After that, he paid special attention to the task of definitely settling the irresponsible disorder that prevailed in the treatment of assets which were left behind by Jews, most of whom had escaped. For this purpose, he appointed two responsible officials. In this instance, too, he had to overcome the most difficult obstacles, as he had to proceed ruthlessly, in order to regain the property which had already been appropriated by others. To prove this, I refer to the statement by Kriminalrat Hasse, Schulz Exh. No. 78. However, this, his principal attitude, must also be considered as shown by this particular statement. Hasse states the following and I quote:
"He - the defendant - considered it his principal task to train his subordinate officials and clerks in such a way - and he devoted a large part of his time to this activity - that they would always act in a correct, honest, and above all decent and humane way. I shall never forget that he often said to me that true police officers should be only men of spiritual greatness, with an instinct for honesty, with heart and tactfulness. In this respect he was an example to me, and - this is no exaggeration - the one great teacher of my life. I owe him much. He frequently emphasized to me the need for waging a war on political opponents in a humane manner. In the question of protective custody, Herr Schulz was more than cautious. I also know very well that Herr Schulz frequently released prisoners after a personal warning." a policy no different from the one he had followed in all the preceding years. This is also confirmed by the statement of Polizeiobersekretaer Fritz Weise from the same office Schulz Exhibit No. 41, in which he says, among other things and I quote:
"On the contrary, he was an exemplary, modest and plain person, who looked after his officials like a father......Especially as far as morals were concerned, he demanded utmost decency, both of himself 5 Feb 1948_A_MSD_24_6_Gross (Hildesheimer) and his subordinates.
his testimony on the witness stand (Eng. transcript. p. 1113/14; German transcript p. 1131), according to which he opposed the intention of the Gauleiter to arrest the leading Czechs at the beginning of the war and succeeded in imposing his conviction. me to discover character witnesses from the former areas of the Sudetengau and the Protectorate. However, I am convinced that I would have succeeded with little effort in locating witnesses for these areas who were credible in every respect and unobjectionalbe as to character and education - and my introduction of evidence is based solely upon such witnesses. But I firmly believe that the court has been given sufficient proof by the documents which have been submitted, in order to enable them to form a judgment concerning the defendant Schulz' attitude and character. I might even say that the documents have a double value as proof, insofar as documents from subordinates of my client are concerned, because they not only present a judgment of their former superior, but beyond that illustrate the decency, and sincerity of his policy of issuing orders. In my opinion this is important because I know from my experience that many times nowadays former subordinates try to hide their own weaknesses, mistakes and undependability behind the orders of their former superiors. tion, because the entire activity of my client in Aussig and Olmuotz and the greater part of his activity in Reichenberg falls outside the time under indictment, namely before 1 September 1939. However, in the Reichenberg period, there is only the campaign against Poland, which had no effects at all upon Reichenberg, especially since Schulz had prevented the arrest of Czech inhabitants which the Gauleiter had demanded. However, after the Polish campaign had come to an end, Schulz left Reichenberg in April 1940, before the campaign in the 5 Feb 1948_A_MSD_24_7_Gross (Hildesheimer) West had begun.
inspector. This event is of far-reaching importance because from this time on until the capitulation. my client withdrew from his former subordinate position under the office of the Gestapo in Berlin and and or the office IV of the RSHA and belonged to Amt I, in the offices of which he was directly employed in the following period. sort. In this connection, I refer to his own statements on the witness stand and the testimony of Regierungsrat Broder in Schulz Exhibit No. 42. This witness, who knows the defendant not only from his own experience but also from the judgment of the widest circles of the Security Police and the SD, above and beyond the spheres of local activity, here draws such a comprehensive picture of the defendant as a person and as a superior in his official as well as in his private life, in his conception of his profession and in his concept of life, that I would like to call it especailly to the attention of the court. This description clearly shows that the complete harmony between word and deed is scared to the defendant when he sets his fundamental principle above all else: "The living example is the best training." because now I shall start the Russian Campaign.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess until tomorrow morning 0930.
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal II.
Military Tribunal II is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
DR. DURCHHOLZ (Attorney for the defendant Schulz): Your Honor, I should like to proceed now in delivering my final plea. We proceed on page 23, paragraph 7:
As early as March 1941, my client was recalled from Hamburg. It is unusual to advance from inspector to Gruppenleiter in the RSHA. But Schulz acceded to the request of the Chief of Personnel at that time, who told him that because of his particular inclination and capacity for leading men, he urgently needed him. He became Gruppenleiter I B (training and education) and Commander of the Leadership School. With his inherent devotion, he dedicated himself to his new work, which he approached with all the greater happiness, as he believed that where he would be able to set the lofty duties of their profession before the eyes of the people. with moving from Hamburg to Berlin, he was taken completely by surprise by his transfer to Russia as Fuehrer of Einsatzkommando 5. tions and circumstantial details. My client has described the latter in detail on the witness stand, I have listed the former in detail in my trial brief submitted to the Court. Therefore I will limit myself - presupposing the totality of events so for as they affect my client - to dividing my subsequent statements into the following topics:
"Schulz, the man. in his relation to the events in Russia and the orders issued."
he knew nothing whatsoever about the comprehensive Fuehrer Order. He was only familiar with the statements of Heydrich in the Prinz Albrecht palace, in which not a word was mentioned concerning the shooting of the Jews and their wives and children, the Gypsies and functionaries. This is also to be regarded as proved by the fact that the co-defendant Ohlendorf likewise took part in this discussion, but together with other co-defendants clearly testifies that the Fuehrer Order was only made public by Streckenbach in Pretsch by order of Heydrich. Although Schulz was in the company of the defendant Rasch, the Chief of his Einsatzgruppe, for 2 days in Schmiedeberg and even took his meals with several officers, neither Rasch nor anyone else of those present spoke of this order made public by Streckenbach. The same statements were also made by the defendants von Radetzky, Graf and Fendler, who belonged to the same Einsatzgruppe. Further, this was nothing extraordinary, for the order was made known to only a very limited circle and the statements of several co-defendants have shown that they likewise were uninformed of this comprehensive order in their stations of Pretsch, Schmiedeberg and Dueben. Since by its very nature it was strictly confidential, it is also not surprising that news of this order did not reach Schmiedeberg, the station of the Einsatzgruppe Rasch; for even it if had been discussed in Dueben or Pretsch, it did not necessarily have to reach Schmiedeberg, which was located several kilometers from these places. Unfortunately the elimination of the defendant Rasch as a witness in the witness stand has deprived me of any possibility of clarifying these and several other points as well in favor of my client. However, from the opening statement of my colleague, Dr. Surholt, regarding his client Rasch, I must conclude that Dr. Rasch probably consciously refrained from making that particular Fuehrer Order public.
I refer to subsection 1 of this opening statement which I quote:
"The Einsatzgruppen were established in the early summer of 1941 in accordance with such principles as are generally recognized as admissible from the viewpoint of international law in the event of war..... a nature as the Prosecution is now quoting under the name of Crimes against Humanity and war Crimes was not given, neither could it be surmised. Thus the defendant Dr. Rasch had no reason to reject the command over Einsatzgruppe C with which he was charged." End of quotation. nor did it become known to him. important to me that he cannot remember ever again having seen Dr. Rasch after he had made his final report, before his departure on 24 September 1941. Without any knowledge of the indictment or the prosecution documents, he gave his testimony, which fully agrees with the statements in the above mentioned opening statement, to Herr Wartenberg orally already on 4 March 1947, and on 9 March 1947, in the presence of Dr. Walton gave Wartenberg this information in voluminous written form. However, this happened at a time in which he simply did not know where Dr. Rasch was. Since Dr. Rasch also was not transferred to the prison, but was completely isolated in the hospital, there was no possibility at all of a verbal agreement, quite apart from the fact that he would have had nothing to do with such a thing. ing route were discussed. Schulz personally took over the command of the convoy of his completely motorized Kommando. duties. But as long as everything was in flux and nothing at all was known of what would happen, these thoughts took no tangible form.
to have stood their ground and then a war of position would have to have been fought which would have made it necessary for the Kommando to have become active in the Reich area of even for the German troops to have been overwhelmed. Since my client holds the position that all tentative plans are out of place because they hinder or disturb decisions in unexpected developments, he always tried to let things develop first. He never once thought that he would have to undertake shootings, since up until that time in his entire career with the police he neither received nor issued an order to shoot a man. As he already stated on the witness stand, he pictured the course of his future activity to be similar to that which he had experienced in his previous assignments, although he probably realized that they would be of a far more serious and dangerous character. like change. In the foreground were the conditions already mentioned which suddenly and glaringly brought into focus all the difficulties of future events and the mercilessness of the coming war.
The announcement by Dr. Rasch of the first order concerning our own war measures in the East stood in direct connection with the thousands of dead, who were found, among whom were also m any German soldiers and officers. Those participants to whom this order was made public, completely overlooked the fact that that order - compiled from the so-called Commissar Order and the Barbarossa Order - had been published even before the beginning of the war with Russia, since they learned of this order only after the war had begun and had to consider it justified by the events which h ad taken place. The effect of the orders published, through the combination of circumstances, was different from what it would have been if they had learned of it before the beginning of the war. One could see from reports and stories that Lemberg was no exception.
witness stand , again agrees with the statements of my colleague Dr. Surholt, in his Opening Statement under Sub-Section 2 (Engl. transcript p. 311, German transcript p. 316), where it says, and I quote:
"Accordingly, the assignment of the Gruppen, or at any rate that of Gruppe C headed by Rasch, was motivated by military necessity. The orders he passed on to the subordin ate Kommandos were based on adequate prerequisites. Executions were only to be carried out if the actual facts of the crime were established, they had thus to be limited to cases involving persons who had participated in murders, looting, acts of sabotage, etc." End of quotation.
Rasch's order also contained the instructions that all political functionaries and agents were to be shot. Of course the partisans also fell under this heading. tion and the lack of a regular court martial, because in its consequence he saw the dangers of arbitrary action, especially since the decision according to the Keitel order was left to officers who lacked any sort of training in the field of law. However, as he testified, he was under the influence of the events of Lemberg. In spite of this his feelings struggled against it. He knew his tendency toward conciliation and his constant inclination toward the good, which have again and again been brought out in all the documents I have submitted and which have so often been falsely characterized as meekness and ascribed his conflict to his predisposition. According to the given facts, he believed that he had to force himself to a greater severity. When he conscientiously considered this with the exclusion of all emotion, he believed that he had to acknowledge the fact that right and emotion could differ, without right thereby becoming wrong. From this conflict however, he came to the conclusion that he would have to limit the not very closely limited order by requiring that the guilt of the political functionaries and agents be proved in advance.
ordered by the Fuehrer of the Jews guilty of and participating in the Lemberg murders. which followed in the wake of the Lemberg murders, in order to be able even to comprehend such a severe order. But from a purely legal point of view he was unable to produce any sound arguments against the order, especially since in addition the attention of the world had been focused on these events and representatives of foreign powers had appeared in Lemberg in order to convince themselves of what had happened. Everything was fully discussed before this public. The Fuehrer gave the order with the explicit reference that it was a matter of reprisals (retaliation). However, such reprisals are perfectly permissible according to international law. Perhaps in such circumstances, any other belligerent power would have done the same. It could appear thoroughly comprehensible that they were also carried out for the murdered Ikrainians, since Germany had placed the Government General under its protection and by so doing had to represent the interests of the Poles. However, those persons murdered in Lemberg were for the most part former Polish citizens. In addition, the population of Lemberg itself demanded these reprisals. According to Rasch's descriptions, the measures were executed by order of the competent Wehrmacht commander in chief in cooperation with the militia under its command. Schulz even endeavored to urge Dr. Rasch to leave these reprisal measures to the Wehrmacht itself. He did this, although Einsatzkommando 6 in connection with Sonderkommando Schoengarth was already commissioned with the investigations and the execution, and therefore he personally was not at all concerned and did not have to be concerned that his Kommando would participate. In spite of this, he further endeavored to advance with his Kommando in order to remove it from this entire event and the depressing experiences in Lemberg, but he did not receive marching orders.
Meanwhile the Jews were arrested, and hearings were constantly being conducted. In the course of time, from the approximately 2500 to 3000 persons arrested, a rather large number was singled out. Schulz saw all this, since he was satying in the same house. He had, therefore, to arrive at the convictions that a somewhat conscientious investigation was being carried out especially since men of the Lemberg authorities were included and Dr. Rasch took a personal interest in the events. that on the afternoon of the day of the shooting, his Kommando would have to carry out the executions. His efforts to have this order rescinded, since neither he nor his men were prepared for such a task, were without result. It would perhaps have been senseless to refuse, since they could not have changed anything in the execution of the order. Even Einsatzkommando 6 would prob ably not have understood if he had demanded of it what he refused himself. He therefore had to accede to the order given by Dr. Rasch. He did it, while conscientiously creating all the conditions under which the execution would be dignified and soldierly for those to be executed and for his men. He could do no more; one cannot in justice either demand or expect more from him. Here, too, I must repeat that the Einstatzkommando was acting only as a Peloton-Kommando. The guilty persons were led out and buried in that locale by Einsatzkommando 6, Sonderkommando Schoengarth and indigenous militia. He and his men performed their duty, more or less with clenched teeth, and in the clear knowledge that they were committing no injustice, since according to information which the group received, only those who were guilty and had participated in the murders were being executed. But the defendant Schulz was made all the more happy that on a day which was so bitter for him, he could free those who were still under arrest, almost 2,000 Jews, and could save the lives of several who were marked for execution. He is almost thankful for the excesses of the Wehrmacht because they m ade it possible for him to do this.
For without this as a basis, it would have been impossible to free these 2,000 men.
The next day, Einsatzkommando 5 went on. There were days of advancing with only occasional brief interruptions. But the Lemberg scenes were repeated. This was especially the case in Dubno, which my client also mentioned. I would like to direct the attentio n of the Court in this connection to Document NO-4525 in the possession of the Prosecution, report of events No. 29 of 21 July 1941, enclosure II of the same, in which the report of these events is contained.
It is not my intention to introduce it as an exhibit. I would only like to mention it in order to emphasize the truth of my client's testimony I did not find this document until after the testimony of my client, while looking through the existing documents of the trial. where it established its quarters for several weeks. During the time subsequent to Lemberg and in the following weeks as well, there were no mass shootings, no shootings of Jews for the sole reason that they were Jews. Inflexibly Schulz clung to his position, although he was reported to be lacking in initiative. He missed no opportunity of impressing upon his officers and men the lessons of decency and humanity. Where severe action was called for, it was to proceed according to the directives he had issued, in a clean and decent soldierly manner. No one could be shot unless he and the person performing the execution knew the exact reasons for the shooting. Acts punishable by death were published on posters. Whoever consciously violated this must have considered the consequences and calculated the risk.
In particular, I must now mention two important events. 1.) The shooting of partisans on the citadel in Berditschew. This was demanded of him because the Security Police was detailed for this according to the agreement between the Wehrmacht and RSHA. The leader of the Teilkommando postponed it. Schulz tacitly bore with the delay, hoping that the Wehrmacht itself would take action or that the matter would be forgotten.
Not until a few days later when Dr. Rasch informed him after his visit to the Army Group that there had been an objection to the fact that nothing had happened yet and ordered him to act now, was he compelled to remind the leader of the Teilkommando to expedite the necessary investigations. However, he openly told Dr. Rasch that he could not understand that the Police were made the jailer of the Wehrmacht. But he could not alter the situation. Schulz naturally had to refrain from intervening in favor of men who as civilians shot at fighting soldiers from ambush. Whoever becomes a party to this and declares himself prepared knows what he has to expect.
2.) The shooting of about 90 persons in Chmelnik. In accordance with an order from the Wehrmacht he makes available a Teilkommando to carry out an investigation. The investigation arrives at the conclusion that this is a case of open rebellion in the course of which 25 inhabitants who had worked at German Wehrmacht headquarters were murdered. In addition, a road trap for Wehrmacht vehicles was built and other incidents occurred which my client no longer remembers. This incident is also described in the documents introduced by the prosecution. These perpetrators, too, knew what would be the consequences for their act. Schulz was stationed with his Kommando in Berditschew - that is during the period from 23 July to 24 August 1941 - were carried out on orders from the Wehrmacht and under the command and supervision of the Wehrmacht. In the first case under the supervision of the Commandant of the Citadel and in the latter case under the command of the Military Governor of Chmelnik without whose approval nothing could be done.
In neither case are we confronted with "Jewish Action". If there are Jews among those to be executed, then not because they are Jews, but because they have become guilty of an act which according to the laws of war is punishable by death through shooting attention to the Jewish culprits which is unequivocally evident from the duplication of reports which offers two different versions of the same incident or if he calls the perpetrators merely Jews, my client cannot be held responsible for that as little as he could be for invented figures.
ruthless measures on the part of units of the Higher SS and Police Leader Jeckeln and soon thereafter, between the 10th and 12th August, he is ordered to come to Shitomir together with other Kommando Leaders, and there Rasch informs them of the order to take more stringent measures against the Jews, According to his statement this order was issued by Jeckeln on instructions from Himmler, and it stipulated that Jews, who were no longer able to work, were to be shot and that no quarter was to be given to their wives and children either in order to obviate acts of revenge against the German people, explanations as given by my colleague Dr. Surholt in his Opening Statement Rasch and which states on page 312 of the English transcript, I quote:
"A change only occurred when new orders were issued. These orders specified that as a matter of principle in the areas that were to be safeguarded by the Einsatzgruppe the Jews, that is, including women and children, were to be exterminated. The exact time of this order is no longer known to the defendant Dr. Rasch. It might have been in August but could also have been in September 1941. The order was transmitted to Rasch by SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Jeckeln." End of quotation, and were purposeless, the defendant Schulz decides to act on his own initiative and in by-passing all official channels, go we Berlin in order to clarify matters there since he simply cannot believe that such an order actually was given from higher up.
and the escape from this dilemma which he chose. He said himself that he was unable to tell his leaders all the things that were on his mind. He no longer saw his way clear. Was it his fault that he could no longer understand matters? It is his opinion that one can criticize the escape which he chose. Yet he chose it since he thought the "misleading" reporting for human reasons was excusable in contrast to appear important. What appear to be prosaic words in the defendant's report is in actual life a truly dramatic incident which can only be described with difficulty in detail. His conflicts do not only center on his own person, he can follow the easy way. All he has to do is to pass on the order. But he can't do that since for him, conscience ranks higher than a man-given order. And he follows the command of his conscience. Human conscience varies from man to man, and like the defendant Schulz whom I am called upon to defend here I would not like to criticize somebody else's views or compare them to others. for every resolution, if it is defended gallantly and manly, deserves to be respected.
On 24 August Schulz goes to Berlin. That trip is known. Also known is his mental agony when he decides to submit his resignation if the order would really remain in force. The road he is to go with regard to his own self is clear to him, but he feels depressed thinking of his men who have to stay on. word that pursues him. Streckenbach's benevolence made this possible; he is, according to the defendant Dr. Six, the good spirit of the RSHA. And owing to his support the course for applicants for the executive service is called off at the same time. This way Schulz at least detached those men who had been entrusted to his supervision during the time they stayed at the leaders' school. Schulz is still in Berlin. H e is also being notified.
Einsatzkommando on the very day he left Berditschew on 24 August 1941. About 15 September 1941 he returns to Skwira without interfering anymore in executive matters. He is merely waiting for Meyer's arrival, who comes on 21 September 1941, possibly already on 20 September. When Dr. Rasch arrives to see him on 24 September on a trip to Kiev he makes his final official report and returns the following day to his office in Berlin. it says the 29th. The other date is not correct. It is the 24th of August. That becomes quite evident from the context. transfer of his Kommando to Skwira, in order to remove it from the sphere of influence of Jeckeln. occurrence end to save his men from the equally terrible consequences of this order. But the order to kill women and children and innocent Jews he never executed. This is proved alone by the fact that in the town of Berditschew with its large Jewish population no Jew was shot as long as Schulz was stationed there with the exception of those who had fought as partisans. He had them all employed as indispensable workers in order to be able to prevent the carrying out of the order.
The statements of the defendant Schulz proved:
1.) by Schulz Exhibit No. 44 in Schulz Document No. 20, Volume I, pp. 68-72 and by the statement of the witness Hartel. his term of service with the Einsatzgruppen could not be produced since they are either killed, dead, or missing, and on my inquiries to the internment camps of the Western Zones I received the answer that they were not found in the camps.
An important witness is Regierungsrat Dr. Krieger who was surrendered to Czechoslovakia. In the first place he can prove that Schulz in Lemberg put an end to the ill-treatment of the Jews and released all Jews found in the place. He also is the person who warned Schulz that in the group staff, to which Dr. Krieger belonged, they "talked very badly about him." did not behave in a way different from what he had done in any other place.
conclusion that the assignment in Russia in particular is the best proof that SCHULZ hasalways followed a course which he could justify before his conscience, before his country, and before the world. from two aspects. For at the time when Schulz went away the German press and radio announced that Russia was actually defeated. And when Kiev fell and at the same time the troops had occupied the Donetz territory and advanced along the Dnjestr River, it was proclaimed that Russia had been crushed. Germany had then reached the absolute peack of its victories. And just at this time when many presumptuously give themselves a free hand Schulz returned to Berlin because he had experienced the bitterest disappointment of his life. detail the various phases of my client's assignment in Russia; also because of the lack of time available to me I must necessarily be brief. the units of Jeckeln which can be considered proved, by the co-defendants as well as the documents on hand, in particularly however by the documents submitted by the Prosecution itself, i.e. Prosecution Exhibit No. 27, Volume I, p. 138 of German text (English text p. 105) Doc. No. NO 3257PS, a report to the Chief of the War Economy Office, General Thomas, dated 2 December 1941. The defendant has made detailed statements as regards this document in his direct examination-- German transcript pp. 973/74). Since the messages of the Kommando were reports of events and not reports on itsown activity -- so-called activity reports -- it can be considered a fact that everything happening in the area of the Kommando is contained in these reports, in other words also what was occasioned by other unitsof the Wehrmacht and of Jeckeln. Likewise I should like to mention once more the misleading reports which in my opinion were justified from an ethical point of view and which were forwarded on the initiative of my client, containing, however, no lies.
If the staff leader himself exaggerates these reports urged by the craving for selfassertion of the Einsatzgruppe and even the RSHA for the same or similar reasons adds new changes, the defendant Schulz cannot be blamed for this. If in spite of this the reports contained in the documents clearly make apparent his reticence with respect to actions as well as to the reporting in itself, then this fact must also be evaluated in favor of my client. But in distinction hereto, how different is the first report of his successor: This different speaks for itself. of my trial brief as follows: (1) Whenever the Einsatzkommando of the defendant Schulz was active, in each case such action was preceded by actions of the Russian enemy in some form or other. As to the multiplicity of his hidden work of undermining, Schulz has given a detailed explanation on the witness stand (English transcript pp. 952-953, German transcript pp. 967-969).
(2) But the inner repudiation of the military measures in the East on the part of the defendant Schulz was not unknown. This is proven by the statements of the witnesses Weber, Hennicke, Sperrhake, Haefner, Bendt in their affidavits and the statement of the witness Hartl on the witness stand. The latter statement has yet a special value because it proves -- as does the statement of Bendt -- that there was talk of the alleged softness and unsuitability of Schulz at the time when he was no longer in Russia at all, for both Hartl and Bendt did not come to Russia until Schulz had left there. But the conflict between emotion and right explained by Schulz also shows that he did not act in a thoughtless way. But his clear deliberation and conduct are also evidence proving that faced with what he had done and what he had left undone he had no feeling of being wrong and did not need to have such feelings.
which he believed he could no longer tolerate for himself and for his men washe induced to request his release. But also the fact that almost at the same time his transfer had already been requested due to his alleged "softness" confirms the truth of his statements and his attitude.
(3) With this attitude I believe to have substantiated, and also proven that Schulz did not commit any crimes against humanity since all inner and outer prerequisites are lacking which could identify the crime according to generally acknowledged international views.
(4) Since the defendant neither sawnor wanted crimes but detested and prevented them he can neither be principal nor participant nor instigator nor abettor.
(5) His general behavior incontestably proves that he never gave his approval apart from the fact that he in no case ever ordered an execution.
(6) The shooting of guilty persons can neither be viewed as a persecution for political reasons but, in consideration of the existing situation in Russia, which cannot be denied, as a measure dictated by the exigencies of war for the protection of the fighting troops.
(7) The same applies to the shooting of Jews, They were shot to death not because they were Jews but because they were Russian, Communist functionaries, agents, spies, or saboteurs and had made themselves guilty of acts which had been publicly announced as liable to be punished with death. Any persecution for racial or religious reasons is therefore completely out of the question.
(8) From what hasbeen stated above, it is also evident that it does not apply to the defendant Schulz when it is alleged that the main duty consisted in following the army and in exterminating Jews, gypsies, Soviet functionaries, and other groups of the civilian population considered racially "inferior" or "politically undesirable"; that means in no form did he take part in any extermination asalleged by the Prosecution.
ordered nor participated in and much less committed a murder, as the Prosecution terms the ruthless compliance with and execution of the Fuehrer order.
(9) No ill-treatment of prisoners of war or of the civilian population took place nor would it leave been tolerated by Schulz. Also in Russia he demanded correctness and decency from his men.
(10) As at the time of Schulz no destruction of any object took place, also the charge of wanton destruction not justified by military necessity is completely invalid.
(11) Schulz never had anything to do with insane persons.
(12) At the time of Schulz' assignment in Russia nothing at all was known of the existence of gas vans.
(13) His acts were not committed in an unlawful way. His measures were permissible according to the rules of war and and international law as well. Therefore he did not commit crimes or other punishable acts either intentionally or knowingly. through his address which he delivered on 1 November 1941 -- that means almost 6 weeks after his return from Russia -- to the participants in the leaders' course at the school. This address is evidenced by the testimony of Haefner (Schulz Exhibit No. 49 in Schulz Document No. 57, Volume II, pp. 171-172) and presents an unmistakable repudiation of the military measures taken in the East. But it also proves that Schulz openly professes his opinion and wants to do so intentionally. When he expresses in front of the assembled leaders his intention to exclude from the course because of inferior character anybody boasting of having shot a Jew because with such an attitude he is unworthy of being an officer, then this proves that Schulz does not change his mind on his return from Russia, but still intends to prevent the pernicious effects of this incrimination.