Prosecution Document Book II, English page 57, German page 61, Exhibit No. 42. Report of events No. 156 dated 16 January 1942: Killing of 10,600 Jews in Riga on 30 November 1941 in an operation led by Higher SS and Police Chief Jeckeln. Although Strauch, at this time was no longer Commander of the Security Police and was not other wise concerned with the operation either, I shall again return to this incident later.
Neither can Strauch be charged with the "first aggregate result" amounting to 33,970 shootings in the area of Einsatzkommando No. 2 as sated in this report, for he ordered no executions from 10 till 20 November 1941, consequently has no share in this aggregate result. That means that the counts of the indictment marked E and F must also be dropped with respect to Strauch (English translation page German page 6). Exhibit No. 21. Report of events No. 155 dated 14 January 1942: Shooting of a total of 33,210 Jews by Einsatzgruppe A since the taking over of affairs in White Ruthenia. been there before. The report shows that he had been formally appointed for White Ruthenia but that Sturmbannfuehrer Hofmann was actually there in charge of the official duties of a Commander of the Security Police English translation page German page 5382-5383. Exhibit No. 107. Report of events No. 168 dated 13 February 1942. Shooting of 5 persons refusing to work by summary courtmartial procedure, in Minsk (1/4 February 1942.) Liquidating of the Ghetto in Rakov comprising about 100 persons (4 February 1942). At this time Strauch was not yet in White Ruthenai and had never before been there. The report shows that he had been formally appointed for White Ruthenia but that actually Sturmbannfuehrer Hoffman was there in charge of the official duties of a Commander of the Security Police (English transcript page German page 5383).
Prosecution Document Book IIIA English page 59, German page 80, Exhibit No. 108. Report of events No. 183 dated 20 March 1942: Shooting of 29 Jews and 4 Communists in Vilajka (5 - 28 February 1942). At this time Strauch was not yet in White Ruthenia and had never before been there. (English transcript page German page 5384). Exhibit No. 109. Report of events No. 186 dated 27 March 1942: Largescale actions against Jews in Rakov and Cherven (In Cherven 15,000 Jews were killed). the east are incidents which took place at least 2 weeks prior to the appearance of the Berlin report. At this time Strauch was not yet in White Ruthenia and had never before been there (English transcript page German page 5384 - 5386).
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, they are locating the translation. Proceed. German transcript page 130, Exhibit 53. Activity Report 178 of 9 March 1942: Execution of Jews at Minsk (3412 Jews) at Viljeka (302 Jews) and at Berenewitsche (2007 Jews); total of Jews shot: 5,721. been there before. The report shows that although it is true that he nominally had been appointed for White Ruthenia, the official duties of the Kommandos there were actually carried out by Sturmbannfuehrer Hoffman (For the situation report, reference is made to the situation report in activity report 172) English transcript page German transcript, page 5386. to Strauch either (English transcript page German transcript page 7).
Prosecution Document Book VA (rebuttal documents) English transcript page German transcript page 25/37, Exhibit 223.
Activity and situation report No. 9 (Not No. 2 as mentioned erroenously in the document book) 1 January - 31 January 1942: In White Ruthenia 33, 210 Jews have been shot so far. This refers to a repetition of the report, culled from activity report 155. Strauch was not in White Ruthenia at this time and had never been there before.
Prosecution Document VA, (rebuttal documents) English page German page 54/70, Exhibit 223. Operation and situation report No. 11, 1 March to 31 March 1943: Execution of Jews at Minsk, Vilejka and Beranewitsche. report 178. Strauch was not in White Ruthenia at this time and had never been there before. reported for Tscherwen in activity report 186 on the occasion of actions in Rakov and Tscherwen (Tscherwen 15,000) is mentioned now for Rokov (inconnection with a place named Artenowsk), that is, it concerns an event distinctly separated from "the remaining areas of the eastern front, therefore, it did not take place in White Rutnenia. of his second arm fracture already handed over the official duties of a KAS (Commander of the Security Police) in Riga to his successor Dr. Lange, but in the following period remained in Riga in his capacity as Chief of department III of the BdS (Commanding officer of Security Police), I tried to get a statement from him in direct examination concerning the Jeckeln operation of 30 November 1941 in Riga. prehensible form during his examination of 13 January 1948, (English transcript page German transcript 5025-5085) and again still quite obscure, during the examination of 19 January 1948 (English transcript page German transcript page 5345-5351). longer the commander at Riga at the time of the Jeckeln operation, I am obliged to stress again these events in order to prevent the drawing of incorrect conclusions from the confused statements of Strauch.
The facts which could only be vaguely deduced from Strauch's statements are as follows: superior in his capacity as Chief of Department III with the BdS and the new Commander of the Security Police, Dr. Lange, the success of Strauch, were away on official business just at the time when Jeckelm tried to forward to them theorder for participation of units of the BdS and KdS in the operation at Riga planned by him. Consequently, Jecklen's messengers came upon Strauch, who was still nursing his broken arm, in his office as Chief of the department III of the BdS and tried to induce him in the absence of Stahlecker and Lange to issue on order for the participation of units of the BdS and KdS in the operation. Strauch had been informed, at the time when he himself took over the official duties of the KdS, that Heydrich had ordered that no actions against Jews should be carried out in Riga. (English transcript page German transcript page 5338); therefore, he refused, referring to that order of Heydrich, to do anything in that matter. (English transcript page German transcript page 5345/46). Thereupon Jeckeln called him personally on the telephone and after reprimanding him insisted on his order. (English transcript page German transcript page 5345). Strauch, who in the absence of both competent leaders and in view of Heydrich's order was loath to make a decision, sent a teletype message to Heydrich and Stahlecker, asking for instructions. However he received information neither from the one nor from the other (English transcript page German transcript page 5347) and neither the BdS nor the KdS returned to Riga. Under such circumstances, Strauch avoided any further discussions with Jeckeln. Because of the fact that he no longer had any authoritive functions in Riga, he made use of the permission granted him "to nurse first of all his arm in Germany", made up his mind and went to Koenigsberg to his wife. He arrived there either on 27 or 28 November 1941.
(Affidavit of Frau Strauch of 4 November 1947, Strauch document I German and English version page 2, exhibit 1). Therefore, Strauch was not in Riga on the day of the Jeckeln action. By abstaining from issuing orders in the absence of Stahlecker and Dr. Lange, he avoided participating in the operation especially as he did not receive any answers from his superiors to his teletype message, Strauch is unable to state from his own knowledge whether Jeckeln carried out the operation only with his own forces or whether he actually succeeded in inducing 1 officer and 20 men of "the EK 2" to participate in it. However, he concluded from the above mentioned fact that nobody from the office of the KdS and BdS took part in the operation, but probably a small detachment of the Riga training school of the EK 2. The EK 2 itself was on duty at the front near Laknje. However, this detachment was subordinated to that Einsatzkommo and not to the KdS Riga, (English transcript page German transcript page 5351). previously and it was his intention to describe the history of this event also in his direct examination in court. However his description was rather vague. separate unit of the KdS Riga, I want to point out furthermore that the prosecution tries to connect Strauch with this EA 2 as well. It charges him quite generally of having been the leader of Einsatzkommando 2 and states for example in its opening statement (English transcript page German transcript page 49:)
"The defendant Strauch was the commander of EK 2, Six months after the beginning of the operations he reported a total of 33,970 executions." Strauch was the leader of the Einsatzkommando 2 from its inception and was in some way connected with the results of its execution activities during these six months. Strauch was at no time leader of the Einsatzkommando 2. After the conquest of Latvia this Kommando had been to a large extent moved up to the front by Stahlecker (see the corresponding reports which were submitted as evidence with document book Strauch II):Activity report No. 24 of 16 July 1941 (English and German version, page 2 exhibit 16 of that document book) and activity report No. 26 of 18 July 1941 (English and German version, page 2 exhibit 16 of that document book). advanced into the area around Leningrad.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, perhaps that might be a good point at which to suspend. Can you come back at seven-thirty?
DR. MINZEL: Yes, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: You will complete the reading then at seven-thirty.
(A recess was taken until 1930 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1930 hours, 10 February 1948)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. MINZEL (ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT STRAUCH):
I stopped at page 9: (English and German version, page 56, exhibit 24 of that document book). which shows that 2/3 of the strength of Einsatzfommando 2 had been moved to the front and only 1/3 remained in Riga for the set-up of the new commando post. time at Loknja (see the testinomy of the defendant JOSTas witness for the defendant STAUCH document book STRAUCH II, English and German version, page 44 exhibit 21). space and personnel from the office of the Kds in Riga, which had been set up after the establishment of the Civil Administration in Latvia. did not form a part of the Army organization but constituted a part of this Civil Administration. It was not a mobile militant unit but a p permanent local authority. The defendant JOST who during his activity as BdS Ostland at Riga was also a Chief of an office of the Civil Administration, described the set up of the BdS and MdS office in this Administration in a survey chart, which is contained in document book JOSTIII, English and German version, page 14, JOST decument 29. units completely different with regard to local and personnel is also shown by the garrison report, included in document book STRAUCH II English exhibit 18, which also mentions the command post at Riga and the Einsatzkommando 2 at Loknja as two different units, each with a special leader of its own.
the establishment of the command post in Riga, this office was listed as "Einsatzkommando 2" can merely be explained by the negligence with which the reports were compiled in Berlin; in this connection wee the affidavit of FUMY of ...(document book OHLENDORF Ia, English version page 11, German version page 25, document OHLENDORF No. 32) and the affidavit of FUMY of 12 January 1948 (document book SANDBERGER Ia, page 50, exhibit .......). This negligence was the reason that, only beginning with activity report No. 146, of 15 December 1941 (document book STRAUCH Ia, page 8, exhibit 16) after the establishment of the civil administration, that is after the actual organizational set up of the Security Police and the SD in the Reich Commisseriat Ostland, the offices were named accordingly and correctly in the reports. kommando 2 and the general chargesof the prosecution are not founded on facts. of department III of the BdS in Riga, that is, he was in charge of compiling SD reports. These duties were carried out by the independent offices of the SD in the Reich completely seqarate from all other tasks, including executive tasks entrusted to joint offices together with such belonging to the executive duties of the Security Police. However, this did not alter the special problems of their duties or their execution. The departments III had nothing whatsoever to do with the other departments, which were in charge of executive duties; its activities were concerned just as the activities of the SD in the Reich, with the compiling and forwarding of news and reports from all spheres of life, in order to keep the leading officials informed about the actual situation. I refer in this connection to the testimonies of the defendant OHLEHDORF concerning the real nature of the information and report activities.
These testimonies have been confirmed in the course of the proceedings by innumerable additional affidavits of the defendants concerning their activities in the SD and as Chiefs of the department III of Einsatzgruppen, and Kommandos as well as command posts. This activity did not involve the defendant STRAUCH in any kind of participation in crimes. Therefore, also as Chief of department III, he did not perpetrate acts punishable according to the indictment.
Therewith all charges are refuted which refer to STRAUCH's activity in Riga. he had to face the following situation: for more Jews lived in White Ruthenia than in any other territory of the Reich Commissariat Ostland. Almost all skilled workers of technical or trade professions were Jews, whereas the indigeneous White Ruthenian population was working predominately in agriculture. (document book STRAUCH II page....exhibit 16: activity report No. 32 of 24 July 1941.) vancing with the troops, were active in the execution of the Fuehrer Order. Repeatedly it had been pointed out in reports of the SD from White Ruthenia that drastic measures against the Jews there would only lead to a crippling of the entire economic life. This opinion was shared by the Commissar General for White Ruthenia KUBE, and when STRAUCH took over his position in Minsk, he demanded from him that in consideration of the situation he should abstain from measures against the Jews. STRAUCH knew from his first visit to STAHLECKER in Riga that the Fuehrer Order for extermination of Jews and Communists had been stipulated as a task of the commanders too.
However, his inner revulsion against this order induced him now, when it was set up to him for the first time to take issue with this order, to make use of every opportunity which would relieve him from its execution. Therefore, STRAUCH agreed at once to undertake nothing until he became more informed about the economic conditions of White Ruthenia. A short time afterwards, the Chief of the Sipo and the SD Heydrich, STRAUCH's highest ranking superior after HIMMLER, arrived by chance in Minsk; STRAUCH informed him of the situation and HEYDRICH granted a postponement of the execution of the measures against the Jews in White Ruthenia, first of all until the gathering of the harvest, that is until the late fall of 1942. Document book STRAUCHI, English and German version page 9, exhibit 6): affidavit, Karl ZENNER of 3 November 1947.) However, KUBE himself went too far. By virtue of all testimonies and documents regarding his person, it has been established that he followed a policy of open favoritism of Jews, contary to the condemnation of Jewry by the Nazi Leadership which was, of course, not fundamentally altered by the suspension of the extermination measures;
THE PRESIDENT: You don't need to read all those.
DR. MINZEL: stronger opposition to this policy. He had already been removed from his post once before as Gauleiter of the Mark Brandenburg, at that time because of shady dealings. How in White Ruthenia, as his friendliness toward the Jews became more and more apparent, this same fate threatened to overtake him. He had already been repeatedly and explicitly warned by Himmler and Heydrich that he would have to count on stricter measures. It was obviously this compulsory state of affairs which brought him to resort on 31 July 1942 to sending a letter to the Reich Commissar for the Eastland, Lohse, in Riga, the so-called Kube letter; (Prosecution Document Book III A, German page 44, 111) in which he reports alleged measures against the Jews, which in the 10 weeks previous to that time, he is supposed to have taken, together with the SS and Police Leader and with his subordinate, Commander of the Security Police Strauch.
55,000 Jews are said to have been exterminated according to this report, and of this number, 10,000 in Minsk on 28 and 29 July alone. The defendant Strauch vehemently denies that such events actually did take place; I have submitted a whole series of statements which confirm that: (Strauch Doc. Book I e, German page 10a, 12, 19, 25a, 34a, Exhibit 6, 7, 8, 11, 15); from them may be seen the cross contradiction between the tenor and contents of the Kube letter and the actual conduct of Kube.
"As though to refute its own incriminating document, the Prosecution has introduced a report about Kube in which his personality, his attitude towards the Fuehrer order, the Security Police and their leaders is so evident that his letter of 31 July 1942 may be interpreted only as an attempt to mislead, which can be explained by his vulnerable position. In this report about Kube, such misleading letters are explicitly mentioned, and on this subject the following is said (page 10 of the original): "In what he says and writes in which he takes a position on the Jewish question, I see only a means of protecting himself for the future." In the face of these statements, the value of the Kube letter vanishes as evidence; this document which the prosecution so especially singled out in its presentation of documents by reading it in its entirety is completely nullified? It is however, rendered completely valueless by the statement, which I have also proved with documents, the Kube's operations against the Jews in the 10 weeks before 31 July 1942 are only a figment of his imagination. In Strauch Document Book No. II pages 28037, Exhibit 18 from the "Reports from the Occupied Eastern territories" No. 1 of 1 May 1942 to No. 15 of 7 August 1942, I have quoted all the passages in excerpts which are concerned with the events and the situation in White Ruthenia.
There is not one word in these reports, which extend over the period decisive for the Kube letter, of even a single operation, as mentioned by Kube in his report.
This is the case, then, as the defendant Strauch testified in direct examination from his knowledge of Kube's personality and the conditions in White Ruthenia: Kube arbitrarily patched together events and figures from a time prior to that in a description of his own invention and applied it to the period before 31 July 1942, in order toprove his positive attitude in the Jewish question during this period, a "political" maneuver, which he undertook following the reprimands such as the one directed at him by Heydrich in his letter of 21 March 1942 (Prosecution Document Book VA - Rebuttaal documents - Engl. page ..... German page 9/10, Exhibit 220). contents, and one made by Kube himself. The operations reported in it simply did not take place, at least not in the period claimed. This is proved by the far more reliable reports of Commander Strauch himself, which are contained in the reports from the occupied Eastern territories. Therefore, no criminal responsibility can be inferred for Strauch from the dates of the Kube letter. ting the report concerning Kube, the Prosecution has furnished the Defense with proof that Strauch did not take up his duties in Minsk until the end of March 1942. The report was made by Strauch in July of 1943 when he was already G-2 (Intelligence officer) with the Task Officer for the Bandit Combat Operations. In the report, Strauch quoted file memoranda and measures of Commanders of the Security Police and the SD in Minsk. He himself had also become Commander of the Security Police in Minsk by that time. Thus, he submitted a memorandum concerning events on 1 and "In a memorandum of the Commander of the Security Police of that time." It is apparent that he is not referring to himself here, thus on 2 March 1942 he had not yet taken over the office of the Commander of the Security Police in Minsk.
On the contrary, Strauch then says in connection with a. memorandum of the Commander of the Security Police dated 18 April 1942:
"I have sent excerpts of the following letter under the dateline 25 April 1942 to the Gauleiter.", and further: "In a letter of 28 April 1942, the Gauleiter significantly did not even touch upon my reproaches." thus speak of himself in this report when he mentions the Commanders of the Security Police of Minsk. no reports concerning operations against the Jews in the period relevant to the Kube letter. On the contrary, what is apparent from the reports is the fact that in White Ruthenia another question was far more vital for the Security Police than measures against the Jews, the The reports (Strauch Document Rook II, eng.
and german pages 25-37, Exhibit 17-18) show that the uprising of partisan bands had attained such proportions that all civilian activities in the General Commissariat White Ruthenia threatened to collapse. In Minsk there were reports of a partisan organization (Strauch Document Rook II, Eng. and German pp. 25/26, Exhibit 17) in which 9 Partisan groups worked together under one staff, among which were groups with a strength of 200-400 men. The organization was supervised by a Communist underground machine, the organizer of which was the Georgian Jew, Delikurdgly, who was financed by Jews from the Ghetto and provided with weapons and reinforcements. From the Ghetto, Jewish troops were also sent to the Partisans. There was a secret press which was directed by a Jew, and a Partisan military council was set up, which maintained connections with Moscow via a parachute group. detail in the Report from the Occupied Eastern territories No. 9. 178, Doc. No. 5156, the German mimeographed copies of which create the impression that the pages of the original have been reproduced in their true continuity.
In reality, the very pages are missing which throw a special light upon the seriousness of the situation and which are concerned with a conference of all the Wehrmacht commanders, the Security Police Commanders and all representatives of the civil administration, in which the Defendant Strauch is also quoted as having participated, and from the course of which may be seen how Strauch was and should have been primarily busy with his Commander of the Security Police Office as G-2 in obtaining advance information for assignments against the Partisans. I have taken the liberty of introducing these very pages as evidence which were left out by the Prosecution.
From this time on, Strauch's entire activity was conducted within the framework of anti-Partisan and guerilla operations. The SS and Police Leader Minsk set up an Einsatz staff for obtaining information about partisans and the Commander of the Security Police Strauch was the leader of this Einsatz staff.
All reports from the period of Strauch's further stay in Minsk are full of the clash of weapons in the Partisan warfare, and it is understandable that in Berlin Strauch was accused of "playing soldier" and of neglecting his Security Police duties, (Strauch Document Book II, Engl. and German page 43, Exhibit 20). mander of the Security Police Minsk in this fight against the Partisans is shown also by the following statements;
Strauch Doc. Book I, Engl, and German p. - Exhi. 11, detail here because my client, in consideration of the unusual circumstances of his examination, had no opportunity to comment thoroughly and clearly enough on the subject. Without sufficient knowledge of the conditions, however the measures of the German Security end constabulary Forces, which had to call upon Wehrmacht units for the most part in their operations, may not be properly evaluated.
In no other area of the Eastland was there such deadly danger for the security of the rear-area communications and for the maintenance of public peace and order as in White Ruthenia, therefore, drastic measures had to be taken in order to counter the criminal activities of the Partisans. light; here it is not a question of imagining a Partisan danger and unscrupulously declaring innocent people to be Partisans or Partisan helpers, but a question of bloody reality. so above all did the defendant Strauch. And Strauch also experienced the reality of the especially active participation of the Jews in the Communist fight in White Ruthenia, claimed by the German authorities. (cf. the report cited above concerning the discovery of the Partisan organization in Minsk). Only when seen from this point of view do the documents which alone of all the Prosecution documents still remain, appear in their true light Prosecution Document Book VA(Rebuttal Documents) Eng. p... German p. 118, Exhibit 226: Report from the occupied Eastern territories No. 5 of 29 May 1942. measures pertaining to Partisan warfare and measures taken exclusively in this connection against captured partisans and Partisan helpers are reproduced. The defendant Strauch also gave this information in his affidavit of 22 January 1948. sans or Partisan helpers who had been sentenced to death by the German court in Minsk. In the reports preceding this report there is ah account of the particular role played by the Minsk Jews in the Partisan and Communist organization which had been uncovered.
court, but in each case of severe but nevertheless justified penal measures against criminals, and not a question of criminal measures against innocent persons.
Prosecution Document Book VA - Rebuttal Documents. German page 105, Exhibit 224: Report from the Occupied Eastern territories No. 41 of 12 February 1943. This report gives a detailed account of the conclusion of extensive operations against the Partisans. In these undertakings, 1165 Partisans were subjected to "special treatment" for having given aid to the Partisans. In this case too the affidavit of the defendant Strauch of 22 January 1948 is referred to. It is a question of an undertaking which in part did not take place in White Ruthenian territory (Sec the mention of the localities Tscherwen and Ossipowitschi in the rear army area) and in which numerous other units participated in addition to those of the Commander of the Security Police Minsk. The leader of the expedition was SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Jeckeln. As in all such expeditions, Strauch was assigned with men of his office for purposes of reconnaissance. cution of pehal measures against the captured bandits and their supporters. Apart from the fact that these penal measures were justified, Strauch's responsibility cannot be deduced from the report, nor from the actual conditions. Prosecution Document Book VA (Rebuttal Documents) German p. 105 Exhibit 225: Report No. 43.
THE PRESIDENT: If you will refer to the exhibit number, then we can go right along.
DR. MINZEL: This report deals with further large-scale combat operations against the bandits. The Commander of the Security Police supplied only a small part of the forces committed in operation "Jakob"; therefore, this report shows that this operation could not possibly have been commanded by Strauch, but that it was the commander of the constabulary, regular police (Ordnungspolizei) in Minsk, at that time, who was in charge of operations.
144 "bandit suspects" were given "special treatment". If the expression "bandit suspects is being used, this does not coincide with the actual facts, as those persons were encountered in the partisan formations, and as they, contrary to the armed partisans, did not carry any weapons openly. The very same report mentions the operation "Harvest Celebration (Erntefest)" in which even stronger forces had been committed. Here again, members of the office of the Commander of the Security Police were only a small part of the total forces, among others 11 police and constabulary battalions participated. 1175 "bandit suspects" received "special treatment". Strauch who had been assigned to reconnaissance duties did not order any executions during this particular operation, nor did he participate. (Strauch Doc. B. III e/german p. 1 Strauch affidavit of 22 January 1948). Reports No. 41 and No. 43 cannot therefore contain any factual information concerning Strauch's participation in crimes against humanity, which could be considered as proof for Strauch's personal responsibility. described just now in the Prosecution rebuttal document, Engl. Page ..., German page 105. Exhibit 224. According to the text of this document the very same 1, 165 partisans were not executed because they were bandit suspects, but because they were bandit supporters, which is a proof for the fact that the word "bandit suspect" has been used quite arbitrarily, and precludes the conclusion that these persons were not found guilty of having committed crimes. Prosecution Document Book VA - Rebuttal Document Book Engl. p. German p. 23 Exhibit 222: Affidavit Ruebe dated 23 October 1947. the Commander of the Security Police Minsk, Strauch, has allegedly participated, having supposedly killed 2000 Jews during this operation.
operation was part of the combatting of bends. In his affidavit of 22 January 1948 (Strauch Document Book III, Engl. and German p. 1, Exh. 25) he also states that he himself had been in charge of the search party in the Sluzk ghetto, and that a large store of weapons had been found there. SS and Police Leader von Gottberg had then ordered a clearing up operation for the ghetto, and heavy weapons had to be used in order to take it. He continues by stating that all surviving Jews were finally shot by order of von Gottberg. Strauch himself did not give this order, nor did he participate in the executions. However, he witnessed those executions following a situation conference which had been ordered by von Gottberg, but he soon departed to the Pinsk swamp country south of Sluzk, in order to continue this reconnaissance operations against the bandits.
That Strauch's statement is correct can be seen from the affidavit by Joahannes Feder of 10 November 1947 and the affidavit by Hubert Strathmann of 10 November 1947. were given special treatment. This memo comes from Strauch. In this connection I refer to his explanations in the repeatedly mentioned affidavit of 22 January 1948. Officer to the Chief of Staff bandit combat formations for a considerable time, i.e. that he was no longer Commander of the Security Police in White Ruthenia at that time. He states that he and his Commending Officer, Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach, at that time left his new office in East Prussia and flew to Minsk. Von dem Bach expressly ordered him to arrest the Jews who were employed by the Generalkommissar Kube (approximately 70 persons), and to have them shot with the assistance of the Commander of the Security Police and the SD in White Ruthenia. Strauch transmitted this order to the Commander of Minsk, his successor, who had them executed by Obersturmfuehrer Hauser, as an attempt to contract Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach, who had alreadyleft, in order to have this order revoked, had not been successful.
Following this, Strauch dictated the memo at the office of the Minsk Commander of the Security Police, his successor, in Order to, prove to von dem Bach that he had executed his order. This was the explanation, he stated, why the memo was written on stationery of the Commander of the Security Police and SD for White Ruthenia in Minsk. However, he did not leave the document in Minsk, but took it with him to the office of the chief of staff bandit combat formations, where he had it filed. Therefore, Strauch was compelled by an order he received personally to take this measure, and he could not possibly refuse to obey or have it executed. Solely Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach is responsible for the arrest and execution of those Jews. Strauch's participation cannot be compared to the independent actions of a commander, or of an Einsatzkommando leader based on the Fuehrer order, which was only a general directive for any such actions. The execution of a specified individual order from an immediate superior cannot be compared to those ordered executions which, although it was compulsory to comply with this general directive, were ordered by the individual leaders in each particular case, either quite independently or implementing their respective superiors instructions. Here special attention must be paid to the fact that this immediate superior was able to check on the implementation of his order at any time. Strauch, being the G-2 (intelligence officer) to the Chief of staff of bandit combat formations was constantly in direct touch with this Chief, von dem Bach, who gave him the execution order. How painstakingly accurate Strauch's account of executing this order has been is proved by the fact that the memorandum, which had been written to cover him, was a completely new and unusual business procedure. I shall now conclude my examination of the actual incriminating points concerning the defendant Strauch as listed in the Prosecution documents. The Prosecution generally accused Strauch of having participated in Jew baitings at Minsk, and to prove their point referred to statements made by the defendant Dr. Sandberger on 19 November 1945.