which are indispensible for the carrying out of combat missions, or for the protection of one's own soldiers, for instance against attacks or sabotage on the part of the civilian population. Therefore, it should not be forgotten that human rights become secondary in relation to "military necessities"; in other words, infringement of the internationally recognized human rights are permitted only insofar as they serve the purposes of military necessities, that is, the protection of military personnel or of war operations. In practice, every independent state decides autocratically as to the limits of the military necessity of its measures on the one hard and the human rights on the other, provided however, that the sovereign state can neither arbitrarily alter the Hague Rules of Land Warfare, nor the laws and usages of war. International Law recognizes two kinds of intentional killing of human beings: the permissible one, i. e. killing in the course of hostile actions during the war and the non-permissible one. The latter constitutes murder, not only according to International Law but also according to the national laws of civilized states. The two executions which were carried out under the supervision of the defendant BLOBEL do not violate, the rules of International Law. Civilians perpetrated hostile acts against the German troops and because of the fact that the prerequisite of article 1 of the supplement to the Hague Rules of Land Warfare did not apply., they forfeited the rights of protection granted by this treaty. Whether, according to the standards of International Law and in consideration of the fact that the Soviet Union did not sign the Hague Convention and often violated the laws and usages of war during the belligerencies, it can be assumed that there is a justified claim to arbitration and thus to legal hearings, must be left open. However, the evidence in that respect had proved that in all such cases interrogation officials of the SK 4a and of the Wehrmacht made thorough investigations, interrogated the accused and finally submitted each case to the C in C AOK 6 for decision. Von Reichenau examined the documents together with his court officer and passed sentence.
This procedure was completely sufficient and without doubt corresponded to the conception of human rights and humaneness as conceived in the Hague Rules of Land Warfare, If the SK 4a carried out executions of which BLOBEL was previously informed, that is those for which he forwarded the orders of the competent Wehrmacht units to his Subkommandos, this does not constitute murder. Every single case had been thouroughly investigated by interrogation officials, the defendant had been granted a hearing, documents were made up for each case and each case was submitted to the AOk 6 for decision. Even if the AOK 6 should have made decisions concerning executions without a thorough examination of the documents at least, the subjective prerequisite of murder with regard to the defendant BLOBEL is lacking; he could assume that on account of the regular orderly examination of the documents by the AOK 6, such an examination was actually made; moreover, the defendant BLOBEL had no authority and also no possibility of establishing the fact that the procedure of the examination had been omitted. Finally, it must be taken into consideration that the defendant did not possess the necessary training in order to be aware of a possible irregularity or illegality. The authorized military commander has to be held responsible for a possible objective violation of International Law in cases of ordered executions or procedural infringements. As an executive official BLOBEL was obliged to obey the military order, believing that it was a correct one.
(The legality of reprisals.) by the competent Wehrmacht Commanders, or by the Higher SS and Police leaders in each case, it must be said, that they too cannot be considered as criminal according to the indictment, as far as they were executed by the SK 4a. Here too, the Hague Rules of Land Warfare try to define the two opposites in the so-called reprisal law in order to reconcile the individual in need of protection and claiming his human rights, with the independent state, insisting upon its judicial omnipotence.
Therefore on the one hand, the individual, who will always consider it a hardship and injustice to be punished wrongly for the mere assumption of a crime, and in addition for the reasons of state of an enemy state. On the other hand, there is the military power of the belligerent state, the military necessities of which demand complete subjugation and supremacy. usages of war alleviation should be achieved by drawing a boundary line between state and individual. The point of view of the state is taken into account by recognizing in principle the right of collective punishment; that of the individual by limiting this right. These limitations are drawn up along three lines: according to purpose, the punishment and the persons to be punished. introduction to the basic agreement. Pursuant to this Paragraph collective punishment is permissible for assassination, attacks and acts of sabotage against the fighting or occupation forces, in order to deter others from similar actions. Concerning the penalities, Article 50 states that they should consist of "fines or other types of penalties". If according to this regulation a fine is to be imposed death penalty is permissible, whereby the International Law does not provide for any proportional relations. Apart of this, Article 50 also limits the category of persons, whose punishment is permitted. Such persons have to be found "jointly responsible for individual actions". It is not stated when human beings are jointly responsible as one body for an individual act. At any rate, it cannot mean that the state occupying a country, may determine that according to its own discretion, since the moral responsibility constitutes the prerequisite of a criminal act according to the established standards of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare, that is, the occupying state may decree a collective punishment for a definable individual act only for those persons guilty of voluntarily perpetrating such an act.
Evidence or incriminating circumstantial evidence must be furnished against the individuals concerned. number of documents which prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the conduct of the Russian enemy was contrary to International Law, and which prove above all that the guerilla warfare had been planned a long time before the outbreak of the war and that the population had been systematically trained for it. Faced with this situation, the German Wehrmacht and the Police units subordinate to the Higher SS and Police leaders could not guarantee the security of the occupation forces without carrying out severe collective punishments. The Soviet Union conducted the war against German troops with methods which not only were in direct contradiction to international law, but also would never have been used by any civilized nation of this world. Men, women, children, old men, in short everyone capable of using a weapon was forced to participate in the system of guerilla warfare prohibited under International Law. A long time before the occupation, an extensive and very detailed organization had been created for the purpose of functioning behind the front lines following the occupation by enemy troops, that is, exclusively for the purpose of causing damage to the personnel and equipment of the occupation forces by malicious and surprise attacks as well as by acts of sabotage wherever and whenever possible. The man left behind, even women and children were used as snipers who attacked individual soldiers and convoys and who did not even hesitate to desecrate the dead in a bestial manner. Women and children acted as spies and informers their primary duty was the safeguarding of supplies for the partisans. There can be no doubt about it, that guerilla warfare conducted in such a way is not permissible under International Law simply because this wan has been declared a war of defense against an agressor. It can never be decisive which one of the warring states is to be considered as the agressor with regard to the illegality under International Law.
lines was well known to the German authorities. Thus, in each raid and act of sabotage, the entire population of this Particular area was always guilty of giving willing assistance, and they were backed up by this superbly operating organization. The fact that in carrying out reprisals innocent people can also be affected and unfortunately are affected, is unavoidable, from the outset, it is the purpose of the reprisals to be mainly directed against innocent persons. Only such reprisals which are carried out according to plan against any kind of a majority of persons regardless of the guilt of the individual are illegal under International Law. to the defendant BLOBEL, that the SK 4a participated in the executed reprisals with the full knowledge of BLOBEL, without first examining as to whether it was a planned crime on the Part of the population.
Your Honors! I believe that whosoever witnessed in Russia these cruelties and inhuman acts perptrated on German soldiers, whosoever saw or even suffered on his own body the horrors and bestialities of Russian warfare, will understand the reprisals carried out by the German troops and will not doubt that they represent genuine "military necessities". danger, because the sovereign state decidesas judge on its own behalf, that is, it transfers the decision to its officials. Its doubtless subjective opinion is the guide for the subsumption of its executed measures according to the standards of International Law. was at all bound to follow the regulations of the Hague Rules of Lana Warfare, in view of the totally different conditions of warfare prevailing in the East - at least according to the propagated opinion of the supreme authorities at that time:
It is true that in international law the non-observance on the part of one party does not relieve the second party from his obligation of observance, but this principle is in no way an exception and especially could not be applied in the war in the East. It is true that the individual who suffers in the conflict between governments and states i s the real object of protection, that is the population and the individual soldiers end prisoners-of-war. Further, it is true that all these individuals, be they military personnel, be they civilians, require this protection all the more in the occupied territory if their army collapses; international law is primarily created to assure the safety of these individuals in such a situation. However, as was the case in the campaign against Russia, when a large number of the inhabitants of this land, whether young, old, man, woman, or child, contrary to all acts of humanity and against every provision of international law, cowardly carries on a war from abmush against the occupying army, then certainly one cannot expect that the provisions of international law would be observed to the letter by this army. That would mean sacrificing oneself and surrendering without benefit of protection to the innumerable influences acting in direct contradiction to international law. The strict implementation of the principle: "Vivat justitia pereat mundus", would mean an irresponsible sacrifice of one's own soldiers, namely if the opponent does not intend in principle to observe on his part" the existing customs of civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the demands of public conscience". In this connection the fundamental question must be asked whether today general international law applies at all. The legal interpretation of this question seems to me to be of great significance with respect to the acts which re under indictment in this trial. For be it from me to lose myself in a maze of juridical observations, I wish only to offer incontestable facts. The allied Powers have imposed a series of provisions of the Hague Convention of Land warfare which are quite obviously not valid law -- and denied Germany the right to impose a corresponding customary law.
In this connection are included the provisions of Articles 46, 47, 50,53, 55 and, 56. These facts, it is true, should not be submitted to critical examination, however, they must be ascertained, since it is unequivocally and incontestably clear from them that the Allies as the occupying ofrces, as well, have declared on their own initiative that provisions of international law are not applicable. According to the principle of equality in international law, Germany should also be accorded this same Light in its conduct of war. May I just add a few comments to the fundamental statements on the subject "Order", which was already presented from the opposing side: As leader of an executive organ Blobel had no other alternative than to carry outthe orders given him by his superiors. The possibility of open insubordination and resistance to superiors existed in Hitler-Germany only under the simultaneous risk of an SS and police proceeding, which could mean the most serious personal disadvantages - loss of freedom and possibly of life, but conceivably did not necessarily have to result in this way. In the final analysis this was contingent upon matters which were beyond the influence of individuals. However, there is a sufficient number of examples on hand to prove that neither one's position of rank or undeniable merits could keep one from the fate of death or the concentration camp. That does not mean that everyone had to pay the high price of loss of life or freedom for such acts. However, could the taking of such a great risk be expected? What should Blobel have done in his condition of constraint into which he had been forced by conditions of war in June of 1941? In all events, would he have been able to achieve anything through insubordination, which would undoubtedly have placed him jeopardy? Another would have taken his place with the same order. The charge of unconditional obedience against the government of Hitler is fundamentally unsubstantiated, since then the whole world would collapse in anarchy if in every state every citizen were permitted to subject the legality of every order of a formal competent organ to scrutiny, every citizen of every state would be logically entitled to the rewards and culpability of everything good and bad achieved by any of the agencies of his state, provided he obeyed the supreme legislator.
In every army loyalty and obedience still apply as the highest military virtues without which it cannot carry out the duties assigned to it. but having obeyed blindly is too lightly raised. Unfortunately, the true picture of the authoritarian state is too lightly misunderstood by all those who have been spared by fate from a life under such a system of government. If it were so simple to disrupt themotivating power of such a government machine, organized down to the n'th degree, then the history of not only of Europe but of the entire world would Present an entirely different picture. The technical means of suppression have in the course of history been perfected to an immense extent. At the time of the storming of the Bastille a comparatively small number of people were able to carry out successfully a unique uprising against weapons which were primitive when compared with those of today, Today they would have been dispelled with a few machine-guns and in all probability it would have required several million martyrs to overthrow the ancient regime. Our era is well aware of the techniques used in controlling the masses and evidences this knowledge through the appreciati n they accorded, among other things, to the atom bomb. As concerns the indictment for membership in the SD declared by the IMT as a criminal organization, neither can Blobel be condemned for this fact. According to the wording of the judgment of the IMT, the prerequisite for the judgment is that the member of the organization did not declare his intention to resign after 1 September 1939 in site of his knowledge of the criminal character of the organization. It can be seen from previous statements that in the action of Blobel there was a lack of subjective facts, that is, that hemust have considered the executions carried out in harmony with international law and so considered them, with the result that the found himself in a credible error of judgment.
It would have been incumbent upon the prosecution to present evidence for this fact, yet it did not produce evidence that Blobel was aware of the criminal character of the organization. In addition, service in the SD was not voluntary, seen from the viewpoint of the conditions of war. This point has been treated in detail in another passage. a man who had been successful in a recognized profession through his assiduity and honest endeavors, who never strayed from the straight path of personal decency, obedience end loyalty, and who, through conditions of war, was placed before a task that today is under severe indictment. Do not consider his case only from the legislative point of view, but also call upon your humanitarian feelings and understanding for the position from which he like many of his comrades found no escape. And now, your Honors, render a judgment that is conceived before God and your conscience, affix your names to a judgment that is an expression of wisdom and justice. Remember the words of your President Woodrow Wilson: "America has raised the torch that will shine for all generations and will light the way of humanity to the goal of justice, freedom and peace."
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to say anything further now on the matter of documents presented in the closing brief by the prosecution, or do you think you have sufficiently covered it?
DR. HEIM: Your Honor, may I ask one question please? The Tribunal has ruled that after the final pleas of theprosecution, the final statement of the prosecution, the defense may immediately reply to it. I will take the liberty, if the Tribunal agrees, during this reply to make these statements briefly.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. We would like to repeat, however, that this additional reply which will be permitted defense counsel must be directed to something entirely novel, unique and new presented by the prosecution which the defense did not have a chance to reply to or meet in its argument.
present in court this morning. There should always be two or three lawyers here to proceed with the further business of the court. Now it so happens that we are just about at the recess period so that no time will be lost, but if Dr. Heim had finished sometime prior to the recess period we would have lost considerable valuable time which is inexcusable. with regard to further counsel ready to present their summations? that you, Dr. Heim, will inform other counsel that they must not take too lightly this business of presentation of their final pleas.
(A recess was taken.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1125 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Durchholz.
DR. DURCHHOLZ: Durchholz for the defendant, Schulz. Your Honor, I would like the defendant , Schulz, to be excused tomorrow morning from participation in this session because I would like to have a talk with him.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant, Schulz, will be excused from attendance in court tomorrow morning. Dr. Gawlik, are you ready to proceed?
DR. GAWLIK: Gawlik for the defendant, Seibert.
DR. GAWLIK (Attorney for the defendant Seibert): D from the middle of July 1941 until June 1942. He did not volunteer for the assignment to the group staff in the capacity as Leader III, but was ordered to the group staff of Einsatzgruppe because of his former activity in Office III of the RSHA. Neither did Seibert work voluntarily in Office III during the war. with the Wehrmacht and was recalled from there without his knowledge and without his volition. I refer to the affidavit of Arthur Bau which has been submitted by me. This affidavit proves that, at the beginning of the war, the defendant Seibert was serving with a Wehrmacht unit where he held the rank of officer. Against his wish, he was recalled from his unit to Berlin, to the RSHA, Office III. This is likewise confirmed by the then leader of the department "Personnel" in Office I of the RSHA, Gottfried Klingemann. His affidavit proves that the department for mobilization orders in Office I, on 1 September 1939, the date of the outbreak of the war, sent orders for their immediate return to the RSHA to all members of the RSHA who were serving with Wehrmacht units at that time, and that Seibert numbered among the re-called, and that Klingemann himself had seen and welcomed him in the RSHA, on which occasion, in early September 1939, he was still wearing the army uniform of a lieutenant. fore, was not a voluntary one, but was based on the Reich Defense Law. The affidavits of Dr. Ehlich and Hennicke which were submitted by me, prove that the defendant Seibert did not volunteer afterwards for Einsatzgruppe D, but was officially assigned there in the capacity of Leader III. The statements of the said persons tally with the findings of the IMT, namely that members of the SD had no possibility of choosing freely their fields of activity, during the war, and that refusals of accepting definite positions, in particular in the occupied territories, could have entailed severe punishment.
For this reason it is not a matter of voluntary transfer to Einsatzgruppe D as the Prosecution asserts in its Closing Brief on page 2. Seibert worked as Leader III, and his work consisted in making reports, in particular about the various fields of daily life, such as about economy, administration, folkdom and culture and about the mood and situation in general. It was therefore not merely a matter of making economic reports as the Prosecution will have it on pages 2 and 3 of the Closing Brief, where, by the way, some mistakes are made as regards the denominations and the activities of Seibert in Office III and as Leader III in field service. The intelligence work of Department III was one of the tasks of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos which fact has been proved by the hearing of the evidence. addition, been commissioned with the task of "liaison with the 11th Army", i.e. with the Wehrmacht, by the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe D, owing to his being an officer in the Army. While the defendant Seibert was a member of Einsatzgruppe D he never exercized any functions in either an Einsatz- or a Sonderkommando which alone, as has been clearly proven by the evidence submitted.,- had the task of carrying out executions. Seibert for part of the executions carried out by Einsatz- and Sonderkommandos of the Einsatzgruppe D. A decision on the Question as to whether the defendant is guilty within the sense of the indictment, depends upon an answer to the following 5 questions, namely which I have already mentioned in my plea for Naumann. These are:
1. Did the defendant personally participate in executions?
2. Were these executions. carried out by his directives or orders?
3. Before the executions were carried out, was he aware of this fact?
4. In case the answer is in the affirmative, did he either have the power or the opportunity to prevent or stop them?
5. Should this also be answered in the affirmative, did he neglect to act and thus became particeps criminis and co-principle?
Concerning question 1: Neither did the Prosecution contend that he did, in fact, do so. However, he neither participated at executions. persons having committed acts of plunder and sabotage. His presence was, however, merely due to chance and was in no way postulated by his tasks with the Staff of Einsatzgruppe D. These tasks merely demanded the carrying out of trip of inspections pertaining to his sphere of work as Leader III, but did not include superintending of executions. On the occasion of these journeys of inspection, it was the task of Seibert to talk to the expert III of the Kommando he was visiting, to give him directions and to visit, jointly with him, the offices of the Army Command or Division of the letter. On most of those trips Seibert was accompanied by the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe. When accompanied by the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe, Seibert's activities or tasks did not differ from the ones he usually undertook when he was alone. That is to say, when he was accompanied by the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe, he merely executed tasks pertaining to his sphere of work, namely that of reporting events. Twice, on trips undertaken jointly with the Chief of Einsatzgruppe, Seibert happened to arrive in time to witness executions, carried out by Kommandos. anything beforehand of these executions. Their presence at these executions was therefore not the purpose of their trip, Whilst en route, Seibert and Ohlendorf merely happened to come upon these execu tions.
Only after the lender of the Kommandos had talked to the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe, did Seibert learn of the details. In this connection the defendant Seibert learned in both cases that the persons about to be executed had committed acts of plunder and sabotage. These, therefore, were not executions based on the Fuehrer Order, The defendant Seibert never admitted, as is contended by the Prosecution in their Closing Brief, page 9, that possibly the victims had only been executed because they were Jews. On the contrary, Seibert has stated (records page 2526 Engl.) that he learned that these persons had committed acts of plunder and sabotage. Neither did the defendant Seibert in his cross-examination by the Court state, as is contended by the Prosecution, referring to the record, page 9 of their Closing Brief, that he knew what the purpose was. Seibert's testimony pertaining to this point, according to page 2523 Engl., is as follows: "Beforehand, I know nothing at all of the execution." Seibert as a subordinate officer could not very well stay in the car, but had to accompany him. Under those circumstances, the presence of the defendant Seibert at the executions does not render him a party to the crime. This is the generally accepted principle of the penal code of laws of all civilized states. I refer in this connection to the arguments of Wharton in his book on "Criminal Evidence" 1935, Vol. II, page 1237, where he says:
"Mere presence at the time a crime is committed without interfering, does not make one a party to a crime, unless his interference was a duty by reason of some position held by him, or unless non-interference operated ans was designed to operate as encouragement or protection." This corresponds also to the judgments regularly passed by the American Courts. For this, I refer to the decisions of the tribunals in the individual states of the USA, listed under note 16 on page 1237 of the quoted work, I further refer to the decision of the British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, held at the Court House, Almelo, Holland, on 24-26 November 1945, printed in Low Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol.
I, pa, 35. From this decision of the British Military Court the fact emerges that the mere presence does not suffice, but that, according to the Established Rules of Criminal Law of civilized Countries, only those are responsible as aiders, abetters, accessories, etc., who in some way supported the action. Hence there must be added a support of the crime by some kind of action in order to create a responsibility as aiders, abettors, accessories, etc. with the judgments regularly passed by German Courts according to which complete inactivity never suffices to make somebody responsible as an accomplice in a crime of commission, not even if the inactive person knew about and approved of the punishable action of the other. Especially his mere presence at the place of crime is not sufficient. realization of the crime (I here refer to Eber-Mayer-Lobe-Rosenberg, Reich Penal Code 1929, Article 47, Note 2b and decisions listed there of the Reich Supreme Court in penal cases). Also the rendering of assistance as an accomplice is a crime of commission in German Penal Law and therefore cannot be found in a purely passive attitude (Sec Olshausen, Commentary on Penal Code, 1927, article 49 Note 10). happened to witness as a spectator, were not measures on the basis of the Fuehrer Order, but measures which probably had been taken in accordance with the law after carrying out proceedings against plunderers and saboteurs. During his presence, Seibert neither had the right nor the obligation to interfere with the carrying out of the executions, because he only accompanied Ohlendorf on his two journeys, owing to the great distances between the locations of the Kommandos in order to take advantage of the Einsatzgruppen-Chief's car, and because his presence at executions did not belong to the service tasks which were incumbent on him in the Staff.
Moreover, it would not have been possible for him to prevent the executions in the presence of his superior Ohlendorf. His non-interference therefore does in no way mean a support of the Kommandos who carried out the executions.
Covering paragraph 2: of Einsatzgruppe D never gave directives or orders for the carrying out of executions. reason that the Fuehrer's Order had been transmitted by Gruppenfuehrer Streckenbach in Pretsch to the Sonder- and Einsatzkommandos already before the beginning of the Russian campaign. Neither would Ohlendorf's temporary absence have given any cause, owing to the order which in Pretsch had been clearly transmitted to all Kommandofuehrers for giving any execution orders or making decisions in this field. In this connection I quote the statement of Einsatzgruppen Chief Ohlendorf (page 533 of the German, 523 of the English transcript) "The orders for the executions in the East given in Pretsch, went to all Einsatzgruppen commanders or Einsatzkommando leaders who went along during the beginning of the Russian campaign.
They were never revoked. Thus they were valid for the entire Russian campaign as long as there were Einsatzgruppen. Thus it was, therefore, unnecessary at any time to give another order of initiative. Therefore, I did not give any general order of initiative and did not give any individual order to kill people." ing to Ohlendorf's own statement, had been transmitted in writing by himself to the Kommandos. I also refer to the statement of defendant Schubert on this point, who testified that there existed written directives by the Einsatzgruppen Chief to the Kommandos.
authority in the Kommandos under his charge to decide whether a person was a Jew, a Gypsy or a Communist and to order his execution, Ohlendorf declared: "That was a matter of the Kommandos". Also codefendant Braune has testified during the cross-examination by the Prosecution that the final establishment of the fact whether a person was a Communist or a Soviet functionary rested with the Teilkommandos. not the responsible deputy in charge of the Einsatzgruppe during the absence of Ohlendorf. February 1947, 24th February 1947 and 7th of December: 1945 to which the Prosecution has referred as evidence, that the defendant Seibert had been the deputy general of Ohlendorf. In the statement dated 24th February 1947 Schubert testified:
"In October 1941 I was assigned to the Einsatzgruppe D. Otto Ohlendorf was the chief of the Einsatzgruppe and Willy Seibert was his deputy, I was assigned as adjutant to Ohlendorf, and stayed in this position from the time of my arrival until the end of June 1942". conclusion by the Prosecution that Seibert had been the responsible deputy of Ohlendorf within the entire Einsatzgruppe. Schubert stated merely, as is evident from the context of his testimony, that Seibert represented the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe Ohlendorf within the Group Staff. During his hearing on the witness stand Schubert has made it absolutely clear, that he wanted to state only this, when making his statement, and that his explanations could only be understood in this sense. Schubert testified to this as follows:
"What can be meant here is only that Herr Seibert in the Staff of Einsatzgruppe D and only for the staff of the Einsatzgruppe D was the deputy of Ohlendorf, only in this one function, but never, and that is what I said, the ease could have happened in which Seibert would have been the deputy of Ohlendorf for the entire Einsatzgruppe D. Therefore I would lie to explain this particular wording Seibert was his deputy,' and that is what I said, I think, in my interrogation very clearly, and I certainly did not put it into this very general form."
proof as compared with the affidavits. For this reason the oral statements are to be given preference. When analyzing the affidavits of Schubert, it should be taken into consideration also, that the statements dated 4th and 14th February 1947 were not composed by Schubert. Rather, they were drawn up by the interrogator Wartenberg on the basis of Schubert's statements and were merely given to Schubert for his signature, as has been confirmed by Wartenberg in the witness box. In the index dated 7th December 1945, Seibert is listed under the heading "staff". Schubert stated with regard to this in the witness box:
"I mean to express by this phrasing, what I actually expressed was what was the actual case. Seibert was the Permanent Representative in the Group Staff of Einsatzgruppe D." justify the assumption that Seibert was the deputy general for the Einsatzgruppe D. The statements of Jonas are much too general. The statements of Jonas are hearsay, which, according to the general rules of evidence, are not admissible. Jonas has only voiced his opinion, that Seibert had been the representative of Ohlendorf in the Einsatzgruppe D, without giving the least indication, how he came to have this "opinion". Jonas was at that time officer in the Company of the Police and - as he himself stated in his affidavit - was assigned to the Sonderkommando 11 B, which up to November 1941 was never stationed at the location of the Group.
He was with the Kommando 11 B in Simferopol, the location of the Group, only at the time, when the defendant Seibert was on leave in Berlin (November/December 1941), and he himself left the Sonderkommando 11 B and with it the Einsatzgruppe in the middle of December 1941, according to his own statements. These statements have been confirmed also by the testimony of the former Kommando Leader 11 B, B raune, during cross-examination. during cross-examination and to the affidavit of Bekhof. the statements of Ohlendorf in his affidavit dated 2 April 1947, in order to substantiate its claim, that Seibert was the responsible plenipotentiary for the entire area of the Einsatzgruppe. Ohlendorf did not have a Deputy General, but the four Group-Leaders of his office represented him each in his sphere of activity. This is evident from the affidavit of Dr. Ehrlich, who knew from the way in which Ohlendorf used to conduct his work and command in RSHA, that Ohlendorf during the 6 yea rs of his activity as Amtschef had never had a deputy. Dr. Ehrlich mentions in particular with regard to this question:
"In his absence, even if lasting for a longer period of time, he was represented by the competent Group-Leader in matters pertaining to his specific sphere of activity. This ruling applied also for the long period of absence of Ohlendorf as Chief of the Einsatzgruppe D in Russia. In the absence of Ohlendorf, the Group-Leader signed with "I.V." (by order, in Vertretung), if it was a matter of letters from the Amtschef, without, however, thus being or becoming the Deputy general for the entire Amt III. This applied also for the time, when Ohlendorf was present as Amtschef III and the Group-Leader signed a letter concerning his Group-area."