(Document Book III, A, English page, German page 17, Exh. 110: This contains a long list of names of those men who were allegedly responsible for the persecution of Jews all over Russia. It is evident that such an accusation is absurd if leveled by a man who was located in Reval, the Northwestern corner of the Baltic countries, and who could not possibly have any knowledge of the events which were taking place in the whole of far-flung Russia. As witness for the defendant Strauch, Dr. Sandberger has stated (Strauch Document Book II, English and German page 49/54, Exhibit 23) that apart from knowing of Strauch's presence in Minsk, he did not have any knowledge of the actual events which took place in Minsk. He himself has never been to Minsk nor was Strauch in Reval at any time. During the whole of this period, they never attended discussions at the office of the Riga Commander of the Security Police; this refers to the time Strauch stayed in Minsk. Defendant Strauch with its gigantic liquidation numbers but the portrayal of a man who for six years as chief of SD sectors was only engaged in compiling SD reports, who, a long time after the Russian Campaign had started and the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos had been assigned to the East, who in Riga, for another four months, as Chief III with the Riga Commander of the Security Police continued to write SD reports, and who finally at Minsk was thrust into the dangerous atmosphere of a constantly lurking fight against the bandits, which required effective soldierly devotion and the implementation of the most stringent measures. Apart from a few others, Strauch is one of the real soldiers amongst the defendants, even though this seems to be a paradox considering his present condition. During the Polish campaign he became an officer and received his decorations as such, and during the fighting against the bandits he further distinguished himself by his personal devotion in fulfilling his reconnaissance tasks.
Ha was a man who made it his business to comply with the orders he received as a soldier, He was compelled to take these orders seriously, for his security police activities in Minsk were actually an effective assistance for the Wehrmacht, in order to secure the supplies and communications coming up from the rear. For many months of fighting against the bandits, Strauch was not even in Minsk. (Strauch Document Book I. English and German page 18. Exhibit 8: statement Feder of 30 Oct. 1947 much as he possibly could (Transcript English page German page 5336-37). Apart from arresting, 70 Jews in Minsk, he did not contribute to implementing this order, which had been given by his immediate superior. Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach, whose order he was obliged to obey. Strauch himself did not give the order to have them executed, but left this task, that is the arrest and actual execution, to his official successor, the Commander of White Ruthenia. Strauch himself had given orders that a camp was to be set up on a large estate for the Minsk Jews, whose immates were doing quite well considering these circumstances. (Transcript English page. German page 5381). The remainder of the executions, which took place in the course of those operations in which Strauch participated, amongst others, cannot be laid to him. The special situation in White Ruthania was the cause that these operations assumed such proportions that all of them were directed by senior officers, while Strauch only had to carry out limited reconnaissance tasks (Strauch Document Book I, English and German page 17, Exhibit 8: Statement Feder of 30 October 1947). The reports quoted at the beginning which deal with these operations, although mentioning that the Minsk Commander of the Security Police participated in them, do not bring any proof that Strauch, who was not in charge of those operations had ordered the punitive measures which followed them. These reports describe the activities of all the participating formations, and they do not allow any conclusion regarding a personal responsibility. Even the statement Ruebe (Prosecution Document Book V A, Rebuttal Documents, English page, German page 23, Exhibit 222). although mentioning that Strauch participated in the operations against the Ghetto at Sluzk, stresses, however, the presence of the SS and Police Leader von Gottberg.
This particular operation took place as part of a large scale combat operation against bandits, in which Strauch was merely commissioned with reconnaissance tasks. (Strauch Document Book I, English and German page 21, Exhibit 13: Statement Strathmann of 10 November 1947). While fighting the bandits. Strauch was one of those defendants who knew better than anybody else that they acted during an emergency for the Reich, in order to establish security measures and ward off a deadly danger. In his case the defense asserts that a mitigating circumstance resulting from the existing emergency should be fully considered; also insofar as Strauch was fully aware that he had to obey the orders he received, and that he could not possibly oppose them without endangering his own life. Now I shall deal with the remaining points, that is, Count III of the Indictment, in which he is charged with membership in a criminal organization. Since 10 January 1932, Strauch had been a member of the SS, and since July 1934, a member of the SD. From the end of 1934 till November 1941, he at first was in charge of a SD sector in Westphalia and at the end in Koenigsberg. In November 1941, he was appointed Commander of the Riga Security Police, but actually worked in this capacity only for about ten days, in order to resume writing SD reports, for another four months. It was not before March 1942 that Strauch really assumed the position of Commander at Minsk, and in this capacity he stayed on till spring 1943, when he was assigned to purely military duties as Intelligence Officer to the Task Officer in Charge of Combat Operations against Bandits. The International Military Tribunal has ruled that those SS members are guilty of criminal membership, who voluntarily joined after 1 September 1939, or remained in that organization, and who either had knowledge of the criminal acts committed by the SS, or themselves were involved in committing such crimes.
In this trial it has been established and proved that members of the SD could not resign from the SD after 1 September 1939, nor could they resign from the SS, with the exception of those whom the Chief of the Security Police wanted removed from this organization. Therefore, since 1 September 1939, Strauch has not been a voluntary member in the SD, which also applies to his SS membership. At the beginning of the war he joined the Polish Campaign as a soldier, and after the conclusion of this campaign he was reassigned to the SD from the Wehrmacht, where he intended to stay, and again contrary to his intentions, was then declared unfit for military service in the Wehrmacht. In the course of his SD reporting duties, which he resumed after returning from the Wehrmacht for the initial period thereafter. Strauch neither committed criminal acts himself nor did he participate in those criminal activities as perpetrated by others, and he also had no knowledge or was aware of the criminal actions committed by the SS. Doinghis duty he rather considered his activities perfectly legal, which consisted of submitting frank and correct reports to the leading authorities of both State and Party. Furthermore, he was assigned to the position of Commander of the Security Police, first in Riga and then in Minsk, without being able to refuse this particular assignment. During the time he was in charge of that office he did not approve of any criminal actions nor did he participate in them. As for the combat against Partisans, he was only a part of the committed large formations, he did not order any actions which would be subject to punishment, nor did he participate in them, if these actions were part of the operations referred to. Having knowledge of the emergency which existed in fighting the partisans and underground organizations, this fact simultaneously excluded an approving knowledge of criminal actions. Strauch considered the very stringent measures, which he did not order himself, but of which he had knowledge, a fully justifiable defense measure.
When by order of Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach in Minsk, he transmitted the order for the arrest of 70 Jews and their extermination, he only obeyed an immediate order given by his superior. He was not in a position to refuse. This situation excluded an independent criminal action. Therefore, merely based on this incident, Strauch could not possibly know or assume that he was a member of an organization which pursued criminal objectives. Incidentally then as before, he did not have an opportunity to resign. Mr. President, Your Honors ! At the outset of the trial it appeared as if it had been just my client who really committed crimes against humanity. Now we are able to discern the facts more clearly, and the ground has been prepared for a fair and just decision. However, the picture is not as clear as it should be, considering the severity of the indictment. The guilt of both this defendant, as that of all the other defendants, must be established beyond all reasonable doubts, if he is to be sentenced. The shortcomings of the Defense in this particular case which are a result of the defendant's ill health, leave certain doubts which can only be removed by eliminating those shortcomings. I repeat my request to take these special conditions into account by making arrangements for a future complete trial. Whatever the outcome will be, however. I trust that the Court will pass a just verdict. DR. MAYER FOR KLINGELHOFER:
May it please the Tribunal: humanity, are also charged with war crimes which they are supposed to have committed within the scope of the Einsatzgruppen, the Einsatz and Sonderkommandos, one is easily tempted in evaluating the offered documentary material, to view the Einsatzgruppen outside of the frame-work into which they had actually been placed. If this were to happen, then an entirely false impression would be created.
in the Eastern territories occupied by German troops, is part and only part of the events of war which occurred like destiny - and one can say due to the force of circumstances between the German Nation and Bolshevist Russia. These intentions of the USSR, voiced right from the beginning of the Soviet regime to bring about world revolution in all countries of the world and the threat contained therein not only to Germany but to the whole Western part of Europe, was a fact always demonstrated to the whole Western part of Europe, was a fact always demonstrated to the German people by its government at the time, as of considerable danger. The Public, as well as the Party end its formations, saw the meaning of this war not in the intention to conquer new territory, but in the aim to prevent by active defense the expected onslaught from the East. The German Nation as the only important neighbour of the Soviet Union was supposed to intervene in this case. It can not be denied that this conflict was publicised as a decisive contest between Eastern and Western culture and that a considerable number, of not exactly the worst Germans, considered this a hard and bitter necessity according to their true conviction. It was furthermore obvious and confirmed by former experiences, that war with Russia would be carried on by this State with a ruthlessness, which would not feel itself in any way restricted by limits of international agreements and international law. It followed from this, that it would be of decisive importance to care by all means for the security of the troops as quickly as possible.
just as soon as they were on Russian territory. This included the breaking up of any resistance wherever it appeared in occupied territory. The malicious fighting of the partisans, saboteurs and spies who camouflaged as harmless civilians would cause insecurity from ambush, was to be expected. But this fight could only meet with success if, by earliest possible, rapid evaluation of the documents captured at NKWD (Secret State Police), military and state officers, the most comprehensive and exact insight possible, which corresponded to the existing facts, could be gained of the entire organization of the Soviet Party machinery, the military structure and the partisan formations intended for unuisance activity. Einsatzgruppen and their sub-formations were first of all intended for this task. They were actually detailed for this. The true picture would be distorted if one would make the mistake of proceeding from the supposition that it was the sole task of the Einsatzgruppen to kill Jews, Gypsies, anti-social elements and communist functionaries. The entire evidence has shown time and again clearly and unequivocally that the previously mentioned basic security task was in the accomplished sense the predominant aim of the Einsatzgruppen. That in fact no sight was lost of this aim, is demonstrated especially well by a number of Operational Situation Reports. ments was therefore a task of special significance which last but not least gave significant information to the command of the army. But it was also a task which due to its importance could only be entrusted to those who had the necessary knowledge and ability. Prerequisite for work in this branch was, aside from acquaintance with Russian conditions, also the perfect knowledge of the Russian language, as only then quick and accurate work could be guaranteed. It is unfortunate that it was impossible for the defense to offer at least some of these sometimes quite voluminous and detailed documents to the Tribunal to show thereby what an amount of work was often contained in them after months of research. From those it would have become obvious that the ones compiling these reports had been engaged in this kind of work to the limit of their time and that they had no possibility to bother with other matters.
mind when judging the case of Klingelhoefer. Evaluation of the captured documents has been accomplished. There is no doubt about that. Such a job demanded men suitable for this kind of work, men who had to, devote themselves and all their time to this matter, and that this work did not constitute any unnecessary waste of time, is also obvious. It is therefore no wonder if the defendant Klingelhoefer's activity during the two years of his assignment in Russia concerned itself exclusively with this task, aside from few exceptions. The importance of this work which presupposes in itself only knowledge of the Russian language was such, that it justified without any doubt the appointment of an SS-Major. It is for this reason alone already a misconception, if the Prosecution tries to infer from the rank of the defendant that he must have been assigned as Commander of Einsatzgruppe Units, and that he as such was active in a sphere different from the one he was actually working in. in which he gives a short outline of his life history up to the time of his assignment in Russia, shows clearly that it would have been an absurdity without comparison if one would have entrusted him with different tasks than the revising and evaluation of the captured documentary material.
Klingelhoefer was born in Moscow. He learned the Russian language together with his mother tongue. Due to long years of residence in Russia he was acquainted with Russian conditions and, what was even more important, with the character of the Slav people. Due to his acquaintance with Bolshevism he joined the NSDAP after his resettlement in Germany because this party promised him a fight against this conception of life which he could not tolerate. In considering this fact, one should not disregard the political situation then existing in Germany, It would go too far if I would give a resume of this situation here again even in rough outline.
I trust that the Tribunal is aware of it and that it will evaluate it accordingly. The fact, that the defendant has a perfect knowledge of the Russian language, and that he could be considered as one acquainted with Russia, made the Security Service, then in the process of being set up, aware of him. The defendant Klingelhoefer who had to take care of his family without any special vocational training, became a salaried member of the SD in Kassel, because in this he saw a possibility to participate actively in the enlightenment about the real character of the Bolshevist system. But he was at first in no way employed with regard to the previously mentioned knowledge. Instead he was placed in charge of the cultural branch and had to take over the Cultural department with all its branches later on. Here he acquired an extensive training in the drawing up of reports in which he pictured the essential and interesting parts from all sectors of cultural life within the area of the SD Administrative Sub-district, Kassel. Later on he received also the order for continuous reporting in which he had to report about the morale of the population results of propaganda in press reports and films and about the populations reactions to war conditions and government measures. In this connection I refer to Doc. Klingelhoefer No. 5, Exh. No. 4. This affidavit of one of the defendants coworkers of that time, confirms the defendant Klingelhoefer's testimony while on the witness stand. It is also certified in the same document, that the defendant always endeavored to adopt a just and objective attitude in his reports and that he pointed out deficiencies and grievances without regard to the person concerned. It is furthermore certified that he was also decent in a human respect and that he never lent his hand to the persecution of persons for racial or other unjustified reasons. This latter fact is clearly stressed by Klingelhoefer Document No. 1, Exh. No. 1. Moreover, the defendant Klingehoefer is a man of extraordinarily kind and gentle character who always endeavours to be righteous and true in his actions and utterances. I may be allowed to point in this connectio to the proved fact that right from the beginning - that means a long time before the beginning of his trial - the defendant always endeavoured in all his interrogations to speak the truth.
He did not wait until Operational Situation Reports were presented to him. He considered it to be his duty as an honourable man to say what actually happened and I can emphasize that this endeavour was also the basis of his testimony on the stand. Administrative Sub-District in Kassel to the Russian assignment virtue of an order given by the Reich Main Security Office to his superior agency in Kassel the defendant Klingelhoefer had to report to the Pretzsch Police School. It that date he was still completely in the dark about the purpose of this assignment. After the setting-up of the organization and formation of the Einsatzgruppen with their Einsatz- and Sonderkommandos he was assigned to Sonderkommando 7b. He belonged to it from 2 June 1941 until 10 or 11 July 1941. After having been taken over thereafter into the Advance Kommando Moscow, in which he was employed until middle of September 1941, he was transferred to the Group Staff of Einsatzgruppe B. He belonged to it for about a month from middle of September 1941 until the end of October 1941. At the last mentioned date he was appointed to his sole independent command in Which he had to command the Advance Kommando Group Staff. He held this command from the end of October 1941 until he went on leave to Germany on 2 December 1941. After his return from leave on 25 December 1941 he was retransferred to the Staff of Einsatzgruppe B where he remained until 20 December 1943. The Advance Kommando Group Staff had been dissolved in the course of December 1941. Already now I should like to stress particularly that Klingelhoefer, apart from commanding the Advance Kommando Group Staff, never directed a unit of Einsatzgruppe B independently and as solely responsible officer. This assertion finds its confirmation in the submitted Operational Situation Reports, especially since the name of the defendant is nowhere mentioned in them, although they frequently contain exact enumerations of names and ranks of the commanders of the units.
This fact should not be overlooked. It is established and is contradictory to the allegations of the Prosecution. mony of nearly all of the defendants, the organization and formation of the Einsatzgruppen and their sub-formations, i.e. the Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos, took place in Pretzsch and Dueben. night, a roll call was held during which the officers and men were assigned to the positions they were intended for in the Einsatzgruppen and Kommandos, On this occasion the defendant was assigned to Sonderkommando ub as an interpreter. In a speech Streckenbach only emphasized particularly the general duties of a soldier in the field with respect to fulfilment of duty and discipline. Any explanation about the aim and purpose of the commitment was not given. In Dueben, to which place the Sonderkommando 7b had been transferred, the organization of this Kommando was set up in detail by its commander, Major Rausch. The Sonderkommando 7b was divided into an SD squad and two executive squads. The defendant Klingelhoefer was assigned to the SD squad with the special order to organize it. This sub-division of Sonderkommando 7b was continued until the withdrawal of the defendant Klingelhoefer from this unit. The later commitment made it necessary to make a new arrangement, namely in that manner that the SD squad disappeared and in its place SD experts were assigned to each of the executive squads. In that regard I refer to the testimony of the defendant in the English transcript, pages 3896 to 3898. The employment of the defendant in the SD squad was done with regard to his activity with the SD in Kassel. The defendant received the knowledge of the aim of the commitment and the purpose of the Sonderkommandos shortly before the departure to the Russian territory, at a roll call hold by the commander of the Kommando for this purpose. Major Rausch particularly stressed that it was the task of the Kommando to cover the rear area of the combat troops and to compile all important material in intelligence reports which was to be done besides the usual SD reports.
In this connection he pointed to the ruthlessness of the fight against the Red Army which was to be foreseen, and, moreover, he disclosed the order of the Fuehrer. According to this, the Jews in Russia were to be considered as the strongest support of Bolshevism and to be shot. He stressed that this must result in a heavy charge for the members of the Kommando. It had also bee tried to have this order cancelled, however in vain. The order would also affect Communist functionaries and Gypsies. In this connection he expressed his opinion that his Kommando would have nothing to do with this order, since it had first of all the task of following the combat troops immediately, while special Einsatzkommandos in the rear area as stationary units would take charge of the carrying through of this order. interpreter and SD-Specialist and must therefore have been convinced that he would never be compelled to participate in the execution of this order. It was a matter of course that this order deeply impressed the defendant and his aversion against it, which he expressly emphasizes in his testimony, can well be understood. His activity during the whole subsequent period kept him away from these things. It is clear and is not denied by the defendant that he frequently heard of the executions in compliance with the Fuehrer Order but the drawing up of his special reports, which was of quite a different nature as compared with the usual SD reporting, prevented any personal participation of the defendant in these incidents, and this is estensibly expressed by the fact that the command of a Sonderkommando or an Einsatzkommando was never conferred upon him.
The fact that he was appointed commander of the Vorkommando Group Staff is not contradictory to this either; for a task was envisaged for this Kommando which was entirely within the framework of the former work of the defendant. For that reason the Vorkommando Group Staff is never mentioned in the documents in connection with the executions. which are to show his participation in the executions which were performed by Sonderkommando 7b, by the Vorkommando Moscow and by the Staff of Einsatzgruppe B.
By Prosecution's Exh. No. 61, Document No. NO-2844, it is to be proved that Klingelhoefer participated in the shooting of 886 persons which is attributed to Sonderkommando 7b in this Operational Situation Report dated 4 September 1941. 1941 until 10 or 11 July 1941, as is proved by his testimony on the stand and by Klingelhoefer Document No. 2. During this period, however, the Sonderkommando 7b was on the advance. During the approximately 3 weeks Klingelhoefer belonged to this Kommando, it travelled via Brest-Litovsk and Slonim to Minsk, a distance which is not at all insignificant. Of course, the advance of such a unit cannot be carried through without difficulties and therefore the statements of the defendant are absolutely worthy of belief, if he reports that during this period the Kommando did not perform executions just because of this advance movement. The Exh, No. 61 of the Prosecution, mentioned at the beginning, shows the state of 20 August 1941 as reporting date. Since the defendant no longer belonged to the Kommando after 10 July 1941 and since the Kommando was engaged in a greater advance movement before this date, the document proves by no means with regard to the defendant that even part of these reported executions took place before the date on which he left Sonderkommando 7b. Therefore, it proves by no means either that he participated in those executions in any form.
The fact that the executions took place is by no means sufficient for the presumption of the defendant's participation in then. The Prosecution ought to have shown from what it concludes a co-operation of the defendant Klingelhoefer. Furthermore, it ought to have advanced the facts and evidence for these facts which would have justified such a conclusion. Prosecution draws from this same Operational Situation Report No. 73, Prosecution's Exh. No. 61, namely Klingelhoefer's participation in the execution of 46 persons by the Vorkommando Moscow. Klingelhoefer document No. 2, Exh. No. 2, proves in an absolutely clear manner that within the Vorkommando Moscow the defendant dealt exclusively with extensive intelligence tasks which were connected with the securing of valuable documents. The same affidavit, more precisely Klingelhoefer Exh. No. 2, Stresses moreover that additional work was assigned to the defendant in Smolensk within the framework of the Vorkommando Moscow, which was in the line of his intelligence activity and entailed important and extensive work for him. Among other things the evaluation of the discovered archives of the Communist Party pertained to this. The further statement contained in this Exhibit No. 2 submitted by Counsel for the Defense, according to which Klingelhoefer neither performed nor participated in an executive activity within the Vorkommando Moscow, is extraordinarily vital in this connection.
The Document No. NO-3143, Prosecution's Exh. No. 64, which was furthermore presented by the Prosecution against Klingelhoefer, cannot be as evidence for a contrary assumption. The sphere of tasks of the defendant always remained the same during the whole period he belonged to the Vorkommando Moscow. The reason for his being transferred to this unit was, of all things, the established fact that he had a good knowledge of the country and its population and that he was at the same time perfectly Conversant with the Russian language. These conditions rendered the defendant particularly qualified for the forementioned work within the Vorkommando Moscow. A simple, reasonable deliberation alone results in the opinion that it would have been a waste of valuable abilities to entrust the defendant with tasks which would have left his knowledge unused.
of two more documents, namely Prosecution's Exh. No. 60 and Prosecution's Exh. No. 63. The first of these documents is an Operational Situation Report dated 9 October 1941 in which the execution of 114 Jews by the VKM is reported. The second document is an Operational Situation Report dated 26 October 1941 in which a total number of 2457 persons executed by the Group Staff and the VKM is stated.
Despite these documents the facts remain the same: The defendant was in no manner involved in the reported executions. I already set forth in detail his actual occupation. As regards Prosecution's Exh. No. 60 I should also like to point to the fact that Klingelhoefer no longer belonged to the Vorkommando Moscow since middle of September 1941, but had been transferred to the Staff of Einsatzgruppe B. Of course, this transfer did not change anything in his occupation. accomplished by the documents it submitted. The contents of the documents are by no means sufficient for an establishment of the personal guilt of the defendant. On the other hand Klingelhoefer's actual occupation is unquestionably ascertained. The affidavit submitted by Counsel for the Defense as Klingelhoefer Document No. 2, confirms that the defendant's testimony on the stand corresponds to the truth. Therefore, it cannot be a question of a guilt of the defendant as set forth by the Prosecution. According to the Prosecution the defendant Klingelhoefer also was in command of the Vorkommando Moscow. This contention does not correspond to the facts in any way. In his affidavit of 2 July 1947, Prosecution Exh. No. 124, the defendant says very plainly on page one that he had deputy-command of the unit. It has been determined beyond a doubt that this deputy command could only have occurred from the end of August, i.e. after the recall of Prof. Dr. Six, the first commander of VKM, until about the middle of September 1941.
As I have already shown, the defendant was transferred to the staff of Einsatzgruppe B in the middle of September 1941. Here I am again referring to the Klingelhoefer Doc. No. 2, Exh. No. 2, pages 7 and 8 of the English and German document books. The defendant explains this deputyship in his affidavit of 17 September 1947, Klingelhoefer Doc. No. 3, in detail. Accordingly, it is shown that while he was appointed deputy commander in the VKM by Nebe who had just taken over the VKM, that this deputy command should only go into effect when Nebe was absent from his permanent office in Smolensk. However, in the approximately three weeks under consideration here, this never happened. In the Klingelhoefer Document No. 2, Exhibit No. 2, it is shown, in this connection, that the defendant was only appointed liaison officer for the VKM and that only in the Case Nebe was absent from Smolensk. It is shown beyond doubt that Nebe had taken the administration of the Vorkommando Moscow in to his own hands and that all clerks and specialists of the VKM were forced to turn directly to Nebe. Klingelhoefer's appointment as liaison officer was pure formality. Therefore the defendant never commanded the Vorkommando Moscow in any way, and he cannot be hold responsible for executions which occurred during the time he was assigned to the Vorkommando Moscow. The advance command, Group Staff, which the defendant actually commanded, had nothing more to do with the Vorkommando Moscow, as it developed under Major Koerting, the successor to Nebe. It was his job to prepare the initial security measures for the imminent march into Moscow. Here I am again referring to the Klingelhoefer Document No. 2. Besides this pure planning and office activity, the Vorkommando Gruppenstab under the command of Klingelhoefer did nothing. Furthermore, the Kommando was dissolved in December 1941 when it was seen that an entry into Moscow could no longer be counted on. The defendant was on furlough in Germany, from 2 December 1941 until 25 December 1941 when the dissolution occurred. Therefore it would he entirely incorrect if, by mistaking the Vorkommando (Group Staff) which was in Gshatsk, for the Vorkommando Moscow, one were to charge the defendant Klingelhoefer with the executions carried out by the latter Vorkommando.
I am convinced that a thorough examination of the evidence will not lead to that mistaken conclusion. Now, during his assignment in Russia, the defendant Klingelhoefer was given some tasks wherein his qualifications as an interpreter must be looked upon as the reason for his assignment. In all of those cases it was necessary to have someone who knew the Russian language, who could clear up the situation on the spot through the necessary inquiries and dealings with the civilian population. However, in all those cases the defendant never executed the Fuehrer order in the course of carrying out his task. This can already be seen from the fact that only the commander of an Einsatzkommando or a Sonderkommando would have teen authorized to carry out the Fuehrer Order. Now I shall examine these assignments in greater detail, insofar as it seems necessary, in view of the arguments of the Prosecution. was ordered by Einsatzgruppen Chief Naumann to carry out a reconnaissance of the Partisans near Krassnji, village about 40 km west of Smolensk. The position, movements and activity of a Partisan group in the forest near Krassnji were to be recomnoitered, to provide the necessary information for the Wehrmacht to fight this group. The reconnaissance was carried out in close collaboration with the local Wehrmacht headquarters in Krassnji. This fact shows clearly that in this case Klingelhoefer's main task was as an interpreter who, by questioning and examining the local civilian population, was to provide the necessary basis for the real purpose of the operation. It doesn't have to be pointed out that reconnaissance is a strictly military function and that Klingelhoefer was only of use here as an interpreter. Here I refer to the statement of the defendant on the witness stand on page 3827 of the English transcript. The result of the reconnaissance near Krassnji was negative, because the Partisans had evidently been warned and had therefore disappeared.
Klingelhoefer was given Another task by Naumann, the Chief of Einsatzgruppe B, in about the middle of December, 1942. According to this he was to conduct an investigation on the state farm Wissokoje which was near Smolensk Just in passing I want to mention that the task described under 1) above had occurred over 1/2 year before and that in the meanwhile the defendant Klingelhoefer had been busy working on and evaluating the files, as I have already described in detail earlier. Russians who had been trained in Germany as intelligence and sabotage troops and who were to be dropped by plane behind the Russian lines, were quartered on this state farm in Wissokoje. There had been a delay of about three weeks due to bad weather, which prevented the execution of this operation. During this period a kind of mutiny had broken out among the Russians, who were about 15 or 16 in number. Klingelhoefer's investigation showed that 2 or 3 of these Russians had threatened to report their comrades, who had different ideas than they who were ready to carry out their assignment, to the nearest NKWD station after they landed behind the Russian front. Klingelhoefer made a thorough report of this investigation and sent it to Einsatzgruppe B. He does not know what, if any, measures were taken against the 2 or 3 Russians as a result of his investigation, because he went to Germany on leave after making his final report. staff of Einsatzgruppe B in this case was because he spoke Russian fluently. It was only through him that a reliable investigation could be made, which as desired under all circumstances. Finally, one cannot overlook the fact that he was assigned to service in Russia as an interpreterrin the first place.
The incidents mentioned under subsections 1) and 2) are not contained in any of the documents the Prosecution has presented. The defendant has mentioned them in pursuing his intention always to tell the whole truth. The credibility of his statements is therefore not to be doubted. The defendant Klingelhoefer was given two more assignments like the ones just mentioned, one of which is mentioned in the Operational Situation Reports, while the other is only found in Klingelhoefer's own affidavit.
This last circumstance again affirms that the defendant expresses his love for the truth in every situation.
Einsatzgruppe Nebe, according to which, Klingelhoefer had to procure winter clothing for the Einsatzgruppe, that is, fur coats and fur linings. The Prosecution submits as evidence in this exhibit No. 124, that is, the affidavit of Klingelhoefer dated 2 July 1947 which was drawn up by the Prosecution's interrogator Wartenberg. This whole affidavit was expressly refuted by the defendant through a second affidavit that was made out before the sane official and countersigned by him. The Defense has submitted this 2nd affidavit dated 17 September 1947 as Klingelhoefer Document No. 3, Exh. No. 3. The reasons for the withdrawal can be seen from this document. As the defendant declared in explanation of this in the witness box, the above-mentioned interrogator of the Prosecution expressly afforded him the right to correct possible inaccuracies in his affidavit dated 2 July 1947 later, in a special new affidavit. That was the reason, too, why Klingelhoefer's affidavit dated 17 September 1947 was countersigned and accepted by the Interrogator Wartenberg. I refer here to page 3855 of the English record. An answer to the question as to why the defendant when he was first interrogated by Wartenberg was in a confused state of nerves can easily be found. If one considers how it must affect a person who throughout his life has done no wrong and is now startlingly confronted with the accusation of having cooperated in a criminal manner in the killing of a number of innocent people, it is clear that such a shock causes a profound reaction. This state of nerves of the defendant led, among other things, which the defendant has mentioned also on the witness stand and which are partly of a purely personal nature, to his attempted suicide, too. it is absolutely understandable if, in spite of the desire to speak the whole truth, he was not in a position to pay attention to the accuracy of the wording of a declaration submitted to him with the considered care that would otherwise characterize a healthy man in a normal condition.