cutions were dictated by military necessity alone. show how great the Partisan danger was, by describing the strength, armament, organization and fighting methods of the Partisan bands, (for example Prosecution Exh. 66, 85, 87, 93 etc, and Ott Exh. 1,4 and 5). so weird that it can only be comprehended if you consider how immense the space, how impenetrable the forests and swamps and how difficult to comprehead the ideas and mental processes of the Asiatic peoples and the peculiarities of the Bolshevist ideology and methods were for the European, and add to this the picture of a relentless ideological bottle which used every means of warfare, from the methods and tricks of primitive tribes to the most modern weapons of technological war. These are the conditions under which one must consider the Russian campaign, and especially the Partisan war, if one is to establish the boundaries of "military necessity." at the battle front in Russia was more than "enemy" and "enemy territory." All conceptions of the Occident concerning man and state, space and time, technology and war and might and right were exploded in this unfathomable land of released demons. In such a situation the Fuehrer Order also had a different aspect than it now has in retrospective contemplation from the view point of a world that is at least formally at peace. In this case, every retrospective verdict can use knowledge which is denied to the man acting in the present. And so the defendant Ott also did not have an extermination program in mind when he came to Russia, but rather, he saw, first of all, the destruction of two German engineer companies in a treacherous Partisan attack using unlawful measures of war.
When he was told of his duties, on the spot, his predecessor told him, in Briansk, of the Fuehrer Order, which had been issued "for security", as he was told. Ott did not understand that defenseless women and children and the aged were to be shot "for security", but his Chief also acknowledged to him that the Supreme War Commander had ordered this. With the sound instinct of a plain man, Ott led his Kommando like a military police unit to secure the rear and the lines of communication of the most advanced troops. Because Ott saw the duties of his Kommando exclusively from the view point of military necessity, he was brought back to Russia by General Schmidt as Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Panzer Army, after he had already been transferred back to his job at home. (Record English page 3714, German 3775). Sonderkommando 7 b only killed proved Partisans under his leadership. And approximately 20 Jews were also members of Partisan groups. Their execution was permitted by the rules of warfare and did not have to be based on the Fuehrer order. The boundaries of the security of his own combat troops Naturally, he could not deny the fact towards the leaders of this subkommando that the Fuehrer order remained formally in effect (Reocrd English page 3752/53, German page 3816), but in practice the Fuehrer order no longer had any meaning in his territory while Ott was in command of the Kommando. (Record English page 3782, German page 3844) The territory of the Army could be considered as free of Jews since long before (Steimle Exhibit 20, 33 and 38), and the security tasks had to be carried out where the danger threatened, that is, in the territory of the Partisans and against them. The Security Police functions of Ott and his Kommando were exhausted in the defense against the Partisans and their sabotage activities. Ott also took measures to maintain strict discipline in his sub-kommandos, he examined all interrogation records in order to prevent frivolous decisions (Record English page 3782, German page 3844). In minor cases, despite the proximity of the front and the attendant increased need for security, he permitted clemency and gave only short prison sentences.
(Prosecution Exhibit 67, subsection 7) These limiting measures indicate the responsible way Ott carried out his police duties. Since they are a result of his own initiative they show his tendency to use milder means which, on the front lines, is equal to saving lives. In Russia, too, Ott helped the civilian population that did not participate in the fighting. Through complaints to the German Labor Office in Brjansk he was able to stop the conscription of laborers. (Ott Document 10, Document Book III). This behavior corresponds to his readiness to help the French population, which the Mayor, elected in 1947, of the village in Lorraine where Ott lived before and after his assignment in Russia, confirmed voluntarily. (Ott Exhibit 2, Record English page 3697, German page 3758). After what has been said, the way Ott commanded Sonderkommando 7 b cannot be considered as a criminal activity, His Security Police activities and his military assignment served exclusively to secure the occupation troops and the rear of the fighting front. Even if the executions of a total of 20 Jews are supposed to have been backed by the Fuehrer Order, yet it remains proven that these 20 Jews were, as well, members of the partisan units, so that they could have been shot according to the general rules of the laws of war too, In these circumstances, no participation in crimes of the murder of peoples can be seen in these 20 cases. Actions which are unobjectionable from the point of view of international law can prove no connection with carrying out of a crime in the sense of Article II, No. 2 of Control Council Law No. 10. The position as Commander of a Sonderkommando Within an Einsatzgruppe can, in itself, entail no criminal responsibility. As Ott did not use his Kommando for actions the purpose of which was the registration of Jews and their execution because of their race, he withdrew his Kommando from a purpose of the kind.
I do not need to verify whether other Kommandos of the Einsatzgruppe B carried out such actions in Ott's time, for, even if they did it, Ott did not take part in these actions and was not a member of a participating unit. The Einsatzgruppe as such was no tactical unit, which carried out restricted and uniformly conducted actions, rather the individual Kommandos operated independently, Ott had no connection with the other Kommandos of Einsatzgruppe B and of other Einsatzgruppen. (Transcript English, page 3760, German page 3823). Nor had he a clear picture of the activity of other Kommandos (Transcript English, page 3785, German page 3847). Thus the applicability of Article III, No. 2 e of Law No. 10 drops out too. Since Ott committed no war crimes and crimes against humanity, took part in no such thing in any form and was otherwise in no way connected with the committing of such, there remains only examination of the question whether Ott, through his knowledge of crimes is to be ranked in the category of persons of an organization declared criminal. First of ally there is no doubt that Ott was familiar with the Fuehrer order and that he knew too that it was carried out in Russia by the Kommandos of the 4 Einsatzgruppen, the leadership of which was principally in the hands of members of the Security police and the SD. This knowledge, in my opinion, does not suffice, because Ott could not see in such a use of individual members of the SD a criminal characteristic of the Organization SD, any more than he could regard as activity of the SD the activity of many SD members on account of their employment within the Wehrmacht. The Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos were mobile units of a peculiar kind with military tasks of a securitypolice nature. When he came to such a unit he had no knowledge of the Fuehrer order so the conspiratorial idea of promoting, by membership in this unit, the realization of the Fuehrer order was missing.
Ott, however, at the time when he discovered that putting into effect of the Fuehrer Order was one of the tasks of an Einsatzkommando, could no longer leave the unit, because he was ordered to it by virtue of war laws and was subject to the laws of war of the soldier, which had been tightened up and which excluded the free expression of volition in the manner of a member of a private union of persons, and, consequently, made withdrawal from the unit impossible. He did not employ the Kommando entrusted to him in a criminal sense and for criminal purposes, from which it is sufficiently clear that such aims were not his. Outside Russia, too, Ott developed no kind of criminal activity whatever during the war and know nothing either of a criminal quality of the SD and could have known nothing The Prosecution is indeed obliged to prove, if it asserts criminal knowledge. Without such proof, however, on the part of the Prosecution I have shown actual proofs in the direct examination (English Transcript page 3695 3703, German page 3756 - 3763) that permit the conclusion to be drawn that Ott had no knowledge in the sense of approval of a criminal activity of the SD. The already mentioned affidavit of the French Mayor Adam seems to me to be a specially valuable piece of evidence in this respect (Ott - Exhibit 2), because this confirmation takes in almost the entire duration of the war with the exception of the Einsatz in Russia and shows the very informative behavior in the occupied territory. Ott Exhibit 3 proves, too, that in Lorraine Ott, through his reports, rebelled against the despotic regime of the Gauleiter Buerckel, in order to help the indigenous population. Nowhere is there a tendency to criminal activity and, for that reason, it is of significance, that at the end of the war Ott presented himself voluntarily to the occupying powers (Transcript English, page 3763, German page 3826), that in 1946 he reported voluntarily to Nuernberg as a witness when the IMT was deliberating on the SD and that finally he gave evidence concerning his activity in Russia that always tallied whether it was before the Interrogator Mr. Wartenberg or the Tribunal, and that always with the same frankness.
Had he had something to hide then he would not have extended the responsibility for Sonderkommando 7 b to a longer period than was necessary according to the documents submitted. From Ott Exhibit 5 it is evident that Ott, as early as 24 July 1942, was no longer designated as Commander of Sonderkommando 7 b, and yet he has assumed responsibility for the later period of its commando. The Prosecution wishes presumably to make good the lacking evidence of culpable behavior on Ott's part by reference to his long membership in the Party. Proofs must be more effective which in Ott's case are produced by the actual behavior of the defendant in the most difficult situations than such a piece of evidence as is based on the idea of collective responsibility. We must not forget that the proceedings before the Nuernberg Tribunals represent a first attempt to interpret power struggles of secular significance in terms of a legal trial by using figures which were utterly unknown in the theater where those power struggles were enacted. If one has already dared the novel innovation of making individuals answerable, from the point of view of International Law, for political and historical events, then, in no event, should this penal responsibility be extended to persons who themselves were never the determining factors but always merely victims of those power-political disputes. Control Council Law No. 10, looked at from a legal point of view, is a much too controversial creation to be regarded as a recognized development of International Law. There is as yet still no court of judicature in the world which could create International Law by means of legislation. If however Control Council Law No. 10 merely intends to fix what is valid International Law, in so doing, it would only take upon itself the task reserved at all times for the Courts.
Besides, this law furnishes characteristics of a particular offense and forms of participation which were entirely foreign to the continental legal system up to now, and, accordingly, can constitute no basis for judging, from the point of view of penal and international law, events which took place in the past before the law was issued, in the time of the war on the Continent. How entirely different is the attitude of the Signatory Powers of the London Agreement and Control Council Law No. 10 in legal thought is revealed by the different interpretations of the meaning of the State form "democracy". However, welcome the effort is to check the methods of political power struggles by international standards yet contemporary events show that experiments with development of international law in the sense of the Nuernberg principles are not yet established on a common practice and legal conviction of all civilized people in the world, This common conviction and practice is however the only real indication of genuine development of International Law. In particular, however, expiation of violations of International Law, on the part of the conquered only, must be avoided, for uniformity of law and similarity of law do not affect merely the extent to which the law can be enforced but are a property of law itself, especially of international law which is built up on reciprocity. If, however, Control Council Law No. 10 is to be looked at in individual part as national law and as legislative work of the Control Council as representative of the Reich Government, then it can not be applied to events prior to the issuing of this law. All these ideas prompt me to ask the honourable Tribunal to acquit the defendant Ott of guilt and punishment.
THE PRESIDENT: I presume you will be ready tomorrow morning to present the summation in behalf of the defendant Schubert.
DR. KOESSL: Your Honor, tomorrow morning a number of colleagues want to present their pleas and I think they would be so jealous that they would not let me do so first and I would rather complete the plea for Schubert in the turn in which it comas regularly. I shall agree with my colleagues about who is to present his plea.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. KOESSL: I think my colleague Kink and several other people want to come before me.
THE PRESIDENTS: The Tribunal will be in recess now until tomorrow at 9:30.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 10 February 1938, at 0930 hours) of America, against Otto Ohlendorf, et al.
,
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal II.
Military Tribunal II is not in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
Dr. HEIM: Dr. Heim for the defendant Blobel. Your Honor, before beginning with my final plea, I would like to make a brief statement about the final brief of the Prosecution. Some weeks ago, already, I submitted my closing brief for Flobel to the Tribunal, which concerned itself with the facts and legal consideration of the evidence submitted by the Prosecution against the defendant Blobel. The viewpoint expressed there is maintained even in view of the closing brief submitted against the defendant Blobel by the Prosecution. I ask the Tribunal to take into consideration the statements in my closing brief when arriving at the judgment. In order to avoid unnecessary repetitions, I shall, therefore, not discuss the documents in detail. but I must point out a few significant mistakes in the mentioned documents of the Prosecution, First of all, as for dates in Document No-3140, Exhibit No. 30 which mentioned the conference in Schitomir, and about the execution to be carried out in order to shoot Jews who were living there, this is mentioned on page 6 of the closing brief of the Prosecution, and is listed as having taken place on 10 September 1941. In the session of 29 October 1947 ----
Mr. Glancy: If it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution is of the opinion it is hardly the time or the place, or is it hardly appro priate for a discussion, or the debating of the broad merits of a docment as presented. This is time for a final plea. This can very well be taken care of. and I an sure it has been in the closing brief which the Doctor said has been submitted to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Heim, you are now about to argue your case, and you have your summation prepared.
DR. HEIM: Your Honor, I have seen the closing brief against the defendant Blobel made by the Prosecution, and I have only received it after my final plea had already been completed and submitted,
THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you intend to file a closing brief yourself, or you already have filed one?
DR. HEIM: Yes, I have already submitted one, Your Honor. Your Honor, in only one and a half pages I merely want to comment briefly on the closing brief of the Prosecution. because I could not consider the statements of the prosecution in my final plea.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Glancy.
MR. GLANCY: I think it should be well and definitely understood, Your Honor, that the functions of a closing brief, that is, of the Prosecution and the Defense. although related, are independent of one another. Totally independent of one another, As the Prosecution gives their interpreation of the evidence as a function for their closing brief, likewise. the same is performed for a closing brief of the defense. It is merely our interpretation or their interpreta tion. They are independent of one another.
THE PRESIDENT: That is correct, Dr. Heim, each side gives its own version of the interpretation of the evidence in the case in the briefs, and, we can not go on replying to each brief back and forth, ad infinitum.
DR. HEIM: Your Honor, I shall then start with the presentation of my plea.
THE PRESIDENT: If in your closing remarks you want to make some reference to a document which has been touched upon by the Prosecution in its closing brief, you certainly may do soo but it is not the place here to argue the brief itself.
DR. HEIM: May it please the Tribunal. the countries of Europe and have in addition to destruction misery, want and hunger left behind millions of dead. These men in the dock have been charged with having caused the death of one million people, whereby this million of people is alleged to have been murdered upon the instigation of the defendants. The defendant Blobel alone is held responsible for 60,000 murders. may it please the Tribunal that I give in short outline a picture of the defendant Blobel since I regard it as being of a very great importance for judging his person and for understanding this case. son of a master carpenter. At the ago of 5 he came to Remscheid, attended school there, learned the carpenter's trade, passed the journeyman's test, worked then as mason and by studying without a teacher acquired the necessary knowledge so that he could attend the building trade school. This training was interrupted by World War I during which he spent four years at the front as soldier. After his return Blobel resumed his interrupted studies and by industry and energy he as a practical and ingenious man attained the respectable profession as a freelance architect which he practiced from 1924 on. Coming from a modest environment he had led an irreproachable, honest and true life. By untiring efforts Blobel became a successful architect. He was then able to realise his dream of owning his own home. He was able to make use of his abilities his entire knowledge as an architect in designing his own house and its furnishings. He could surely look back with pride upon the past years of hard work which finally had not been without success. His diligent activity, however, could not for ever postpone the impending fate. The years of economic "false prosperity" were followed in Germany all the sooner by a decline, which dragged many absolutely secure existences into its destructive whirlpool.
Thus also the economic rise of the defendant Blobel achieved with great effort was suddenly interrupted by the economic crisis of the years 1928/29. he solid existence for which he had fought and worked untiringly was smached by the general economic collapse. New orders could not be obtained, outstanding fees could not be realized. The years of distress that followed consumed his last savings. The mortgage interest could no longer be paid. Due to the general economic crisis Blobel "was doen to his last shirt". This is only one fate which so many people of that type experienced. Nothing indicates that Blobel was particularly interested in politics or sympathized with any of the parties existing at that time. If there existed an association of ideas at all then Blobel only occupied himself with the socialist parties Since he himself came from the workers' class. But the substance of Blobel's life was the establishment of security in his job, his family and profession. of the quarrel between the large political parties which was becoming ever more violent; they all promised the German people a removal of the distress which was taking on the proportions of an avalanche and a restoration of sound and just social conditions. This situation alone makes the subsequent behavior of the defendant Blobel comprehensible It can only be interpreted correctly on the basis of the extraordinary situation at that time. What may appear reprehensible objectionable today was at that time regarded as a panacea which could lead out of the diastrous years. persons. For 4 1/2 years he had nothing but the most modest state support to depend upon. Thus the immense economic depression, as it is again being experienced by the world a second time - at present after this World War II- caused him simultaneously to become a member in the SPD as well as the SA reserve. By joining these two organizations he did not so much pursue political goals; economic interests were much more decisive.
He hoped his membership in the parties would make it easier for him to overcome the economic crisis and he expected finally to use it for building up his destroyed existence again. In 1932 Blobel became a member of the SS. Not fanatic eagerness to fight for the ideology of National Socialism, not the irresponsible acceptance of the platform of the NSDAP were decisive for his membership in the SS but solely the conviction that this was a way which might lead out of the economic chaos. Finally. after the seizure of power by National Socialism he was for one year employed by the municipal administration in Solingen receiving a more than modest monthly salary. His position was by no means commensurate with his training and knowledge. And when then in 1935 he received the order as an architect to furnish the office of the SD in Duesseldorf he in no way declined this offer in view of his economic situation but accepted it without long deliberation since he could again work in his line. Since his economic situation had not yet by any means essentially improved and the building business still was stagnant he readily accepted the offer to stay there as coworker in the office he had just designed; in the time thereafter he was placed in charge of the intelligence work for the SD covering all spheres of public life in the Duesselderf territory. at the same time resulted in his leaving the Allgemeine SS; he had entered into relations which he in the time to come he was unable to sever in spite of all efforts. duties and the nature of the SD. The SD, and NSDAP agency, had been established for the sole purpose of communicating to the leadership of the Party and in view of the unity of Party and State - also to the leadership of the state a true picture of all spheres of public life within the Reich. Its task exclusively consisted in collecting news from all spheres of life, in ascertaining public opinion in pointing out abuses, in short, to give the Party and State leadership a picture of how the man in the street reacted to the measures and decrees of Party and State.
The SD never had executive power, since being an organization of the NSDAP it could never authorized for that. Then SD may properly be compared with the I attitude for the Study of the Public Opinion, especially since the SD had many coworkers who did not at all belong to the NSDAP. In this respect it was an entirely objective source for intelligence. the reason why he was declared to be indispensable by a general order of the Reichsfuehrer-SS according to an agreement with the OKW, i.e. that for the duration of his indispensable status, he was at the disposal not of the Wehrmacht but exclusively of the Reichsfuehrer SS. This activity as full-time SD leader was also the cause for Blobel's being ordered to Berlin in June 1941, According to the agreements reached between Wehrmacht and the Reichsfuehrer-SS this was placed on the same level with a draft into the army, i.e. it corresponded to an induction notice such as millions of German men fit for service received during the war. Non-compliance with the draft order was equal to a refusal of military service which was subject to severest punishment. This was, however, not a typically German institution. None of the belligerent countries contented itself with an appeal to voluntary enlistments, not one country could in this world - wide struggle renounce the conscription of its men fit for service. World War II toward a withdrawal from his service of fulltime SD in order to be able to devote himself to his former profession as an architect had been in vain, it had now become completely impossible due to the order of the Reichsfuehrer-SS. Once ought in this vicious circle there was no retreat. From the time of his transfer in June 1941 Blobel was considered soldier and was subject to the regulations of maritial law; in case of a refusal he would undoubtedly have been placed before an SS and Police tribunal.
The statements made by Streckenbach and Heydrich at Pretsch were also to the same effect. Thus the defendant Blobel had slipped into this assignment without intending it and without in the least having made any efforts in this respect, nay even without having known in advance what his assignment actually meant. SD, The refusal of his spureior office did not per it him to materialize this plan. his remaining with the SD at all have been regarded as criminal ommission taking into consideration his knowledge at that tiie of the activity of the SD? By no means. activity with the SD and to turn his back upon this organization for his duty merely was to collect information without making comments and to pass it on to the competent offices. That this never can be a criminal activity and never has been so was an established fact for the defendant Blobel at that time and still is so at present, Quito on the contrary. he had to regard this activity of his as a proper and admissible instrument for informing the government about the actual state of mind of the people and the suitability of the adopted measures, a means which - if duly applied and evaluated would necessarily be of benefit to all nationals of the Reich and in thepositive sense of an inestimable value. charged with having occasioned the murder of 60,000 persons as leader of Sonderkommando 40. what now did Blobel actually do as long as he was leader of Sonderkommando 4a? Has he made himself liable to punishment on the grounds of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the East according to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution?
long as it was commanded by Blobel, beginning from the first day on always was in every respect exclusively subordinated to the Army in the combat area under the command of Field Marshal von Reichrenau, and that this subordination resulted in a situation for Sonderkommando 4a which was entirely different from that of other Kommandos, and which is of fundamental importance for the judgment under criminal law of the defendant Blobel. The very name "Sonder"-Kommando (special Kommando) refers to the direct subordination of the unit under unit of the army. Neither is this refuted by the draft of an order for the commitment of the Einsatzgruppen of the Secutiry Police and the SD (Doc.
NOKW-256, Exh. 174). The document involved is merely a draft and the Prosecution has not been in a position to prove that it was carried out as such. The fact of subordination under an army unit also accounts for the essentially smaller number of personnel which amounted to about one quarter of that of the remaining Kommandos of Einsatzgruppe C (BLOBEL statement, German Transcript, page 1531). In this connection the following circumstances must be pointed out; The frontline in the East extended from North to South over a distance of much more than 1000 kilometers. In this vast area 4 Einsatzgruppen with an average of 4 Kommandos each were in charge of Security police tasks which had to be carried out in cooperation with Wehrmacht and Constabulary. The purely military operations were incumbent on 3 Army Groups: Army group North Field Marshal Ritter von LEEB --, Army Group Center Field Marshal von BOCK and Army Group south-Field Marshal von RUNDSTENDT-Several armies and special military formations were subordinated to every Army Group. As has been shown at all times during military actions the person of the army commander is the decisive essential, It is his initiative which lends the special character to the orders coming to him for execution from the supreme authority. This is ultimately the reason why the situation was entirely different for the individual Einsatzgruppen and oven more so for the individual Kommandos. Sonderkommando 4a was appointed for commitment in the area of Army (AOK) 6. The chief commander of AOK 6 was Field Marshal von REICHENAU. As will be shown later, von REICHENAU as military commander exercised a decisive influence on the activity of Sonderkommando 4a; in doing so he wasperhaps in opposition to other generals who -- perhaps intentionally -- hold themselves aloof from the units of the Security Police and the SD and from their sphere of duties. Von REICHENAU was an army commander of an entirely different past. His eminent person asserted itself also insofar as he exercised an influence on everything that in the least degree would touch upon the military interests of his zone of operations. In order to elucidate what has been said up to now, the following must be noted:
The German generals did not form a homogeneous unit. They were different in their conceptions and view. At the time when National Socialism seized power in 1933 there were on the whole only a few generals who could be regarded as absolute followers of HITLER. However, one of these few was von REICHENAU. His words: "The Wehrmacht will be National Socialist or it will not exist", are typical of his attitude at that time and also later. His absolute subordination toward Hitler made him contrary to many another army commander -- an obedient and passionate executor of his directive. In this connection I wish to refer especially to the statements made by the USSR member of the International Military Tribunal Brigadier General (?) of Justice L.T. Nikitschenko concerning the "inaccurate decision with regard to the General Staff and the OK Which in their latter part in detail deal with von REICHNAU's person. the commander -in-Chief of AOK 6. On this occasion he was informed of the order from OKH which had been directed to AOK 6 directly. According to this order, Kommandos of the Security Police were subordinated to the military commanders in their area whereby it was the task of the Kommandos to handle the-circles of political opponents according to security police principles and to bring about the absolute elimination of all elements insofar as these would in any form impinge the security of the military units and the military operations. In addition to this order of the OKH it was left to the discretion of the commanders of the forces to issue the corresponding implementation provisions. (BLOBEL statement. German Transcript pages 1532/33). Accordingly, Field Marshal von REICHENAU ordered that Sonderkommando 4a be attached to AOK 6 with regard to movement and supply. As regards its activity it was subordinated directly to department C of AOK 6, its duties being the handling of security police matters. (BLOBEL statement, German Transcript, page 1533). This order by REICHANAU was, while still in the discussion stage, laid down in writing and passed on to the units involved (division commander and commander of the army rear area). In accordance with the chain of command von REICHENAU immediately ordered the splitting up of the Kommando into 3 sections and the subordination of those sub-kommandos (Partial Kommandos) under the division commanders (BLOBEL statement, German Transcript, page 1532, BLOBEL Doc.
No. 5 Exh. 5, HAEFNER Affidavit, para 4). In the period from 28 June 1941 to the end of August 1941 the situation of Sonderkommando 4a was as follows: In its entirety it was completely subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the AOK 6 Field marshal von REICHANAU. The leadership of Sonderkommando 4a. received its orders directly from Department C of AOK 6, which corresponds to the G-2 in the American Army. In order to prevent every overlapping and contradictory orders, the directives of Einsatzgruppe C for Sonderkommando 4a were routed through Department C of AOK 6, Moreover, directives from Einsatzgruppe C could only be of minor importance, since Sonderkommando 4a was assigned to the combat zone and here exclusively AOK 6 was competent, whereby it must be taken into consideration that Sonderkammando 4a was attached to AOK 6 as military Security Police unit. men including drivers, mess personnel and office, was divided into three subkommandos and into one tank obstacle clearing kommandos. These subkommandos were in charge of the handling Security Police matters, that is, the search for, seizure of, and collection of enemy records, the interrogation of persons, the compilation of files on incidents and also the carrying out of executions that had been ordered. The subkommandos were for reasons of expediency subordinated to the divisions of the AOK 6 and accordingly received their orders from these directly, that is, from their Departments C, whereby these orders because of their urgency only in exceptional cases were routed through the office of Sonderkommando 4a, and in such cases merely forwarded.