decisive for the Kube letter, of even a single operation, as mentioned by Kube in his report.
This is the case, then, as the defendant Strauch testified in direct examination from his knowledge of Kube's personality and the conditions in White Ruthenia: Kube arbitrarily patched together events and figures from a time prior to that in a description of his own invention and applied it to the period before 31 July 1942, in order toprove his positive attitude in the Jewish question during this period, a "political" maneuver, which he undertook following the reprimands such as the one directed at him by Heydrich in his letter of 21 March 1942 (Prosecution Document Book VA - Rebuttaal documents - Engl. page ..... German page 9/10, Exhibit 220). contents, and one made by Kube himself. The operations reported in it simply did not take place, at least not in the period claimed. This is proved by the far more reliable reports of Commander Strauch himself, which are contained in the reports from the occupied Eastern territories. Therefore, no criminal responsibility can be inferred for Strauch from the dates of the Kube letter. ting the report concerning Kube, the Prosecution has furnished the Defense with proof that Strauch did not take up his duties in Minsk until the end of March 1942. The report was made by Strauch in July of 1943 when he was already G-2 (Intelligence officer) with the Task Officer for the Bandit Combat Operations. In the report, Strauch quoted file memoranda and measures of Commanders of the Security Police and the SD in Minsk. He himself had also become Commander of the Security Police in Minsk by that time. Thus, he submitted a memorandum concerning events on 1 and "In a memorandum of the Commander of the Security Police of that time." It is apparent that he is not referring to himself here, thus on 2 March 1942 he had not yet taken over the office of the Commander of the Security Police in Minsk.
On the contrary, Strauch then says in connection with a. memorandum of the Commander of the Security Police dated 18 April 1942:
"I have sent excerpts of the following letter under the dateline 25 April 1942 to the Gauleiter.", and further: "In a letter of 28 April 1942, the Gauleiter significantly did not even touch upon my reproaches." thus speak of himself in this report when he mentions the Commanders of the Security Police of Minsk. no reports concerning operations against the Jews in the period relevant to the Kube letter. On the contrary, what is apparent from the reports is the fact that in White Ruthenia another question was far more vital for the Security Police than measures against the Jews, the The reports (Strauch Document Rook II, eng.
and german pages 25-37, Exhibit 17-18) show that the uprising of partisan bands had attained such proportions that all civilian activities in the General Commissariat White Ruthenia threatened to collapse. In Minsk there were reports of a partisan organization (Strauch Document Rook II, Eng. and German pp. 25/26, Exhibit 17) in which 9 Partisan groups worked together under one staff, among which were groups with a strength of 200-400 men. The organization was supervised by a Communist underground machine, the organizer of which was the Georgian Jew, Delikurdgly, who was financed by Jews from the Ghetto and provided with weapons and reinforcements. From the Ghetto, Jewish troops were also sent to the Partisans. There was a secret press which was directed by a Jew, and a Partisan military council was set up, which maintained connections with Moscow via a parachute group. detail in the Report from the Occupied Eastern territories No. 9. 178, Doc. No. 5156, the German mimeographed copies of which create the impression that the pages of the original have been reproduced in their true continuity.
In reality, the very pages are missing which throw a special light upon the seriousness of the situation and which are concerned with a conference of all the Wehrmacht commanders, the Security Police Commanders and all representatives of the civil administration, in which the Defendant Strauch is also quoted as having participated, and from the course of which may be seen how Strauch was and should have been primarily busy with his Commander of the Security Police Office as G-2 in obtaining advance information for assignments against the Partisans. I have taken the liberty of introducing these very pages as evidence which were left out by the Prosecution.
From this time on, Strauch's entire activity was conducted within the framework of anti-Partisan and guerilla operations. The SS and Police Leader Minsk set up an Einsatz staff for obtaining information about partisans and the Commander of the Security Police Strauch was the leader of this Einsatz staff.
All reports from the period of Strauch's further stay in Minsk are full of the clash of weapons in the Partisan warfare, and it is understandable that in Berlin Strauch was accused of "playing soldier" and of neglecting his Security Police duties, (Strauch Document Book II, Engl. and German page 43, Exhibit 20). mander of the Security Police Minsk in this fight against the Partisans is shown also by the following statements;
Strauch Doc. Book I, Engl, and German p. - Exhi. 11, detail here because my client, in consideration of the unusual circumstances of his examination, had no opportunity to comment thoroughly and clearly enough on the subject. Without sufficient knowledge of the conditions, however the measures of the German Security end constabulary Forces, which had to call upon Wehrmacht units for the most part in their operations, may not be properly evaluated.
In no other area of the Eastland was there such deadly danger for the security of the rear-area communications and for the maintenance of public peace and order as in White Ruthenia, therefore, drastic measures had to be taken in order to counter the criminal activities of the Partisans. light; here it is not a question of imagining a Partisan danger and unscrupulously declaring innocent people to be Partisans or Partisan helpers, but a question of bloody reality. so above all did the defendant Strauch. And Strauch also experienced the reality of the especially active participation of the Jews in the Communist fight in White Ruthenia, claimed by the German authorities. (cf. the report cited above concerning the discovery of the Partisan organization in Minsk). Only when seen from this point of view do the documents which alone of all the Prosecution documents still remain, appear in their true light Prosecution Document Book VA(Rebuttal Documents) Eng. p... German p. 118, Exhibit 226: Report from the occupied Eastern territories No. 5 of 29 May 1942. measures pertaining to Partisan warfare and measures taken exclusively in this connection against captured partisans and Partisan helpers are reproduced. The defendant Strauch also gave this information in his affidavit of 22 January 1948. sans or Partisan helpers who had been sentenced to death by the German court in Minsk. In the reports preceding this report there is ah account of the particular role played by the Minsk Jews in the Partisan and Communist organization which had been uncovered.
court, but in each case of severe but nevertheless justified penal measures against criminals, and not a question of criminal measures against innocent persons.
Prosecution Document Book VA - Rebuttal Documents. German page 105, Exhibit 224: Report from the Occupied Eastern territories No. 41 of 12 February 1943. This report gives a detailed account of the conclusion of extensive operations against the Partisans. In these undertakings, 1165 Partisans were subjected to "special treatment" for having given aid to the Partisans. In this case too the affidavit of the defendant Strauch of 22 January 1948 is referred to. It is a question of an undertaking which in part did not take place in White Ruthenian territory (Sec the mention of the localities Tscherwen and Ossipowitschi in the rear army area) and in which numerous other units participated in addition to those of the Commander of the Security Police Minsk. The leader of the expedition was SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Jeckeln. As in all such expeditions, Strauch was assigned with men of his office for purposes of reconnaissance. cution of pehal measures against the captured bandits and their supporters. Apart from the fact that these penal measures were justified, Strauch's responsibility cannot be deduced from the report, nor from the actual conditions. Prosecution Document Book VA (Rebuttal Documents) German p. 105 Exhibit 225: Report No. 43.
THE PRESIDENT: If you will refer to the exhibit number, then we can go right along.
DR. MINZEL: This report deals with further large-scale combat operations against the bandits. The Commander of the Security Police supplied only a small part of the forces committed in operation "Jakob"; therefore, this report shows that this operation could not possibly have been commanded by Strauch, but that it was the commander of the constabulary, regular police (Ordnungspolizei) in Minsk, at that time, who was in charge of operations.
144 "bandit suspects" were given "special treatment". If the expression "bandit suspects is being used, this does not coincide with the actual facts, as those persons were encountered in the partisan formations, and as they, contrary to the armed partisans, did not carry any weapons openly. The very same report mentions the operation "Harvest Celebration (Erntefest)" in which even stronger forces had been committed. Here again, members of the office of the Commander of the Security Police were only a small part of the total forces, among others 11 police and constabulary battalions participated. 1175 "bandit suspects" received "special treatment". Strauch who had been assigned to reconnaissance duties did not order any executions during this particular operation, nor did he participate. (Strauch Doc. B. III e/german p. 1 Strauch affidavit of 22 January 1948). Reports No. 41 and No. 43 cannot therefore contain any factual information concerning Strauch's participation in crimes against humanity, which could be considered as proof for Strauch's personal responsibility. described just now in the Prosecution rebuttal document, Engl. Page ..., German page 105. Exhibit 224. According to the text of this document the very same 1, 165 partisans were not executed because they were bandit suspects, but because they were bandit supporters, which is a proof for the fact that the word "bandit suspect" has been used quite arbitrarily, and precludes the conclusion that these persons were not found guilty of having committed crimes. Prosecution Document Book VA - Rebuttal Document Book Engl. p. German p. 23 Exhibit 222: Affidavit Ruebe dated 23 October 1947. the Commander of the Security Police Minsk, Strauch, has allegedly participated, having supposedly killed 2000 Jews during this operation.
operation was part of the combatting of bends. In his affidavit of 22 January 1948 (Strauch Document Book III, Engl. and German p. 1, Exh. 25) he also states that he himself had been in charge of the search party in the Sluzk ghetto, and that a large store of weapons had been found there. SS and Police Leader von Gottberg had then ordered a clearing up operation for the ghetto, and heavy weapons had to be used in order to take it. He continues by stating that all surviving Jews were finally shot by order of von Gottberg. Strauch himself did not give this order, nor did he participate in the executions. However, he witnessed those executions following a situation conference which had been ordered by von Gottberg, but he soon departed to the Pinsk swamp country south of Sluzk, in order to continue this reconnaissance operations against the bandits.
That Strauch's statement is correct can be seen from the affidavit by Joahannes Feder of 10 November 1947 and the affidavit by Hubert Strathmann of 10 November 1947. were given special treatment. This memo comes from Strauch. In this connection I refer to his explanations in the repeatedly mentioned affidavit of 22 January 1948. Officer to the Chief of Staff bandit combat formations for a considerable time, i.e. that he was no longer Commander of the Security Police in White Ruthenia at that time. He states that he and his Commending Officer, Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach, at that time left his new office in East Prussia and flew to Minsk. Von dem Bach expressly ordered him to arrest the Jews who were employed by the Generalkommissar Kube (approximately 70 persons), and to have them shot with the assistance of the Commander of the Security Police and the SD in White Ruthenia. Strauch transmitted this order to the Commander of Minsk, his successor, who had them executed by Obersturmfuehrer Hauser, as an attempt to contract Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach, who had alreadyleft, in order to have this order revoked, had not been successful.
Following this, Strauch dictated the memo at the office of the Minsk Commander of the Security Police, his successor, in Order to, prove to von dem Bach that he had executed his order. This was the explanation, he stated, why the memo was written on stationery of the Commander of the Security Police and SD for White Ruthenia in Minsk. However, he did not leave the document in Minsk, but took it with him to the office of the chief of staff bandit combat formations, where he had it filed. Therefore, Strauch was compelled by an order he received personally to take this measure, and he could not possibly refuse to obey or have it executed. Solely Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach is responsible for the arrest and execution of those Jews. Strauch's participation cannot be compared to the independent actions of a commander, or of an Einsatzkommando leader based on the Fuehrer order, which was only a general directive for any such actions. The execution of a specified individual order from an immediate superior cannot be compared to those ordered executions which, although it was compulsory to comply with this general directive, were ordered by the individual leaders in each particular case, either quite independently or implementing their respective superiors instructions. Here special attention must be paid to the fact that this immediate superior was able to check on the implementation of his order at any time. Strauch, being the G-2 (intelligence officer) to the Chief of staff of bandit combat formations was constantly in direct touch with this Chief, von dem Bach, who gave him the execution order. How painstakingly accurate Strauch's account of executing this order has been is proved by the fact that the memorandum, which had been written to cover him, was a completely new and unusual business procedure. I shall now conclude my examination of the actual incriminating points concerning the defendant Strauch as listed in the Prosecution documents. The Prosecution generally accused Strauch of having participated in Jew baitings at Minsk, and to prove their point referred to statements made by the defendant Dr. Sandberger on 19 November 1945.
(Document Book III, A, English page, German page 17, Exh. 110: This contains a long list of names of those men who were allegedly responsible for the persecution of Jews all over Russia. It is evident that such an accusation is absurd if leveled by a man who was located in Reval, the Northwestern corner of the Baltic countries, and who could not possibly have any knowledge of the events which were taking place in the whole of far-flung Russia. As witness for the defendant Strauch, Dr. Sandberger has stated (Strauch Document Book II, English and German page 49/54, Exhibit 23) that apart from knowing of Strauch's presence in Minsk, he did not have any knowledge of the actual events which took place in Minsk. He himself has never been to Minsk nor was Strauch in Reval at any time. During the whole of this period, they never attended discussions at the office of the Riga Commander of the Security Police; this refers to the time Strauch stayed in Minsk. Defendant Strauch with its gigantic liquidation numbers but the portrayal of a man who for six years as chief of SD sectors was only engaged in compiling SD reports, who, a long time after the Russian Campaign had started and the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos had been assigned to the East, who in Riga, for another four months, as Chief III with the Riga Commander of the Security Police continued to write SD reports, and who finally at Minsk was thrust into the dangerous atmosphere of a constantly lurking fight against the bandits, which required effective soldierly devotion and the implementation of the most stringent measures. Apart from a few others, Strauch is one of the real soldiers amongst the defendants, even though this seems to be a paradox considering his present condition. During the Polish campaign he became an officer and received his decorations as such, and during the fighting against the bandits he further distinguished himself by his personal devotion in fulfilling his reconnaissance tasks.
Ha was a man who made it his business to comply with the orders he received as a soldier, He was compelled to take these orders seriously, for his security police activities in Minsk were actually an effective assistance for the Wehrmacht, in order to secure the supplies and communications coming up from the rear. For many months of fighting against the bandits, Strauch was not even in Minsk. (Strauch Document Book I. English and German page 18. Exhibit 8: statement Feder of 30 Oct. 1947 much as he possibly could (Transcript English page German page 5336-37). Apart from arresting, 70 Jews in Minsk, he did not contribute to implementing this order, which had been given by his immediate superior. Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach, whose order he was obliged to obey. Strauch himself did not give the order to have them executed, but left this task, that is the arrest and actual execution, to his official successor, the Commander of White Ruthenia. Strauch himself had given orders that a camp was to be set up on a large estate for the Minsk Jews, whose immates were doing quite well considering these circumstances. (Transcript English page. German page 5381). The remainder of the executions, which took place in the course of those operations in which Strauch participated, amongst others, cannot be laid to him. The special situation in White Ruthania was the cause that these operations assumed such proportions that all of them were directed by senior officers, while Strauch only had to carry out limited reconnaissance tasks (Strauch Document Book I, English and German page 17, Exhibit 8: Statement Feder of 30 October 1947). The reports quoted at the beginning which deal with these operations, although mentioning that the Minsk Commander of the Security Police participated in them, do not bring any proof that Strauch, who was not in charge of those operations had ordered the punitive measures which followed them. These reports describe the activities of all the participating formations, and they do not allow any conclusion regarding a personal responsibility. Even the statement Ruebe (Prosecution Document Book V A, Rebuttal Documents, English page, German page 23, Exhibit 222). although mentioning that Strauch participated in the operations against the Ghetto at Sluzk, stresses, however, the presence of the SS and Police Leader von Gottberg.
This particular operation took place as part of a large scale combat operation against bandits, in which Strauch was merely commissioned with reconnaissance tasks. (Strauch Document Book I, English and German page 21, Exhibit 13: Statement Strathmann of 10 November 1947). While fighting the bandits. Strauch was one of those defendants who knew better than anybody else that they acted during an emergency for the Reich, in order to establish security measures and ward off a deadly danger. In his case the defense asserts that a mitigating circumstance resulting from the existing emergency should be fully considered; also insofar as Strauch was fully aware that he had to obey the orders he received, and that he could not possibly oppose them without endangering his own life. Now I shall deal with the remaining points, that is, Count III of the Indictment, in which he is charged with membership in a criminal organization. Since 10 January 1932, Strauch had been a member of the SS, and since July 1934, a member of the SD. From the end of 1934 till November 1941, he at first was in charge of a SD sector in Westphalia and at the end in Koenigsberg. In November 1941, he was appointed Commander of the Riga Security Police, but actually worked in this capacity only for about ten days, in order to resume writing SD reports, for another four months. It was not before March 1942 that Strauch really assumed the position of Commander at Minsk, and in this capacity he stayed on till spring 1943, when he was assigned to purely military duties as Intelligence Officer to the Task Officer in Charge of Combat Operations against Bandits. The International Military Tribunal has ruled that those SS members are guilty of criminal membership, who voluntarily joined after 1 September 1939, or remained in that organization, and who either had knowledge of the criminal acts committed by the SS, or themselves were involved in committing such crimes.
In this trial it has been established and proved that members of the SD could not resign from the SD after 1 September 1939, nor could they resign from the SS, with the exception of those whom the Chief of the Security Police wanted removed from this organization. Therefore, since 1 September 1939, Strauch has not been a voluntary member in the SD, which also applies to his SS membership. At the beginning of the war he joined the Polish Campaign as a soldier, and after the conclusion of this campaign he was reassigned to the SD from the Wehrmacht, where he intended to stay, and again contrary to his intentions, was then declared unfit for military service in the Wehrmacht. In the course of his SD reporting duties, which he resumed after returning from the Wehrmacht for the initial period thereafter. Strauch neither committed criminal acts himself nor did he participate in those criminal activities as perpetrated by others, and he also had no knowledge or was aware of the criminal actions committed by the SS. Doinghis duty he rather considered his activities perfectly legal, which consisted of submitting frank and correct reports to the leading authorities of both State and Party. Furthermore, he was assigned to the position of Commander of the Security Police, first in Riga and then in Minsk, without being able to refuse this particular assignment. During the time he was in charge of that office he did not approve of any criminal actions nor did he participate in them. As for the combat against Partisans, he was only a part of the committed large formations, he did not order any actions which would be subject to punishment, nor did he participate in them, if these actions were part of the operations referred to. Having knowledge of the emergency which existed in fighting the partisans and underground organizations, this fact simultaneously excluded an approving knowledge of criminal actions. Strauch considered the very stringent measures, which he did not order himself, but of which he had knowledge, a fully justifiable defense measure.
When by order of Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach in Minsk, he transmitted the order for the arrest of 70 Jews and their extermination, he only obeyed an immediate order given by his superior. He was not in a position to refuse. This situation excluded an independent criminal action. Therefore, merely based on this incident, Strauch could not possibly know or assume that he was a member of an organization which pursued criminal objectives. Incidentally then as before, he did not have an opportunity to resign. Mr. President, Your Honors ! At the outset of the trial it appeared as if it had been just my client who really committed crimes against humanity. Now we are able to discern the facts more clearly, and the ground has been prepared for a fair and just decision. However, the picture is not as clear as it should be, considering the severity of the indictment. The guilt of both this defendant, as that of all the other defendants, must be established beyond all reasonable doubts, if he is to be sentenced. The shortcomings of the Defense in this particular case which are a result of the defendant's ill health, leave certain doubts which can only be removed by eliminating those shortcomings. I repeat my request to take these special conditions into account by making arrangements for a future complete trial. Whatever the outcome will be, however. I trust that the Court will pass a just verdict. DR. MAYER FOR KLINGELHOFER:
May it please the Tribunal: humanity, are also charged with war crimes which they are supposed to have committed within the scope of the Einsatzgruppen, the Einsatz and Sonderkommandos, one is easily tempted in evaluating the offered documentary material, to view the Einsatzgruppen outside of the frame-work into which they had actually been placed. If this were to happen, then an entirely false impression would be created.
in the Eastern territories occupied by German troops, is part and only part of the events of war which occurred like destiny - and one can say due to the force of circumstances between the German Nation and Bolshevist Russia. These intentions of the USSR, voiced right from the beginning of the Soviet regime to bring about world revolution in all countries of the world and the threat contained therein not only to Germany but to the whole Western part of Europe, was a fact always demonstrated to the whole Western part of Europe, was a fact always demonstrated to the German people by its government at the time, as of considerable danger. The Public, as well as the Party end its formations, saw the meaning of this war not in the intention to conquer new territory, but in the aim to prevent by active defense the expected onslaught from the East. The German Nation as the only important neighbour of the Soviet Union was supposed to intervene in this case. It can not be denied that this conflict was publicised as a decisive contest between Eastern and Western culture and that a considerable number, of not exactly the worst Germans, considered this a hard and bitter necessity according to their true conviction. It was furthermore obvious and confirmed by former experiences, that war with Russia would be carried on by this State with a ruthlessness, which would not feel itself in any way restricted by limits of international agreements and international law. It followed from this, that it would be of decisive importance to care by all means for the security of the troops as quickly as possible.
just as soon as they were on Russian territory. This included the breaking up of any resistance wherever it appeared in occupied territory. The malicious fighting of the partisans, saboteurs and spies who camouflaged as harmless civilians would cause insecurity from ambush, was to be expected. But this fight could only meet with success if, by earliest possible, rapid evaluation of the documents captured at NKWD (Secret State Police), military and state officers, the most comprehensive and exact insight possible, which corresponded to the existing facts, could be gained of the entire organization of the Soviet Party machinery, the military structure and the partisan formations intended for unuisance activity. Einsatzgruppen and their sub-formations were first of all intended for this task. They were actually detailed for this. The true picture would be distorted if one would make the mistake of proceeding from the supposition that it was the sole task of the Einsatzgruppen to kill Jews, Gypsies, anti-social elements and communist functionaries. The entire evidence has shown time and again clearly and unequivocally that the previously mentioned basic security task was in the accomplished sense the predominant aim of the Einsatzgruppen. That in fact no sight was lost of this aim, is demonstrated especially well by a number of Operational Situation Reports. ments was therefore a task of special significance which last but not least gave significant information to the command of the army. But it was also a task which due to its importance could only be entrusted to those who had the necessary knowledge and ability. Prerequisite for work in this branch was, aside from acquaintance with Russian conditions, also the perfect knowledge of the Russian language, as only then quick and accurate work could be guaranteed. It is unfortunate that it was impossible for the defense to offer at least some of these sometimes quite voluminous and detailed documents to the Tribunal to show thereby what an amount of work was often contained in them after months of research. From those it would have become obvious that the ones compiling these reports had been engaged in this kind of work to the limit of their time and that they had no possibility to bother with other matters.
mind when judging the case of Klingelhoefer. Evaluation of the captured documents has been accomplished. There is no doubt about that. Such a job demanded men suitable for this kind of work, men who had to, devote themselves and all their time to this matter, and that this work did not constitute any unnecessary waste of time, is also obvious. It is therefore no wonder if the defendant Klingelhoefer's activity during the two years of his assignment in Russia concerned itself exclusively with this task, aside from few exceptions. The importance of this work which presupposes in itself only knowledge of the Russian language was such, that it justified without any doubt the appointment of an SS-Major. It is for this reason alone already a misconception, if the Prosecution tries to infer from the rank of the defendant that he must have been assigned as Commander of Einsatzgruppe Units, and that he as such was active in a sphere different from the one he was actually working in. in which he gives a short outline of his life history up to the time of his assignment in Russia, shows clearly that it would have been an absurdity without comparison if one would have entrusted him with different tasks than the revising and evaluation of the captured documentary material.
Klingelhoefer was born in Moscow. He learned the Russian language together with his mother tongue. Due to long years of residence in Russia he was acquainted with Russian conditions and, what was even more important, with the character of the Slav people. Due to his acquaintance with Bolshevism he joined the NSDAP after his resettlement in Germany because this party promised him a fight against this conception of life which he could not tolerate. In considering this fact, one should not disregard the political situation then existing in Germany, It would go too far if I would give a resume of this situation here again even in rough outline.
I trust that the Tribunal is aware of it and that it will evaluate it accordingly. The fact, that the defendant has a perfect knowledge of the Russian language, and that he could be considered as one acquainted with Russia, made the Security Service, then in the process of being set up, aware of him. The defendant Klingelhoefer who had to take care of his family without any special vocational training, became a salaried member of the SD in Kassel, because in this he saw a possibility to participate actively in the enlightenment about the real character of the Bolshevist system. But he was at first in no way employed with regard to the previously mentioned knowledge. Instead he was placed in charge of the cultural branch and had to take over the Cultural department with all its branches later on. Here he acquired an extensive training in the drawing up of reports in which he pictured the essential and interesting parts from all sectors of cultural life within the area of the SD Administrative Sub-district, Kassel. Later on he received also the order for continuous reporting in which he had to report about the morale of the population results of propaganda in press reports and films and about the populations reactions to war conditions and government measures. In this connection I refer to Doc. Klingelhoefer No. 5, Exh. No. 4. This affidavit of one of the defendants coworkers of that time, confirms the defendant Klingelhoefer's testimony while on the witness stand. It is also certified in the same document, that the defendant always endeavored to adopt a just and objective attitude in his reports and that he pointed out deficiencies and grievances without regard to the person concerned. It is furthermore certified that he was also decent in a human respect and that he never lent his hand to the persecution of persons for racial or other unjustified reasons. This latter fact is clearly stressed by Klingelhoefer Document No. 1, Exh. No. 1. Moreover, the defendant Klingehoefer is a man of extraordinarily kind and gentle character who always endeavours to be righteous and true in his actions and utterances. I may be allowed to point in this connectio to the proved fact that right from the beginning - that means a long time before the beginning of his trial - the defendant always endeavoured in all his interrogations to speak the truth.
He did not wait until Operational Situation Reports were presented to him. He considered it to be his duty as an honourable man to say what actually happened and I can emphasize that this endeavour was also the basis of his testimony on the stand. Administrative Sub-District in Kassel to the Russian assignment virtue of an order given by the Reich Main Security Office to his superior agency in Kassel the defendant Klingelhoefer had to report to the Pretzsch Police School. It that date he was still completely in the dark about the purpose of this assignment. After the setting-up of the organization and formation of the Einsatzgruppen with their Einsatz- and Sonderkommandos he was assigned to Sonderkommando 7b. He belonged to it from 2 June 1941 until 10 or 11 July 1941. After having been taken over thereafter into the Advance Kommando Moscow, in which he was employed until middle of September 1941, he was transferred to the Group Staff of Einsatzgruppe B. He belonged to it for about a month from middle of September 1941 until the end of October 1941. At the last mentioned date he was appointed to his sole independent command in Which he had to command the Advance Kommando Group Staff. He held this command from the end of October 1941 until he went on leave to Germany on 2 December 1941. After his return from leave on 25 December 1941 he was retransferred to the Staff of Einsatzgruppe B where he remained until 20 December 1943. The Advance Kommando Group Staff had been dissolved in the course of December 1941. Already now I should like to stress particularly that Klingelhoefer, apart from commanding the Advance Kommando Group Staff, never directed a unit of Einsatzgruppe B independently and as solely responsible officer. This assertion finds its confirmation in the submitted Operational Situation Reports, especially since the name of the defendant is nowhere mentioned in them, although they frequently contain exact enumerations of names and ranks of the commanders of the units.