the statements she made on the witness-stand regarding the dates were true, because she referred to her diary entries of that time to support her memory, and to the fact, that she still claimed to know that a statement of confirmation was issued to her by the VKM under the date 31 August 1941 regarding the fate of her husband and signed by Dr. Mahnke, at a time when Six was still office chief in Smolensk, However the witness has proven on the witness-stand, that she has no memory for time and dates, whatsoever. She was not even able to say how much time had elapsed last summer in 1947, between the date on which she was approached for the first time by the wife of Defendant Six for bearing witness, and the 14 September 1947 when the Defense Counsel appeared at her place in Stuttgart to take her sworn statement. She still knew that Dr. Mahnke had told her of the celebration of defendant Six's birthday in Smolensk, but she no longer know when this birthday was to have taken place. It was on 12 August 1941. in a village in the proximity of Smolensk when the had withdrawn with the opening of the bombardment. But in that case she could have returned to Smolensk only between 10 and 15 September 1941 at the earliest, for the first German attack on Smolensk took place on 10 July 1941 and the artillery bombardment lasted from then until 4 August 1941. In this manner, however, the witness could not even have been again in Smolensk on 31 August 1941, when, she already was given the statement of confirmation, the issuing of which, however, obviously presupposes some time for the investigations which she had already previously requested. The witness, however, claims to take the data for her two months stay in the village directly from her diary. Since she wants to quote her return on 23 August 1941 likewise from the diary, she must have quit Smolensk already on the second day of battle, thus almost three weeks before the war approached Smolensk, while she claims to have not pulled out before the bombardment of Smolensk.
But here also her statements regarding the dates made on the witness-stand are fraught with contradictions, for she said at one time, that she had left the city with her child on 27 June, following the arrest of her husband - page 5262 - and later, she declared to the President of the Court, that she had gone into the village only while the city was being bombed - page 5236 - of the German Court Record. These dates do not agree at all, but show a discrepancy of more than two weeks. of the witness, and which was deliberately included by the Defense on 14 September 1947 at the time of the recording of the sworn statement for the illustrating of the time data, did not stand up to a subsequent examination. It concerns the statement which the witness allowed to be recorded in her affidavit, namely, that she was to have returned with her 12 months old child after the entry of the German troops into Smolensk, However, this child, according to the official confirmation by the Burgomaster of Korntal, submitted as Defense document No. 67 in my Document book IV was already 12 months old on 22 April 1941. It is well known that in small children the difference between the ages of 12 and 16 months is very significant and particularly indelible for a mother. However, not even in this respect are the data of witness Vetter correct, even though she expressly points out - as indicated on page 5274 of the Court Record - that one keeps familiar dates, such as marriage and birth in memory, in contrast to unusual events, such as the ones under discussion. Therefore, with respect to witness Vetter, one can only draw the conclusion, that she made the statements on the dates concerned, which are recorded in the affidavit for the Defense without an actual recollection of precise dates on her part. However, it cannot be deduced, that her subsequent information relating to dates must how be accurate, because the fact that the latter are not correct is demonstrable from the remaining evidence on file for this trial on this point. This evidence consists of the clear information relating to dates with respect to the defendant Six's return from Russia to Germany at the date given by the Defendant himself on the witness-stand, namely, the 20 and 21 August 1941, respectively.
To this are added the ascertainments regarding this point, as they are recorded in the sworn statements taken in part before the Defense Counsel, in part, however, also before disinterested, yet officially recognized notary public clerics, of Professor Walz, Exhibit No. 12, Burmester, Exhibit No. 13, Huppenkothen, Exhibit No. 49, Plautz, Exhibit No. 50, Mahnke, Exhibit No. 40, Mueller Exhibit No. 44, and Hilpert, Exhibit No. 45. in my written presentation of the case, as far as the confirmation of the date of the defendant Six's departure from Russia on 20 August 1941 may be gathered from them. The co-defendant Klingelhoefer, as a member of "Vorkommando Moskau" (Advance Command Moscow) of that time, has also affirmed in his statement on the witness-stand - page 3373 of the Court Record that Six left Smolensk on 20 August 1941.
Completely clear and unobjectionable evidence of SIX' renewed presence in Berlin already on 22 August 1941, has been given by the female witness ALANDER who was heard under oath in the witness stand on 22 January 1948. Finally, after hearing the female witness VETTER in cross-examination, in contrast to the dates given by her which could not possibly be correct, statements were asked for and laid down in affdavits, from other persons who at that time had either been together with SIX or met him, namely his two former commando comrades Dr. MAHNKE and Dr. AUGSBURG, his secretary Ilse RICHTER. These affidavits have been included under document No, 63, 68, 60 and 59, in the Document Book IV, resp. Appendix IV B, which latter has been compiled and submitted to the Tribunal after the hearing of female witness VETTER. In order to prove the exclusion of every possible error in these dates given by secretary RICHTER and Frau SIX, an official certificate from the German Red Cross - Klementinenhaus Hannover - has been included as document No. 61 in Document Book IV, which by the official registration of patients of this clinic, confirms the fact referred to by both witnesses as an aid to their memory, namely that defendant had returned to Germany before Frau SIX was taken to the hospital in Hannover on 1 September 1941. Just these assurances show that Frau VETTER must have been mistaken in her statements during cross-examination and that also the reference to the note in her diary is casual (unbehelflich) and incomplete. We will therefore quote the essential part as follows: From Document No. 63 by Dr. AUGSBURG.
" I met Frau Veronika VETTER in the beginning of August 1941 in Smolensk.
Immediately after the shelling of the city had ceased, sity professor and Racial German VETTER .......By order of Prof husband, which took weeks.
......I informed Dr. MAHNKE of this outcome, as Professor SIX had already departed.
...... Of course still had been in Russia at that time."
From Document No. 63 by Dr. MAHNKE.
" With respect to the statements of Frau Veronika VETTER on for Professor SIX, Several officers from the "Reich" Division This birthday party was held on Prof.
SIX' birthday, since Prof.
SIX' regimental comrades had appeared on this very day .
property to Smolensk from her place of evacuation. In my VETTER's statement."
prove that, already during her time of service with the Moscow Vorkommando (VKM) that is after her first meeting with SIX, she has seen herself how another detachment with a higher commander arrived and took quarters on a higher floor of the lateral wing of the police building. These statements are so precise that it can be deduced that this other detachment and its commander can only have been the Group Staff and NEBE.
But according to the Report of Events No. 43 dated 5 August 1941 the staff of Einsatzgruppe B had already arrived at Smolensk at that time, a fact which has also been confirmed by co-defendant KLINGELHOFFER in the witness stand (Transcript p. 3877), by Dr. SIX himself in the witness stand (Transcript p. 1361) and in Defense Document No. 40 by Dr. AUGSBURG. shows that she must have seen and met defendant SIX in Smolensk already during the first days of August. Since she further testified that SIX remained only for a short time, it can be deduced also from her statements during cross-examination that the date for SIX' departure from Smolensk given originally in her affidavit of 14 September 1947 as 20 August 1941, must be correct and that her diary notes, to which she referred for her changed date, were not an aid to her memory but caused a confusion of her memory. Prosecution has not been submitted in evidence. Hence this part of VETTER's statement is completely deprived of any support.
4. But this departure from Russia on 20 August 1941 or Defendant SIX took place upon his own request for release. He has made this request for release because he realized that has Vorkommando Moscow, which had been formed for the task of seizing archives in Moscow, was purposeless because the fall of Moscow could not be expected for the time being. Hence it results that defendant SIX never understood and intended his assignment in Russia to be anything else but practical activity in the sense of the archives tasks and archive commandos of Office VII and that he evaded successfully and to the ultimately possible degree employment in the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos in Russia under the SD service.
5.) It need hardly be mentioned in view of otherwise inadequate evidence produced by the Prosecution that the defendants' promotions as well as the written documents and memoranda referring to them constitute no means of evidence against him concerning his co-operation or accompliceship in the deeds perpetrated by the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos as the Prosecution tries to prove, inasmuch as the relevant counter-argumentations have already, been exhaustively laid down in writing by the defense. I only wish to refer to document No. 4768 Prosecution Doc. Book V B, Exh. 237 which included the letter from the SSOperational Main Office - Commandant of the Waffen-SS of 3 April 1942 addressed to the SS-Personnel Main Office. This document does not permit the slightest conclusion as regards the defendants' employment in the East. This is an act of the RSHA deliberately misleading the Waffen-SS and the Wehrmacht with the object of getting defendant SIX released from military service against his will and of bringing him back under the disciplinary authority of the SD. To this end the Waffen-SS, after the Wehrmacht had already refused his release, was confronted by the RSHA with an allegedly accomplished fact by letting them know that SIX had already been assigned to the East as Commander of the Security Police and the SD, in other words, that he had already departed. This however, does net correspond to the facts. In 1942 SIX was in Berlin and he has never held the position of a Commander of the Security Police and the SD.
On the other hand, this document proves the sort of methods HEYDRICH adopted to enforce the defendant SIX' return to the SD and his release from military service against his will. At the same time the defendants' statement in the witness box is herewith confirmed once more. of defendant SIX's personal records, the Prosecution, on the other hand, would have been sure to detect some document proving the employment of the defendant in the Service of the SD-Einsatzgruppen if this had been defacto the case with the defendant.
7.) The final conclusion:must be drawn, therefore, that he charge against the defendant Dr. SIX with reference to counts I and II of the indictment has been based merely on diverse grounds of suspicion, which in themselves are incoherent and altogether rather feeble, and that the Prosecution in the course of this trial has not been able to substantiate it with evidence strong enough to disperse all doubts. On the other hand, the chain of counter-arguments offered by the defense is absolutely solid and constitutes full proof that the defendant is not in the least incriminated in the sense of counts I and II of the Indictment and that, therefore, the Tribunal must needs come to the decision to declare the defendant not guilty on counts I and II of the indictment.
1.) Concerning Count III of the indictment, the defendants' membership in the criminal organisations of the SS and the SD, I have to debate the point whether, apart from the more membership of these organisations , there existed from the part of the defendant also some sort of cooperation with them in the sense of their criminal actions or a participation in their criminal tendencies. Since the charge contained in counts I and II of the indictment, i.e. defendants' participation in war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos of the SD, is bound to break down also in connection with Count III of the indictment, there remains only to argue, whether his other connections with the SD and the SS constitute a participation in some form or another in the criminal tendencies of these organizations.
The defendant is not guilty per se under count III of the indictment, because on the key-day, 1 September 1939. as ruled according to the verdict of the International Tribunal, the defendant was still a member of the SS and the SD in his capacity as Chief of Amt VII, which, according to the verdict was included in the criminal organizations. As Chief Prosecutor JACKSON in his opening statement before the International Trial conceded to each member, to explicate in a trial his personal relation to the organization so has this also been done in the case of defendant Dr. SIX in this trial.
2.) I stated at the beginning that SIX did not enter the SD as a politician but as a scientist and that his activity was confined to this scientific sphere. His membership in the SS was compulsorily necessitated and was dependant on his membership in the SD. Not until his entry into the SD was the defendant transferred to the SS from the SA to which he had belonged until then. His promotion in rank in the SS was effected in accordance with his duty assignment and activity in the SD. After his final inactivation in the SD the defendant did not become an active member of the SS, but an honorary member; his SS rank which ha was allowed to retain and which was finally raised to Brigadefuehrer was an honorary rank equivalent to his professional rank of ambassador 1 stclass in the Foreign Office. The fact that no SS-assignment of any other kind was the basis of his promotion in the SS is proved by the written service curriculum of the defendant, submitted by the Prosecution in Document Book V B, Document No. 4768. This reveals clearly that the type of duty of the defendant as a member of the SS was always within the sphere of SD duties. During the period of the defendant's membership in the Waffen-SS his activity consisted only of military training and training for war assignments, which does not have the nature of criminal activity within the meaning of the decision of the International Military Tribunal.
3.) The defendant never entered the Allegmeine SS as such. He never joined it as a member but due to his profession he became a member of the SS-Sonderformation SD because he thereby bad the opportunity of being active in the field of science.
In the SD the defendant was in charge of Amt VII as from November 1939. This office was designated as criminal by the International Military Tribunal, but in the reasons for the judgment this designation was not connected with any of the features which mark the SD as criminal.
In other words office VII was not especially blamed for criminal acts committed in the East, for the Nacht and Nebel decree or for the ballet (Kugel) decree, screening measures or other criminal acts mentioned especially in the judgment of the International Military Tribunal. Therefore it must be proved that the defendant SIX was personally involved in crimes committed by the SD. The main point, there fore, with regard to the defendant's criminal guilt, is whether he is guilty in accordance with the prosecution's point III, as a result of his membership in the and merely through having had knowledge of the activities of the Einsatzgruppen, without however having ever had any personal part in these activities; or whether it can be deduced from his general behavior during his SD membership that be put himself, his work and his designs at the disposal of the activities of the SB which have been ascertained as criminal. gruppen in Russia during his own totally different assignment as Chief of the Archivkommando Moskau. His having had a part in the planning of the Einsatzgruppen activity, even only in an ideological way, is therefore completely out of the question. The fact that the defendant did not participate nor wish to participate in the execution, can be ascertained as a result of those proceedings. Consciously, on his own initiative and using all means at his disposal, the defendant extricated himself from his being used in the fast by the SD upon his recognizing the impossibility of fulfilling his scientific assignment and at a time when it was being considered to change his assignment into partisan combat duties within the sphere of tasks of Einsatzgruppe B. It is sufficient here to state these simple facts.
I have already mentioned this point in my statement today as well as in my trial briefs. But the defendant's entire attitude as a member of the and an SD leader was not an unrestrictedly positive attitude but a critical negative one which resulted in his leaving the SD. had to go through extremely serious, even dangerous, conflicts with HEYDRICH: he was absolutely shelved and treated with suspicion as a most unreliable member. That the defendant succeeded in getting away be entering the service of the Foreign Office, where, by virtue of an existing ministerial decree, SD-activity was even prohibited, goes to prove his own inner aloofness and unsuitability for the SD. 4. In submitting Document No. 3919-PS of their Document Book V B, the prosecution has tried to prove that, just during his service with the foreign Office, the defendant SIX behaved in a criminal way. This document contains the confidential report on the meeting in Krummhuebel on 3 and 4 April 1944 of the Information Office XIV with its experts attached to the German Missions. This document is supplemented by a conglomeration of secret correspondence between the Reich Security Main Office - Office IV, and via the foreign Office. Department for Home Affairs II, - the missions abroad on the handling of the Jewish problem by those missions. The information Office XIV of the Foreign Office was an independent office with its own chief and responsible directly to the state secretary. The tasks of this office lay purely in the field of propaganda and had no connection with the other departments of the Foreign Office within its organization. I was only the opening meeting which had to be attended, according to instructions of the state secretary, by representatives of all departments.
At that opening meeting, the defendant SIX made a short speech of a purely informational character, took his leave immediately afterwards and returned to Berlin. Therefore he does not know anything about the further course of the meeting. The affidavits of so many persons who attended that meeting prove that the words he is accused of having said were never uttered. There exist therefore well-founded doubts as to the authenticity of this document which had been submitted by Russian quarters to the IMT in 1946, all the more so as it bears no signature. With regard to the brief which have been arbitrarily submitted with this document no relation whatsoever, as far as business procedure and time are concerned, to the Department of Culture or its Chief, SIX, I refer to the affidavit by THADDEN, Document Book IV, Appendix A, Document No. 67. attempt to prove the defendant guilty in Count III, refers to the Krummhuebel meeting, which the defendant attended to be sure and at which he made a speech, the following has to be stated in this connections: Supposing the document were not of questionable origin, it were not a garbled excerpt, it were not without signature, then it would merely prove a knowledge, but not an approval, of the events. 5) Thus, the prosecution has also failed in Count III to furnish conclusive proof that the defendant SIX, as a member of an organization which has been pronounced criminal, participated in any way actively in measures declared criminal. on the other hand, the defense has proved, in submitting the large number of documents of the Complex Groups C and D General Behavior of the Defendant Six during his Activity at the diversity and the Foreign Office - that SIX emerged always and everywhere only as a scientist of a typically candid attitude and free of dogmatic limitations.
He has never committed a criminal act nor done any harm whatsoever or supported, wanted or sanctioned the carrying out of National Socialist crimes. On the contrary, he rather opposed that ideology with determination when it did not conform to European principles and ethics. He not only tolerated opponents of the regime of whom he got to know, but frequently aided them and admitted frankly that he himself rejected the excesses of National Socialism. This entire attitude of their defendant and his behavior as a member of an organization declared criminal should absolve him from any responsibility in acts of this organization which have been found criminal. all the facts Mentioned here above pertaining to Count III, while I myself am of the opinion that also as far as this count is concerned, the defendant should be found not guilty according to the rebuttal by the defense of the charges preferred by the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Who follows? Dr. Heim?
THE SECRETARY GENERAL: Dr. Heim's final plea hasn't come up.
DR. MAYER: Dr. Mayer for the defendant Steimle. with crimes against humanity and war crimes, and in addition with the membership in one of the organizations declared criminal by the I.M.T. The specific charge is the participation in an extermination program for the annihilation of certain racial and other groups; it is asserted that the Einsatzgruppen including their Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos were established for, and employed in, the implementation of this program.
Steimle is stated to have participated in this by his activities as leader of the Sonderkommando 7 a of the Einsatzgruppe B and of the Sonderkommando 4 a of the Einsatzgruppe C; it is said that he thus cooperated in the implementation of the program. could really be carried out by the relatively small number of persons forming the Einsatzgruppen. It may also be left undecided whether the decree of the Fuehrer, which appears to play a very predominant part in this trial, was really meant to be the basis of such a plan. Steimle was in a position to ascertain whether this program of genocide existed or that it existed, and whether or not he took part in the murder of innocent persons by any activities implementing the Fuehrer decree. It must be admitted that it would constitute such participation in a wider sense, if during the period, in which he was in charge of SK 7 a or SK 4 a, members of his command had co-operated in this policy of extermination with the cognizance and the approval of Steimle.
COURT NO. II, CASE NO. IX.
The evaluation of the activities of the defendant Steimle in the light of the charges raised against him cannot be restricted to the consideration of the evidence produced by the prosecution all the more as this evidence is not comprehensive anyhow. It must consider all those circumstances which directed his action while he was committed in Russia. A tremendous amount of material of this kind is contained in the extracts from incident reports produced by the Defense. They will show that the trend and the scope of his activities in his capacity as Kommando-leader were to a large extent caused by external condition as such; this applies particularly to the areas of commitment of SK 7a. Furthermore, it will become apparent that the implementation of the decree of the Fuehrer, as charged by the prosecution, was practically impossible in these conditions, which will be described more fully later on. The same applies to Steimle's activities in the capacity of the leader of SK 4a. the personal attitude of Steimle toward the implementation of the order of Fuehrer is, therefore, of secondary importance. We may believe the defendant, if he asserts that it would have been against the grain, if not impossible, for him to carry out the Fuehrer-order, if he had been confronted with the necessity to do so. It requires an inflexibility more than human to implement such an order, and it would only be natural to shrink back. We do, however, claim that Steimle would actually have refused to obey the order, if direct pressure or force had been brought to bear on him. But he must not be prejudiced by the fact that the conditions actually prevailing saved him from this necessity. The evidence will even prove that on his own initiative he made a clover use of existing conditions with the very purpose to eliminate such necessity in his area.
guarantee of a just decision consists in the application of those legal principles which are established internationally and which reflect accordingly in the sentences pronounced by the Military Tribunals in the cases already tried. Nobody may be convicted if his personal guilt has not been proved. This requires that it must be carefully determined which of the various criminal acts charged in the indictment have been committed by the individual defendants, in this instance by Steimle. The fact that the onus of proof rests with the prosecution - which As an established principle protects the defendant from being held responsible on the basis of assertions of the prosecution, if proof is lacking. The principle that every defendant is prime facia presumed to be not guilty enhances this protection. defendant Steimle is the fact that he was assigned employment in the East. The assignment covers two periods separated by an interval of one year. The first assignment was the appointment as leader of SK 7 a of Einsatzgruppe B for the period from the middle of September 1941 to the middle of December 1941. The assertion of the prosecution that this assignment of Steimle lasted until the middle of February 1942, will be discussed later. At this juncture it is sufficient to state that this does not correspond to the facts. The second assignment of Steimle was his appointment as leader of SK 4 a in Einsatzgruppe C for the period from August 1942 to 17 January 1943. been wrapped up in his work in the SD district headquarters Stuttgart.
It seems, therefore, indicated to breach the nature of these activities and Steimle's attitude underlying them, for they will reveal the background from which he started for commitments in the East, a field which was completely new to him. It will also reveal how much his Stuttgart duties contrasted with those incumbent on him in SK 7a. The deposition of the defendant made on the stand furnishes acomplete picture of his professional background and curriculum; in this respect reference is made to the transcript dated 5 and 6 November 1947. The documents Steimle No. 1 - 5, discloses the attitude of the defendant toward the Nazi regime in the period prior to his commitment in Russia. They make it evident that he was by no means one of the blind fanatics who accepted the measures of the Third Reich without any criticism. On the contrary, he considered his activities in the SD a propitious opportunity of submitting unbiassed reports on the effects of the measures of the government as a substitute for criticism, the latter being prohibited. His purpose was to set a limit to arbitrariness. He is described as unbiassed and as a man who lent his assistance, his support and his protection where ever he feels they are needed. During his activities in the SD district headquarters, the defendant applied several times for his transfer to the army, as he wanted to do active service. Steimle document No. 4 Exhibit No. 4. As late as in January 1941 he again endeavored to be called up for active service, and he even secured an interview in Berlin for that purpose. With the obvious purpose to turn these repeated applications down, he was in August 1941 assigned to SK 7 a and appointed its leader. It must, therefore, be kept in mind that he was given this assignment at a date long after the time when the Einsatzgruppen including the Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos were formed and committed for the first time.
The defendant Steimle was neither sent to Dueben nor to Pretzsch, the only places where special indictrination courses on the purpose and tasks of the Einsatzgruppen were held. The question of the Fuehrer's decree playing a decisive part in this trial, it is not devoid of special significance that the defendant was never given detailed instructions by executive leaders on the meaning and purport of the decree. The defendant does not deny that he was made converssnt little by little with the Fuehrer's decree by way of information given to him by Einsatzgruppen-Leader Nebe, his superior official, and by the men of SK 7 a. But these informations given to him by Nebe or his own subleaders can, of course, not be considered substitute for the official indictrination given in Pretzsch and Dueben. It is obvious that an order which has not been laid down in writing can in practice never be transmitted entirely in its original form. conversant with the tasks of the Sonderkommandos and with those of SK 7 a in particular. When he reported to Einsatzgruppen-Leader Nebe on 4 September 1941, he was told only that it was the task of his Kommando - and of the other Kommandos, too, for that matter -- to secure the rear area against all communist leaders and their forces active in the area and against their supporters. On or about 7 September 1941, he was told by the deputy leader of SK 7 a, Foltis, that during its advance SK 7 a had shot a number of male Jews of military age. Only then did the defendant Steimle realize the real purport with regard to the Jews of the decree of the Fuehrer.
No wonder the reaction of the defendant to this piecemeal information on the Fuehrer's decree, the implementation of which called for particular ruthlessness, was such he did not take pains to report an order of this kind to this sub-leaders and men. There is no doubt that during the first phase of Steimle's command, the members of Steimle's unit were more conversant with their tasks in the Sonderkommando then the defendant Stimle himself. This follows from the very fact that the Kommando had been operating since June 1941. It must be emphasized that neither at this nor at any other time the defendant Steimle gave orders of his own to his men concerning the implementation of the decree of the Fuehrer with regard to the Jews. The incident reports produced both by the prosecution and the defense show that SK 7 a is not mentioned in a single report for the shooting of Jews in implementation of the decree of the Fuehrer. In fact, during the whole period when Steimle was in charge, no Jews, Jewesses of Jewish children were shot in SK 7 a in implementation of the Fuehrer order. On the other hand, the above-mentioned incident reports are dealing throughout with the ever increasing partisan menace and with "action"i.e. combat operations, of SK 7 a against partisans, mostly carried out jointly with, and often initiated by, Wehrmacht units. Walter Roller, Steimle document No. 12, exh. No. 12. Roller was the driver of the defendant Steimle and is in a position to confirm that no executions of Jews based on the Fuehrer's decree were carried out at that period. did not implement the Fuehrer-decree while the defendant was in charge.
The defendant himself has, when on the stand, stated that this can not be explained by a claim that he had been in a position simply to refuse to carry out this order. Adhering to the truth, he admits that he would have been obliged to comply with this order in the same way as with any other order, if the necessity had arisen. In this connection, it must, however, be reiterated that the defendant did have a certain part in the actual operations of the Kommando in his charge, in so far as he cleverly exploited the conditions actually prevailing in order to be able to shelve, without incurring a personal set-back, the implementation of the decree. We must not forget that the implementation of the decree. We must not forget that the implementation of the Fuehrer's decree was not the only task of the Einsatzgruppen. According to both the deposition of the defendant made on the stand and the incident reports, it was also the task of the Sonderkommandos and Einsatzkommandos to maintain the security of the rear communication of the combat troops and to take all security measures necessary for this purpose. The latter task included the furnishing of intelligence concerning the organization of the enemy army, the communist party, and in particular the reconnoitring of the organization of partisan warfare, raised to the level of a method of warfare by the Red Army. The irrefutable fact that the strength of the Sonderkommandos was extremely weak - about 100 men for each Sonderkommando- madt it impossible to carry out the Fuehrer order and to fight the partisan menace at the same time. In fact, the combatting of partisans was the more urgent task. It had to be given priority, because the malicious combat methods of the partisans threatened the rear of the combat troops and inflicted considerable losses on the Wehrmacht.