(SS BLOBEL statement, German Transcript, page 1534 to 1540; Doc. Book I BLOBEL Document No. 1 Exhibit 1) BLOBEL himself stayed with the rest of Sonderkommando 4a consisting of orderly room, messing personnel, as well as of an interpreter. Handicapped by the bad read conditions, the structure of the vast combat area and the state of the operations, during the advance a connection between the subkommandos and the rest of Sonderkommando 4a was absolutely out of the question; however, even apart from that it was hardly possible, since Sonderkommando 4a and the subkommandos possessed no radio communication and merely depended on courier service by messenger. As chief leader of Sonderkommando 4a BLOBEL was not competent to make independent decisions, he was solely subordinate military agency which carried out the orders received from AOK 6. In a Edition, the subkommandos were more or less separated from the chain of command, from Sonderkommando 4a; they were only subordinated to this in personnel matters. To whom could thus BLOBEL have given orders in view of this situation. STRECHENBACH had announced in Pretsch, i.e. whether the extermination of all communist groups and Jews had been ordered or merely the elimination of these elements who imperiled the security of troops and thus the military operations. Even as blanket orders it was of no importance whatever for BLOBEL since Sonderkommando 4a only was the executive agency of AOK 6. It was only of importance for those officers whose unit was not directly subordinate to a military unit. For BLOBEL exclusively and solely the order received from von REICHENAU and issued by the OKW was decisive, whereby its execution in every single case was ordered by AOK 6. According to the statements of BLOBEL which have not been refuted this order merely contained the directive that those elements should be exterminated who attempted to prejudice the course of the military operations in a way contrary to international Law. Thus the "Fuehrer decree" is of no importance whatever for judging the activity of the defendant BLOBEL so tint there is no need for further details concerning this question.
underwent no change even in August 1941 when 28 to 30 men of the police as well as two platoons of the Waffen-SS were ordered to Sonderkommando 4a and thus caused a certain re-organization of Sonderkommando 4a. These attached units were with regard to orders subordinate to the competent Wehrmacht units -- as was Sonderkommando 4a itself. BLOBEL had no competence whatsoever to give them orders or directives since they were completely outside of his jurisdiction. of the Waffen-SS to the subkommando South, since pursuant to a directive by the AOK 6 to begin with only 2 subkommandos had been found BLOBEL statement, German Transcript, page 1552/53), of which later -- as had already been provided for the Advancekommando Kiev -- was found with the strength of 2 leaders and 8 men. army units and within their assigned area received their orders directly from the Wehrmacht Kommandant. They were in addition, also subordinate to the Chief of Einsatzgruppe C who, however, chiefly received his orders from Department G-2 of AOK 6 as well as from the Higher SS and Police Leader JECKELN. We particularly refer to the statements in the closing Brief (page 31) concerning the person of JECKELN. In agreement with this commitment and the subordination of these Subkommandos to the Wehrmacht Kommandants there existed, no connection whatever with regard to orders between the rest of Sonderkommando 4a and the Subkommandos. The office and the supply column of Sonderkommando 4a comprised merely 3 leaders, 6 non-cons and men, as well as one or two interpreters. The subkommandos were also assigned to fight against the guerillas.
together with units of the Wehrmacht, the local Kommendantures, the Ukrainian militia with the army units and formations, which were exclusively subordinate to the Higher SS and Police Leader JECKELN. (BLOBEL statement, German Transcript, pages 1555/56, Doc. Book BLOBEL I Doc. BLOBEL No. 2, Exh. 2.). Corresponding to the commitment of Sonderkommando 4a in the combat area ordered by the Wehrmacht, BLOBEL could exercise no influence whatsoever on the activity of the subkommandose, neither on executions possibly carried out by them. It is incontestable that the subkommandos were integral parts of Sonderkommando 4a and that its officers were subordinated to BLOBEL in disciplinary ratters, this does, however, not imply any authority whatever to issue orders concerning their activity in carrying out security police measures. Those measures were exclusively meant to guarantee the security of the Wehrmacht and a smooth course of the military operations as possible, and to avert impingement of any kind.
Since Sonderkommando 4a only was employed in the direct combat zone, the exclusive responsibility rested with the Wehrmacht Commander who was in charge of the control and performance of the military operations. This very fact proves that the defendant BLOBEL even at that time never had any authority to give orders to the subkommandos with regard to security police matters. The rest of Sonderkommando 4a was far away from them, its functions more of a purely administrative character and with a view to its small number of personnel it was not taken into consideration for any security police measures. BLOBELS activity merely consisted in the handling of purely administrative duties, however, in the widest sense.
In discussing Doc. NO-3140 presented by the Prosecution as Exhibit No. 30 the Kiev operation and BLOBEL's participation in it were dealt with in detail in the closing Brief for the defendant BLOBEL (page 23), Reference can be made to it in this respect. If it is mentioned again, then it is done only because the Prosecution offered in rebuttal an affidavit by Karl HENNICKE as evidence with which it wishes to prove BLOBEL's participation in the execution in Kiev, (see Doc. IX-4999, Exh. No. 202). Incidentally we wish to note that HENNICKE was not an officer of Sonderkommando 4a, asis erronesouly assorted on page lit in the Closing Brief of the Prosecution, According to his own statement HENNICKE was the official in charge (Sachbearbeiter) of Ant III with the staff of Einsatzgruppe C (see Doc. NO-4999, Exhibit No. 202, Subparagraph 3). First of all, we establish that the executions in Kiev were by no means carried out by BLOBEL's order, but Kiev were not carried out on Blobel's order at all but on the basis of a joint large-scale action of the town commander and the Higher SS and Police Leader Jaeckel by the forces of the Constabulary and the Security Police (Blobel testimony, German transcript, page 1606), Since a town commander, of the Wehrmacht had been appointed who was in charge of the entire area of the town, only he -- in agreement with the Higher SS and Police Leader -- could be competent for executions of that kind, BLOBEL himself had suffered a head wound during the dynamiting of buildings at the time of the entry into Kiew and as a consequence was not fit for duty (Blobel testimony German transcript, page 1603) Document Book Blobel II, Affidavit Hennicke, Doc.
No. 7, Exhibit 7; Affidavit Ostermann, Doc. No. 12, Exh. 11; Affidavit Haefner, Doc. No. 6, Exh. 6, Section 4). This testimony of BLOBEL, which is substantiated by several affidavits cannot be refuted by the prosecution not upon by the affidavit of Hennicke of 4 September 1947 (Doc. NO-4999) Exh. 202, which they submitted. does not follow at all that BLOBEL was personally present during those executions, it leaves completely obscure the question as to whore and in what capacity Hennicke supposedly saw the defendant BLOBEL, In addition, his statement is obviously incorrect, since he claims to have seen Calsen also. Calsen was one of the candidates for a supervisory position, who had already left Kiew before 29 September owing to their having been ordered to return to Berlin, The affidavit is in no way suited to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the participation of BLOBEL in the executions in Kiew because of its inaccurate formulation and because of the incorrect statements proved in the above mentioned paragraph, as a witness on his own behalf, BLOBEL has not denied (testimony Blobel, German transcript, pages 1598 ff) that men of SK 4a had been assigned to that large -- scale action; that fact however does not establish a criminal responsibility, since the Higher SS and Police Leader and the town commander were in charge of all of the detachments which had been assigned to the executions; SK 4a thus merely had been ordered to supply the required number of enlisted men.
In connection with that it must be considered that BLOBEL -- as already mentioned -- was not at all fit for duty due to his head injury and thus could not have had a hand in those transfers. preparatory action or the actual execution, that fact alone cannot be considered a criminal act by the defendant BLOBEL in accordance with the provisions of Control Council Law No. 10. An analysis of the text of the Affidavit by Hennicke (Doc. NO-4999, Exh. 202) -- its doubtful value as evidence has already been pointed out -- leads, to no other conclusion than that BLOBEL actually had been only a spectoator, and that he himself had no authority to order or to carry out the executions in Kiew. November 1941 was stationed in the same place -- Kiew -- as Einsatzgruppe C, necessitated a change in the chain of command, even though it was only of a minor nature. The Remaining sonderkommando - 4a - was directly subordinate to Einsatzgruppe C. Even though it had been intended for commitment in the combat zone, it had remained at the headquarters of Einsatzgruppe C due to personnel changes, and was utilized there for patrol and security duty. (See Affidavit Ostermann, Doc. BLOBEL No. 12, Exh. 11). Both of the Subkommandos were located in the frontline-zone; there they were subordinated to the 0-2 sections of the individual divisions and received their orders directly by way of AOK 6 - Division. Einsatzgruppe C was completely excluded in regard to the Subkommandos. The channel of commands between AOK 6 and Einsatzgruppe C continued to exist. (Testimony Blobel, German transcript, pages 1632/33; Document Book Blobel I, Doc. Blobel No. 3, Exh. 3) During this period also, BLOBEL, who was with the Remainingkommando of SK 4a had no authority to issue orders to the SK-4a Subkommandos, which were committed in the combat zone.
the Remaingkommando of SK 4a arrived there after a trip which had been made difficult by the unusually severe winter, on or about 10 December. Almost at the same time the two Subkommandos arrived. SK 4a thus for the first time in many months was almost full strength i.e., 4 Officers and 42-45 non-commissioned officers and men, except for a decrease in personnel due to sickness. Kharkow was in the combat zone and. was the focus of the Russian winter offensive for the reconquest of that strategically important town. The situation was extremely precarious and necessitated the commitment of all available forces for the defense of Kharkow. The severe Russian winter, to which the German soldiers were not accustomed and which in addition reached temperatures lower than any recorded for a long time, had in conjunction with all other difficulties -- undoubtedly impaired their fighting power. The over-all situation had as a consequence that from December 1941 SK 4a was released from its security police tasks and was committed next to combat units in the defense belt around Kharkowin a purely military function. Thus in its entity it was subordinate exclusively to the competent Wehrmacht commander of that sector (Blobel testimony, German transcript, pages 1634 - 1637; Doc. Book Blobel I, Doc. Blobel No. 4, Exh. 4). defendant BLOBEL (Doc. NO-3824, Exh. 31) in connection with his testimony as a witness on his own behalf regarding his criminal responsi bility (German transcript, pages 1646 - 1654): they had been ordered by the Commander-in-Chief of AOK6. These included persons who had been arrested by the Wehrmacht and the SK 4a because of guerrilla activities, attacks on German troops, disrupting of supply lines and acts of sabotage.
Those cases were examined by Field Marshall von Reichenau himself together with his Judge Advocate on the basis of the documents, after the accused had been thoroughly interrogated and given fair hearing. Thereupon, BLOBEL was ordered by the Commander-inChief, Field Marshall von Reichenau, to have those executions carried out under his personal supervision. (Blobel testimony, German transcript, pare 1649). In addition, it is a fact that the maximum number of persons who were executed in actions in which the SK 4a participated in any way, be it only by furnishing a few non, amounted to approximately 10-15,000 including the Kiew action (Blobel testimony, German transcript, page 1649). Apart from a few reprisal measures and actions which had been ordered because of special incidents, by C in C, AOK 6, and/or the Higher SS and Police Leader, executions have been carried out by the SK 4a only on the basis of unobjectionable ordinary procedure and the decision of the C in C of the AOK 6 or the officers, assigned for this purpose. At no time did BLOBEL hold independent authority to execute an operation (statement Blobel, German transcript page 1648-49). Not one single document of the prosecution proves that any executions had been carried out by order or by instigation of Blobel. Not one single document states that BLOBEL had knowledge of executions carried out by the Subkommandos. All assertions of the prosecution to the contrary are merely conclusions without being substantially proofs. BLOBEL, i.e. whether he actually became liable to punishment for murder by his action in the sense of International Law, according to the charge preferred against him by the indictment.
Before appraising BLOBEL's activity in the light of criminal law may I define the criminal act of murder more in detail. Control Council Law No. 10 in connection with the London agreement, which has established the rulings on which this trial is based, mentions among other things, murder, without, however, specifying the elements which make it a criminal act and the criterion for killings which are permissible in war.
One solution of this extraordinarly grave problem is possible only by explaining it rather from the actual meaning than from the mere wording of rules of International Law. According to this, where now is the difference is between the permissible and non-permissible, between "military necessities" and offense, between sanctioned killing and murder? century-whether as customary law or legal maxims - ware exhaustively codified by the first and second Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Even if it is true that the community of nations adhering to International Law, has alienated itself from the spirit of the Hague Rules of Landwarfare in the time following these conferences, and above all by the ordeal by fire of two world wars, the existence of a general International Law corresponding to the Hague Convention cannot be denied. acknowledged the Hague Rules de jure, or have ratified them. This is especially true with regard to the Soviet Republic. I will enter later on into the discussion of the question as to whether as a consequence of the lack of a formal ratification by the Soviet Union legal inferences may be drawn, Moreover, in this respect, I would like to refer to the previous exhaustive discussions, because this concerns a general question, which affects. the case in chief of all defendants. War and its unavoidable consequence of the killing of human beings, constitutes from time immemorial an institution of International Law, Most of all, under the effects of doctrine of natural law, it was bound to become one of the most important tasks to find a suitable limit which divides the two basically recognized spheres of law, that of the state and that of the individual. The Hague Rules of Land Warfare is one of those laws, which aspires to fulfill this task by ore erecting barriers for the protection of the enemy soldiers and the civilian population against a belligerent or victorious sovereign power, occupying; a particular area, according to Paragraph IV of the introduction to the basic agreement it tries "to draw a certain line" in order to restrict that is, to "limit" the hardships of war.
It merely confirms something, which had already existed before, similar to the proclamation of the King of Russia of 11 August 1870: "I wage war against the French soldiers, not against the citizens of France. Therefore, they will continue to enjoy complete security with regard to their persons and their property and as long as they do not deprive themselves of this privilege by undertaking hostile actions against German troops, I will accord them my protection." in cases where human beings are killed in violation of the rules of International Law. It is true that paragraph VI of the introduction to the basic agreement emphasizes that the "necessites militaires" the the "military necessities" have precedence over alleviating the hardships war. "military necessity" can be defined as those acts.
which are indispensible for the carrying out of combat missions, or for the protection of one's own soldiers, for instance against attacks or sabotage on the part of the civilian population. Therefore, it should not be forgotten that human rights become secondary in relation to "military necessities"; in other words, infringement of the internationally recognized human rights are permitted only insofar as they serve the purposes of military necessities, that is, the protection of military personnel or of war operations. In practice, every independent state decides autocratically as to the limits of the military necessity of its measures on the one hard and the human rights on the other, provided however, that the sovereign state can neither arbitrarily alter the Hague Rules of Land Warfare, nor the laws and usages of war. International Law recognizes two kinds of intentional killing of human beings: the permissible one, i. e. killing in the course of hostile actions during the war and the non-permissible one. The latter constitutes murder, not only according to International Law but also according to the national laws of civilized states. The two executions which were carried out under the supervision of the defendant BLOBEL do not violate, the rules of International Law. Civilians perpetrated hostile acts against the German troops and because of the fact that the prerequisite of article 1 of the supplement to the Hague Rules of Land Warfare did not apply., they forfeited the rights of protection granted by this treaty. Whether, according to the standards of International Law and in consideration of the fact that the Soviet Union did not sign the Hague Convention and often violated the laws and usages of war during the belligerencies, it can be assumed that there is a justified claim to arbitration and thus to legal hearings, must be left open. However, the evidence in that respect had proved that in all such cases interrogation officials of the SK 4a and of the Wehrmacht made thorough investigations, interrogated the accused and finally submitted each case to the C in C AOK 6 for decision. Von Reichenau examined the documents together with his court officer and passed sentence.
This procedure was completely sufficient and without doubt corresponded to the conception of human rights and humaneness as conceived in the Hague Rules of Land Warfare, If the SK 4a carried out executions of which BLOBEL was previously informed, that is those for which he forwarded the orders of the competent Wehrmacht units to his Subkommandos, this does not constitute murder. Every single case had been thouroughly investigated by interrogation officials, the defendant had been granted a hearing, documents were made up for each case and each case was submitted to the AOk 6 for decision. Even if the AOK 6 should have made decisions concerning executions without a thorough examination of the documents at least, the subjective prerequisite of murder with regard to the defendant BLOBEL is lacking; he could assume that on account of the regular orderly examination of the documents by the AOK 6, such an examination was actually made; moreover, the defendant BLOBEL had no authority and also no possibility of establishing the fact that the procedure of the examination had been omitted. Finally, it must be taken into consideration that the defendant did not possess the necessary training in order to be aware of a possible irregularity or illegality. The authorized military commander has to be held responsible for a possible objective violation of International Law in cases of ordered executions or procedural infringements. As an executive official BLOBEL was obliged to obey the military order, believing that it was a correct one.
(The legality of reprisals.) by the competent Wehrmacht Commanders, or by the Higher SS and Police leaders in each case, it must be said, that they too cannot be considered as criminal according to the indictment, as far as they were executed by the SK 4a. Here too, the Hague Rules of Land Warfare try to define the two opposites in the so-called reprisal law in order to reconcile the individual in need of protection and claiming his human rights, with the independent state, insisting upon its judicial omnipotence.
Therefore on the one hand, the individual, who will always consider it a hardship and injustice to be punished wrongly for the mere assumption of a crime, and in addition for the reasons of state of an enemy state. On the other hand, there is the military power of the belligerent state, the military necessities of which demand complete subjugation and supremacy. usages of war alleviation should be achieved by drawing a boundary line between state and individual. The point of view of the state is taken into account by recognizing in principle the right of collective punishment; that of the individual by limiting this right. These limitations are drawn up along three lines: according to purpose, the punishment and the persons to be punished. introduction to the basic agreement. Pursuant to this Paragraph collective punishment is permissible for assassination, attacks and acts of sabotage against the fighting or occupation forces, in order to deter others from similar actions. Concerning the penalities, Article 50 states that they should consist of "fines or other types of penalties". If according to this regulation a fine is to be imposed death penalty is permissible, whereby the International Law does not provide for any proportional relations. Apart of this, Article 50 also limits the category of persons, whose punishment is permitted. Such persons have to be found "jointly responsible for individual actions". It is not stated when human beings are jointly responsible as one body for an individual act. At any rate, it cannot mean that the state occupying a country, may determine that according to its own discretion, since the moral responsibility constitutes the prerequisite of a criminal act according to the established standards of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare, that is, the occupying state may decree a collective punishment for a definable individual act only for those persons guilty of voluntarily perpetrating such an act.
Evidence or incriminating circumstantial evidence must be furnished against the individuals concerned. number of documents which prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the conduct of the Russian enemy was contrary to International Law, and which prove above all that the guerilla warfare had been planned a long time before the outbreak of the war and that the population had been systematically trained for it. Faced with this situation, the German Wehrmacht and the Police units subordinate to the Higher SS and Police leaders could not guarantee the security of the occupation forces without carrying out severe collective punishments. The Soviet Union conducted the war against German troops with methods which not only were in direct contradiction to international law, but also would never have been used by any civilized nation of this world. Men, women, children, old men, in short everyone capable of using a weapon was forced to participate in the system of guerilla warfare prohibited under International Law. A long time before the occupation, an extensive and very detailed organization had been created for the purpose of functioning behind the front lines following the occupation by enemy troops, that is, exclusively for the purpose of causing damage to the personnel and equipment of the occupation forces by malicious and surprise attacks as well as by acts of sabotage wherever and whenever possible. The man left behind, even women and children were used as snipers who attacked individual soldiers and convoys and who did not even hesitate to desecrate the dead in a bestial manner. Women and children acted as spies and informers their primary duty was the safeguarding of supplies for the partisans. There can be no doubt about it, that guerilla warfare conducted in such a way is not permissible under International Law simply because this wan has been declared a war of defense against an agressor. It can never be decisive which one of the warring states is to be considered as the agressor with regard to the illegality under International Law.
lines was well known to the German authorities. Thus, in each raid and act of sabotage, the entire population of this Particular area was always guilty of giving willing assistance, and they were backed up by this superbly operating organization. The fact that in carrying out reprisals innocent people can also be affected and unfortunately are affected, is unavoidable, from the outset, it is the purpose of the reprisals to be mainly directed against innocent persons. Only such reprisals which are carried out according to plan against any kind of a majority of persons regardless of the guilt of the individual are illegal under International Law. to the defendant BLOBEL, that the SK 4a participated in the executed reprisals with the full knowledge of BLOBEL, without first examining as to whether it was a planned crime on the Part of the population.
Your Honors! I believe that whosoever witnessed in Russia these cruelties and inhuman acts perptrated on German soldiers, whosoever saw or even suffered on his own body the horrors and bestialities of Russian warfare, will understand the reprisals carried out by the German troops and will not doubt that they represent genuine "military necessities". danger, because the sovereign state decidesas judge on its own behalf, that is, it transfers the decision to its officials. Its doubtless subjective opinion is the guide for the subsumption of its executed measures according to the standards of International Law. was at all bound to follow the regulations of the Hague Rules of Lana Warfare, in view of the totally different conditions of warfare prevailing in the East - at least according to the propagated opinion of the supreme authorities at that time:
It is true that in international law the non-observance on the part of one party does not relieve the second party from his obligation of observance, but this principle is in no way an exception and especially could not be applied in the war in the East. It is true that the individual who suffers in the conflict between governments and states i s the real object of protection, that is the population and the individual soldiers end prisoners-of-war. Further, it is true that all these individuals, be they military personnel, be they civilians, require this protection all the more in the occupied territory if their army collapses; international law is primarily created to assure the safety of these individuals in such a situation. However, as was the case in the campaign against Russia, when a large number of the inhabitants of this land, whether young, old, man, woman, or child, contrary to all acts of humanity and against every provision of international law, cowardly carries on a war from abmush against the occupying army, then certainly one cannot expect that the provisions of international law would be observed to the letter by this army. That would mean sacrificing oneself and surrendering without benefit of protection to the innumerable influences acting in direct contradiction to international law. The strict implementation of the principle: "Vivat justitia pereat mundus", would mean an irresponsible sacrifice of one's own soldiers, namely if the opponent does not intend in principle to observe on his part" the existing customs of civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the demands of public conscience". In this connection the fundamental question must be asked whether today general international law applies at all. The legal interpretation of this question seems to me to be of great significance with respect to the acts which re under indictment in this trial. For be it from me to lose myself in a maze of juridical observations, I wish only to offer incontestable facts. The allied Powers have imposed a series of provisions of the Hague Convention of Land warfare which are quite obviously not valid law -- and denied Germany the right to impose a corresponding customary law.
In this connection are included the provisions of Articles 46, 47, 50,53, 55 and, 56. These facts, it is true, should not be submitted to critical examination, however, they must be ascertained, since it is unequivocally and incontestably clear from them that the Allies as the occupying ofrces, as well, have declared on their own initiative that provisions of international law are not applicable. According to the principle of equality in international law, Germany should also be accorded this same Light in its conduct of war. May I just add a few comments to the fundamental statements on the subject "Order", which was already presented from the opposing side: As leader of an executive organ Blobel had no other alternative than to carry outthe orders given him by his superiors. The possibility of open insubordination and resistance to superiors existed in Hitler-Germany only under the simultaneous risk of an SS and police proceeding, which could mean the most serious personal disadvantages - loss of freedom and possibly of life, but conceivably did not necessarily have to result in this way. In the final analysis this was contingent upon matters which were beyond the influence of individuals. However, there is a sufficient number of examples on hand to prove that neither one's position of rank or undeniable merits could keep one from the fate of death or the concentration camp. That does not mean that everyone had to pay the high price of loss of life or freedom for such acts. However, could the taking of such a great risk be expected? What should Blobel have done in his condition of constraint into which he had been forced by conditions of war in June of 1941? In all events, would he have been able to achieve anything through insubordination, which would undoubtedly have placed him jeopardy? Another would have taken his place with the same order. The charge of unconditional obedience against the government of Hitler is fundamentally unsubstantiated, since then the whole world would collapse in anarchy if in every state every citizen were permitted to subject the legality of every order of a formal competent organ to scrutiny, every citizen of every state would be logically entitled to the rewards and culpability of everything good and bad achieved by any of the agencies of his state, provided he obeyed the supreme legislator.
In every army loyalty and obedience still apply as the highest military virtues without which it cannot carry out the duties assigned to it. but having obeyed blindly is too lightly raised. Unfortunately, the true picture of the authoritarian state is too lightly misunderstood by all those who have been spared by fate from a life under such a system of government. If it were so simple to disrupt themotivating power of such a government machine, organized down to the n'th degree, then the history of not only of Europe but of the entire world would Present an entirely different picture. The technical means of suppression have in the course of history been perfected to an immense extent. At the time of the storming of the Bastille a comparatively small number of people were able to carry out successfully a unique uprising against weapons which were primitive when compared with those of today, Today they would have been dispelled with a few machine-guns and in all probability it would have required several million martyrs to overthrow the ancient regime. Our era is well aware of the techniques used in controlling the masses and evidences this knowledge through the appreciati n they accorded, among other things, to the atom bomb. As concerns the indictment for membership in the SD declared by the IMT as a criminal organization, neither can Blobel be condemned for this fact. According to the wording of the judgment of the IMT, the prerequisite for the judgment is that the member of the organization did not declare his intention to resign after 1 September 1939 in site of his knowledge of the criminal character of the organization. It can be seen from previous statements that in the action of Blobel there was a lack of subjective facts, that is, that hemust have considered the executions carried out in harmony with international law and so considered them, with the result that the found himself in a credible error of judgment.
It would have been incumbent upon the prosecution to present evidence for this fact, yet it did not produce evidence that Blobel was aware of the criminal character of the organization. In addition, service in the SD was not voluntary, seen from the viewpoint of the conditions of war. This point has been treated in detail in another passage. a man who had been successful in a recognized profession through his assiduity and honest endeavors, who never strayed from the straight path of personal decency, obedience end loyalty, and who, through conditions of war, was placed before a task that today is under severe indictment. Do not consider his case only from the legislative point of view, but also call upon your humanitarian feelings and understanding for the position from which he like many of his comrades found no escape. And now, your Honors, render a judgment that is conceived before God and your conscience, affix your names to a judgment that is an expression of wisdom and justice. Remember the words of your President Woodrow Wilson: "America has raised the torch that will shine for all generations and will light the way of humanity to the goal of justice, freedom and peace."
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to say anything further now on the matter of documents presented in the closing brief by the prosecution, or do you think you have sufficiently covered it?
DR. HEIM: Your Honor, may I ask one question please? The Tribunal has ruled that after the final pleas of theprosecution, the final statement of the prosecution, the defense may immediately reply to it. I will take the liberty, if the Tribunal agrees, during this reply to make these statements briefly.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. We would like to repeat, however, that this additional reply which will be permitted defense counsel must be directed to something entirely novel, unique and new presented by the prosecution which the defense did not have a chance to reply to or meet in its argument.
present in court this morning. There should always be two or three lawyers here to proceed with the further business of the court. Now it so happens that we are just about at the recess period so that no time will be lost, but if Dr. Heim had finished sometime prior to the recess period we would have lost considerable valuable time which is inexcusable. with regard to further counsel ready to present their summations? that you, Dr. Heim, will inform other counsel that they must not take too lightly this business of presentation of their final pleas.
(A recess was taken.)