No human being is without faults. And not even Schulz raises such claim for himself. However, based on the experiences which I have gained as a result of my relationship with the defendant, I should like to say: "Had Schulz not been in Russia, then he would not have had the opportunity to prove so unequivocally that he allowed nothing to force him to deviate from the path of decency, justice and humanitarianism which he observed determinedly for almost 25 years in his police activity. The responsibility which he assumed was greater than his "self-concealment". The responsibility which he took upon himself in the interests of people which in every way could have resulted in serious consequences for him presupposed a stronger and bettor will than tacit and connivance. He did not leave until he realized that he was completely incapable of stopping this avalanche which had already begun its course and could no longer be halted. Under the set of circumstances prevailing his own protest was bound to be of no avail. the defendant Schulz did himself. were restricted. However, in the decree dated 13 May 1941 concerning the evvect of the court martial jurisdiction in the area "Barbarossa" and concerning special measures of the troops -- this is the so-called Keitel-Order and was submitted to the tribunal in Document Book III for the defendant Ohlendorf on page 1 as Ohlendorf Exhibit No. 13, Ohlendorf Document No. 44 -- it is ordered in I, sub-section 4, that the officer shall decide whether a shooting is to be carried out or not. Since the leaders of the Teilkommando were officers of the Teilkommando, Schulz would have had no authority at all over his Teilkommando leaders. According to this, he could not have either prevented an action or intervened if his Teilkommando leaders had violated the restriction of the Fuehrer-Order ordered by him on his own initiative.
action who issued such orders, for they must have been aware to what they would lead. of 1 December against the defendant Schulz can deter from these facts and the resulting conclusions. For the conclusions of the Prosecution for the most part are based on a distortion of the true facts which became quite obvious in the presentation of evidence. The Prosecution brief refers only to contradictions on the part of the defendant which however on the basis of the text of transcript reveal themselves as no contradictions at all. To the contrary, the brief of the Prosecution contains itself a number of contradictions. at a final conclusions different from that of the defense. But this must not lead to an arbitrary attempt to use as the basis of argumentation -- this also in contrast to the views of the court -- only such evidence that appears incriminating only to one side, and to disregard all defense evidence that has been before the tribunal from the very beginning or was introduced by the Prosecution itself. Fair proceedings, however, require equal consideration and evaluation of either evidence as well as an examination of the subjective conduct of the accused. Yet I have explained in sufficient detail particularly the subjective attitude of the defendant Schulz toward all matters and incidents, and I am certain that the Tribunal in its way will take this into account. defendant is full of contradiction, that it is completely untrue, that it appears grotesque, that it does not merit any credibility, that its statements lack any basis whatsoever, that they do not correspond to the facts, and so on, nor is it appropriate to draw the conclusion, and I quote:
"In the light of all this evidence his entire testimony cannot be considered credible." pointed out and brought to the attention of the Tribunal which are the incorrect facts and erroneous conclusions in the prosecution brief. I, therefore, ask the court also to take cognisznce of the supplementary statements which I have made in that connection. to discuss point by point the written statements made by the prosecution. My present statements, just as those made by me before, which are neither artificial, nor merely protective, nor made because of the need for distortion of facts, permit only one conclusion. II of the indictments evidence for the guilt of the defendant Schulz, eliminating all reasonable doubts which might be held by an impartial, unbiased and carefully deliberating party. judgment, that: crimes against humanity of which he has been accused in the indictment. could be made against the defendant either concerning the time up to 1 September 1939, or that after his return from Russia, which I have described concluding with a quotation from his speech of 1 November 1941 held in the instruction course for candidates for leading positions, neither for his activities in Berlin nor for those in Salzburg, that the statement was accepted as truth that he had no knowledge of any criminal activities (English transcript p. 1015-1017 1931, German transcript 1026 1028, 1977), I think it necessary to sum up his activities up to the time of the capitulation as I wish to furnish evidence, as already announced in my statement, that my client's attitude was from the first to the last undiscriminating, uncompromising, honest and straightforward, and that he never disregarded the principlesof fairness and decency, justice, chivalry and humanity which were sacred to him.
My second reason for giving this summary is that I need not then go into details about Count III of the indictment.
duties as a commander of the officers' training school (Fuehrerschule) and as a leader of Group I B (training and education) which has been moved from RSHA headquarters to the schoolhouse in Charlottenburg. Apart from his disappointment in Russia he is depressed by the fact that he has again been accused of being "soft", an accusation against which he is forever fighting in vain. He recognizes in it the dangerous influence of "modern slogans" to which people are reacting without actually understanding them and, therefore, interpreting them and using them incorrectly. For this reason he quite deliberately changes the whole training system, giving it a new, purely technical trend herewith putting emphasis on the development of a righteous attitude. He personally takes care of the final directives to his students. He points out to them valueless slogans and makes them aware of differences in attitude and teaches them how to separate the important from the valueless. He requests the future officers to be true leaders of their men and not only superior officers who stupidly and carelessly carry out orders. They ought to live a life exemplary to their subordinates and try to show themselves worthy of their authority by their own attitude and accomplishments, and not regard it as an easily acquired possession gained together with the service rank and commission. He emphatically warns against the misuse of the idea of the "super-man" (Herrenmensch) and shows that this term might earily lead to the development of the type of the "bossy man" (herrischer Mensch) who is to be considered as a being of definitely inferior character. He compares the conceptions of "kindness " and "softness" and proves that they are basically different from each other, According to him being "good" is fulfilling one of the major aims of humanity whereas being "soft" means a definite flaw in a person's character. And just as different as the conceptions of "kindness" and "softness" are those of "harshness"and"brutality". A person of character must know how to be harsh, first of all towards himself, in the imperturbab ility of his aims and ways, but "brutality" an attitude caused by a mean character, must be rejected.
The "Fuehrertype" (leader type) would have to be kind and harsh at the same time, and harshness might strange as it might sound - mean greatest kindness. The "vorgesetztentyp" (superior officers' type) however, would be either "bossy" or brutal towards others and disgustingly soft towards himself. I can only take highlights from the long speeches of my client which may throw some light on his real aims. He tried to make his students think, his purpose being that of causing them, when they were called upon to make their own decisions in the future, to be aware of the conflicts to find the courage to take responsibility for their own actions and in such a way to be leaders of their men whose fate had been entrusted to them and to lead them according to the principle that a living example is the best education. of the defendant Schulz in the officers' training school and the I B.
1.) The affidavit of Kriminalrat Dr. Fleischmann, Schulz Exhibit No. 43 in Schulz document Book I - Doc. No. 24, p . 89 - 91;
2.) The affidavit of Kriminalrat Rudolf Hetzel, Schulz Exhibit No. 79 in Schulz Document Book III - Doc. No. 70, p. 200 - 202;
3.) the affidavit of Regierungsrat Dr. Ing. Hans O'Gilvie, Schulz Exh. No. 80, Schulz Document Book III - Doc. No. 72, p. 205 - 211;
4.) the affidavit of Regierungsrat Dr. Walter Sirpins, Schulz Exh. No. 81, Schulz Document Book III - Doc. No. 76, p. 220-221. takes over Group I A of the RSHA (personnel). I am referring to his statements on the witness stand (English transcript o. 1019/20, German transcript o. 1030/1031). I should like to emphasize the fact that Schulz declares himself willing to take over only under the condition that there would be no more shooting of Jews in the East as he does not want to be responsible for having to detail men for tasks which he is not prepared to take upon himself.
Streckenbach definitely reassures him about this and he actually had no information about such happenings at that time. This fact is also proved by some affidavits for instance those of the defendants Ohlendorf, Naumann and Ott (English transcript, o. 709, 870, 3731, German transcript p. 720, 801, 3794) who stated that no more shootings of Jews were carried out at that time. Should there actually have occurred anything contrary to this statement, my client had certainly no knowledge of it. which he is only gradually becoming acquainted is trying to makes his influence felt. He is also now, for the first time, gaining personal experience from the real tendencies which are guiding the RSHA. quarrel, Streckenbach leaves the RSHA in January 1943, in order to join the Waffen-SS, Schulz is appointed Leader of the Amt I. It is by no means ambition which makes him accept this duty. It is again Streckenbach's request to which he gives way although these very serious misunderstandings between Streckenbach and Himmler do not make him visualize this task in a rosy light. However, as all problems concerning "Administration and Law" which had up to that time been handled by Office I and with which Schulz cannot cope because of his lack of experience and knowledge, are being separated from it and now handled by an independent Amt, Office II or III, he thinks himself capable of managing Amt I as one which concerns itself only with personnel problems. As Kaltenbrunner is being appointed the new RSHA chief at the same time he hopes to be able to assert himself. From the time of his work with Amt I and also from Streckenbach's manifold complaints which have, in the end, caused his resignation from the office, Schulz knows that there is still very much wrong. It is especially the duties of the Security Police in the East with its partisan-activities which seem to him tasks alien to ordinary police duties. which he regarded as amateurish play at soldiering and which caused him so much concern because he believed he could recognize that they were accorded primary importance by a few ambitious leaders who were striving more for decorations and medals.
Therefore, during one of the initial department chief conferences he put forth as his first demand the creation of an office of the Inspector General, who, independent of all departments, was to check the various offices in the operational area. His demand is rejected. But in a personal discussion with Kaltenbrunner, he succeeds in having an inspector assigned, the Colonel of the Police, Dr. Canaries, who receives the order to make a tour of the Eastern territories and to submit a complete replrt sparing no details of the conditions there. The result of this report is a complete clean-up of improprieties and insufficiencies which h ad been uncovered; in addition this also resulted in the release of some personnel. In his inaugural speech before the directors of the various offices, Schulz, in agreement with Kaltenbrunner reports that the offices in the East are to refrain completely from all duties not directly connected with police activities. He is further successful in having the requirement of Himmler lifted, that in cases of promotion the individual concern ed must leave the church. He coordinates the schooling system through Group I A and gives priority to technical training. He creates directives pertinent to careers, promotions according to seniority rights, regulates efficiency and ability, eliminates arbitrary action and the patronage system and regulates an equitable development in the many Sparten. His efforts to revise the unworthy classification and uniforming along the lines of common sense cannot be fully realized. His work with Kaltenbrunner is in the beginning satisfactory. But the relationship becomes less favorable. Schulz senses the forces working against him, but is unable to get at them. He is not up to the stmosphere of the invisible battle of powers so common perhaps in the many ministerial offices, He perceives this condition quite clearly, but it does not occur to him to make his own lot an easier one through appeasement, since he is convinced that such appeasement would only be at the expense of the officials and employees.
Kaltenbrunner does not back him up, divides his activities in this respect by making concessions in personnel matters with other section chiefs contrary to the agreements with his personnel chief, he gives way to whispering campaigns which make a uniform following of procedure impossible. Already towards the end of 1943 it comes to an open break between the defendant Schulz and Kaltenbrunner; Schulz requests that he be released, since he feels himself incapable of continuing in office. The differences are patched up again, but the breach remains open. It would have been simple for Schulz to keep his position if he had been willing to become an obliging tool. He remains in his post because his concern for the people binds him to this. However, he goes when the attitude of Kaltenbrunner which he can no longer reconcile with honor becomes insulting, and because he recognizes quite clearly that he will never be able to adapt himself to those conditions. of the defendant in Group I A and as Personnel Chief, I cite the statements of the defendant on the witness stand and the following affidavits:
1.) Testimony of Regierungsrat Gustav Gottwald, Schulz Exhibit No. 51, Schulz Doc. Book Vol I, Doc. 16, p. 46-50.
2.) Testimony of Regierungsrat Heinz Wanninger, Schulz Exhibit No. 52, Schulz Doc. Book Vol I, Doc. 17 , p. 51-56.
3.) Testimony of Regierungsamtmann Karl Dommnick. Schulz Exhibit No. 50, Schulz Doc. Book Vol II, Doc. 48, p . 144-146.
4.) Testimony of Regierungsrat Dr. Ing. O'Gilvio, Schulz Exhibit No. 80, Schulz Doc. Book Vol III, Doc. 72, p. 209-210, under subsec. 9.
5.) Testimony of Regierungsrat Dr. Paul Dittel, Schulz Exh. No. 82, Schulz Doc. Book Vol III, p. 196-197.
In April 1944 Schulz is transferred to Salzburg as Inspector. In order not to make his transfer appear as an undeserved demotion, he receives the title "Commanding Officer of the Security Police," activity in Salzburg (English transcript p. 1021-1025, German transcript p. 1032-1037). However, his laudable efforts for the benefit not only of the population of Salzburg and the prisoners-of-war and foreign workers living in this section, but also in the last act of the tragedy in avoiding loss of human life in the face of the advancing victor, require a short summary on my part. If the day of the assasination attempt upon Hitler, 20 July 1944, passed in Salzburg without any unpleasant aftermath, then this is prim arily thanks to Schulz since he was forced to act quite independently because the Gauleiter was not present every day and the competent Higher SS and Police Leader was located in Laibach-Yugoslavia. When Himmler took over prisoner-of-war matters, Schulz, on his own initiative, volunteered for this work aware of the responsibility of his action, in order to dissipate the influence of the Higher SS and Police Leader Roesener, who was a ruthless fanatic. He not only saw to it that the Geneva Convention was strictly adhered to, but also protect ed the prisoners-of-war from the unreasonable demands of some of the State and Party offices. He patiently accepted the attacks upon his own person in the interest of the cause, but nevertheless he was not deterred. Against the desire and will of some offices and cont rary to press released which had already been published, he saw to it that in cases of airraids the prisoners-of-war were also permitted shelter in the absolutely safe placed located in the Moenchsberg and Kapuzinerberg (mountains in Salzburg).
First he did not issue the announcement of the so-called "Closeeyes Order" (Augen zu Befehl). Contrary to this order, which he was quite incapable of comprehending, he called upon his police officials to conduct themselves decently and chivalrously.
For example, a flier who had landed in the Salzach was saved from drowning by policemen. Not until the order was announced from other quarters outside of the police and at the same time the rumor became rife that "Terror Fliers" were to be shot, did Schulz immediately call all of his police commanders to him and inform them of the contents of the order and at the same time expressly emphasized that there was not a word of truth in the alleged shooting order. With regard to the non-interference of the Police he announced in unmistakable terms that such conduct could not be reconciled with the profession of a police official, quite apart from the fact that similar conduct shown towards German aviators that had been shot down would undoubtedly cause violent protestations. For this reason Schulz forbade the forwarding of this order, and ordered that fliers who had been shot down be treated correctly and turned over immediately to the competent Wehrmacht authorities. And this happened. again consecrated his entire person to the interests of the people, after he realized that any resistance had become senseless and unjustifiable. All his successful efforts were not achieved without untiring work. Every phase could not be achieved without tenacious efforts, efforts which were based on convictions. Nothing happened which did not entail danger for the individual, since during those very days many persons were shot for alleged cowardness particularly upon the order of Himmler, who even announced his orders in the press and on the radio and himself was too much a coward to take the responsibility for the orders which he issued. he was successful in bringing about the lifting of the blockade around Salzburg, the Volkssturm was used only as constabulary, the explosive charges which had just been brought up were removed from the bridges, the so-called "Bundschuh-Befehl" which meant the committing of fighting and sabotage groups behind enemy lines, was not carried out, and lastly no Werewolf organizations were assigned.
His suggestion, made in the Salzburg government building in the presence of the responsible officials, to surrender the city of Salz burg and the Gau, was rejected. In the so-called "Alpenfestung" (Alpine Fortress) Schulz saw to it that quiet and order were observed.
On the day of surrender the American troops marched successfully into the city without a single sign of disorganization either in the city or Gau of Salzburg. manner because Schulz had been influenced in this direction. influenced his superior and other participating offices in this direction, and had to suffer many a bitter word, also from those very persons, who, contrary to their former attitude, later revealed themselves as the liberators of Salzburg from the miseries of war, and who were then too cowardly, at least for the sake of truth, to give Schulz the credit he deserved. I must admit that I myself was indignant over such conduct. I should like to offer another example here showing the inner greatness of my client, who following my outburst of anger, answered: "Let it go, they're simply human beings. I didn't do this simply to gain recognition." in Salzburg is proved through his own testimony on the witness stand, which even the prosecutor recognized as completely credible (English transcript, p . 1934, German transcript p. 1980) and the credibility of which is again repeated on the occasion of the interrogation of the witness Dr. Wolfgang Laue (English transcript, p. 1929-1933, German transcript 1975-1980) and by the following affidavits:
1.) Testimony of the commanding general Julius Ringel, Schulz Exh. No. 55, Vol II, Doc. No. 50, p . 150-152.
2.) testimony of his Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Anton Glasl, Schulz Exhibit No. 83, Vol . III, Doc.
69, p. 198-199.
3.) testimony of the then Gauleiter Dr. G. Adolf Scheel, Schulz Exh. No. 54, Vol I, Doc. No. 25, p. 92-94.
4.) Testimony of Police-Lt. Col Wilhelm Kirchoff, Schulz Exh. No. 56. Vo. II, Doc. No. 51, p. 153-156.
5.) testimony of Lt. Col. Otto Barck, with the commander of the prisoners-of-war, Schulz Exh. No. 57, Vo. II, Doc. No. 52, p. 157-159. humanness, and his exemplary conduct in his profession. Also his resolution and devotion in the interests of the people must be particularly mentioned. Lt. Col. Barck speaks of the "unusual decent thinking" of my client thanks to which the Geneva Convention was able to be defended in the Military Area XVIII against the attacks of high Party offices even after the reorganization of the chain of command in October 1944. He also states that he could not remember ever having seen any conduct on the part of Herr Schulz which could not have been an example for every police officer. attributes as leader and superior officer:
1.) Testimony of Regierungs Assessor Karl Peukert , Schulz Exh. No. 59, Schulz Doc. Vol. II, Doc. No. 54, p. 162-166.
2.) Testimony of Egmont Damm, Schulz Exh. No. 53, Schulz Doc. Vol I, Doc. No. 23, p. 86-88.
3.) Testimony of Hildegard Seiringer, who was drafted by the war emergency act, Schulz Exh. No. 86, Schulz Doc. Vol. III, Doc. No, 75, p. 218-219.
4.) Testimony of Richard Rothboek, Schulz Exh. No. 84, Schulz Doc. Vol. Ill, Doc. No. 81, p. 237-238.
5.) Testimony of Dr. Robert Leitinger, Schulz Exh. No. 85, Schulz Doc. Vol. III, Doc. No. 88, p. 257-259.
following:
1.) witness, Franz Schubert, Schulz Exh. No. 58, Schulz Doc. Vol. II, Doc. No. 53, p. 160-161
2.) Witness, Katharina Froschauer, Schulz Exh. No, 60, Schulz Doc. Vol. II, Doc. No. 55, p. 167-168. most generous manner for political opponents when the duty and the laws of humanity bade him to do so, can be substantiated by the testimony of the present mayor of Salzburg, whom Schulz had liberated from the concentration camp at Dachau: Schulz Exh. No. 61, Schulz Doc. Vol. II, Doc. No. 58, p. 173-174. And in Schulz Exh. No. 87, Schulz Doc. Vol. III, Doc. No. 73, p. 212-213.
"It gives me great satisfaction to render some assistance in return, to the man to whom I possibly owe my father's life by making this truthful statement". End of quotation. However, I do not want to conclude the Salzburg episode without mentioning: If Salzburg is still standing comparatively undamaged, if its people have been spared the horrors of battle, and if Salzburg, already in 1945, was again able to open its gate to the world with its "Salzburg Festivals", this can be ascrib ed to a great extent, as has been proved by the witnesses' testimony, to the untiring efforts on the part of my client. American headquarters in Zell am See, after having made arrangements down to the last detail, to account for his person and principles, which he had upheld, and he did so without prompting, evidently causing surprise by this action. Following his request, he was given permission on 17 May 1945 to go to Salzburg in order to report there. He received a pass, and went to Salzburg without any escort. True to his promise, he immediately reported there. In the afternoon he was arrested. He had to be detained because of the "automatic arrest order", as he was politely informed.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Durchholz, I notice in glancing through the rest of your summation that there are various itemizations of proof, which, of course, you can omit in the reading. You might glance through it and see if there is anything else you may omit as you finish up after the recess because you have already exhausted the time which was allotted to you. We will permit you to finish, of course, but please go through and cross out what isn't necessary to read to the Court.
DR. DURCHHOLZ: I shall read only the necessary parts and refer to the remainder.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. The Tribunal will show be in recess for 15 minutes.
(The hearing reconvened at 1130 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. SCHWARZ: Your Honor, according to the arrangements which have been made, it was my turn after my colleague, Ulmer, which probably will be this afternoon, to present my final plea, but I heard this morning that my final plea has been translated but has not been reviewed yet. I assume that the Tribunal does not have it as yet. I now would like to ask you to find out-
PRESIDENT: We do not have it?
THE MARSHAL: No, Sir.
PRESIDENT: The answer is "No".
DR. SCHWARZ: Your Honor, in that case I would like to ask you when I should start to present my final plea so that the Tribunal can make further arrangements, and who is to continue after Dr. Ulmer.
PRESIDENT: W ell, Dr. Durchholz, we understand that Blobel's plea is ready, Sandberger, Seibert, Steimle. There are many ready, according to this list which I received. Yes, we have Steimle, we have Biberstein, Six.
DR. SCHWARZ: Then I may assume that I have to wait for the time being for presenting my final plea until the English translation is on hand.
PRESIDENT: Yes. Very well.
DR. DURCHHOLZ: Durchholz for Schulz. Your Honor, of the rest of my final plea I shall read such part as will take about 10 minutes. The fifth part I shall not read at all, but I shall continue on page 53, the sixth part. The fifth part contains only a list of exhibit numbers to which I would like to draw the Tribunal's attention. Thus I have submitted my client's professional career from 1923 - 1945 in the shortest possible manner, and I will now deal with count III of the indictment, in which my client is accused of having been a member, after 1 September 1939, of those organizations which have been declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal, and pursuant to para graph 1 (d) of article II of Control Council Law No. 10.
In count IIIA he is accused of having been a member of the SS, and in count III C of having been a member of Department IV of the Reich Security Main Office. Being equally applicable to both counts, I would like to mention in advance that my client was not in a position to resign from the SS or the Security Police on 1 September 1939, as the war laws prohibited this action. I believe I need not comment on this any further, as these points were thoroughly discussed and explained both by all the defendants on the witness stand, and also by my colleagues. In this case of my client, however, it must be added that at the time in question, he did not receive any orders with criminal contents, nor did he issue any. On the contrary, he could convince himself that in his position he was able to eliminate much hardship, and to prevent many measures, especially by party circles, tending to extremes and intolerance. He could not anticipate, though, the happenings that developed in the course of the war. Yet the Russia Einsatz proves that in this instance he cut adrift from those happenings, which he did not deem reconcilable with his opinions and his conscience. As member of Department I, however, he has been a part to any of the actions with which he is charged, nor participated in the planning or execution; he was not even informed about them. Allow me to mention just a few items of those orders concerning the sorting out of prisoners of war, the night - and fog decree, the bullet (Kugel) -decree, the mass killings of Jews in Auschwitz, Maidanek, and Treblinka; Schulz, for the first time, learns about these through the Nuernberg trials. Treblimka, Maidanek, Belsen, and many other places mentioned in this trial, were not known to him even by name until now. However, in the case of my client it should not be necessary to go into details, as his proven attitude and his official positions excluded the possibility to commit any criminal acts, or to have participated in them in any way whatsoever.
DR. DURCHHOLZ: I shall omit point 2, and will not read it. It contains general legal explanations concerning Count III. I am referring to my written statements and to the statements which my colleagues, Aschenauer and Gawlik, have made on that count before me. I continue on page 56 under figure 3. Applying those principles, I now return to the defendant SCHULZ concerning count III A regarding membership in the SS. The SS special formation Security Service (SD) is not a part of the regular SS. On 20 April 1935 the defendant SCHULZ was, without ever having filled in the prescribed application form, taken over by this formation as SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, according to his official rank as an officer - he was a police captain at that time. He never saw active service in the regular SS. By his consecutive promotion as officer and official, he was also promoted in the SS. In order to show, too, that his advancements were by no means outstanding, I submit some of his promotion data. On 1 September 1931 SCHULZ was promoted 1st Lieutenant (SCHULZ-Exhibit No. 2). On 1 February 1934 he became a captain (SCHULZ-Exhibit No. 3). His next promotion took place on 1 March 1938. On that date, he is simultaneously transferred from the ordinary police to the Security Police. As this force did not have officer ranks at that time, he was not promoted to major, but appointed Regierungsrat. On 1 July 1940 he was promoted Oberregierungsrat. At the end of 1940, when the Security Police receives officer ranks within its own organization, SCHULZ returns to his officer's career, and on 1 December 1940, he becomes lieut,-colonel according to his official rank of Oberregierungsrat, senior government counsillor. This conversion does not constitute a promotion. At the beginning of 1941 he is promoted to colonel (SCHULZ-Exhibit No. 10). His promotion to brigadier general follows after approximately 2 years at the end of October 1942. I am unable to submit a document for this, as SCHULZ did not have it returned with his papers. As all the last original documents are missing, my client assumes that they are still in the possession of the CIC.
When he was interrogated in Oberursel by Herr 1st Lieut. GUTMANN, they were still complete. This was his last promotion. It took place - not counting his army service - after 20 years of uninterrupted service in the police force. SCHULTZ was then 43 years old. The SS promotions coincide with these other promotions. An exception is his promotion to SS-Oberfuehrer on 9 November 1941, because there was no equivalent officer rank for this position. This promotion constitutes an intermediary stage, which cannot be actually called a promotion, as it did not involve any pay raise, because SCHULZ was not paid as an SS-officer but as a police officer. These facts, too, prove that this promotion was an absolutely regular one. This promotion therefore, which had to take place between the official rank of colonel and brigadier general, is nothing exceptional. This is proved by, 1st, the defendant's regular career, 2nd his testimony on the witness stand (English transcript, p. 1111 - 1112). German transcript p. 1128 - 1129) , and in connection with this the testimony of the defendant BLUME on the witness stand (Engl. transcript p. 1925 - 1926, German transcript, p. 1972 - 1973), and 3rd my explanations on p. 667 - 69 in the trial brief. For SCHULZ and the other officers in the Security Police the simultaneous promotions in the SS were a compelling necessity, as the uniform of the Security Police was the same as that of the Waffen-SS with police drab cloth. If the promotions in the SS had not taken place, therefore, the officers would not have been able at all to wear their rank insignia. Thos points mentioned by me above are actually all that connected the defendant with the SS.
Court No. II, Case No. IX.
Reich Security Main Office. Here I can be quite brief. in April 1940 (SCHULZ-Exhibit No. 7), SCHULZ leaves Department IV, to which he belonged automatically till then as official in charge of the Bremen and Reichenberg State Police branches, and from then on till the surrender he is a member of Department I. As an inspector he neither has the right to give orders, nor does he have any executive powers. In this connection I refer to my client's testimony on the witness stand, as well as to the testimony by the witness BREDER concerning the work and tasks of the inspector.
On 1 March 1941 he joins Department I for good. He becomes Group Leader I B (schools and education), and commander of the training center for future National Socialist leaders (Fuehrerschule), which also belonged to Department I. At the end of June 1942 he becomes the officer in charge of Group I A (personnel) in Department I. mains there until he assumes his duties as inspector in Salzburg on 1 May 1941. What has been said about his Hamburg activities, also applies to his Salzburg work, as it is the same official position. In this case, too, he did not have any authorization to give orders nor executive powers, (in this connection I am referring to the testimony made by the witness PEUKERT in SCHULZ Exhibit No. 59), with the exception of the last 14 days, during which time he was additionally appointed SS and Police leader. influence, as he did in Salzburg, and, in the interest of the people concerned, was able to accomplish so much, this achievement should be emphasized so much more. Reich Security Main Office Department I has not been declared a criminal organization. Besides, the prosecution - as mentioned before - has Court No. II, Case No. IX.