I have already mentioned this point in my statement today as well as in my trial briefs. But the defendant's entire attitude as a member of the and an SD leader was not an unrestrictedly positive attitude but a critical negative one which resulted in his leaving the SD. had to go through extremely serious, even dangerous, conflicts with HEYDRICH: he was absolutely shelved and treated with suspicion as a most unreliable member. That the defendant succeeded in getting away be entering the service of the Foreign Office, where, by virtue of an existing ministerial decree, SD-activity was even prohibited, goes to prove his own inner aloofness and unsuitability for the SD. 4. In submitting Document No. 3919-PS of their Document Book V B, the prosecution has tried to prove that, just during his service with the foreign Office, the defendant SIX behaved in a criminal way. This document contains the confidential report on the meeting in Krummhuebel on 3 and 4 April 1944 of the Information Office XIV with its experts attached to the German Missions. This document is supplemented by a conglomeration of secret correspondence between the Reich Security Main Office - Office IV, and via the foreign Office. Department for Home Affairs II, - the missions abroad on the handling of the Jewish problem by those missions. The information Office XIV of the Foreign Office was an independent office with its own chief and responsible directly to the state secretary. The tasks of this office lay purely in the field of propaganda and had no connection with the other departments of the Foreign Office within its organization. I was only the opening meeting which had to be attended, according to instructions of the state secretary, by representatives of all departments.
At that opening meeting, the defendant SIX made a short speech of a purely informational character, took his leave immediately afterwards and returned to Berlin. Therefore he does not know anything about the further course of the meeting. The affidavits of so many persons who attended that meeting prove that the words he is accused of having said were never uttered. There exist therefore well-founded doubts as to the authenticity of this document which had been submitted by Russian quarters to the IMT in 1946, all the more so as it bears no signature. With regard to the brief which have been arbitrarily submitted with this document no relation whatsoever, as far as business procedure and time are concerned, to the Department of Culture or its Chief, SIX, I refer to the affidavit by THADDEN, Document Book IV, Appendix A, Document No. 67. attempt to prove the defendant guilty in Count III, refers to the Krummhuebel meeting, which the defendant attended to be sure and at which he made a speech, the following has to be stated in this connections: Supposing the document were not of questionable origin, it were not a garbled excerpt, it were not without signature, then it would merely prove a knowledge, but not an approval, of the events. 5) Thus, the prosecution has also failed in Count III to furnish conclusive proof that the defendant SIX, as a member of an organization which has been pronounced criminal, participated in any way actively in measures declared criminal. on the other hand, the defense has proved, in submitting the large number of documents of the Complex Groups C and D General Behavior of the Defendant Six during his Activity at the diversity and the Foreign Office - that SIX emerged always and everywhere only as a scientist of a typically candid attitude and free of dogmatic limitations.
He has never committed a criminal act nor done any harm whatsoever or supported, wanted or sanctioned the carrying out of National Socialist crimes. On the contrary, he rather opposed that ideology with determination when it did not conform to European principles and ethics. He not only tolerated opponents of the regime of whom he got to know, but frequently aided them and admitted frankly that he himself rejected the excesses of National Socialism. This entire attitude of their defendant and his behavior as a member of an organization declared criminal should absolve him from any responsibility in acts of this organization which have been found criminal. all the facts Mentioned here above pertaining to Count III, while I myself am of the opinion that also as far as this count is concerned, the defendant should be found not guilty according to the rebuttal by the defense of the charges preferred by the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Who follows? Dr. Heim?
THE SECRETARY GENERAL: Dr. Heim's final plea hasn't come up.
DR. MAYER: Dr. Mayer for the defendant Steimle. with crimes against humanity and war crimes, and in addition with the membership in one of the organizations declared criminal by the I.M.T. The specific charge is the participation in an extermination program for the annihilation of certain racial and other groups; it is asserted that the Einsatzgruppen including their Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos were established for, and employed in, the implementation of this program.
Steimle is stated to have participated in this by his activities as leader of the Sonderkommando 7 a of the Einsatzgruppe B and of the Sonderkommando 4 a of the Einsatzgruppe C; it is said that he thus cooperated in the implementation of the program. could really be carried out by the relatively small number of persons forming the Einsatzgruppen. It may also be left undecided whether the decree of the Fuehrer, which appears to play a very predominant part in this trial, was really meant to be the basis of such a plan. Steimle was in a position to ascertain whether this program of genocide existed or that it existed, and whether or not he took part in the murder of innocent persons by any activities implementing the Fuehrer decree. It must be admitted that it would constitute such participation in a wider sense, if during the period, in which he was in charge of SK 7 a or SK 4 a, members of his command had co-operated in this policy of extermination with the cognizance and the approval of Steimle.
COURT NO. II, CASE NO. IX.
The evaluation of the activities of the defendant Steimle in the light of the charges raised against him cannot be restricted to the consideration of the evidence produced by the prosecution all the more as this evidence is not comprehensive anyhow. It must consider all those circumstances which directed his action while he was committed in Russia. A tremendous amount of material of this kind is contained in the extracts from incident reports produced by the Defense. They will show that the trend and the scope of his activities in his capacity as Kommando-leader were to a large extent caused by external condition as such; this applies particularly to the areas of commitment of SK 7a. Furthermore, it will become apparent that the implementation of the decree of the Fuehrer, as charged by the prosecution, was practically impossible in these conditions, which will be described more fully later on. The same applies to Steimle's activities in the capacity of the leader of SK 4a. the personal attitude of Steimle toward the implementation of the order of Fuehrer is, therefore, of secondary importance. We may believe the defendant, if he asserts that it would have been against the grain, if not impossible, for him to carry out the Fuehrer-order, if he had been confronted with the necessity to do so. It requires an inflexibility more than human to implement such an order, and it would only be natural to shrink back. We do, however, claim that Steimle would actually have refused to obey the order, if direct pressure or force had been brought to bear on him. But he must not be prejudiced by the fact that the conditions actually prevailing saved him from this necessity. The evidence will even prove that on his own initiative he made a clover use of existing conditions with the very purpose to eliminate such necessity in his area.
guarantee of a just decision consists in the application of those legal principles which are established internationally and which reflect accordingly in the sentences pronounced by the Military Tribunals in the cases already tried. Nobody may be convicted if his personal guilt has not been proved. This requires that it must be carefully determined which of the various criminal acts charged in the indictment have been committed by the individual defendants, in this instance by Steimle. The fact that the onus of proof rests with the prosecution - which As an established principle protects the defendant from being held responsible on the basis of assertions of the prosecution, if proof is lacking. The principle that every defendant is prime facia presumed to be not guilty enhances this protection. defendant Steimle is the fact that he was assigned employment in the East. The assignment covers two periods separated by an interval of one year. The first assignment was the appointment as leader of SK 7 a of Einsatzgruppe B for the period from the middle of September 1941 to the middle of December 1941. The assertion of the prosecution that this assignment of Steimle lasted until the middle of February 1942, will be discussed later. At this juncture it is sufficient to state that this does not correspond to the facts. The second assignment of Steimle was his appointment as leader of SK 4 a in Einsatzgruppe C for the period from August 1942 to 17 January 1943. been wrapped up in his work in the SD district headquarters Stuttgart.
It seems, therefore, indicated to breach the nature of these activities and Steimle's attitude underlying them, for they will reveal the background from which he started for commitments in the East, a field which was completely new to him. It will also reveal how much his Stuttgart duties contrasted with those incumbent on him in SK 7a. The deposition of the defendant made on the stand furnishes acomplete picture of his professional background and curriculum; in this respect reference is made to the transcript dated 5 and 6 November 1947. The documents Steimle No. 1 - 5, discloses the attitude of the defendant toward the Nazi regime in the period prior to his commitment in Russia. They make it evident that he was by no means one of the blind fanatics who accepted the measures of the Third Reich without any criticism. On the contrary, he considered his activities in the SD a propitious opportunity of submitting unbiassed reports on the effects of the measures of the government as a substitute for criticism, the latter being prohibited. His purpose was to set a limit to arbitrariness. He is described as unbiassed and as a man who lent his assistance, his support and his protection where ever he feels they are needed. During his activities in the SD district headquarters, the defendant applied several times for his transfer to the army, as he wanted to do active service. Steimle document No. 4 Exhibit No. 4. As late as in January 1941 he again endeavored to be called up for active service, and he even secured an interview in Berlin for that purpose. With the obvious purpose to turn these repeated applications down, he was in August 1941 assigned to SK 7 a and appointed its leader. It must, therefore, be kept in mind that he was given this assignment at a date long after the time when the Einsatzgruppen including the Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos were formed and committed for the first time.
The defendant Steimle was neither sent to Dueben nor to Pretzsch, the only places where special indictrination courses on the purpose and tasks of the Einsatzgruppen were held. The question of the Fuehrer's decree playing a decisive part in this trial, it is not devoid of special significance that the defendant was never given detailed instructions by executive leaders on the meaning and purport of the decree. The defendant does not deny that he was made converssnt little by little with the Fuehrer's decree by way of information given to him by Einsatzgruppen-Leader Nebe, his superior official, and by the men of SK 7 a. But these informations given to him by Nebe or his own subleaders can, of course, not be considered substitute for the official indictrination given in Pretzsch and Dueben. It is obvious that an order which has not been laid down in writing can in practice never be transmitted entirely in its original form. conversant with the tasks of the Sonderkommandos and with those of SK 7 a in particular. When he reported to Einsatzgruppen-Leader Nebe on 4 September 1941, he was told only that it was the task of his Kommando - and of the other Kommandos, too, for that matter -- to secure the rear area against all communist leaders and their forces active in the area and against their supporters. On or about 7 September 1941, he was told by the deputy leader of SK 7 a, Foltis, that during its advance SK 7 a had shot a number of male Jews of military age. Only then did the defendant Steimle realize the real purport with regard to the Jews of the decree of the Fuehrer.
No wonder the reaction of the defendant to this piecemeal information on the Fuehrer's decree, the implementation of which called for particular ruthlessness, was such he did not take pains to report an order of this kind to this sub-leaders and men. There is no doubt that during the first phase of Steimle's command, the members of Steimle's unit were more conversant with their tasks in the Sonderkommando then the defendant Stimle himself. This follows from the very fact that the Kommando had been operating since June 1941. It must be emphasized that neither at this nor at any other time the defendant Steimle gave orders of his own to his men concerning the implementation of the decree of the Fuehrer with regard to the Jews. The incident reports produced both by the prosecution and the defense show that SK 7 a is not mentioned in a single report for the shooting of Jews in implementation of the decree of the Fuehrer. In fact, during the whole period when Steimle was in charge, no Jews, Jewesses of Jewish children were shot in SK 7 a in implementation of the Fuehrer order. On the other hand, the above-mentioned incident reports are dealing throughout with the ever increasing partisan menace and with "action"i.e. combat operations, of SK 7 a against partisans, mostly carried out jointly with, and often initiated by, Wehrmacht units. Walter Roller, Steimle document No. 12, exh. No. 12. Roller was the driver of the defendant Steimle and is in a position to confirm that no executions of Jews based on the Fuehrer's decree were carried out at that period. did not implement the Fuehrer-decree while the defendant was in charge.
The defendant himself has, when on the stand, stated that this can not be explained by a claim that he had been in a position simply to refuse to carry out this order. Adhering to the truth, he admits that he would have been obliged to comply with this order in the same way as with any other order, if the necessity had arisen. In this connection, it must, however, be reiterated that the defendant did have a certain part in the actual operations of the Kommando in his charge, in so far as he cleverly exploited the conditions actually prevailing in order to be able to shelve, without incurring a personal set-back, the implementation of the decree. We must not forget that the implementation of the decree. We must not forget that the implementation of the Fuehrer's decree was not the only task of the Einsatzgruppen. According to both the deposition of the defendant made on the stand and the incident reports, it was also the task of the Sonderkommandos and Einsatzkommandos to maintain the security of the rear communication of the combat troops and to take all security measures necessary for this purpose. The latter task included the furnishing of intelligence concerning the organization of the enemy army, the communist party, and in particular the reconnoitring of the organization of partisan warfare, raised to the level of a method of warfare by the Red Army. The irrefutable fact that the strength of the Sonderkommandos was extremely weak - about 100 men for each Sonderkommando- madt it impossible to carry out the Fuehrer order and to fight the partisan menace at the same time. In fact, the combatting of partisans was the more urgent task. It had to be given priority, because the malicious combat methods of the partisans threatened the rear of the combat troops and inflicted considerable losses on the Wehrmacht.
In this connection, reference is made to the exhibit Ohlendorf No. 3, doc. Ohlendorf No. 40, page 66 of doc. book Ohlendorf II, which contains some illuminating figures for a small sector of the front. It becomes evident from the fact, specified in detail in the following, why the SK 7 a under Steimle's leadership did not carry out the Fuehrer order; 1.) That the danger from the partisans played a prominent part in the back of the combat troops in the deployment in the East, but particularly in the deployment area of the Sonderkommando 7a results from the excerpts of the reports of events submitted by the defense. This was already pointed out. Thus, the area can rather exactly be established in which a particular concentration of the partisans took place. It is further possible on the basis of these facts to establish of which circle of persons the partisans consisted and further still what kind of activity they carry out and thus what kind of danger the partisans were.
a) There is an especially great number of partisans in the extensive forests and in the impregnable marsh area, because they can find here shelter and hideout for men and weapons without any trouble. It is explicitly stated in the report of events No. 97 of 28 September 1941, which is reprinted in the Steimle document No. 25, exh. No. 24 page 37 and 40 of the English and German document book Steimle II: the main seat of the Partisans' activity in the region, comprises the area of which the city of Welish is the centre. This region is bordered in the East by the road Smolensk-Demidow, in the South by the motor highway, in the West by the road Smolensk - Witebsk, and in the North by the road Smolensk Demidow.
It is known to the Tribunal that this city was the seat of the Sonderkommando 7a in the months September/ October 1941. The size of the afore mentioned region brought it about that the SK 7a had to be permanently occupied with combatting the partisans. They succeeded in many cases in escaping in time, thanks to the impracticable conditions of the roads.
The document Steimle No. 29, Exh. No. 28 contains on page 46 of the German and English document book Steimle No. II a detailed report on a partisan operation in the neighborhood of the township of Demidow, South East of where dense forests stand. The whole deployment area of the Sonderkommando 7a is full of forests and marshes and represents, therefore, a territory which is especially favorable for the activity of the partisans. It is complained in particular in the document Steimle No. 23 Exh. No. 22 in a report on page 18 of the original that the extensive marshes and the big forests, accessible only with much trouble, are extraordinarily helpful to the partisans. It would go to far to enumerate here all documents of the defense which express themselves in the same way with all they contain. It must be considered on the basis of the documentary evidence a fact which does not admit any doubts that there existed one of the best hideouts for partisans in the area of the Einsatzgruppe B, but especially in the deployment area of the Sonderkommando 7a when the defendant Steimle was its leader.
b) The circle of persons of which the partisans consisted can also be described in its essential points on the basis of the reports which are present as documentary evidence. The document Steimle No. 23. Exh. No. 22 gives a clear view of the organization of the future partisans' training in so-called partisan schools.
The document Steimle No. 25 Exh. No. 24 emphasizes expressly that the so-called destruction division consisted of party members of the Communist party and active Bolshevists. For this reason alone they had not been drafted for military service. Document Steimle No. 32 Exh. No. 31 confirms that the escaped Communist functionaries and agents were active as partisans without any exception. A report in document Steimle No. 34, exh. No. 33 points to the fact that also women and predominately young ones joined the partisans to serve as scouts and to transmit intelligence. It is expressly pointed out in the document No. 40 exh. No. 3 on page 66 of the document book Ohlendorf No. II that the leadership of the partisans was assumed in most cases by the secretary of the local Bolshevist party committee or by other party functionaries. It follows from the same document that women and children were committed with especial ruthlessness for the partisan fight. Also tasks in the line of direct combat were given to them on this occasion. Neither is it excluded that partisan units were led by women. It appears from this very important document that the Bolshevist party fanaticism is not deterred from making use of children in partisan detachments. The most difficult tasks are assigned to them there, as e.g. the demolition of bridges.
The proclamation of Stalin of 3 June, 1941, document Ohlendorf No. 39 exh. No. 2 does not permit any doubt on the fact that the Soviet state leadership planned and intended to have the total civilian population participate in the partisan war. It is also this point of view which makes it appear a necessary consequence that party functionaries of all ranks, party members and Bolshevists formed the backbone of the partisan movements. It only serves to complete the picture that the members of the Red Army were ordered to enforce in the disguise of civilians the ranks of the partisans, in case they were separated from their units. The systematic preparation of the partisan war against the Germans as occupation troops and troops of the front line comprised a considerable portion of all parts of the population and demonstrates clearly enough the ruthlessness of the treacherous manner of combat which was used by the partisans. It was the plan of the Bolshevist State leadership that the German troops should never be sure that a group of peasants which looked quite harmless or other harmless civilians could not change suddenly to armed partisans. particular the Bolshevist functionaries and NKWD agents who remained in the back of the German troops of the front line tried over and over again to form and organize partisan units out of the civilian population. This appears in several cases from the submitted documents. It cannot be contested that Jews belonged to these leading circles and also especially that there were Jews among the Communist functionaries and NKWD agents. It can be said in generally that every Communist functionary, every NKWD agent and every Bolshevist who was moving behind the German lines was obliged by the party to organize the partisan fight and to advance it.
And it can be understood that this was especially successful in an area like the one of the Sonderkommando 7a, if one looks at the fact that it was so easy to find a hideout, as was already emphasized repeatedly. is extremely great during the time in which STEIMLE was the leader of the Kommando. Document STEIMLE No. 18, exh. No. 18 reports that an attack of 200 heavily armed partisans against the city of Surash took place and had to be repulsed on 15 September 1941. A report is contained in the document STEIMLE No. 23 exh. No. 22 on page 29 of the German and English document book STEIMLE II which mentions major operations of the Sonderkommando 7a in various locations. They were unsuccessful, it is true, because the partisans fled in time. An operation of the SK 7a is reported in the same report. Here 12 persons were apprehended. It was established after intensive interrogations that 8 of them were partisans and they were shot accordingly. The report goes for the time until 13 September 1941. The defendant STEIMLE was then leader of the Kommando for a few days only. This report is interesting because it gives a total number of 1011 persons shot to death by the Sonderkommando 7a as of 13 September 1941. The next report of the commitment of the Sonderkommando 7a is in the document STEIMLE No. 29 exh. No. 28. It is reported there that a large style operation against partisans is carried out with the assistance of two divisions of the Wehrmacht in the dense forests Sout East of Demidow. A series of persons was immediately released again after detailed interrogations by the Wehrmacht, while 72 Red Army soldiers were apprehended, but without any proof that they were connected with the partisans.
Therefore, they were brought into a prisoner of war camp. The SK 7a established 183 individuals as partisans on this occasion. They were shot subsequently. It is further on explained in the same report that the Sk 7a carried out several operations against partisans North West of Welish, and that 27 individuals could be established as partisans on this occasion. The Sk 7a is once more mentioned in the same document, and it is stated that 8 individuals could be convicted of partisanship in the village of Michalowo. The report contains further the interesting information that 8 partisans were apprehended and that they were so called youths between 16 and 22 years of age. Thus a hint is given what age groups are put together in the reports under the word "youths". This report gives a total number of 1252 persons shot to death by the Sk 7a as of 26 September 1941. This means according to the reports an increase of 241, while there are actually only about 218 shootings according to the contents of the report. STEIMLE document No. 32, exh. No. 31 mentions that 19 reports on partisan activities came in from the area Welikije Luki alone, one of the places where the Sk 7a was stationed. It describes clearly and in detail the destructive activity of the partisans. 12 operations against partisans of the Sk 7a are reported on page 79 of the German and English document book STEIMLE II, that means in the same document STEIMLE No. 32. Among them are several in which it took part as an interrogation squad on the occasion of Wehrmacht operations. 41 partisans were shot to death after interrogation. Another operation of Sk 7a is mentioned in the prosecution document No. NO-3160 exh. No. 65. 63 Communist functionaries, NKWD agents and agitators had to be shot in the course of combatting the partisans after it had taken place.
This report obviously comprises a series of individual reports, given in the course of the reported period. The document of the prosecution No. NO-2825 exh. No. 59 reports of Sk 7a that it executed 153 liquidations on occasion of combatting partisans in the reported period. The total number of the expressly reported numbers in the individual reports gives the figure of approximately 500, the same figure which results as a difference from comparing the total number of persons shot to death by the Sonderkommando 7a viz. 1011 as of 13 September 1941 and the total number of persons shot to death by the same Kommando viz. 1517 as of 14 November 1941. All shootings are thus actually proven by documents to be nothing but shootings of partisans. that the Sonderkommando 7a is only mentioned in connection with partisan actions, carried out either independently or together with Wehrmacht units by parts of the Sonderkommando. The Communist functionaries and NKWD agents represent in all cases the backbone and the leadership of the partisan units according to this documentary support. This was the only reason why they still were behind the German lines. No reason can be perceived why theu should not have joined the general evacuation movement, propagated and energetically carried out before the arrival of the German troops. once more still - in particular in the area of the Sonderkommando 7a, which can be unambiguously learned from the documents, compelled the defendant STEIMLE obviously and with necessity to fight the partisans with the assistance of the men of his Kommando and his subleaders from the first days of his presence in this area. It forced him to continue this fight with all means at his disposal until his departure to Germany in December 1941.
That meant the security of the fighting units and the necessity of maintaining without disturbance army communication lines between the front and the back. It cannot be contested that the Sonderkommandos had also the task of combatting the partisans. Just as little can be contested that this was an urgent task, especially in the combat area, and that everything must automatically stand back which prevented the forces of the Sonderkommando from this task, forces which were weak anyhow. The defendant STEIMLE had, therefore, no choice in the question, whether the combatting of the partisans must fall short of carrying out the Fuehrer order. The informations, received by him piecemeal on the Fuehrer order, contained nothing on the necessity of carrying it out before all other tasks. Neither was such an order ever given and it would have been absolutely nonsensical in consideration of the grave partisan danger. that he himself was not trained from the military point of view or from that of criminal law for the task given to the Sk 7a of combatting the partisans. Therefore, he was in no position to assume the leadership of the Kommando in this respect. Moreover, there existed no necessity, as an operation of the whole Kommando was out of consideration, due to its subdivision in two or three partial units which were widely separated in space. The partial Kommando of the Sk 7a operated together with units of the Wehrmacht and functioned mainly as interrogation units on such occasions; it was here the task of the defendant STEIMLE to check the regularity of the interrogation proceedings and of the decisions, made after it.
It was clear without further ado from the above mentioned subdivision of the Kommando that this control could only be performed at random. It was still made more difficult by the circumstance that the Kommando under the leadership of STEIMLE was advancing in his parts since the middle of October 1941, as it always had to remain in immediate neighborhood of the fighting units according to the order of AOK 9. The proper working field of the defendant, the reporting on life in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union would by itself not have been his personal task as leader of the Kommando, but he had to perform it in addition to everything else, due to the lack of a proper person in charge of it. Fuehrer order in the time when the defendant STEIMLE lead the Sonderkommando 7a. The document STEIMLE No. 13, exh. No. 13 and the document STEIMLE No. 12, exh. No. 12 express also unambiguously that the defendant STEIMLE did not carry out the Fuehrer order and that he did not go farther and did not repeat himself the Fuehrer order, when dealing with the subleaders and men subordinated to him. The defense believes to have shown that this did not happen in violation of his duty and neither, because the defendant simply refused the execution of the Fuehrer order. It happened, in the contrary, from intelligent evaluation of the existing situation and necessiated by the compulsion of leading the combat against the partisans. stands on the other hand the fact that there were exceedingly few Jews in the commitment area of the Sonderkommando 7a of which we talk here after all. As already fully explained above, the commitment area of the Sonderkommando 7a in its whole not unconsiderable extent was covered with big forests, extending far and wide, and with impassable marshes.
The reports, submitted by the defense, demonstrate unequivocally that a planned evacuation had already taken place in the commitment area of the Sonderkommando 7a before the invasion by the German military units. And here again the evacuation of the Jewish population was performed in a preferred manner and also according to plans. There is talk in the document STEIMLE No. 21, exh. No. 20 on page 13 of the German and English document book STEIMLE II in a report on the military intelligence service in the Welikije Luki area. The Court will remember that Welikije Luki was the stations of a subdetachment of Sk 7a. The report emphasize in connection with this township the evacuation of the population according to plans already at the time of the report, which evacuation was effected to a higher degree than previously. population had a preference treatment when the evacuation went into effect already weeks before and participated in it to a greater extent than the others. It is stated again in the document STEIMLE No. 32, exh. No. 31 on page 78 of the English and German document book STEIMLE No. II that the trend of flight and the planned evacuation of the Jews towards the East took greater and greater dimensions. This obviously refers to the interval of time between the 21 September and 24 October 1941. It is reported in the document STEIMLE No. 34, exh. No. 33 on page 90 of the English and German document book STEIMLE II that the Jewish population fled without an exception at that moment, viz. the 14 November 1941 and that this evacuation movement, which was promoted from the outset by extensive propaganda of the Soviet regime, was considerably facilitated by the transport trains which were put at disposal by the Red Army.