THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Heim, you are now about to argue your case, and you have your summation prepared.
DR. HEIM: Your Honor, I have seen the closing brief against the defendant Blobel made by the Prosecution, and I have only received it after my final plea had already been completed and submitted,
THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you intend to file a closing brief yourself, or you already have filed one?
DR. HEIM: Yes, I have already submitted one, Your Honor. Your Honor, in only one and a half pages I merely want to comment briefly on the closing brief of the Prosecution. because I could not consider the statements of the prosecution in my final plea.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Glancy.
MR. GLANCY: I think it should be well and definitely understood, Your Honor, that the functions of a closing brief, that is, of the Prosecution and the Defense. although related, are independent of one another. Totally independent of one another, As the Prosecution gives their interpreation of the evidence as a function for their closing brief, likewise. the same is performed for a closing brief of the defense. It is merely our interpretation or their interpreta tion. They are independent of one another.
THE PRESIDENT: That is correct, Dr. Heim, each side gives its own version of the interpretation of the evidence in the case in the briefs, and, we can not go on replying to each brief back and forth, ad infinitum.
DR. HEIM: Your Honor, I shall then start with the presentation of my plea.
THE PRESIDENT: If in your closing remarks you want to make some reference to a document which has been touched upon by the Prosecution in its closing brief, you certainly may do soo but it is not the place here to argue the brief itself.
DR. HEIM: May it please the Tribunal. the countries of Europe and have in addition to destruction misery, want and hunger left behind millions of dead. These men in the dock have been charged with having caused the death of one million people, whereby this million of people is alleged to have been murdered upon the instigation of the defendants. The defendant Blobel alone is held responsible for 60,000 murders. may it please the Tribunal that I give in short outline a picture of the defendant Blobel since I regard it as being of a very great importance for judging his person and for understanding this case. son of a master carpenter. At the ago of 5 he came to Remscheid, attended school there, learned the carpenter's trade, passed the journeyman's test, worked then as mason and by studying without a teacher acquired the necessary knowledge so that he could attend the building trade school. This training was interrupted by World War I during which he spent four years at the front as soldier. After his return Blobel resumed his interrupted studies and by industry and energy he as a practical and ingenious man attained the respectable profession as a freelance architect which he practiced from 1924 on. Coming from a modest environment he had led an irreproachable, honest and true life. By untiring efforts Blobel became a successful architect. He was then able to realise his dream of owning his own home. He was able to make use of his abilities his entire knowledge as an architect in designing his own house and its furnishings. He could surely look back with pride upon the past years of hard work which finally had not been without success. His diligent activity, however, could not for ever postpone the impending fate. The years of economic "false prosperity" were followed in Germany all the sooner by a decline, which dragged many absolutely secure existences into its destructive whirlpool.
Thus also the economic rise of the defendant Blobel achieved with great effort was suddenly interrupted by the economic crisis of the years 1928/29. he solid existence for which he had fought and worked untiringly was smached by the general economic collapse. New orders could not be obtained, outstanding fees could not be realized. The years of distress that followed consumed his last savings. The mortgage interest could no longer be paid. Due to the general economic crisis Blobel "was doen to his last shirt". This is only one fate which so many people of that type experienced. Nothing indicates that Blobel was particularly interested in politics or sympathized with any of the parties existing at that time. If there existed an association of ideas at all then Blobel only occupied himself with the socialist parties Since he himself came from the workers' class. But the substance of Blobel's life was the establishment of security in his job, his family and profession. of the quarrel between the large political parties which was becoming ever more violent; they all promised the German people a removal of the distress which was taking on the proportions of an avalanche and a restoration of sound and just social conditions. This situation alone makes the subsequent behavior of the defendant Blobel comprehensible It can only be interpreted correctly on the basis of the extraordinary situation at that time. What may appear reprehensible objectionable today was at that time regarded as a panacea which could lead out of the diastrous years. persons. For 4 1/2 years he had nothing but the most modest state support to depend upon. Thus the immense economic depression, as it is again being experienced by the world a second time - at present after this World War II- caused him simultaneously to become a member in the SPD as well as the SA reserve. By joining these two organizations he did not so much pursue political goals; economic interests were much more decisive.
He hoped his membership in the parties would make it easier for him to overcome the economic crisis and he expected finally to use it for building up his destroyed existence again. In 1932 Blobel became a member of the SS. Not fanatic eagerness to fight for the ideology of National Socialism, not the irresponsible acceptance of the platform of the NSDAP were decisive for his membership in the SS but solely the conviction that this was a way which might lead out of the economic chaos. Finally. after the seizure of power by National Socialism he was for one year employed by the municipal administration in Solingen receiving a more than modest monthly salary. His position was by no means commensurate with his training and knowledge. And when then in 1935 he received the order as an architect to furnish the office of the SD in Duesseldorf he in no way declined this offer in view of his economic situation but accepted it without long deliberation since he could again work in his line. Since his economic situation had not yet by any means essentially improved and the building business still was stagnant he readily accepted the offer to stay there as coworker in the office he had just designed; in the time thereafter he was placed in charge of the intelligence work for the SD covering all spheres of public life in the Duesselderf territory. at the same time resulted in his leaving the Allgemeine SS; he had entered into relations which he in the time to come he was unable to sever in spite of all efforts. duties and the nature of the SD. The SD, and NSDAP agency, had been established for the sole purpose of communicating to the leadership of the Party and in view of the unity of Party and State - also to the leadership of the state a true picture of all spheres of public life within the Reich. Its task exclusively consisted in collecting news from all spheres of life, in ascertaining public opinion in pointing out abuses, in short, to give the Party and State leadership a picture of how the man in the street reacted to the measures and decrees of Party and State.
The SD never had executive power, since being an organization of the NSDAP it could never authorized for that. Then SD may properly be compared with the I attitude for the Study of the Public Opinion, especially since the SD had many coworkers who did not at all belong to the NSDAP. In this respect it was an entirely objective source for intelligence. the reason why he was declared to be indispensable by a general order of the Reichsfuehrer-SS according to an agreement with the OKW, i.e. that for the duration of his indispensable status, he was at the disposal not of the Wehrmacht but exclusively of the Reichsfuehrer SS. This activity as full-time SD leader was also the cause for Blobel's being ordered to Berlin in June 1941, According to the agreements reached between Wehrmacht and the Reichsfuehrer-SS this was placed on the same level with a draft into the army, i.e. it corresponded to an induction notice such as millions of German men fit for service received during the war. Non-compliance with the draft order was equal to a refusal of military service which was subject to severest punishment. This was, however, not a typically German institution. None of the belligerent countries contented itself with an appeal to voluntary enlistments, not one country could in this world - wide struggle renounce the conscription of its men fit for service. World War II toward a withdrawal from his service of fulltime SD in order to be able to devote himself to his former profession as an architect had been in vain, it had now become completely impossible due to the order of the Reichsfuehrer-SS. Once ought in this vicious circle there was no retreat. From the time of his transfer in June 1941 Blobel was considered soldier and was subject to the regulations of maritial law; in case of a refusal he would undoubtedly have been placed before an SS and Police tribunal.
The statements made by Streckenbach and Heydrich at Pretsch were also to the same effect. Thus the defendant Blobel had slipped into this assignment without intending it and without in the least having made any efforts in this respect, nay even without having known in advance what his assignment actually meant. SD, The refusal of his spureior office did not per it him to materialize this plan. his remaining with the SD at all have been regarded as criminal ommission taking into consideration his knowledge at that tiie of the activity of the SD? By no means. activity with the SD and to turn his back upon this organization for his duty merely was to collect information without making comments and to pass it on to the competent offices. That this never can be a criminal activity and never has been so was an established fact for the defendant Blobel at that time and still is so at present, Quito on the contrary. he had to regard this activity of his as a proper and admissible instrument for informing the government about the actual state of mind of the people and the suitability of the adopted measures, a means which - if duly applied and evaluated would necessarily be of benefit to all nationals of the Reich and in thepositive sense of an inestimable value. charged with having occasioned the murder of 60,000 persons as leader of Sonderkommando 40. what now did Blobel actually do as long as he was leader of Sonderkommando 4a? Has he made himself liable to punishment on the grounds of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the East according to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution?
long as it was commanded by Blobel, beginning from the first day on always was in every respect exclusively subordinated to the Army in the combat area under the command of Field Marshal von Reichrenau, and that this subordination resulted in a situation for Sonderkommando 4a which was entirely different from that of other Kommandos, and which is of fundamental importance for the judgment under criminal law of the defendant Blobel. The very name "Sonder"-Kommando (special Kommando) refers to the direct subordination of the unit under unit of the army. Neither is this refuted by the draft of an order for the commitment of the Einsatzgruppen of the Secutiry Police and the SD (Doc.
NOKW-256, Exh. 174). The document involved is merely a draft and the Prosecution has not been in a position to prove that it was carried out as such. The fact of subordination under an army unit also accounts for the essentially smaller number of personnel which amounted to about one quarter of that of the remaining Kommandos of Einsatzgruppe C (BLOBEL statement, German Transcript, page 1531). In this connection the following circumstances must be pointed out; The frontline in the East extended from North to South over a distance of much more than 1000 kilometers. In this vast area 4 Einsatzgruppen with an average of 4 Kommandos each were in charge of Security police tasks which had to be carried out in cooperation with Wehrmacht and Constabulary. The purely military operations were incumbent on 3 Army Groups: Army group North Field Marshal Ritter von LEEB --, Army Group Center Field Marshal von BOCK and Army Group south-Field Marshal von RUNDSTENDT-Several armies and special military formations were subordinated to every Army Group. As has been shown at all times during military actions the person of the army commander is the decisive essential, It is his initiative which lends the special character to the orders coming to him for execution from the supreme authority. This is ultimately the reason why the situation was entirely different for the individual Einsatzgruppen and oven more so for the individual Kommandos. Sonderkommando 4a was appointed for commitment in the area of Army (AOK) 6. The chief commander of AOK 6 was Field Marshal von REICHENAU. As will be shown later, von REICHENAU as military commander exercised a decisive influence on the activity of Sonderkommando 4a; in doing so he wasperhaps in opposition to other generals who -- perhaps intentionally -- hold themselves aloof from the units of the Security Police and the SD and from their sphere of duties. Von REICHENAU was an army commander of an entirely different past. His eminent person asserted itself also insofar as he exercised an influence on everything that in the least degree would touch upon the military interests of his zone of operations. In order to elucidate what has been said up to now, the following must be noted:
The German generals did not form a homogeneous unit. They were different in their conceptions and view. At the time when National Socialism seized power in 1933 there were on the whole only a few generals who could be regarded as absolute followers of HITLER. However, one of these few was von REICHENAU. His words: "The Wehrmacht will be National Socialist or it will not exist", are typical of his attitude at that time and also later. His absolute subordination toward Hitler made him contrary to many another army commander -- an obedient and passionate executor of his directive. In this connection I wish to refer especially to the statements made by the USSR member of the International Military Tribunal Brigadier General (?) of Justice L.T. Nikitschenko concerning the "inaccurate decision with regard to the General Staff and the OK Which in their latter part in detail deal with von REICHNAU's person. the commander -in-Chief of AOK 6. On this occasion he was informed of the order from OKH which had been directed to AOK 6 directly. According to this order, Kommandos of the Security Police were subordinated to the military commanders in their area whereby it was the task of the Kommandos to handle the-circles of political opponents according to security police principles and to bring about the absolute elimination of all elements insofar as these would in any form impinge the security of the military units and the military operations. In addition to this order of the OKH it was left to the discretion of the commanders of the forces to issue the corresponding implementation provisions. (BLOBEL statement. German Transcript pages 1532/33). Accordingly, Field Marshal von REICHENAU ordered that Sonderkommando 4a be attached to AOK 6 with regard to movement and supply. As regards its activity it was subordinated directly to department C of AOK 6, its duties being the handling of security police matters. (BLOBEL statement, German Transcript, page 1533). This order by REICHANAU was, while still in the discussion stage, laid down in writing and passed on to the units involved (division commander and commander of the army rear area). In accordance with the chain of command von REICHENAU immediately ordered the splitting up of the Kommando into 3 sections and the subordination of those sub-kommandos (Partial Kommandos) under the division commanders (BLOBEL statement, German Transcript, page 1532, BLOBEL Doc.
No. 5 Exh. 5, HAEFNER Affidavit, para 4). In the period from 28 June 1941 to the end of August 1941 the situation of Sonderkommando 4a was as follows: In its entirety it was completely subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the AOK 6 Field marshal von REICHANAU. The leadership of Sonderkommando 4a. received its orders directly from Department C of AOK 6, which corresponds to the G-2 in the American Army. In order to prevent every overlapping and contradictory orders, the directives of Einsatzgruppe C for Sonderkommando 4a were routed through Department C of AOK 6, Moreover, directives from Einsatzgruppe C could only be of minor importance, since Sonderkommando 4a was assigned to the combat zone and here exclusively AOK 6 was competent, whereby it must be taken into consideration that Sonderkammando 4a was attached to AOK 6 as military Security Police unit. men including drivers, mess personnel and office, was divided into three subkommandos and into one tank obstacle clearing kommandos. These subkommandos were in charge of the handling Security Police matters, that is, the search for, seizure of, and collection of enemy records, the interrogation of persons, the compilation of files on incidents and also the carrying out of executions that had been ordered. The subkommandos were for reasons of expediency subordinated to the divisions of the AOK 6 and accordingly received their orders from these directly, that is, from their Departments C, whereby these orders because of their urgency only in exceptional cases were routed through the office of Sonderkommando 4a, and in such cases merely forwarded.
(SS BLOBEL statement, German Transcript, page 1534 to 1540; Doc. Book I BLOBEL Document No. 1 Exhibit 1) BLOBEL himself stayed with the rest of Sonderkommando 4a consisting of orderly room, messing personnel, as well as of an interpreter. Handicapped by the bad read conditions, the structure of the vast combat area and the state of the operations, during the advance a connection between the subkommandos and the rest of Sonderkommando 4a was absolutely out of the question; however, even apart from that it was hardly possible, since Sonderkommando 4a and the subkommandos possessed no radio communication and merely depended on courier service by messenger. As chief leader of Sonderkommando 4a BLOBEL was not competent to make independent decisions, he was solely subordinate military agency which carried out the orders received from AOK 6. In a Edition, the subkommandos were more or less separated from the chain of command, from Sonderkommando 4a; they were only subordinated to this in personnel matters. To whom could thus BLOBEL have given orders in view of this situation. STRECHENBACH had announced in Pretsch, i.e. whether the extermination of all communist groups and Jews had been ordered or merely the elimination of these elements who imperiled the security of troops and thus the military operations. Even as blanket orders it was of no importance whatever for BLOBEL since Sonderkommando 4a only was the executive agency of AOK 6. It was only of importance for those officers whose unit was not directly subordinate to a military unit. For BLOBEL exclusively and solely the order received from von REICHENAU and issued by the OKW was decisive, whereby its execution in every single case was ordered by AOK 6. According to the statements of BLOBEL which have not been refuted this order merely contained the directive that those elements should be exterminated who attempted to prejudice the course of the military operations in a way contrary to international Law. Thus the "Fuehrer decree" is of no importance whatever for judging the activity of the defendant BLOBEL so tint there is no need for further details concerning this question.
underwent no change even in August 1941 when 28 to 30 men of the police as well as two platoons of the Waffen-SS were ordered to Sonderkommando 4a and thus caused a certain re-organization of Sonderkommando 4a. These attached units were with regard to orders subordinate to the competent Wehrmacht units -- as was Sonderkommando 4a itself. BLOBEL had no competence whatsoever to give them orders or directives since they were completely outside of his jurisdiction. of the Waffen-SS to the subkommando South, since pursuant to a directive by the AOK 6 to begin with only 2 subkommandos had been found BLOBEL statement, German Transcript, page 1552/53), of which later -- as had already been provided for the Advancekommando Kiev -- was found with the strength of 2 leaders and 8 men. army units and within their assigned area received their orders directly from the Wehrmacht Kommandant. They were in addition, also subordinate to the Chief of Einsatzgruppe C who, however, chiefly received his orders from Department G-2 of AOK 6 as well as from the Higher SS and Police Leader JECKELN. We particularly refer to the statements in the closing Brief (page 31) concerning the person of JECKELN. In agreement with this commitment and the subordination of these Subkommandos to the Wehrmacht Kommandants there existed, no connection whatever with regard to orders between the rest of Sonderkommando 4a and the Subkommandos. The office and the supply column of Sonderkommando 4a comprised merely 3 leaders, 6 non-cons and men, as well as one or two interpreters. The subkommandos were also assigned to fight against the guerillas.
together with units of the Wehrmacht, the local Kommendantures, the Ukrainian militia with the army units and formations, which were exclusively subordinate to the Higher SS and Police Leader JECKELN. (BLOBEL statement, German Transcript, pages 1555/56, Doc. Book BLOBEL I Doc. BLOBEL No. 2, Exh. 2.). Corresponding to the commitment of Sonderkommando 4a in the combat area ordered by the Wehrmacht, BLOBEL could exercise no influence whatsoever on the activity of the subkommandose, neither on executions possibly carried out by them. It is incontestable that the subkommandos were integral parts of Sonderkommando 4a and that its officers were subordinated to BLOBEL in disciplinary ratters, this does, however, not imply any authority whatever to issue orders concerning their activity in carrying out security police measures. Those measures were exclusively meant to guarantee the security of the Wehrmacht and a smooth course of the military operations as possible, and to avert impingement of any kind.
Since Sonderkommando 4a only was employed in the direct combat zone, the exclusive responsibility rested with the Wehrmacht Commander who was in charge of the control and performance of the military operations. This very fact proves that the defendant BLOBEL even at that time never had any authority to give orders to the subkommandos with regard to security police matters. The rest of Sonderkommando 4a was far away from them, its functions more of a purely administrative character and with a view to its small number of personnel it was not taken into consideration for any security police measures. BLOBELS activity merely consisted in the handling of purely administrative duties, however, in the widest sense.
In discussing Doc. NO-3140 presented by the Prosecution as Exhibit No. 30 the Kiev operation and BLOBEL's participation in it were dealt with in detail in the closing Brief for the defendant BLOBEL (page 23), Reference can be made to it in this respect. If it is mentioned again, then it is done only because the Prosecution offered in rebuttal an affidavit by Karl HENNICKE as evidence with which it wishes to prove BLOBEL's participation in the execution in Kiev, (see Doc. IX-4999, Exh. No. 202). Incidentally we wish to note that HENNICKE was not an officer of Sonderkommando 4a, asis erronesouly assorted on page lit in the Closing Brief of the Prosecution, According to his own statement HENNICKE was the official in charge (Sachbearbeiter) of Ant III with the staff of Einsatzgruppe C (see Doc. NO-4999, Exhibit No. 202, Subparagraph 3). First of all, we establish that the executions in Kiev were by no means carried out by BLOBEL's order, but Kiev were not carried out on Blobel's order at all but on the basis of a joint large-scale action of the town commander and the Higher SS and Police Leader Jaeckel by the forces of the Constabulary and the Security Police (Blobel testimony, German transcript, page 1606), Since a town commander, of the Wehrmacht had been appointed who was in charge of the entire area of the town, only he -- in agreement with the Higher SS and Police Leader -- could be competent for executions of that kind, BLOBEL himself had suffered a head wound during the dynamiting of buildings at the time of the entry into Kiew and as a consequence was not fit for duty (Blobel testimony German transcript, page 1603) Document Book Blobel II, Affidavit Hennicke, Doc.
No. 7, Exhibit 7; Affidavit Ostermann, Doc. No. 12, Exh. 11; Affidavit Haefner, Doc. No. 6, Exh. 6, Section 4). This testimony of BLOBEL, which is substantiated by several affidavits cannot be refuted by the prosecution not upon by the affidavit of Hennicke of 4 September 1947 (Doc. NO-4999) Exh. 202, which they submitted. does not follow at all that BLOBEL was personally present during those executions, it leaves completely obscure the question as to whore and in what capacity Hennicke supposedly saw the defendant BLOBEL, In addition, his statement is obviously incorrect, since he claims to have seen Calsen also. Calsen was one of the candidates for a supervisory position, who had already left Kiew before 29 September owing to their having been ordered to return to Berlin, The affidavit is in no way suited to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the participation of BLOBEL in the executions in Kiew because of its inaccurate formulation and because of the incorrect statements proved in the above mentioned paragraph, as a witness on his own behalf, BLOBEL has not denied (testimony Blobel, German transcript, pages 1598 ff) that men of SK 4a had been assigned to that large -- scale action; that fact however does not establish a criminal responsibility, since the Higher SS and Police Leader and the town commander were in charge of all of the detachments which had been assigned to the executions; SK 4a thus merely had been ordered to supply the required number of enlisted men.
In connection with that it must be considered that BLOBEL -- as already mentioned -- was not at all fit for duty due to his head injury and thus could not have had a hand in those transfers. preparatory action or the actual execution, that fact alone cannot be considered a criminal act by the defendant BLOBEL in accordance with the provisions of Control Council Law No. 10. An analysis of the text of the Affidavit by Hennicke (Doc. NO-4999, Exh. 202) -- its doubtful value as evidence has already been pointed out -- leads, to no other conclusion than that BLOBEL actually had been only a spectoator, and that he himself had no authority to order or to carry out the executions in Kiew. November 1941 was stationed in the same place -- Kiew -- as Einsatzgruppe C, necessitated a change in the chain of command, even though it was only of a minor nature. The Remaining sonderkommando - 4a - was directly subordinate to Einsatzgruppe C. Even though it had been intended for commitment in the combat zone, it had remained at the headquarters of Einsatzgruppe C due to personnel changes, and was utilized there for patrol and security duty. (See Affidavit Ostermann, Doc. BLOBEL No. 12, Exh. 11). Both of the Subkommandos were located in the frontline-zone; there they were subordinated to the 0-2 sections of the individual divisions and received their orders directly by way of AOK 6 - Division. Einsatzgruppe C was completely excluded in regard to the Subkommandos. The channel of commands between AOK 6 and Einsatzgruppe C continued to exist. (Testimony Blobel, German transcript, pages 1632/33; Document Book Blobel I, Doc. Blobel No. 3, Exh. 3) During this period also, BLOBEL, who was with the Remainingkommando of SK 4a had no authority to issue orders to the SK-4a Subkommandos, which were committed in the combat zone.
the Remaingkommando of SK 4a arrived there after a trip which had been made difficult by the unusually severe winter, on or about 10 December. Almost at the same time the two Subkommandos arrived. SK 4a thus for the first time in many months was almost full strength i.e., 4 Officers and 42-45 non-commissioned officers and men, except for a decrease in personnel due to sickness. Kharkow was in the combat zone and. was the focus of the Russian winter offensive for the reconquest of that strategically important town. The situation was extremely precarious and necessitated the commitment of all available forces for the defense of Kharkow. The severe Russian winter, to which the German soldiers were not accustomed and which in addition reached temperatures lower than any recorded for a long time, had in conjunction with all other difficulties -- undoubtedly impaired their fighting power. The over-all situation had as a consequence that from December 1941 SK 4a was released from its security police tasks and was committed next to combat units in the defense belt around Kharkowin a purely military function. Thus in its entity it was subordinate exclusively to the competent Wehrmacht commander of that sector (Blobel testimony, German transcript, pages 1634 - 1637; Doc. Book Blobel I, Doc. Blobel No. 4, Exh. 4). defendant BLOBEL (Doc. NO-3824, Exh. 31) in connection with his testimony as a witness on his own behalf regarding his criminal responsi bility (German transcript, pages 1646 - 1654): they had been ordered by the Commander-in-Chief of AOK6. These included persons who had been arrested by the Wehrmacht and the SK 4a because of guerrilla activities, attacks on German troops, disrupting of supply lines and acts of sabotage.
Those cases were examined by Field Marshall von Reichenau himself together with his Judge Advocate on the basis of the documents, after the accused had been thoroughly interrogated and given fair hearing. Thereupon, BLOBEL was ordered by the Commander-inChief, Field Marshall von Reichenau, to have those executions carried out under his personal supervision. (Blobel testimony, German transcript, pare 1649). In addition, it is a fact that the maximum number of persons who were executed in actions in which the SK 4a participated in any way, be it only by furnishing a few non, amounted to approximately 10-15,000 including the Kiew action (Blobel testimony, German transcript, page 1649). Apart from a few reprisal measures and actions which had been ordered because of special incidents, by C in C, AOK 6, and/or the Higher SS and Police Leader, executions have been carried out by the SK 4a only on the basis of unobjectionable ordinary procedure and the decision of the C in C of the AOK 6 or the officers, assigned for this purpose. At no time did BLOBEL hold independent authority to execute an operation (statement Blobel, German transcript page 1648-49). Not one single document of the prosecution proves that any executions had been carried out by order or by instigation of Blobel. Not one single document states that BLOBEL had knowledge of executions carried out by the Subkommandos. All assertions of the prosecution to the contrary are merely conclusions without being substantially proofs. BLOBEL, i.e. whether he actually became liable to punishment for murder by his action in the sense of International Law, according to the charge preferred against him by the indictment.
Before appraising BLOBEL's activity in the light of criminal law may I define the criminal act of murder more in detail. Control Council Law No. 10 in connection with the London agreement, which has established the rulings on which this trial is based, mentions among other things, murder, without, however, specifying the elements which make it a criminal act and the criterion for killings which are permissible in war.
One solution of this extraordinarly grave problem is possible only by explaining it rather from the actual meaning than from the mere wording of rules of International Law. According to this, where now is the difference is between the permissible and non-permissible, between "military necessities" and offense, between sanctioned killing and murder? century-whether as customary law or legal maxims - ware exhaustively codified by the first and second Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Even if it is true that the community of nations adhering to International Law, has alienated itself from the spirit of the Hague Rules of Landwarfare in the time following these conferences, and above all by the ordeal by fire of two world wars, the existence of a general International Law corresponding to the Hague Convention cannot be denied. acknowledged the Hague Rules de jure, or have ratified them. This is especially true with regard to the Soviet Republic. I will enter later on into the discussion of the question as to whether as a consequence of the lack of a formal ratification by the Soviet Union legal inferences may be drawn, Moreover, in this respect, I would like to refer to the previous exhaustive discussions, because this concerns a general question, which affects. the case in chief of all defendants. War and its unavoidable consequence of the killing of human beings, constitutes from time immemorial an institution of International Law, Most of all, under the effects of doctrine of natural law, it was bound to become one of the most important tasks to find a suitable limit which divides the two basically recognized spheres of law, that of the state and that of the individual. The Hague Rules of Land Warfare is one of those laws, which aspires to fulfill this task by ore erecting barriers for the protection of the enemy soldiers and the civilian population against a belligerent or victorious sovereign power, occupying; a particular area, according to Paragraph IV of the introduction to the basic agreement it tries "to draw a certain line" in order to restrict that is, to "limit" the hardships of war.
It merely confirms something, which had already existed before, similar to the proclamation of the King of Russia of 11 August 1870: "I wage war against the French soldiers, not against the citizens of France. Therefore, they will continue to enjoy complete security with regard to their persons and their property and as long as they do not deprive themselves of this privilege by undertaking hostile actions against German troops, I will accord them my protection." in cases where human beings are killed in violation of the rules of International Law. It is true that paragraph VI of the introduction to the basic agreement emphasizes that the "necessites militaires" the the "military necessities" have precedence over alleviating the hardships war. "military necessity" can be defined as those acts.