In this connection, reference is made to the exhibit Ohlendorf No. 3, doc. Ohlendorf No. 40, page 66 of doc. book Ohlendorf II, which contains some illuminating figures for a small sector of the front. It becomes evident from the fact, specified in detail in the following, why the SK 7 a under Steimle's leadership did not carry out the Fuehrer order; 1.) That the danger from the partisans played a prominent part in the back of the combat troops in the deployment in the East, but particularly in the deployment area of the Sonderkommando 7a results from the excerpts of the reports of events submitted by the defense. This was already pointed out. Thus, the area can rather exactly be established in which a particular concentration of the partisans took place. It is further possible on the basis of these facts to establish of which circle of persons the partisans consisted and further still what kind of activity they carry out and thus what kind of danger the partisans were.
a) There is an especially great number of partisans in the extensive forests and in the impregnable marsh area, because they can find here shelter and hideout for men and weapons without any trouble. It is explicitly stated in the report of events No. 97 of 28 September 1941, which is reprinted in the Steimle document No. 25, exh. No. 24 page 37 and 40 of the English and German document book Steimle II: the main seat of the Partisans' activity in the region, comprises the area of which the city of Welish is the centre. This region is bordered in the East by the road Smolensk-Demidow, in the South by the motor highway, in the West by the road Smolensk - Witebsk, and in the North by the road Smolensk Demidow.
It is known to the Tribunal that this city was the seat of the Sonderkommando 7a in the months September/ October 1941. The size of the afore mentioned region brought it about that the SK 7a had to be permanently occupied with combatting the partisans. They succeeded in many cases in escaping in time, thanks to the impracticable conditions of the roads.
The document Steimle No. 29, Exh. No. 28 contains on page 46 of the German and English document book Steimle No. II a detailed report on a partisan operation in the neighborhood of the township of Demidow, South East of where dense forests stand. The whole deployment area of the Sonderkommando 7a is full of forests and marshes and represents, therefore, a territory which is especially favorable for the activity of the partisans. It is complained in particular in the document Steimle No. 23 Exh. No. 22 in a report on page 18 of the original that the extensive marshes and the big forests, accessible only with much trouble, are extraordinarily helpful to the partisans. It would go to far to enumerate here all documents of the defense which express themselves in the same way with all they contain. It must be considered on the basis of the documentary evidence a fact which does not admit any doubts that there existed one of the best hideouts for partisans in the area of the Einsatzgruppe B, but especially in the deployment area of the Sonderkommando 7a when the defendant Steimle was its leader.
b) The circle of persons of which the partisans consisted can also be described in its essential points on the basis of the reports which are present as documentary evidence. The document Steimle No. 23. Exh. No. 22 gives a clear view of the organization of the future partisans' training in so-called partisan schools.
The document Steimle No. 25 Exh. No. 24 emphasizes expressly that the so-called destruction division consisted of party members of the Communist party and active Bolshevists. For this reason alone they had not been drafted for military service. Document Steimle No. 32 Exh. No. 31 confirms that the escaped Communist functionaries and agents were active as partisans without any exception. A report in document Steimle No. 34, exh. No. 33 points to the fact that also women and predominately young ones joined the partisans to serve as scouts and to transmit intelligence. It is expressly pointed out in the document No. 40 exh. No. 3 on page 66 of the document book Ohlendorf No. II that the leadership of the partisans was assumed in most cases by the secretary of the local Bolshevist party committee or by other party functionaries. It follows from the same document that women and children were committed with especial ruthlessness for the partisan fight. Also tasks in the line of direct combat were given to them on this occasion. Neither is it excluded that partisan units were led by women. It appears from this very important document that the Bolshevist party fanaticism is not deterred from making use of children in partisan detachments. The most difficult tasks are assigned to them there, as e.g. the demolition of bridges.
The proclamation of Stalin of 3 June, 1941, document Ohlendorf No. 39 exh. No. 2 does not permit any doubt on the fact that the Soviet state leadership planned and intended to have the total civilian population participate in the partisan war. It is also this point of view which makes it appear a necessary consequence that party functionaries of all ranks, party members and Bolshevists formed the backbone of the partisan movements. It only serves to complete the picture that the members of the Red Army were ordered to enforce in the disguise of civilians the ranks of the partisans, in case they were separated from their units. The systematic preparation of the partisan war against the Germans as occupation troops and troops of the front line comprised a considerable portion of all parts of the population and demonstrates clearly enough the ruthlessness of the treacherous manner of combat which was used by the partisans. It was the plan of the Bolshevist State leadership that the German troops should never be sure that a group of peasants which looked quite harmless or other harmless civilians could not change suddenly to armed partisans. particular the Bolshevist functionaries and NKWD agents who remained in the back of the German troops of the front line tried over and over again to form and organize partisan units out of the civilian population. This appears in several cases from the submitted documents. It cannot be contested that Jews belonged to these leading circles and also especially that there were Jews among the Communist functionaries and NKWD agents. It can be said in generally that every Communist functionary, every NKWD agent and every Bolshevist who was moving behind the German lines was obliged by the party to organize the partisan fight and to advance it.
And it can be understood that this was especially successful in an area like the one of the Sonderkommando 7a, if one looks at the fact that it was so easy to find a hideout, as was already emphasized repeatedly. is extremely great during the time in which STEIMLE was the leader of the Kommando. Document STEIMLE No. 18, exh. No. 18 reports that an attack of 200 heavily armed partisans against the city of Surash took place and had to be repulsed on 15 September 1941. A report is contained in the document STEIMLE No. 23 exh. No. 22 on page 29 of the German and English document book STEIMLE II which mentions major operations of the Sonderkommando 7a in various locations. They were unsuccessful, it is true, because the partisans fled in time. An operation of the SK 7a is reported in the same report. Here 12 persons were apprehended. It was established after intensive interrogations that 8 of them were partisans and they were shot accordingly. The report goes for the time until 13 September 1941. The defendant STEIMLE was then leader of the Kommando for a few days only. This report is interesting because it gives a total number of 1011 persons shot to death by the Sonderkommando 7a as of 13 September 1941. The next report of the commitment of the Sonderkommando 7a is in the document STEIMLE No. 29 exh. No. 28. It is reported there that a large style operation against partisans is carried out with the assistance of two divisions of the Wehrmacht in the dense forests Sout East of Demidow. A series of persons was immediately released again after detailed interrogations by the Wehrmacht, while 72 Red Army soldiers were apprehended, but without any proof that they were connected with the partisans.
Therefore, they were brought into a prisoner of war camp. The SK 7a established 183 individuals as partisans on this occasion. They were shot subsequently. It is further on explained in the same report that the Sk 7a carried out several operations against partisans North West of Welish, and that 27 individuals could be established as partisans on this occasion. The Sk 7a is once more mentioned in the same document, and it is stated that 8 individuals could be convicted of partisanship in the village of Michalowo. The report contains further the interesting information that 8 partisans were apprehended and that they were so called youths between 16 and 22 years of age. Thus a hint is given what age groups are put together in the reports under the word "youths". This report gives a total number of 1252 persons shot to death by the Sk 7a as of 26 September 1941. This means according to the reports an increase of 241, while there are actually only about 218 shootings according to the contents of the report. STEIMLE document No. 32, exh. No. 31 mentions that 19 reports on partisan activities came in from the area Welikije Luki alone, one of the places where the Sk 7a was stationed. It describes clearly and in detail the destructive activity of the partisans. 12 operations against partisans of the Sk 7a are reported on page 79 of the German and English document book STEIMLE II, that means in the same document STEIMLE No. 32. Among them are several in which it took part as an interrogation squad on the occasion of Wehrmacht operations. 41 partisans were shot to death after interrogation. Another operation of Sk 7a is mentioned in the prosecution document No. NO-3160 exh. No. 65. 63 Communist functionaries, NKWD agents and agitators had to be shot in the course of combatting the partisans after it had taken place.
This report obviously comprises a series of individual reports, given in the course of the reported period. The document of the prosecution No. NO-2825 exh. No. 59 reports of Sk 7a that it executed 153 liquidations on occasion of combatting partisans in the reported period. The total number of the expressly reported numbers in the individual reports gives the figure of approximately 500, the same figure which results as a difference from comparing the total number of persons shot to death by the Sonderkommando 7a viz. 1011 as of 13 September 1941 and the total number of persons shot to death by the same Kommando viz. 1517 as of 14 November 1941. All shootings are thus actually proven by documents to be nothing but shootings of partisans. that the Sonderkommando 7a is only mentioned in connection with partisan actions, carried out either independently or together with Wehrmacht units by parts of the Sonderkommando. The Communist functionaries and NKWD agents represent in all cases the backbone and the leadership of the partisan units according to this documentary support. This was the only reason why they still were behind the German lines. No reason can be perceived why theu should not have joined the general evacuation movement, propagated and energetically carried out before the arrival of the German troops. once more still - in particular in the area of the Sonderkommando 7a, which can be unambiguously learned from the documents, compelled the defendant STEIMLE obviously and with necessity to fight the partisans with the assistance of the men of his Kommando and his subleaders from the first days of his presence in this area. It forced him to continue this fight with all means at his disposal until his departure to Germany in December 1941.
That meant the security of the fighting units and the necessity of maintaining without disturbance army communication lines between the front and the back. It cannot be contested that the Sonderkommandos had also the task of combatting the partisans. Just as little can be contested that this was an urgent task, especially in the combat area, and that everything must automatically stand back which prevented the forces of the Sonderkommando from this task, forces which were weak anyhow. The defendant STEIMLE had, therefore, no choice in the question, whether the combatting of the partisans must fall short of carrying out the Fuehrer order. The informations, received by him piecemeal on the Fuehrer order, contained nothing on the necessity of carrying it out before all other tasks. Neither was such an order ever given and it would have been absolutely nonsensical in consideration of the grave partisan danger. that he himself was not trained from the military point of view or from that of criminal law for the task given to the Sk 7a of combatting the partisans. Therefore, he was in no position to assume the leadership of the Kommando in this respect. Moreover, there existed no necessity, as an operation of the whole Kommando was out of consideration, due to its subdivision in two or three partial units which were widely separated in space. The partial Kommando of the Sk 7a operated together with units of the Wehrmacht and functioned mainly as interrogation units on such occasions; it was here the task of the defendant STEIMLE to check the regularity of the interrogation proceedings and of the decisions, made after it.
It was clear without further ado from the above mentioned subdivision of the Kommando that this control could only be performed at random. It was still made more difficult by the circumstance that the Kommando under the leadership of STEIMLE was advancing in his parts since the middle of October 1941, as it always had to remain in immediate neighborhood of the fighting units according to the order of AOK 9. The proper working field of the defendant, the reporting on life in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union would by itself not have been his personal task as leader of the Kommando, but he had to perform it in addition to everything else, due to the lack of a proper person in charge of it. Fuehrer order in the time when the defendant STEIMLE lead the Sonderkommando 7a. The document STEIMLE No. 13, exh. No. 13 and the document STEIMLE No. 12, exh. No. 12 express also unambiguously that the defendant STEIMLE did not carry out the Fuehrer order and that he did not go farther and did not repeat himself the Fuehrer order, when dealing with the subleaders and men subordinated to him. The defense believes to have shown that this did not happen in violation of his duty and neither, because the defendant simply refused the execution of the Fuehrer order. It happened, in the contrary, from intelligent evaluation of the existing situation and necessiated by the compulsion of leading the combat against the partisans. stands on the other hand the fact that there were exceedingly few Jews in the commitment area of the Sonderkommando 7a of which we talk here after all. As already fully explained above, the commitment area of the Sonderkommando 7a in its whole not unconsiderable extent was covered with big forests, extending far and wide, and with impassable marshes.
The reports, submitted by the defense, demonstrate unequivocally that a planned evacuation had already taken place in the commitment area of the Sonderkommando 7a before the invasion by the German military units. And here again the evacuation of the Jewish population was performed in a preferred manner and also according to plans. There is talk in the document STEIMLE No. 21, exh. No. 20 on page 13 of the German and English document book STEIMLE II in a report on the military intelligence service in the Welikije Luki area. The Court will remember that Welikije Luki was the stations of a subdetachment of Sk 7a. The report emphasize in connection with this township the evacuation of the population according to plans already at the time of the report, which evacuation was effected to a higher degree than previously. population had a preference treatment when the evacuation went into effect already weeks before and participated in it to a greater extent than the others. It is stated again in the document STEIMLE No. 32, exh. No. 31 on page 78 of the English and German document book STEIMLE No. II that the trend of flight and the planned evacuation of the Jews towards the East took greater and greater dimensions. This obviously refers to the interval of time between the 21 September and 24 October 1941. It is reported in the document STEIMLE No. 34, exh. No. 33 on page 90 of the English and German document book STEIMLE II that the Jewish population fled without an exception at that moment, viz. the 14 November 1941 and that this evacuation movement, which was promoted from the outset by extensive propaganda of the Soviet regime, was considerably facilitated by the transport trains which were put at disposal by the Red Army.
This report obviously refers to the region of Rschew, a town which is also situated in the territory of the Sk 7a. are not limited only to the development area of the Sonderkommando 7a. But they are felt especially clearly in this part of the country which anyhow lacks in population, because it comprises a very considerable part of the population and before all practically all of the Jewish population. submitted excerpts from the reports of events had not started only when the Sonderkommando entered its development area. On the contrary it started already before the invasion by the German troops. This situation was essentially already in existence when the defendant STEIMLE arrived.
PRESIDENT: Dr. Mayer, would you want to suspend at this point? The Tribunal will be in recess 15 minutes.
( A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. MAYER (ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT STEIMLE): Your Honors, before I continue, I wouldlike to make a correction which I consider necessary on page 2oof the translation, line 16 from the bottom, there is a "not" missing, the word, "not"; this does meant to say, however, as in the translation, "we do claim". It says here, I think, "We do not claim." That is the 16th line from the bottom on page 2.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. MAYER: May I continue then?
The PRESIDENT: Please do.
DR. MAYER: It is still more evident from these circumstances that he did not start with carrying out the Fuehrer Order. There existed on the one hand the partisan danger, overshadowing everything. It was so great that the most vital interests of the military would have suffered damage, if this danger had just been ignored. On the other hand the men of the Sonderkommando 7a would have to waste their small forces in exhaustive searches for the Jewish part of the population, a task which would not have stood up in any way to what was demanded from them under the given conditions. need to carry out the Fuehrer Order. Beyond that, they have shown that it would have even been senseless to postpone the task of combatting the partisans for no other reason than to carry out the Fuehrer Order. The proceedings up to now have not established in any way that the Fuehrer Order would have had to be carried out first and under all circumstances. 7 a under the command of the defendant Steimle. The prosecution, it is true, charges him with having killed 272 Jews and Jewesses, and in evidence of this fact they have submitted the incident report No. 124 of 25 October 1941, Document No. NO-3160 , Exh. No. 65. There can be no doubt that this evidence is inconclusive.
Firstly, it must be stated from a point of view of form that the Sonderkommando 7 a is nowhere explicitly mentioned as being the unit which carried out the execution of the said number of Jews and Jewesses. It was only a deduction which led to the assumption that the SK 7a was involved and the includiveness of this deduction is adversely affected by the fact that the data concerning localities given in these incident reports cannot always be regarded as completely reliable. This is definitely established by the fact that there is neither a locality called Sadrudub, nor one called Belowschtschina within the area covered by the Sonderkommando 7 a. I refer in this connection to Doc. Steinle No. 16, Exh. No.15, Doc. Steimle No. 17 Exh. No. 16, and to Doc. Steimle No. 15, Exh. No. 14. These records show that a locality called Sadrudub does not exist at all, for, if it existed, one ought to be able to find it, in view of the ending "dub", which can only designate a town. Apart from that, the expression Sadrudub in one word is impossible in the Russian language. Furthermore, the same documents which I mentioned before show that the designation Sadrudub is abviously a mutilation of the word Starodub. Starodub is a term situated in what was then the area covered by the Sonderkommando 7b. Document Steimle No. 32, exhibit No. 31, page 80 of the English and German document book No. I. As is shown in particular by document Steimle No. 16, page 16 the village of Belowschtschine is in the immediate neighborhood of the town of Starodub, and that is the place where the Jews - obviously those from the town of Starodub in the area covered by the SK 7b - were supposed to set up a ghetto. The fact that the killing of the 272 Jews and Jewesses took place in the area covered by the SK 7b, i.e. near Starodub and Belowschtschina, is further confirmed by the incident report of 26 October 1941, prosecution exhibit 63. On page 2 of the original of this record it is reported that the Sonderkommando 7b secured 46,000 Rubol of cash which had been "the property of a number of liquidated Jews". There is no report to this effect from the SK 7a, not only during this period, but at no other time. In spite of the fact that the SK 7 a is again and again mentioned in the report of events between the 10 Sept, and 20 December 1941, and this always in connection with the combatting of partisans, there is never a report to the effect that the Sonderkommando 7a had secured Jewish money or other valuable subsequent toa possible liquidation of Jews.
Beyond this, the sane afore-mentioned document shows that according to the reported increase in the total figure of shootings carried out by Sonderkommando 7a and Sonderkommando 7b, the shooting of the 272 Jews and Jewesses must be placed to the account of Sonderkommando 7b. The report of events No. 108 of 9 October 1941, prosecution document No. 60, gives a total figure of shootings carried by the Sonderkommando 7a amounting to 1252 and a total figure of shootings carried out by Sonderkommando 7b amounting to 1544. This refers to the position as per 28 Sept. 1941. The incident report No. 125 of 26 October 1941 prosecution exhibit No. 63, gives a total figure of 1344 in respect of Sonderkommando 7a and a figure of 1822 in respect of Sonderkommando 7b. Thus the figure of shootings carried out by Sonderkommando 7a has only increased by 92 during the period in question, in which the incident occured with which the defendant Steimle has been charged. The increase however, should have amounted to exactly 372, as in the meantime only 2 collective shootings comprising about 100 persons executed were reported, and the Jews of Sadrudub would have to be added on to this. According to the records contained in the documents the increase in the figure of shootings carried out by SK 7b amounts to 278, and it is important to note in this connection that during this same period between the last report giving the figure of 1544 and the just mentioned report giving the figure of 1822 shootings, no executions at all are reported in respect to Sonderkommando 7b. These reported figures in connection with the report concerning the Rubel amounts secured by Sonderkommando 7b, and in connection with the geographical and linguistic argument pointing to the town of Starodub, make it completely clear that the reported shooting of 272 Jews and Jewesses with which the defendant Steimle has been charged was not carried out by Sonderkommando 7a but definitely by Sonderkommando 7b. In connection with the same document, i.e. the report of events No. 124, prosecution exhibit No. 65, the defendant Steimle is further charged with the shooting of 63 communists officials NKWD-agents and agitators.
The defendant has pointed out on the witness stand that this total figure must comprise various operations against partisans, as the result of which the fact was established that some of the partisans arrested in the course of each operation were party officials, NKWD agents and agitators. Previous evidence has been submitted for the fact t that the leaders of partisans were to be found on principle among this group of persons which constituted the backbone of the partisan movement.
The purpose and aim of their operations behind the German lines was solely to keep the idea of partisan fighting alive among the population, and to carry out the organization of the partisan movement. In view of the situation in the area covered by the Sonderkommando 7a, which has also been described in detail, it is obvious that here, too, the persons in question were such as had been arrested in the course of operations against partisans.
The document No. NO-2825, Exhibit No. 95, of 14 Nov, 1941 mentions the execution of 173 persons by the Sonderkommando 7a, without giving the reasons for which the execution was carried out. The afore-mentioned prosecution document contains a number of execution figures with respect to other Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos; these figures refer almost exclusively to Jews. In view of the situation with Sonderkommando 7a which has been mentioned several times, the indisputable conclusion must be drawn that the 173 persons in question must have been partisans. There is no reason why these executed persons should not have been designated as Jews in this case as well if the SK 7a had carried out such an execution. The operations against Jews mentioned in this report can be easily placed to the account of the competent Einsatz - and Sonderkommandos on the basis of the names of localities given. The defendant Steimle expoinded this point in detail on the witness stand, on the basis of the garrison reports contained in the documents. In this connection I refer to page 2008 and 2009 of the English transcript. Therefore, these 173 executions can on no account be charged to the defendant as acts committed on the basis of the Fuehrer order.
The prosecution also links the record NO_2324, prosecution exhibit No. 62, with defendant Steimle's responsibility. This evidence exhibit reports the shooting of a considerable number of Jews, Jewish women and children. The document is dated 19 December 1941, i.e. refers to a period when the defendant Steimle had already gone to Germany on leave. But this is not the only reason why he is not responsible for the executions of Jews reported therein, another reason is that in this report the localities of the executions and mostly also the Einsatz- or Sonderkommandos concerned, are very carefully stated. The SK 7a is nowhere mentioned, on the basis of the available incident reports every locality of execution can be easily placed as a station covered by a certain Sonder- or Einsatzkommando. In no case is a locality mentioned which by means of this procedure could be placed as a station covered by Einsatzkommando 7a. The defendant Steimle stressed this point on the witness stand, and the defendant Naumann, in reply to my detailed questioning, also stated in his testimony, that none of the localities mentioned here were situated in the area covered by SK 7a. Here again it is clearly shown that the Sonderkommando 7a, under the command of the defendant Steimle, is not mentioned in connection with shootings of Jews. This fact features in all incident reports and therefore it cannot possibly be a matter of coincidence. The repeated statements of the defendant on the witness stand, according to which he never carried out operations against Jews with the help of his commando, are thus once more confirmed and emphasized, quite apart from the other documentary evidence submitted by the defense. In this connection it must be stressed that the defendant did not only adopt this point of view when the proceedings against him were instituted he expressed it from the very start, as is shown, for instance, by his affidavit made in 1945, Doc. No. NO-3842, Prosecution Exh. No. 119.
By reason of Prosecution Exh. No. 60, Doc. No. NO-3156, that is the incident report No. 108 of 9 October 1941, the defendant is further charged with the execution of Communists youngsters who had been arrested while trying to blow up a bridge.
Incidentally it should be mentioned that this same report, as is easily recognisable, appears twice within the same record. I have explained before that the term "Youngsters" in the incident reports comprises the age groups from 16 to 22, and it is superfluous to point out that it was the intention of these Communists to commit an act which seriously endangered the safety of the troops and which was c carried out within the framework of the partisan movement. It seems out of the question therefore, that the defendant Steimle should be incriminated on this account. ing to submit evidence for the fact that the defendant Steimle was in charge of the Kommando 7a up to 13 February 1942 must be regarded as a failure. The period in which he led the Sonderkommando 7a only lasted from the middle of September 1941 to the middle of December 1941. This fact has been proved by the defense. The prosecution does not appear to have any doubts concerning the date on which he started his activities with the Sonderkommando 7a. Only as a precautionary measure do I refer in this connection to Document Steimle No. 13, Exhibit No. 13, page 47, of the German and English Document Book Steimle No. I. The liaison officer of the Sonderkommando 7a attached to A.O.K. 9, confirms explicitly in this document that the first half of September 1941, when the latter took over the Sonderkommando. As far as the termination of Steimle's command is concerned, his statement on the witness stand is confirmed by document Steimle No. 11, Exhibit No. 11, and, in particular, by Document Steile No. 12, exhibit No. 12. The driver of the defendant Steimle, Walter Roller, served with the Sonderkommando 7a until January 1944 and explicitly states in his affidavit that the defendant Steimle arrived in Stuttgart about 20 December 1941 and did not return to the Sonderkommando 7a. In this connection, too, it must be emphasized that the defendant Steimle has stated from the very start that the date when he determinated his command with the SK 7a was the middle of December 1941.
His two affidavits submitted by the prosecution prove these facts. Steimle of 24 July 1947, Document No. NO-4459, Prosecution Exhibit No. 120must 70 considered more closely. In this document Steimle admits that on the occasion of a conference with the Chief of Einsatzgruppe B, Nebe, about the beginning of October, he heard from the latter that the Sonderkommando 7a had, up to then, not yet shot any women and children, but that Nebe now requested that these should be shot as well. This statement of Nebe cannot be interpreted as meaning, that the Sonderkommando 7a under Stemmle's command had already shot male Jews. On the contrary, it can only be understood to mean that SK 7a had itself carried out executions of Jews, but this had occurred - as your Honors well know - under the Commander of the SK 7a who proceeded Steimle. The defendant Blume, who was this predecessor, has admitted on the witness stand that on one occasion he had had a number of Jews shot. The Chief of the Einsatzgruppe B, Nebe, must have known that Steimle had only taken charge of the command for a shot time before, and he must also known that the defendant had not carried out any executions of Jews at all up to then. Clear Evidence to this effect has been given in my previous expositions. Nor did the defendant Steimle subsequently carry out the afore-mentioned order of Nebe, or pass it on to his men. In this connection I refer to Document Steimle 12, Exhibit No. 12, and Document Steimle 13, Exhibit No. 13. In the same affidavit of the defendant which I mentioned above Steimle further admits that he, with the help of his Kommando, arrested persons suspected of partisan activities and members of the Red Army who were hiding within the area covered by the 9th Army instead of reporting, as it was their duty to do. After the facts had been established by the leaders of the sub-Kommandos, these arrested persons were shot.
The expression "persons suspected of partisan activities" is only contained in this affidavit because the defendant, in the course of his interrogation on which this affidavit is based, admitted that the incident report No. 123, Document Steimle No. 32, Exhibit No. 31, was correct, and this expression appears on page 10 of the original. On the witness stand the defendant stated explicitly that only and exclusively such people were classed as persons suspected of partisan activity who rendered the partisans any kind of services. In this connection I again wish to point out briefly that this statement of the defendant was incorrectly translated into English, as can be proved from the German and English transcripts. For this reason the court received the impression that even persons who had nothing to do with partisans or who could not be proved to have rendered them any services were placed in this category. It is correct that the expression "persons suspected of partisan activity" is not inexact if viewed in connection with the statement made by the defendant. That is why the defendant mentioned "persons suspected of so-called partisan activity" in the course of his interrogation, in order to show that the persons in question were partisan supporters who were suspected of having actively participated in the partisan fighting. However, it is evident that their support of the partisans had to be regarded as equally dangerous from the security point of view as the partisan activities themselves, and the court has also expressed itself to that effect. defendant Steimle were former members of the Soviet Army, that is to say, former active soldiers who wandered around behind the front in civilian clothes and pursued their real purpose which was to reinforce the partisan units. Anybody who had reported to the German offices was safe from punishment. Orders to this effect had been made public everywhere by means of posters in German and Russian. These orders contained the warning that anybody who did not fulfill his obligation to report and was arrested would be treated as a guerilla and be punished by death.
Steimle Document No. 40, Exhibit No. 39, page 2 of the German and English Document Book Steimle, Book No. III. transcript of the testimony of the defendant Steimle, when compared to the German transcript, contains some grave errors in translation, and I have made a special application to have these corrected. I beg that Your Honors, when judging the case Steimle, should take these corrections-which are still to be made - into consideration. Steimle never on his own initiative passed on the Fuehrer order to his subleaders and other ranks. He himself did not participate in any execution in which partisans were shot. The activities of his Kommando were completely taken up by the combatting of the partisans, and the danger, scope, and inescapable necessity of this combat is shown by the material submitted by the defense. In all cases when partisans were arrested they were first interrogated in detail, and only if the guilt of the individual had been established a decision was pronounced. Steimle always convinced himself by means of spot checks that the interrogations were properly carried out and that the decisions made corresponded to the result of the interrogations. In the submitted records we again and again find the statement that interrogations were carried out and that the Sub-Kommandos of the SK 7a lent their own interrogation units to the Wehrmacht, if the Wehrmacht intended to carry out operations against the partisans. The combatting of the partisans itself was partly carried out by the Sub-Kommandos of the SK 7a on their own initiative partly in cooperation with and under the command of, W ehrmacht units. The personnel which made up the Sonderkommando 7a constituted a guaranted for the irreproachable conduct of the interrogations and for the justice of the decisions based thereon. Criminal investigators with the necessary training were available and were employed as subleaders and other ranks.