, shows the singularity of the incorporation of this intelligence organization into a formation which had its control agency in the Reich Security Main Office. At all events, the theory of a criminal activity, participation in or furtherance of crimes by Office III (SD Inland) and its subordinate agencies cannot be maintained after the evidence produced in this trial, since these indeed directly opposed and unlawful development of the Party activity. other agencies and their subordinated agencies committed or supported any criminal activity or whether their members even without any personal participation had to be or could be aware of any such activity by branches of their agencies. In any case, Dr. Sandberger had not, could not and was not obliged to have become aware of any such activity by other offices even after he had been appointed Referent of Office I in the Reich Main Security Office, Due to lack of any criminal intent and actions of the Security Service, Dr. Sandberger had also no cause to leave same up to the beginning of the second World War, but he endeavored to bring about his release after the war had started in order to serve in the army and to do so he removed first of all the impediment which consisted in his rheumatic ailment. But these endeavors of his were blocked already by the then valid strict order against any withdrawal from service, Membership in the SD was not voluntary any longer; release was now only and alone at the discretion of the common high command, shared also with other semi-military and military organizations, which extended their compulsory orders intended for organizations of this kind, also to the SD, entirely unsuited to this by its nature.
The facts about the impossibility of a withdrawal from this time on, were proven by me in a number of testimonies; I refer in this instance to these exhibits contained in the Document Books. The Einsatzgruppen- and Kommandos were then formed for the campaign against Russia and Dr. Sandberger was ordered to Einsatzgruppe A as Commander of SK la. As a member of the SD it was to him in no way discernible or to be expected beforehand, that for a member of the SD every anything else but purely informational, especially police executive functions could come under consideration, for the one reason, that the SD had a common High Command with other organizations. Sandberger had no knowledge at all about the tasks of Einsatzgruppen before he was detailed for duty. Valid for his detail were regulations regarding police units on special duty. Insubordination was threatened with severest penalties by SS and Police Courts. Due to his enforced activity with a Sonderkommando Dr. Sandberger became aware of measures forming the basis of these proceedings. He himself however has refrained from any criminal activity, Actual participation in a crime is therefore not the case. His membership, while aware of criminal plans and acts of others, was nevertheless compulsory, it could not constitute any participation or activity. Despite of this Dr. Sandberger proved his intention to quit his activity. From the end of 1941 Dr. Sandberger tried 7 times to get released for service in the Armed Forces, always without success. In this respect I refer to the testimony of the witness Spengler and to the testimonials in this respect submitted by me as evidence.
Verona, Italy, he was finally able to return to mere SD reporting activity in the scope of which Sandberger acted now as before neither criminally, nor was he able to gain any knowledge about such an activity of others there, the SD had remained true to his rejection of such active or passive participation. He was now in his capacity as an SD member also under the authority of SS and Police jurisdiction, to which also SD agencies were subject.
Dr. Sandberger was finally yet head of a group in Office VI of the Reich Main Security Office, in this position he took care of technical administration tasks, he came into contact with the relevant tasks of the office in connection with the "Egmont Report". But just this contact shows again no characteristics of criminal implication, sanctioning of such an activity or the awareness of participation only by membership. On the contrary it was the aim of this report to make highest quarters well inclined to an immediate cessation of hostilities at the price of capitulation, by giving a clear picture of the Reich's hopeless state. connection with the foreign news service operated by it, should ever have been in contact with criminal intentions or a criminal activity, then this was surely not the case from the year 1944 on, the year in which Dr. Sandberger took over his post there. participation in such an activity, favoring, or conscious support due to mere membership while aware of such acts as a member of the SD or the Office VI of the Reich Main Security Office; do therefore not apply to Dr. Sandberger. But mere membership without these characteristics can not be liable to punishment.
His membership after the 1 September 1939 was besides not voluntary, nor his membership of a Sonderkommando either. Valid is in this respect what caused the IMT to exempt certain groups of persons from membership in criminal organizations.
Exempts must be those persons who "are drafted by the State for membership in such a manner that they had no choice left. not made himself liable to punishment in the sense of Count I, II, and III of the indictment. I beg the honorable Court to pay due consideration to this result of the trial by a just sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Koessl.
DR. KOESSL: Attorney for the defendant Ott.
M a y i t p l e a s e t h e C o u r t ! this trial is concerned with the crime of genocide, which in the theory of the Prosecution was incited by the fundamental teachings of the Nazi doctrine. The Prosecution logically requests that the Tribunal, by imposing a punishment in accordance with international law, will confirm the fact that human beings have the right to live in peace and dignity, whatever their race or their religious faith may be. The prosecution, therefore, does not raise the charge of murder within the meaning of the facts constituting this crime in national legislative codes. None of the defendants is charged in the Indictment with the murder or mistreatment of any one specific person. If this were the case the Indictment would doubtless name the presumed victim.
criminal act covered by national penal code, but it does not base the Indictment either on par. 211 of the Reich Penal Code or on the corresponding paragraphs of the Soviet Penal Code as the law governing the place of the crime, but apparently only wishes to cite thereby a fundamental criminal act, just as reference was also made in the course of the trial to God's 10 Commandments as the root of the moral conceptions of the civilized world. These legal and moral Prohibitions against killings are the foundation, not the subject matter, of this trial. for persecutions which "attain the proportions of national campaigns" and which "are intended to exterminate large groups of human beings." whether there was any participation in an extermination program and if so of what kind it was. For the accused members of the Einsatzgruppen these questions are identical with the questions: 1) Was the Fuehrer Order forwarded to the Einsatzgruppen in Pretsch - Dueben - Schmiedeberg an order for extermination? 2) To what extent and in what way did the individual defendants participate in the execution of this order? The first question will be discussed by my colleague, Dr. Aschenauer, both for the defense as a whole, and also the significance in criminal law of the order in general and the Fuehrer Order in particular, insofar as it becomes of acute importance for the defendants.
the defendant Ott which appears to justify the conclusion that Sonderkommando 7b executed 27 Jews on the basis of the Fuehrer Order while under Ott's command. This document is to be found in Document Book II B, English p. 60, German p. 52, bears the number NO 3276, and is submitted as Exhibit 66. This Operational Situation Report No. 194 of 21.4.1942 contains a list showing the number of executions which the individual Kommandos of Einsatzgruppe B presumably carried out between 6 and 30 March 1942, in which the number of persons killed by each Kommando is divided up according to groups of persons, from the description of which the reason for the execution, can be understood. evidence showing that these Operational Situation Reports were exposed to many sources of error and therefore possess only qualified value as evidence. The Operational Situation Reports represented summarized reports of the RSHA, which for their part were again based on summaries Which were prepared on the staff of the Einsatzgruppen. Each revision changes the picture of the original report, especially if it is combined with abbreviations and ideas directed at some specific purpose. that Operational Situation Report No. 194 does not constitute any proof that Sonderkommando 7b executed 27 Jews between 6 and 30 March 1942.
1. In the first place, the given period of time from the 6th to the 30th is not named as a reporting period in any other month, and as a matter of fact the regular reports were prepared on each occasion. in the middle and at the end of a month for the preceding 14 days, but never for 3 weeks or for 24 days.
2. This unusual report period is given here for all Kommandos of Einsatzgruppe B, so that it is apparently an arbitrary summarization by the staff of Einsatzgruppe B or the RSHA.
3. Through the submission of Doc. Book 1 for the defendant Ott it was proved that there were many gaps in the reports of Einsatzgruppe B between December 1941 and April 1942 and that no figures at all on executions were reported in this entire period up to Report No. 194 of 21 April 1942, although in some reports occurrences were reported which doubtlessly led to executions.
This very much speaks in favor of the supposition that the figures given in Operational Situation Report No. 194 also include executions which dated back before the time given; presumably these figures include executions which took place after the last numerical report in December 1941.
4. Activity and Situation Report No. 11 covering the period of 1- 31 March 1942, which has been submitted in Ott Doc. Book II as Ott Document and Exh. 4, does not mention, any executions within the area of Sonderkommando 7b.
5. The strongest proof for the assertion that it was impossible for Sonderkommando 7b to have executed 27 Jews on the basis of the Fuehrer Order during the period from 6- 30 March 1942 is furnished by the defendant Ott's own statement on the witness stand (transcript English p. 3744, German p. 3805 et seq.). Ott proved that he has a good memory and recalled many details. It is clear that just the events during the first month of his activity in Russia remained particularly vivid in his memory and that therefore he would have to remember such a large number of executions as is mentioned in the Operational Situation Report No. 194. (See also Engl. transcript P. 3793, German P. 3856). cross-examination by the Prosecution again confirmed possibly that not before 16 March 1942 did he take over responsible Command of the Sonderkommando 7 b and that up until then his predecessor Rausch made all decisions, held conferences with Wehrmacht agencies and signed reports (Engl. Transcript P. 3781, German P. 3843). Even supposing the Operational Situation Report No. 194 was correct, the possibility would still remain upon that the executions mentioned there, were ordered by his predecessor Rausch, or under Rausch's responsibility during the first half of torch, without the defendant Ott knowing about it, since he was then only getting acquainted with his work and did not overlook the Commando yet and therefore also had not yet taken responsibility.
outline of his activity in Russia, and disproved all misleading interpretations of his affidavit of 24 April 1947 NO 2993 - (Pros.Exh. 67 in the Doc. Book II B, Engl. P. 64, German P. 57.) He has stated that his Commando 7b has during the whole time he was in command of it, which after deduction of 2 longer interruptions amounted to approximately 6 months, executed not more than 80 - 100 persons after careful investigations. (Transcript Engl. P. 3733 - 3735, 3741, German P. 3795 - 3798, 3803). testimony with Mr. Wartenberg and during cross-examination, forbidden his Sub-Commando leaders, to act independently, and ordered them to submit to the Commando all protocols and interrogation records for reexamination. Minor offences were punished with imprisonment differentiated in time, so that the degree of guilt could find proper consideration, (Fig. 7 of the affidavit Ott, Pros.Exh.67).
The Execution of only 80 - 100 persons during all of Ott's activity in a distinctly partisan area, the concientious reexamination of each individual case and the imposing of differentiated detention penalties in minor cases, show that Ott did not consider his unit as an extermination instrument for Asiatic peoples and that he did not use it as such. initiative of his own. He did not carry out any action to find Jews and execute them after seizure for the reasons mentioned in the Fuehrer Order. (Transcript English P. 3718, German P. 3799). To be sure, the Army-territory was in general considered as already free of Jews, when Ott came to the Sonder Commando 7 b, but yet it was known that here and there Jews kept themselves hidden. If Ott had been a man of this kind as the opening speech of the Prosecution characterized the defendants, then instead of the numerous, dangerous reconnaissance actions against the skillfully fighting partisans he would at least have carried out a few safe searching raids for Jews, Ott did not search for Jews and also he did not have defenseless old men and children executed.
The few women executed were active partisan fighters, (Transcript Engl. P. 3760, German P. 3822). that Jews were seized only in connection with sabotage -, partisan - or. communistic units and that about 20 Jews were executed on the basis of the Fuehrer Order. (Transcript Engl. P. 3753, 3754, German P. 3816/17). it did not become clear, whether these Jews were shot only bee use of their race or because of partisan activity, At any rate after the crossand re-direct examination the President asked some more questions, obviously to clear up this matter. (Transcript Engl. P. 3791 ff. part. P. 3793 - 3795, German P. 3853 ff, especially p. 3856 - 3858). Operational Situation Report No. 194 were not executed under his respossible Commando leadership and that the total number of 20 executed Jews admitted by him extend to his whole activity in Russia, there with present the total number. He repeated his previous statements that all Jews were seized in Band - territory and that there the Jews were doubtlessly very capable of defense. To the question: "But some were entirely defenseless?" Ott answered: "Yes, some were among them". (England Transcript P. 3795,... German P. 3857/58).
This is the central question in the case Ott: Do these facts meet the specifications of a crime against humanity according to Count I of the Indictment and of War Crimes according to Count II of the Indictment? of Communist agitation and sabotage troops or some other Partisan groups. Since Ott could not advance into the heart of the Partisan area with his small forces, it was without doubt one of those active harrassing units which the Partisans had operating on the main railway stretches behind the lines.
There were neither children nor old or feeble persons among those captured, only people of both sexes who were capable of carrying arms. carry their arms openly, and also did not abide by the rules of warfare, they could, according to existing rules of warfare, be shot after their capture. Since the Presiding Judge asked the defendant Ott on the witness stand if there were also defenseless persons among the Jewish Partisans, I would like to refer here to the changeable Partisan tactics, which depended completely on surprise and the most elaborate use of deceit. Harmless appearing women suddenly drew hidden weapons and shot down unsuspecting soldiers. Unarmed Partisans in civilian clothes did intelligence work, signalled to the riflemen who were hidden in perfectly camouflaged ambush positions by means of unobtrusive signs and, after completing their job, themselves joined the armed conflict. These scouts and messengers can't be called "defenseless" even when, for the moment, they are unarmed. The really defenseless people stayed in the heart of the Partisan territory, where such small reconnaissance units such as Ott led, could not go. Stronger forces usually found empty nests after marching for days, as in operation "Polar Bear",Ott Exhibit 5. through the statements of individual members of same or through our own observation must, under such conditions, be sufficient proof in regard to those members, too, who refuse to make a statement. I, as defense counsel for the defendant Ott, was astounded when he, on the witness stand, unexpectedly admitted applying the Fuehrer Order in 20 instances. own earlier motives, for Ott has emphasized, now as then, that these 20 Jews were also captured as Partisans. The meaning of his statement is merely that he could not show Jewish Partisans any mercy, because the Fuehrer Order had authoritatively established the fact that the entire Eastern Jewry was involved with the Bolshevist system in such a way as to endanger the security and that Jews were even to be shot if no connection with the Partisans could be proved in the individual case.
cutions were dictated by military necessity alone. show how great the Partisan danger was, by describing the strength, armament, organization and fighting methods of the Partisan bands, (for example Prosecution Exh. 66, 85, 87, 93 etc, and Ott Exh. 1,4 and 5). so weird that it can only be comprehended if you consider how immense the space, how impenetrable the forests and swamps and how difficult to comprehead the ideas and mental processes of the Asiatic peoples and the peculiarities of the Bolshevist ideology and methods were for the European, and add to this the picture of a relentless ideological bottle which used every means of warfare, from the methods and tricks of primitive tribes to the most modern weapons of technological war. These are the conditions under which one must consider the Russian campaign, and especially the Partisan war, if one is to establish the boundaries of "military necessity." at the battle front in Russia was more than "enemy" and "enemy territory." All conceptions of the Occident concerning man and state, space and time, technology and war and might and right were exploded in this unfathomable land of released demons. In such a situation the Fuehrer Order also had a different aspect than it now has in retrospective contemplation from the view point of a world that is at least formally at peace. In this case, every retrospective verdict can use knowledge which is denied to the man acting in the present. And so the defendant Ott also did not have an extermination program in mind when he came to Russia, but rather, he saw, first of all, the destruction of two German engineer companies in a treacherous Partisan attack using unlawful measures of war.
When he was told of his duties, on the spot, his predecessor told him, in Briansk, of the Fuehrer Order, which had been issued "for security", as he was told. Ott did not understand that defenseless women and children and the aged were to be shot "for security", but his Chief also acknowledged to him that the Supreme War Commander had ordered this. With the sound instinct of a plain man, Ott led his Kommando like a military police unit to secure the rear and the lines of communication of the most advanced troops. Because Ott saw the duties of his Kommando exclusively from the view point of military necessity, he was brought back to Russia by General Schmidt as Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Panzer Army, after he had already been transferred back to his job at home. (Record English page 3714, German 3775). Sonderkommando 7 b only killed proved Partisans under his leadership. And approximately 20 Jews were also members of Partisan groups. Their execution was permitted by the rules of warfare and did not have to be based on the Fuehrer order. The boundaries of the security of his own combat troops Naturally, he could not deny the fact towards the leaders of this subkommando that the Fuehrer order remained formally in effect (Reocrd English page 3752/53, German page 3816), but in practice the Fuehrer order no longer had any meaning in his territory while Ott was in command of the Kommando. (Record English page 3782, German page 3844) The territory of the Army could be considered as free of Jews since long before (Steimle Exhibit 20, 33 and 38), and the security tasks had to be carried out where the danger threatened, that is, in the territory of the Partisans and against them. The Security Police functions of Ott and his Kommando were exhausted in the defense against the Partisans and their sabotage activities. Ott also took measures to maintain strict discipline in his sub-kommandos, he examined all interrogation records in order to prevent frivolous decisions (Record English page 3782, German page 3844). In minor cases, despite the proximity of the front and the attendant increased need for security, he permitted clemency and gave only short prison sentences.
(Prosecution Exhibit 67, subsection 7) These limiting measures indicate the responsible way Ott carried out his police duties. Since they are a result of his own initiative they show his tendency to use milder means which, on the front lines, is equal to saving lives. In Russia, too, Ott helped the civilian population that did not participate in the fighting. Through complaints to the German Labor Office in Brjansk he was able to stop the conscription of laborers. (Ott Document 10, Document Book III). This behavior corresponds to his readiness to help the French population, which the Mayor, elected in 1947, of the village in Lorraine where Ott lived before and after his assignment in Russia, confirmed voluntarily. (Ott Exhibit 2, Record English page 3697, German page 3758). After what has been said, the way Ott commanded Sonderkommando 7 b cannot be considered as a criminal activity, His Security Police activities and his military assignment served exclusively to secure the occupation troops and the rear of the fighting front. Even if the executions of a total of 20 Jews are supposed to have been backed by the Fuehrer Order, yet it remains proven that these 20 Jews were, as well, members of the partisan units, so that they could have been shot according to the general rules of the laws of war too, In these circumstances, no participation in crimes of the murder of peoples can be seen in these 20 cases. Actions which are unobjectionable from the point of view of international law can prove no connection with carrying out of a crime in the sense of Article II, No. 2 of Control Council Law No. 10. The position as Commander of a Sonderkommando Within an Einsatzgruppe can, in itself, entail no criminal responsibility. As Ott did not use his Kommando for actions the purpose of which was the registration of Jews and their execution because of their race, he withdrew his Kommando from a purpose of the kind.
I do not need to verify whether other Kommandos of the Einsatzgruppe B carried out such actions in Ott's time, for, even if they did it, Ott did not take part in these actions and was not a member of a participating unit. The Einsatzgruppe as such was no tactical unit, which carried out restricted and uniformly conducted actions, rather the individual Kommandos operated independently, Ott had no connection with the other Kommandos of Einsatzgruppe B and of other Einsatzgruppen. (Transcript English, page 3760, German page 3823). Nor had he a clear picture of the activity of other Kommandos (Transcript English, page 3785, German page 3847). Thus the applicability of Article III, No. 2 e of Law No. 10 drops out too. Since Ott committed no war crimes and crimes against humanity, took part in no such thing in any form and was otherwise in no way connected with the committing of such, there remains only examination of the question whether Ott, through his knowledge of crimes is to be ranked in the category of persons of an organization declared criminal. First of ally there is no doubt that Ott was familiar with the Fuehrer order and that he knew too that it was carried out in Russia by the Kommandos of the 4 Einsatzgruppen, the leadership of which was principally in the hands of members of the Security police and the SD. This knowledge, in my opinion, does not suffice, because Ott could not see in such a use of individual members of the SD a criminal characteristic of the Organization SD, any more than he could regard as activity of the SD the activity of many SD members on account of their employment within the Wehrmacht. The Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos were mobile units of a peculiar kind with military tasks of a securitypolice nature. When he came to such a unit he had no knowledge of the Fuehrer order so the conspiratorial idea of promoting, by membership in this unit, the realization of the Fuehrer order was missing.
Ott, however, at the time when he discovered that putting into effect of the Fuehrer Order was one of the tasks of an Einsatzkommando, could no longer leave the unit, because he was ordered to it by virtue of war laws and was subject to the laws of war of the soldier, which had been tightened up and which excluded the free expression of volition in the manner of a member of a private union of persons, and, consequently, made withdrawal from the unit impossible. He did not employ the Kommando entrusted to him in a criminal sense and for criminal purposes, from which it is sufficiently clear that such aims were not his. Outside Russia, too, Ott developed no kind of criminal activity whatever during the war and know nothing either of a criminal quality of the SD and could have known nothing The Prosecution is indeed obliged to prove, if it asserts criminal knowledge. Without such proof, however, on the part of the Prosecution I have shown actual proofs in the direct examination (English Transcript page 3695 3703, German page 3756 - 3763) that permit the conclusion to be drawn that Ott had no knowledge in the sense of approval of a criminal activity of the SD. The already mentioned affidavit of the French Mayor Adam seems to me to be a specially valuable piece of evidence in this respect (Ott - Exhibit 2), because this confirmation takes in almost the entire duration of the war with the exception of the Einsatz in Russia and shows the very informative behavior in the occupied territory. Ott Exhibit 3 proves, too, that in Lorraine Ott, through his reports, rebelled against the despotic regime of the Gauleiter Buerckel, in order to help the indigenous population. Nowhere is there a tendency to criminal activity and, for that reason, it is of significance, that at the end of the war Ott presented himself voluntarily to the occupying powers (Transcript English, page 3763, German page 3826), that in 1946 he reported voluntarily to Nuernberg as a witness when the IMT was deliberating on the SD and that finally he gave evidence concerning his activity in Russia that always tallied whether it was before the Interrogator Mr. Wartenberg or the Tribunal, and that always with the same frankness.
Had he had something to hide then he would not have extended the responsibility for Sonderkommando 7 b to a longer period than was necessary according to the documents submitted. From Ott Exhibit 5 it is evident that Ott, as early as 24 July 1942, was no longer designated as Commander of Sonderkommando 7 b, and yet he has assumed responsibility for the later period of its commando. The Prosecution wishes presumably to make good the lacking evidence of culpable behavior on Ott's part by reference to his long membership in the Party. Proofs must be more effective which in Ott's case are produced by the actual behavior of the defendant in the most difficult situations than such a piece of evidence as is based on the idea of collective responsibility. We must not forget that the proceedings before the Nuernberg Tribunals represent a first attempt to interpret power struggles of secular significance in terms of a legal trial by using figures which were utterly unknown in the theater where those power struggles were enacted. If one has already dared the novel innovation of making individuals answerable, from the point of view of International Law, for political and historical events, then, in no event, should this penal responsibility be extended to persons who themselves were never the determining factors but always merely victims of those power-political disputes. Control Council Law No. 10, looked at from a legal point of view, is a much too controversial creation to be regarded as a recognized development of International Law. There is as yet still no court of judicature in the world which could create International Law by means of legislation. If however Control Council Law No. 10 merely intends to fix what is valid International Law, in so doing, it would only take upon itself the task reserved at all times for the Courts.
Besides, this law furnishes characteristics of a particular offense and forms of participation which were entirely foreign to the continental legal system up to now, and, accordingly, can constitute no basis for judging, from the point of view of penal and international law, events which took place in the past before the law was issued, in the time of the war on the Continent. How entirely different is the attitude of the Signatory Powers of the London Agreement and Control Council Law No. 10 in legal thought is revealed by the different interpretations of the meaning of the State form "democracy". However, welcome the effort is to check the methods of political power struggles by international standards yet contemporary events show that experiments with development of international law in the sense of the Nuernberg principles are not yet established on a common practice and legal conviction of all civilized people in the world, This common conviction and practice is however the only real indication of genuine development of International Law. In particular, however, expiation of violations of International Law, on the part of the conquered only, must be avoided, for uniformity of law and similarity of law do not affect merely the extent to which the law can be enforced but are a property of law itself, especially of international law which is built up on reciprocity. If, however, Control Council Law No. 10 is to be looked at in individual part as national law and as legislative work of the Control Council as representative of the Reich Government, then it can not be applied to events prior to the issuing of this law. All these ideas prompt me to ask the honourable Tribunal to acquit the defendant Ott of guilt and punishment.
THE PRESIDENT: I presume you will be ready tomorrow morning to present the summation in behalf of the defendant Schubert.
DR. KOESSL: Your Honor, tomorrow morning a number of colleagues want to present their pleas and I think they would be so jealous that they would not let me do so first and I would rather complete the plea for Schubert in the turn in which it comas regularly. I shall agree with my colleagues about who is to present his plea.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. KOESSL: I think my colleague Kink and several other people want to come before me.
THE PRESIDENTS: The Tribunal will be in recess now until tomorrow at 9:30.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 10 February 1938, at 0930 hours) of America, against Otto Ohlendorf, et al.
,
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal II.
Military Tribunal II is not in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
Dr. HEIM: Dr. Heim for the defendant Blobel. Your Honor, before beginning with my final plea, I would like to make a brief statement about the final brief of the Prosecution. Some weeks ago, already, I submitted my closing brief for Flobel to the Tribunal, which concerned itself with the facts and legal consideration of the evidence submitted by the Prosecution against the defendant Blobel. The viewpoint expressed there is maintained even in view of the closing brief submitted against the defendant Blobel by the Prosecution. I ask the Tribunal to take into consideration the statements in my closing brief when arriving at the judgment. In order to avoid unnecessary repetitions, I shall, therefore, not discuss the documents in detail. but I must point out a few significant mistakes in the mentioned documents of the Prosecution, First of all, as for dates in Document No-3140, Exhibit No. 30 which mentioned the conference in Schitomir, and about the execution to be carried out in order to shoot Jews who were living there, this is mentioned on page 6 of the closing brief of the Prosecution, and is listed as having taken place on 10 September 1941. In the session of 29 October 1947 ----
Mr. Glancy: If it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution is of the opinion it is hardly the time or the place, or is it hardly appro priate for a discussion, or the debating of the broad merits of a docment as presented. This is time for a final plea. This can very well be taken care of. and I an sure it has been in the closing brief which the Doctor said has been submitted to the Tribunal.