For without this as a basis, it would have been impossible to free these 2,000 men.
The next day, Einsatzkommando 5 went on. There were days of advancing with only occasional brief interruptions. But the Lemberg scenes were repeated. This was especially the case in Dubno, which my client also mentioned. I would like to direct the attentio n of the Court in this connection to Document NO-4525 in the possession of the Prosecution, report of events No. 29 of 21 July 1941, enclosure II of the same, in which the report of these events is contained.
It is not my intention to introduce it as an exhibit. I would only like to mention it in order to emphasize the truth of my client's testimony I did not find this document until after the testimony of my client, while looking through the existing documents of the trial. where it established its quarters for several weeks. During the time subsequent to Lemberg and in the following weeks as well, there were no mass shootings, no shootings of Jews for the sole reason that they were Jews. Inflexibly Schulz clung to his position, although he was reported to be lacking in initiative. He missed no opportunity of impressing upon his officers and men the lessons of decency and humanity. Where severe action was called for, it was to proceed according to the directives he had issued, in a clean and decent soldierly manner. No one could be shot unless he and the person performing the execution knew the exact reasons for the shooting. Acts punishable by death were published on posters. Whoever consciously violated this must have considered the consequences and calculated the risk.
In particular, I must now mention two important events. 1.) The shooting of partisans on the citadel in Berditschew. This was demanded of him because the Security Police was detailed for this according to the agreement between the Wehrmacht and RSHA. The leader of the Teilkommando postponed it. Schulz tacitly bore with the delay, hoping that the Wehrmacht itself would take action or that the matter would be forgotten.
Not until a few days later when Dr. Rasch informed him after his visit to the Army Group that there had been an objection to the fact that nothing had happened yet and ordered him to act now, was he compelled to remind the leader of the Teilkommando to expedite the necessary investigations. However, he openly told Dr. Rasch that he could not understand that the Police were made the jailer of the Wehrmacht. But he could not alter the situation. Schulz naturally had to refrain from intervening in favor of men who as civilians shot at fighting soldiers from ambush. Whoever becomes a party to this and declares himself prepared knows what he has to expect.
2.) The shooting of about 90 persons in Chmelnik. In accordance with an order from the Wehrmacht he makes available a Teilkommando to carry out an investigation. The investigation arrives at the conclusion that this is a case of open rebellion in the course of which 25 inhabitants who had worked at German Wehrmacht headquarters were murdered. In addition, a road trap for Wehrmacht vehicles was built and other incidents occurred which my client no longer remembers. This incident is also described in the documents introduced by the prosecution. These perpetrators, too, knew what would be the consequences for their act. Schulz was stationed with his Kommando in Berditschew - that is during the period from 23 July to 24 August 1941 - were carried out on orders from the Wehrmacht and under the command and supervision of the Wehrmacht. In the first case under the supervision of the Commandant of the Citadel and in the latter case under the command of the Military Governor of Chmelnik without whose approval nothing could be done.
In neither case are we confronted with "Jewish Action". If there are Jews among those to be executed, then not because they are Jews, but because they have become guilty of an act which according to the laws of war is punishable by death through shooting attention to the Jewish culprits which is unequivocally evident from the duplication of reports which offers two different versions of the same incident or if he calls the perpetrators merely Jews, my client cannot be held responsible for that as little as he could be for invented figures.
ruthless measures on the part of units of the Higher SS and Police Leader Jeckeln and soon thereafter, between the 10th and 12th August, he is ordered to come to Shitomir together with other Kommando Leaders, and there Rasch informs them of the order to take more stringent measures against the Jews, According to his statement this order was issued by Jeckeln on instructions from Himmler, and it stipulated that Jews, who were no longer able to work, were to be shot and that no quarter was to be given to their wives and children either in order to obviate acts of revenge against the German people, explanations as given by my colleague Dr. Surholt in his Opening Statement Rasch and which states on page 312 of the English transcript, I quote:
"A change only occurred when new orders were issued. These orders specified that as a matter of principle in the areas that were to be safeguarded by the Einsatzgruppe the Jews, that is, including women and children, were to be exterminated. The exact time of this order is no longer known to the defendant Dr. Rasch. It might have been in August but could also have been in September 1941. The order was transmitted to Rasch by SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Jeckeln." End of quotation, and were purposeless, the defendant Schulz decides to act on his own initiative and in by-passing all official channels, go we Berlin in order to clarify matters there since he simply cannot believe that such an order actually was given from higher up.
and the escape from this dilemma which he chose. He said himself that he was unable to tell his leaders all the things that were on his mind. He no longer saw his way clear. Was it his fault that he could no longer understand matters? It is his opinion that one can criticize the escape which he chose. Yet he chose it since he thought the "misleading" reporting for human reasons was excusable in contrast to appear important. What appear to be prosaic words in the defendant's report is in actual life a truly dramatic incident which can only be described with difficulty in detail. His conflicts do not only center on his own person, he can follow the easy way. All he has to do is to pass on the order. But he can't do that since for him, conscience ranks higher than a man-given order. And he follows the command of his conscience. Human conscience varies from man to man, and like the defendant Schulz whom I am called upon to defend here I would not like to criticize somebody else's views or compare them to others. for every resolution, if it is defended gallantly and manly, deserves to be respected.
On 24 August Schulz goes to Berlin. That trip is known. Also known is his mental agony when he decides to submit his resignation if the order would really remain in force. The road he is to go with regard to his own self is clear to him, but he feels depressed thinking of his men who have to stay on. word that pursues him. Streckenbach's benevolence made this possible; he is, according to the defendant Dr. Six, the good spirit of the RSHA. And owing to his support the course for applicants for the executive service is called off at the same time. This way Schulz at least detached those men who had been entrusted to his supervision during the time they stayed at the leaders' school. Schulz is still in Berlin. H e is also being notified.
Einsatzkommando on the very day he left Berditschew on 24 August 1941. About 15 September 1941 he returns to Skwira without interfering anymore in executive matters. He is merely waiting for Meyer's arrival, who comes on 21 September 1941, possibly already on 20 September. When Dr. Rasch arrives to see him on 24 September on a trip to Kiev he makes his final official report and returns the following day to his office in Berlin. it says the 29th. The other date is not correct. It is the 24th of August. That becomes quite evident from the context. transfer of his Kommando to Skwira, in order to remove it from the sphere of influence of Jeckeln. occurrence end to save his men from the equally terrible consequences of this order. But the order to kill women and children and innocent Jews he never executed. This is proved alone by the fact that in the town of Berditschew with its large Jewish population no Jew was shot as long as Schulz was stationed there with the exception of those who had fought as partisans. He had them all employed as indispensable workers in order to be able to prevent the carrying out of the order.
The statements of the defendant Schulz proved:
1.) by Schulz Exhibit No. 44 in Schulz Document No. 20, Volume I, pp. 68-72 and by the statement of the witness Hartel. his term of service with the Einsatzgruppen could not be produced since they are either killed, dead, or missing, and on my inquiries to the internment camps of the Western Zones I received the answer that they were not found in the camps.
An important witness is Regierungsrat Dr. Krieger who was surrendered to Czechoslovakia. In the first place he can prove that Schulz in Lemberg put an end to the ill-treatment of the Jews and released all Jews found in the place. He also is the person who warned Schulz that in the group staff, to which Dr. Krieger belonged, they "talked very badly about him." did not behave in a way different from what he had done in any other place.
conclusion that the assignment in Russia in particular is the best proof that SCHULZ hasalways followed a course which he could justify before his conscience, before his country, and before the world. from two aspects. For at the time when Schulz went away the German press and radio announced that Russia was actually defeated. And when Kiev fell and at the same time the troops had occupied the Donetz territory and advanced along the Dnjestr River, it was proclaimed that Russia had been crushed. Germany had then reached the absolute peack of its victories. And just at this time when many presumptuously give themselves a free hand Schulz returned to Berlin because he had experienced the bitterest disappointment of his life. detail the various phases of my client's assignment in Russia; also because of the lack of time available to me I must necessarily be brief. the units of Jeckeln which can be considered proved, by the co-defendants as well as the documents on hand, in particularly however by the documents submitted by the Prosecution itself, i.e. Prosecution Exhibit No. 27, Volume I, p. 138 of German text (English text p. 105) Doc. No. NO 3257PS, a report to the Chief of the War Economy Office, General Thomas, dated 2 December 1941. The defendant has made detailed statements as regards this document in his direct examination-- German transcript pp. 973/74). Since the messages of the Kommando were reports of events and not reports on itsown activity -- so-called activity reports -- it can be considered a fact that everything happening in the area of the Kommando is contained in these reports, in other words also what was occasioned by other unitsof the Wehrmacht and of Jeckeln. Likewise I should like to mention once more the misleading reports which in my opinion were justified from an ethical point of view and which were forwarded on the initiative of my client, containing, however, no lies.
If the staff leader himself exaggerates these reports urged by the craving for selfassertion of the Einsatzgruppe and even the RSHA for the same or similar reasons adds new changes, the defendant Schulz cannot be blamed for this. If in spite of this the reports contained in the documents clearly make apparent his reticence with respect to actions as well as to the reporting in itself, then this fact must also be evaluated in favor of my client. But in distinction hereto, how different is the first report of his successor: This different speaks for itself. of my trial brief as follows: (1) Whenever the Einsatzkommando of the defendant Schulz was active, in each case such action was preceded by actions of the Russian enemy in some form or other. As to the multiplicity of his hidden work of undermining, Schulz has given a detailed explanation on the witness stand (English transcript pp. 952-953, German transcript pp. 967-969).
(2) But the inner repudiation of the military measures in the East on the part of the defendant Schulz was not unknown. This is proven by the statements of the witnesses Weber, Hennicke, Sperrhake, Haefner, Bendt in their affidavits and the statement of the witness Hartl on the witness stand. The latter statement has yet a special value because it proves -- as does the statement of Bendt -- that there was talk of the alleged softness and unsuitability of Schulz at the time when he was no longer in Russia at all, for both Hartl and Bendt did not come to Russia until Schulz had left there. But the conflict between emotion and right explained by Schulz also shows that he did not act in a thoughtless way. But his clear deliberation and conduct are also evidence proving that faced with what he had done and what he had left undone he had no feeling of being wrong and did not need to have such feelings.
which he believed he could no longer tolerate for himself and for his men washe induced to request his release. But also the fact that almost at the same time his transfer had already been requested due to his alleged "softness" confirms the truth of his statements and his attitude.
(3) With this attitude I believe to have substantiated, and also proven that Schulz did not commit any crimes against humanity since all inner and outer prerequisites are lacking which could identify the crime according to generally acknowledged international views.
(4) Since the defendant neither sawnor wanted crimes but detested and prevented them he can neither be principal nor participant nor instigator nor abettor.
(5) His general behavior incontestably proves that he never gave his approval apart from the fact that he in no case ever ordered an execution.
(6) The shooting of guilty persons can neither be viewed as a persecution for political reasons but, in consideration of the existing situation in Russia, which cannot be denied, as a measure dictated by the exigencies of war for the protection of the fighting troops.
(7) The same applies to the shooting of Jews, They were shot to death not because they were Jews but because they were Russian, Communist functionaries, agents, spies, or saboteurs and had made themselves guilty of acts which had been publicly announced as liable to be punished with death. Any persecution for racial or religious reasons is therefore completely out of the question.
(8) From what hasbeen stated above, it is also evident that it does not apply to the defendant Schulz when it is alleged that the main duty consisted in following the army and in exterminating Jews, gypsies, Soviet functionaries, and other groups of the civilian population considered racially "inferior" or "politically undesirable"; that means in no form did he take part in any extermination asalleged by the Prosecution.
ordered nor participated in and much less committed a murder, as the Prosecution terms the ruthless compliance with and execution of the Fuehrer order.
(9) No ill-treatment of prisoners of war or of the civilian population took place nor would it leave been tolerated by Schulz. Also in Russia he demanded correctness and decency from his men.
(10) As at the time of Schulz no destruction of any object took place, also the charge of wanton destruction not justified by military necessity is completely invalid.
(11) Schulz never had anything to do with insane persons.
(12) At the time of Schulz' assignment in Russia nothing at all was known of the existence of gas vans.
(13) His acts were not committed in an unlawful way. His measures were permissible according to the rules of war and and international law as well. Therefore he did not commit crimes or other punishable acts either intentionally or knowingly. through his address which he delivered on 1 November 1941 -- that means almost 6 weeks after his return from Russia -- to the participants in the leaders' course at the school. This address is evidenced by the testimony of Haefner (Schulz Exhibit No. 49 in Schulz Document No. 57, Volume II, pp. 171-172) and presents an unmistakable repudiation of the military measures taken in the East. But it also proves that Schulz openly professes his opinion and wants to do so intentionally. When he expresses in front of the assembled leaders his intention to exclude from the course because of inferior character anybody boasting of having shot a Jew because with such an attitude he is unworthy of being an officer, then this proves that Schulz does not change his mind on his return from Russia, but still intends to prevent the pernicious effects of this incrimination.
No human being is without faults. And not even Schulz raises such claim for himself. However, based on the experiences which I have gained as a result of my relationship with the defendant, I should like to say: "Had Schulz not been in Russia, then he would not have had the opportunity to prove so unequivocally that he allowed nothing to force him to deviate from the path of decency, justice and humanitarianism which he observed determinedly for almost 25 years in his police activity. The responsibility which he assumed was greater than his "self-concealment". The responsibility which he took upon himself in the interests of people which in every way could have resulted in serious consequences for him presupposed a stronger and bettor will than tacit and connivance. He did not leave until he realized that he was completely incapable of stopping this avalanche which had already begun its course and could no longer be halted. Under the set of circumstances prevailing his own protest was bound to be of no avail. the defendant Schulz did himself. were restricted. However, in the decree dated 13 May 1941 concerning the evvect of the court martial jurisdiction in the area "Barbarossa" and concerning special measures of the troops -- this is the so-called Keitel-Order and was submitted to the tribunal in Document Book III for the defendant Ohlendorf on page 1 as Ohlendorf Exhibit No. 13, Ohlendorf Document No. 44 -- it is ordered in I, sub-section 4, that the officer shall decide whether a shooting is to be carried out or not. Since the leaders of the Teilkommando were officers of the Teilkommando, Schulz would have had no authority at all over his Teilkommando leaders. According to this, he could not have either prevented an action or intervened if his Teilkommando leaders had violated the restriction of the Fuehrer-Order ordered by him on his own initiative.
action who issued such orders, for they must have been aware to what they would lead. of 1 December against the defendant Schulz can deter from these facts and the resulting conclusions. For the conclusions of the Prosecution for the most part are based on a distortion of the true facts which became quite obvious in the presentation of evidence. The Prosecution brief refers only to contradictions on the part of the defendant which however on the basis of the text of transcript reveal themselves as no contradictions at all. To the contrary, the brief of the Prosecution contains itself a number of contradictions. at a final conclusions different from that of the defense. But this must not lead to an arbitrary attempt to use as the basis of argumentation -- this also in contrast to the views of the court -- only such evidence that appears incriminating only to one side, and to disregard all defense evidence that has been before the tribunal from the very beginning or was introduced by the Prosecution itself. Fair proceedings, however, require equal consideration and evaluation of either evidence as well as an examination of the subjective conduct of the accused. Yet I have explained in sufficient detail particularly the subjective attitude of the defendant Schulz toward all matters and incidents, and I am certain that the Tribunal in its way will take this into account. defendant is full of contradiction, that it is completely untrue, that it appears grotesque, that it does not merit any credibility, that its statements lack any basis whatsoever, that they do not correspond to the facts, and so on, nor is it appropriate to draw the conclusion, and I quote:
"In the light of all this evidence his entire testimony cannot be considered credible." pointed out and brought to the attention of the Tribunal which are the incorrect facts and erroneous conclusions in the prosecution brief. I, therefore, ask the court also to take cognisznce of the supplementary statements which I have made in that connection. to discuss point by point the written statements made by the prosecution. My present statements, just as those made by me before, which are neither artificial, nor merely protective, nor made because of the need for distortion of facts, permit only one conclusion. II of the indictments evidence for the guilt of the defendant Schulz, eliminating all reasonable doubts which might be held by an impartial, unbiased and carefully deliberating party. judgment, that: crimes against humanity of which he has been accused in the indictment. could be made against the defendant either concerning the time up to 1 September 1939, or that after his return from Russia, which I have described concluding with a quotation from his speech of 1 November 1941 held in the instruction course for candidates for leading positions, neither for his activities in Berlin nor for those in Salzburg, that the statement was accepted as truth that he had no knowledge of any criminal activities (English transcript p. 1015-1017 1931, German transcript 1026 1028, 1977), I think it necessary to sum up his activities up to the time of the capitulation as I wish to furnish evidence, as already announced in my statement, that my client's attitude was from the first to the last undiscriminating, uncompromising, honest and straightforward, and that he never disregarded the principlesof fairness and decency, justice, chivalry and humanity which were sacred to him.
My second reason for giving this summary is that I need not then go into details about Count III of the indictment.
duties as a commander of the officers' training school (Fuehrerschule) and as a leader of Group I B (training and education) which has been moved from RSHA headquarters to the schoolhouse in Charlottenburg. Apart from his disappointment in Russia he is depressed by the fact that he has again been accused of being "soft", an accusation against which he is forever fighting in vain. He recognizes in it the dangerous influence of "modern slogans" to which people are reacting without actually understanding them and, therefore, interpreting them and using them incorrectly. For this reason he quite deliberately changes the whole training system, giving it a new, purely technical trend herewith putting emphasis on the development of a righteous attitude. He personally takes care of the final directives to his students. He points out to them valueless slogans and makes them aware of differences in attitude and teaches them how to separate the important from the valueless. He requests the future officers to be true leaders of their men and not only superior officers who stupidly and carelessly carry out orders. They ought to live a life exemplary to their subordinates and try to show themselves worthy of their authority by their own attitude and accomplishments, and not regard it as an easily acquired possession gained together with the service rank and commission. He emphatically warns against the misuse of the idea of the "super-man" (Herrenmensch) and shows that this term might earily lead to the development of the type of the "bossy man" (herrischer Mensch) who is to be considered as a being of definitely inferior character. He compares the conceptions of "kindness " and "softness" and proves that they are basically different from each other, According to him being "good" is fulfilling one of the major aims of humanity whereas being "soft" means a definite flaw in a person's character. And just as different as the conceptions of "kindness" and "softness" are those of "harshness"and"brutality". A person of character must know how to be harsh, first of all towards himself, in the imperturbab ility of his aims and ways, but "brutality" an attitude caused by a mean character, must be rejected.
The "Fuehrertype" (leader type) would have to be kind and harsh at the same time, and harshness might strange as it might sound - mean greatest kindness. The "vorgesetztentyp" (superior officers' type) however, would be either "bossy" or brutal towards others and disgustingly soft towards himself. I can only take highlights from the long speeches of my client which may throw some light on his real aims. He tried to make his students think, his purpose being that of causing them, when they were called upon to make their own decisions in the future, to be aware of the conflicts to find the courage to take responsibility for their own actions and in such a way to be leaders of their men whose fate had been entrusted to them and to lead them according to the principle that a living example is the best education. of the defendant Schulz in the officers' training school and the I B.
1.) The affidavit of Kriminalrat Dr. Fleischmann, Schulz Exhibit No. 43 in Schulz document Book I - Doc. No. 24, p . 89 - 91;
2.) The affidavit of Kriminalrat Rudolf Hetzel, Schulz Exhibit No. 79 in Schulz Document Book III - Doc. No. 70, p. 200 - 202;
3.) the affidavit of Regierungsrat Dr. Ing. Hans O'Gilvie, Schulz Exh. No. 80, Schulz Document Book III - Doc. No. 72, p. 205 - 211;
4.) the affidavit of Regierungsrat Dr. Walter Sirpins, Schulz Exh. No. 81, Schulz Document Book III - Doc. No. 76, p. 220-221. takes over Group I A of the RSHA (personnel). I am referring to his statements on the witness stand (English transcript o. 1019/20, German transcript o. 1030/1031). I should like to emphasize the fact that Schulz declares himself willing to take over only under the condition that there would be no more shooting of Jews in the East as he does not want to be responsible for having to detail men for tasks which he is not prepared to take upon himself.
Streckenbach definitely reassures him about this and he actually had no information about such happenings at that time. This fact is also proved by some affidavits for instance those of the defendants Ohlendorf, Naumann and Ott (English transcript, o. 709, 870, 3731, German transcript p. 720, 801, 3794) who stated that no more shootings of Jews were carried out at that time. Should there actually have occurred anything contrary to this statement, my client had certainly no knowledge of it. which he is only gradually becoming acquainted is trying to makes his influence felt. He is also now, for the first time, gaining personal experience from the real tendencies which are guiding the RSHA. quarrel, Streckenbach leaves the RSHA in January 1943, in order to join the Waffen-SS, Schulz is appointed Leader of the Amt I. It is by no means ambition which makes him accept this duty. It is again Streckenbach's request to which he gives way although these very serious misunderstandings between Streckenbach and Himmler do not make him visualize this task in a rosy light. However, as all problems concerning "Administration and Law" which had up to that time been handled by Office I and with which Schulz cannot cope because of his lack of experience and knowledge, are being separated from it and now handled by an independent Amt, Office II or III, he thinks himself capable of managing Amt I as one which concerns itself only with personnel problems. As Kaltenbrunner is being appointed the new RSHA chief at the same time he hopes to be able to assert himself. From the time of his work with Amt I and also from Streckenbach's manifold complaints which have, in the end, caused his resignation from the office, Schulz knows that there is still very much wrong. It is especially the duties of the Security Police in the East with its partisan-activities which seem to him tasks alien to ordinary police duties. which he regarded as amateurish play at soldiering and which caused him so much concern because he believed he could recognize that they were accorded primary importance by a few ambitious leaders who were striving more for decorations and medals.
Therefore, during one of the initial department chief conferences he put forth as his first demand the creation of an office of the Inspector General, who, independent of all departments, was to check the various offices in the operational area. His demand is rejected. But in a personal discussion with Kaltenbrunner, he succeeds in having an inspector assigned, the Colonel of the Police, Dr. Canaries, who receives the order to make a tour of the Eastern territories and to submit a complete replrt sparing no details of the conditions there. The result of this report is a complete clean-up of improprieties and insufficiencies which h ad been uncovered; in addition this also resulted in the release of some personnel. In his inaugural speech before the directors of the various offices, Schulz, in agreement with Kaltenbrunner reports that the offices in the East are to refrain completely from all duties not directly connected with police activities. He is further successful in having the requirement of Himmler lifted, that in cases of promotion the individual concern ed must leave the church. He coordinates the schooling system through Group I A and gives priority to technical training. He creates directives pertinent to careers, promotions according to seniority rights, regulates efficiency and ability, eliminates arbitrary action and the patronage system and regulates an equitable development in the many Sparten. His efforts to revise the unworthy classification and uniforming along the lines of common sense cannot be fully realized. His work with Kaltenbrunner is in the beginning satisfactory. But the relationship becomes less favorable. Schulz senses the forces working against him, but is unable to get at them. He is not up to the stmosphere of the invisible battle of powers so common perhaps in the many ministerial offices, He perceives this condition quite clearly, but it does not occur to him to make his own lot an easier one through appeasement, since he is convinced that such appeasement would only be at the expense of the officials and employees.
Kaltenbrunner does not back him up, divides his activities in this respect by making concessions in personnel matters with other section chiefs contrary to the agreements with his personnel chief, he gives way to whispering campaigns which make a uniform following of procedure impossible. Already towards the end of 1943 it comes to an open break between the defendant Schulz and Kaltenbrunner; Schulz requests that he be released, since he feels himself incapable of continuing in office. The differences are patched up again, but the breach remains open. It would have been simple for Schulz to keep his position if he had been willing to become an obliging tool. He remains in his post because his concern for the people binds him to this. However, he goes when the attitude of Kaltenbrunner which he can no longer reconcile with honor becomes insulting, and because he recognizes quite clearly that he will never be able to adapt himself to those conditions. of the defendant in Group I A and as Personnel Chief, I cite the statements of the defendant on the witness stand and the following affidavits:
1.) Testimony of Regierungsrat Gustav Gottwald, Schulz Exhibit No. 51, Schulz Doc. Book Vol I, Doc. 16, p. 46-50.
2.) Testimony of Regierungsrat Heinz Wanninger, Schulz Exhibit No. 52, Schulz Doc. Book Vol I, Doc. 17 , p. 51-56.
3.) Testimony of Regierungsamtmann Karl Dommnick. Schulz Exhibit No. 50, Schulz Doc. Book Vol II, Doc. 48, p . 144-146.
4.) Testimony of Regierungsrat Dr. Ing. O'Gilvio, Schulz Exhibit No. 80, Schulz Doc. Book Vol III, Doc. 72, p. 209-210, under subsec. 9.
5.) Testimony of Regierungsrat Dr. Paul Dittel, Schulz Exh. No. 82, Schulz Doc. Book Vol III, p. 196-197.
In April 1944 Schulz is transferred to Salzburg as Inspector. In order not to make his transfer appear as an undeserved demotion, he receives the title "Commanding Officer of the Security Police," activity in Salzburg (English transcript p. 1021-1025, German transcript p. 1032-1037). However, his laudable efforts for the benefit not only of the population of Salzburg and the prisoners-of-war and foreign workers living in this section, but also in the last act of the tragedy in avoiding loss of human life in the face of the advancing victor, require a short summary on my part. If the day of the assasination attempt upon Hitler, 20 July 1944, passed in Salzburg without any unpleasant aftermath, then this is prim arily thanks to Schulz since he was forced to act quite independently because the Gauleiter was not present every day and the competent Higher SS and Police Leader was located in Laibach-Yugoslavia. When Himmler took over prisoner-of-war matters, Schulz, on his own initiative, volunteered for this work aware of the responsibility of his action, in order to dissipate the influence of the Higher SS and Police Leader Roesener, who was a ruthless fanatic. He not only saw to it that the Geneva Convention was strictly adhered to, but also protect ed the prisoners-of-war from the unreasonable demands of some of the State and Party offices. He patiently accepted the attacks upon his own person in the interest of the cause, but nevertheless he was not deterred. Against the desire and will of some offices and cont rary to press released which had already been published, he saw to it that in cases of airraids the prisoners-of-war were also permitted shelter in the absolutely safe placed located in the Moenchsberg and Kapuzinerberg (mountains in Salzburg).
First he did not issue the announcement of the so-called "Closeeyes Order" (Augen zu Befehl). Contrary to this order, which he was quite incapable of comprehending, he called upon his police officials to conduct themselves decently and chivalrously.