The way in which the witness had then to be questioned on the witness-stand cannot be called a regular examination. The hearing had to be improvised and some of the most important points, for instance that of a basic description of the personality of the defendant and his attitude to the Fuehrer-order which is all important for the subjective side of his actions, could not be gone into because of considerations due to the state of health of the defendant. However, in this trial in which it is made so difficult for the defendants to find witnesses and documents, apart from those which the Prosecution has collected, it is of the greatest importance to have a regular examination of the defendant on the witness-stand. According to my opinion those facts present such flaws in the proceeding that the discontinuation of the proceedings against the defendant Dr. Strauch would be justified until the condition of his health has improved enough to enable him to take part in the trials personally, to give full informations to his defense counsel and to make correct statements in his own cause. I am, therefore, herewith repeating my plea for discontinuation of the proceedings, and refer in addition to my new statement of 5 February 1948 and the attached affidavit of Herr Dr. Spengler, the defendant Strauch's roommate at the city hospital here. now state such evidence which can be found in favor of the defense under the afore-mentioned restricted possibilities of information, i.e. from the documentary material, the statement of evidence and the examination of the defendant which is hampered by the difficulties already described.
With reference to Count I of the indictment, the defendant Dr. Strauch has been accused of crimes against humanity, with reference to Count II of the indictment he has been accused of war-crimes, and according to the prosecution it is obvious that the actions with shich my client has been charged are supposed to be offenses against both counts of the indictment at one and the same time. He specialization has either been actually made or attempted. documents presented by the prosecution against the defendant Dr. Strauch. the prosecution makes it clear that it is of great importance to find out at what time incidents have occurred which are mentioned in these reports and if, at that particular time, the defendant could have taken a responsible part in these incidents, taking into consideration his official position and place of residence at that particular time. criminal actions committed in two localities: of acts committed in Riga (Latvia) and Minsk (White Ruthenia). If it can be established without doubt for how long Dr. Strauch was stationed first in Riga and then in Minsk we shall be able to take this as basis for our judgment of possibilities referring to time of his participation in the acts committed in near the other of these areas. responsible information, stated that he arrived in Riga on 10 or 11 November 1941, that he was transferred to Minsk shortly after his arrival in Riga, but stayed on in Riga until his fractured arm has healed, that he had left only on 20 March 1942 and arrived in Minisk on 22 March 1942. In July 1943, he was then transferred as I c to the Commissioner for the Combatting of Bands.
dates made this possible for him, he made similar statements also when he was interrogated. He stated that:
German transcr. p. 5333 He arrived in Riga either on 10 or 12 German transcr.
p. 5342 Stayed on in Riga until March and was German transcr.
p. 5352 That he arrived in Minsk in March 1942 German transcr.
p. 5355 That the left on 22 March and arrived in Riga (Strauch meant to say Minsk) in Rositten on 21 March 1942, his father's German transcr.
p. 5377 That at the beginning of March 1942 he German transcr.
p. 5381 That he arrived in Minsk on 22 March, 1942, German transcr.
p. 5383 Concerning a report of events of 1 to 4 German transcr.
p. 5384 Concerning a report of events from 5 till German transcr.
p. 5385 Concerning a document dated 27 March 1942 German transcr.
p. 5387 That on 2 and 3 March 1942 he was not following exhibits submitted by me:
1. In her statement dated 4 November 1947 (Strauch document Book I English and German p. 1, Exhibit No. 1) Frau Luise Strauch confirms that he husband received his order of transfer on 5 November 1947 in Koenigsberg, but he did not leave for Riga until on 10 November 1941 because he had obtained a delay of his reporting for duty in Riga because of a fractured arm. Further she confirms that in Riga he broke his arm for the second time and came from Riga several times to visit her in the Reich, and told her that he had again been transferred to Minsk hat need not go there before his arm had been completely healed.
From 10 till 16 March 1942 she was once more together with her husband in Berlin on which occasion he told her that he would combine the moving to Minsk with a visit to his brother in Rositten on 21 March.
2. The Defendant Dr. Blume stated as witness for the Defendant Strauch (Strauch Document Bock II English and German 0,48, Exhibit No. 22) that he remembers after Strauch had been ordered to Riga, that he received a telephone call from his. Because of the fracture of his arm Strauch had asked for a delay in his departure for Riga, and he (Dr. Blume) had agreed to a delay not to exceed 8 days. Hardly was Strauch in Riga before he was again transferred to Minsk whereas Dr. Lange was to take over his position in Riga. But then he suffered a new arm fracture which delayed his so that it was decided his arm should be entirely healed before he went to Minsk.
3. Strauch's mother, Frau Ida Strauch, in her statement dated 4 November 1947 (Strauch Document Book I English and German p. 4, Exhibit No. 2).
4. Strauch's father, Oskar Strauch, in his statement dated 5 November 1947 (Strauch Document Book I English and German p. 5 Exhibit No. 3).
5. and Strauch's aunt, Frau Paula Gunkel, in her statement dated 5 November 1947 (Strauch Document Book I English and German p. 6. Exhibit No. 4) confirm concerdantly that on the journey to Minsk in order to report for duty Strauch traveled via Resitten, met his brother, Dr. Osker Strauch, who was stationed there as captain (Med), on 21 March 1942 and that both of them tried to call up their father in order to congratulate him on his birthday.
6. The Defendant Dr. Rasch in his statement dated 26 January 1948 (Strauch Document Book III English and German p. 8, Exhibit No. 21) testifies that he visited Strauch at the end of January or during the first half of February 1942 in Riga and was billeted in his house.
contained in Strauch's personal files (Prosecution Document Book IIIa English, p. 20, German P. 29 Exhibit No. 106):
"From 4 November 1941 commander of the Einsatzkommando Latvia with the Chief of the Security Police "Ostland" "February 1942 Commander of the Security Police in White Ruthenia".From Strauch Document Book I, Exhibit No. 1 and from Strauch Document Book II, Exhibit No. 22, it appears that Strauch was ordered to Riga some days prior to his reporting for duty, the delay being due to the fracture of his arm.
The date given in the files of the RSHA; 4 November 1941, is then the day on which the order was issued in Berlin which sent Strauch to Riga and not the day on which Strauch actually reported for duty in Riga. With respect to the personal date, naturally the date of the order of transfer was decisive for the RSHA but this date is irrelevant for the responsibility with which Strauch is charged in this trial. Here everything depends on the actual taking over of the management of official business. proved indirectly by the contents of report of events No. 29 dated 5 November 1941 (Strauch Document Book II English and German p. 3, Exhibit No, 16). Here the preducesser of Strauch in Riga, Batz, is actually mentioned, but his name has been crossed out and substituted with "Strauch" in hand-writing. That means: some employee in Berlin substituted the name of Strauch for that of Batz in the copy of the report of events, apparently because in Berlin it was officially known to him that an order had been issued transferring Strauch to Riga, whereas in fact Strauch had not yet received this order at all, or at least had not yet arrived in Riga.
The wording of the garrison report is accordingly a result of the corrections made in Berlin and based on the orders issued from Berlin which however, had at that time actually not yet brought about the change of commands out there in the East which had been prescribed by the issuance of the orders. East at any time not directed by orders from Berlin were mostly not known in Berlin until some time later, so that commanders appeared in the Berlin reports who out there actually had no longer held the position referred to for some time.
In Riga Strauch served not as commander of Einsatzkommando No. 2 But as Commander of the Security Police and the SD, to which point I shall return later, but only for about 10 days when he broke his arm again, and was replaced by Dr. Lange in the position of Commander of Security Police. Even at this time he was formally transferred Minsk, but until the healing of the second fracutre of his arm he stayed in Riga where he was used for pure reporting activity by the Chief of the Security Police Stahlecker (consultant for the reporting on the "vital territories). This confusion of re-assignments, sickness, and legal emergency, solutions, which is evidenced also by the testimony of the Defendant Dr. Blume (Strauch Document Book English and German p. 48, Exhibit No. 22), is again reflected in the garrison reports:
Report of events No. 146 dated 15 December 1941 (Strauch Document Book II English and German p. 8, Exhibit No. 16) mentions Strauch still as the commander of Einsatzkommando No. 2, but the entry has been crossed out in hand-writing and substituted by: Commander of the Security Police Latvia, Dr. Lange. Not until this time apparently, was it known in Berlin that since 20 November 1941 at the latest Strauch was not at all functioning in Riga as Commander of the Security Police but had laready been replaced By Dr. Lange, The date of the report on this event in the Berlin report - approximately 3 weeks after the event had taken place in the East - is in aggrement with the general fact, proved in this trial, that it took between 2 and 3 weeks to forward the reports.
(of Sandberger Document Book Ia, Statement of Fumy dated 12 January 1948, English and German p.50) when in report of events No. 148 dated 19 December 1941 (Strauch Document Book II, English and German P. 9, Exhibit No. 16), two reports later, Strauch is nevertheless again mentioned as commander of Einsatzkommando No. 2. On the other hand, already in reports of events No. 149 dated 23 December 1941 to No. 151 dated 5 January 1942 (Strauch Document Book II English and German 9/10, Exhibit No. 16) Strauch is mentioned as Commander of the Security Police in White Ruthenia because the order of transfer to White Ruthenia had already been issued at this time.
Report of events No. 152 dated 7 January 1942 (Strauch Document Book II English and German p. 10, Exhibit No. 16) is the first report which by the handwritten entry. "At present deputized by SS Sturmbannfuehrer Regierungsrat Hofmann" shows that in fact Strauch had not at all entered upon duty. This naturally, had again not become known in Berlin until some time following the transfer of Struach to Minisk. (Forwarding time of the reports: 2-3 weeks). 1942; here to compare the statements of Frau Strauch (Strauch Document Book I English and German p.3, Exhibit No. 1) that during the time from 10 to 16 March 1942 Strauch told her in Berlin that now he finally had to go to Minsk, and the testimony of the Defendant Schulz as witness for the Defendant Strauch Document Book II English and German p. 42, Exhibit No. 20) that in the personnel office of the RSHA in Berlin the draft of the order of transfer was persumably written out with "February" only, leaving the date open for the office chief who was to sign the order later.
In report of events No. 179, dated 11 March 1942, the first report containing a garrison report since 23 February 1942 (Strauch Document Book II English and and German p. 20, Exhibit No. 16). the addition "deputized by SS Sturmbannfuehrer Regierungsrat Hofmann" has been crossed out in hand-writing. But of course Strauch had not entered upon duty in Minsk at the time of issuance of the final order in Berlin, not until he had received this order and had made preparations for his journey. documents, was no longer Commander of the Security Police in Riga but had not yet entered upon duty in Minsk, the local office of the Commander of the Security Police, in charge of Sturmbannfuehrer Hofmann, Dr. Lange, is proved to have been Commander of the Security Police in Riga (statement of Dr. Click dated 26 January 1948 - Strauch Document Book III English and German p. 9. Exhibit No. 27). When these testimonies and documents are compared, it appears that the statements which Strauch formerly made to me and also tried to explain to the Tribunal to the best of his ability in his direct examination, are perfectly true:
1. By order of the RSHA Strauch was about 4 November 1941 appointed Commander of the Security Police and the SD in Riga.
2. Strauch was Commander of the Security Police in Riga approximately from 10 November till 18 November 1941.
3. At this time he broke his arm for the second time and was first through Stahlecker replaced by Dr. Lange who was also from Berlin appointed Commander of the Security Police in Riga as successor to Strauch.
4. After the second fracture of his arm - which was at first supposed to be completely healed - Strauch was used by Stahlecker for office work as leader III in the office of the Chief of the Security Police in Riga until 20 March 1942, since Strauch was able to attend to this work (reading and dictation of reports on the vital territories) in spite of his incapacitation.
5. By order of the RSHA Strauch was finally transferred to Minsk in March 1942.
6. But in fact he did not enter upon duty in Minsk until 22 March 1942. Defendant Strauch cannot be charged with any responsibility whatsoever for all occurrences which took place in Riga and Latvia prior and subsequent to the period from 10 November till 18, or at the latest 20 November 1941, when he was actually in office as Commander of the Security Police, and in Minsk, prior to 22 March 1942 when he entered upon duty. Prosecution documents:
Prosecution Document Book II, English page 57, German page 61, Exhibit No. 42. Report of events No. 156 dated 16 January 1942: Killing of 10,600 Jews in Riga on 30 November 1941 in an operation led by Higher SS and Police Chief Jeckeln. Although Strauch, at this time was no longer Commander of the Security Police and was not other wise concerned with the operation either, I shall again return to this incident later.
Neither can Strauch be charged with the "first aggregate result" amounting to 33,970 shootings in the area of Einsatzkommando No. 2 as sated in this report, for he ordered no executions from 10 till 20 November 1941, consequently has no share in this aggregate result. That means that the counts of the indictment marked E and F must also be dropped with respect to Strauch (English translation page German page 6). Exhibit No. 21. Report of events No. 155 dated 14 January 1942: Shooting of a total of 33,210 Jews by Einsatzgruppe A since the taking over of affairs in White Ruthenia. been there before. The report shows that he had been formally appointed for White Ruthenia but that Sturmbannfuehrer Hofmann was actually there in charge of the official duties of a Commander of the Security Police English translation page German page 5382-5383. Exhibit No. 107. Report of events No. 168 dated 13 February 1942. Shooting of 5 persons refusing to work by summary courtmartial procedure, in Minsk (1/4 February 1942.) Liquidating of the Ghetto in Rakov comprising about 100 persons (4 February 1942). At this time Strauch was not yet in White Ruthenai and had never before been there. The report shows that he had been formally appointed for White Ruthenia but that actually Sturmbannfuehrer Hoffman was there in charge of the official duties of a Commander of the Security Police (English transcript page German page 5383).
Prosecution Document Book IIIA English page 59, German page 80, Exhibit No. 108. Report of events No. 183 dated 20 March 1942: Shooting of 29 Jews and 4 Communists in Vilajka (5 - 28 February 1942). At this time Strauch was not yet in White Ruthenia and had never before been there. (English transcript page German page 5384). Exhibit No. 109. Report of events No. 186 dated 27 March 1942: Largescale actions against Jews in Rakov and Cherven (In Cherven 15,000 Jews were killed). the east are incidents which took place at least 2 weeks prior to the appearance of the Berlin report. At this time Strauch was not yet in White Ruthenia and had never before been there (English transcript page German page 5384 - 5386).
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, they are locating the translation. Proceed. German transcript page 130, Exhibit 53. Activity Report 178 of 9 March 1942: Execution of Jews at Minsk (3412 Jews) at Viljeka (302 Jews) and at Berenewitsche (2007 Jews); total of Jews shot: 5,721. been there before. The report shows that although it is true that he nominally had been appointed for White Ruthenia, the official duties of the Kommandos there were actually carried out by Sturmbannfuehrer Hoffman (For the situation report, reference is made to the situation report in activity report 172) English transcript page German transcript, page 5386. to Strauch either (English transcript page German transcript page 7).
Prosecution Document Book VA (rebuttal documents) English transcript page German transcript page 25/37, Exhibit 223.
Activity and situation report No. 9 (Not No. 2 as mentioned erroenously in the document book) 1 January - 31 January 1942: In White Ruthenia 33, 210 Jews have been shot so far. This refers to a repetition of the report, culled from activity report 155. Strauch was not in White Ruthenia at this time and had never been there before.
Prosecution Document VA, (rebuttal documents) English page German page 54/70, Exhibit 223. Operation and situation report No. 11, 1 March to 31 March 1943: Execution of Jews at Minsk, Vilejka and Beranewitsche. report 178. Strauch was not in White Ruthenia at this time and had never been there before. reported for Tscherwen in activity report 186 on the occasion of actions in Rakov and Tscherwen (Tscherwen 15,000) is mentioned now for Rokov (inconnection with a place named Artenowsk), that is, it concerns an event distinctly separated from "the remaining areas of the eastern front, therefore, it did not take place in White Rutnenia. of his second arm fracture already handed over the official duties of a KAS (Commander of the Security Police) in Riga to his successor Dr. Lange, but in the following period remained in Riga in his capacity as Chief of department III of the BdS (Commanding officer of Security Police), I tried to get a statement from him in direct examination concerning the Jeckeln operation of 30 November 1941 in Riga. prehensible form during his examination of 13 January 1948, (English transcript page German transcript 5025-5085) and again still quite obscure, during the examination of 19 January 1948 (English transcript page German transcript page 5345-5351). longer the commander at Riga at the time of the Jeckeln operation, I am obliged to stress again these events in order to prevent the drawing of incorrect conclusions from the confused statements of Strauch.
The facts which could only be vaguely deduced from Strauch's statements are as follows: superior in his capacity as Chief of Department III with the BdS and the new Commander of the Security Police, Dr. Lange, the success of Strauch, were away on official business just at the time when Jeckelm tried to forward to them theorder for participation of units of the BdS and KdS in the operation at Riga planned by him. Consequently, Jecklen's messengers came upon Strauch, who was still nursing his broken arm, in his office as Chief of the department III of the BdS and tried to induce him in the absence of Stahlecker and Lange to issue on order for the participation of units of the BdS and KdS in the operation. Strauch had been informed, at the time when he himself took over the official duties of the KdS, that Heydrich had ordered that no actions against Jews should be carried out in Riga. (English transcript page German transcript page 5338); therefore, he refused, referring to that order of Heydrich, to do anything in that matter. (English transcript page German transcript page 5345/46). Thereupon Jeckeln called him personally on the telephone and after reprimanding him insisted on his order. (English transcript page German transcript page 5345). Strauch, who in the absence of both competent leaders and in view of Heydrich's order was loath to make a decision, sent a teletype message to Heydrich and Stahlecker, asking for instructions. However he received information neither from the one nor from the other (English transcript page German transcript page 5347) and neither the BdS nor the KdS returned to Riga. Under such circumstances, Strauch avoided any further discussions with Jeckeln. Because of the fact that he no longer had any authoritive functions in Riga, he made use of the permission granted him "to nurse first of all his arm in Germany", made up his mind and went to Koenigsberg to his wife. He arrived there either on 27 or 28 November 1941.
(Affidavit of Frau Strauch of 4 November 1947, Strauch document I German and English version page 2, exhibit 1). Therefore, Strauch was not in Riga on the day of the Jeckeln action. By abstaining from issuing orders in the absence of Stahlecker and Dr. Lange, he avoided participating in the operation especially as he did not receive any answers from his superiors to his teletype message, Strauch is unable to state from his own knowledge whether Jeckeln carried out the operation only with his own forces or whether he actually succeeded in inducing 1 officer and 20 men of "the EK 2" to participate in it. However, he concluded from the above mentioned fact that nobody from the office of the KdS and BdS took part in the operation, but probably a small detachment of the Riga training school of the EK 2. The EK 2 itself was on duty at the front near Laknje. However, this detachment was subordinated to that Einsatzkommo and not to the KdS Riga, (English transcript page German transcript page 5351). previously and it was his intention to describe the history of this event also in his direct examination in court. However his description was rather vague. separate unit of the KdS Riga, I want to point out furthermore that the prosecution tries to connect Strauch with this EA 2 as well. It charges him quite generally of having been the leader of Einsatzkommando 2 and states for example in its opening statement (English transcript page German transcript page 49:)
"The defendant Strauch was the commander of EK 2, Six months after the beginning of the operations he reported a total of 33,970 executions." Strauch was the leader of the Einsatzkommando 2 from its inception and was in some way connected with the results of its execution activities during these six months. Strauch was at no time leader of the Einsatzkommando 2. After the conquest of Latvia this Kommando had been to a large extent moved up to the front by Stahlecker (see the corresponding reports which were submitted as evidence with document book Strauch II):Activity report No. 24 of 16 July 1941 (English and German version, page 2 exhibit 16 of that document book) and activity report No. 26 of 18 July 1941 (English and German version, page 2 exhibit 16 of that document book). advanced into the area around Leningrad.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, perhaps that might be a good point at which to suspend. Can you come back at seven-thirty?
DR. MINZEL: Yes, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: You will complete the reading then at seven-thirty.
(A recess was taken until 1930 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1930 hours, 10 February 1948)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. MINZEL (ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT STRAUCH):
I stopped at page 9: (English and German version, page 56, exhibit 24 of that document book). which shows that 2/3 of the strength of Einsatzfommando 2 had been moved to the front and only 1/3 remained in Riga for the set-up of the new commando post. time at Loknja (see the testinomy of the defendant JOSTas witness for the defendant STAUCH document book STRAUCH II, English and German version, page 44 exhibit 21). space and personnel from the office of the Kds in Riga, which had been set up after the establishment of the Civil Administration in Latvia. did not form a part of the Army organization but constituted a part of this Civil Administration. It was not a mobile militant unit but a p permanent local authority. The defendant JOST who during his activity as BdS Ostland at Riga was also a Chief of an office of the Civil Administration, described the set up of the BdS and MdS office in this Administration in a survey chart, which is contained in document book JOSTIII, English and German version, page 14, JOST decument 29. units completely different with regard to local and personnel is also shown by the garrison report, included in document book STRAUCH II English exhibit 18, which also mentions the command post at Riga and the Einsatzkommando 2 at Loknja as two different units, each with a special leader of its own.
the establishment of the command post in Riga, this office was listed as "Einsatzkommando 2" can merely be explained by the negligence with which the reports were compiled in Berlin; in this connection wee the affidavit of FUMY of ...(document book OHLENDORF Ia, English version page 11, German version page 25, document OHLENDORF No. 32) and the affidavit of FUMY of 12 January 1948 (document book SANDBERGER Ia, page 50, exhibit .......). This negligence was the reason that, only beginning with activity report No. 146, of 15 December 1941 (document book STRAUCH Ia, page 8, exhibit 16) after the establishment of the civil administration, that is after the actual organizational set up of the Security Police and the SD in the Reich Commisseriat Ostland, the offices were named accordingly and correctly in the reports. kommando 2 and the general chargesof the prosecution are not founded on facts. of department III of the BdS in Riga, that is, he was in charge of compiling SD reports. These duties were carried out by the independent offices of the SD in the Reich completely seqarate from all other tasks, including executive tasks entrusted to joint offices together with such belonging to the executive duties of the Security Police. However, this did not alter the special problems of their duties or their execution. The departments III had nothing whatsoever to do with the other departments, which were in charge of executive duties; its activities were concerned just as the activities of the SD in the Reich, with the compiling and forwarding of news and reports from all spheres of life, in order to keep the leading officials informed about the actual situation. I refer in this connection to the testimonies of the defendant OHLEHDORF concerning the real nature of the information and report activities.
These testimonies have been confirmed in the course of the proceedings by innumerable additional affidavits of the defendants concerning their activities in the SD and as Chiefs of the department III of Einsatzgruppen, and Kommandos as well as command posts. This activity did not involve the defendant STRAUCH in any kind of participation in crimes. Therefore, also as Chief of department III, he did not perpetrate acts punishable according to the indictment.
Therewith all charges are refuted which refer to STRAUCH's activity in Riga. he had to face the following situation: for more Jews lived in White Ruthenia than in any other territory of the Reich Commissariat Ostland. Almost all skilled workers of technical or trade professions were Jews, whereas the indigeneous White Ruthenian population was working predominately in agriculture. (document book STRAUCH II page....exhibit 16: activity report No. 32 of 24 July 1941.) vancing with the troops, were active in the execution of the Fuehrer Order. Repeatedly it had been pointed out in reports of the SD from White Ruthenia that drastic measures against the Jews there would only lead to a crippling of the entire economic life. This opinion was shared by the Commissar General for White Ruthenia KUBE, and when STRAUCH took over his position in Minsk, he demanded from him that in consideration of the situation he should abstain from measures against the Jews. STRAUCH knew from his first visit to STAHLECKER in Riga that the Fuehrer Order for extermination of Jews and Communists had been stipulated as a task of the commanders too.
However, his inner revulsion against this order induced him now, when it was set up to him for the first time to take issue with this order, to make use of every opportunity which would relieve him from its execution. Therefore, STRAUCH agreed at once to undertake nothing until he became more informed about the economic conditions of White Ruthenia. A short time afterwards, the Chief of the Sipo and the SD Heydrich, STRAUCH's highest ranking superior after HIMMLER, arrived by chance in Minsk; STRAUCH informed him of the situation and HEYDRICH granted a postponement of the execution of the measures against the Jews in White Ruthenia, first of all until the gathering of the harvest, that is until the late fall of 1942. Document book STRAUCHI, English and German version page 9, exhibit 6): affidavit, Karl ZENNER of 3 November 1947.) However, KUBE himself went too far. By virtue of all testimonies and documents regarding his person, it has been established that he followed a policy of open favoritism of Jews, contary to the condemnation of Jewry by the Nazi Leadership which was, of course, not fundamentally altered by the suspension of the extermination measures;
THE PRESIDENT: You don't need to read all those.
DR. MINZEL: stronger opposition to this policy. He had already been removed from his post once before as Gauleiter of the Mark Brandenburg, at that time because of shady dealings. How in White Ruthenia, as his friendliness toward the Jews became more and more apparent, this same fate threatened to overtake him. He had already been repeatedly and explicitly warned by Himmler and Heydrich that he would have to count on stricter measures. It was obviously this compulsory state of affairs which brought him to resort on 31 July 1942 to sending a letter to the Reich Commissar for the Eastland, Lohse, in Riga, the so-called Kube letter; (Prosecution Document Book III A, German page 44, 111) in which he reports alleged measures against the Jews, which in the 10 weeks previous to that time, he is supposed to have taken, together with the SS and Police Leader and with his subordinate, Commander of the Security Police Strauch.