which the American Officer in Salzburg made out about this fact. It might be that this report also contains the sentence which the defendant spoke to that officer, convinced of the principle that every man should be aware of his own value, namely; "I was the same man before 1933 as after 1933 and if I remain now what I was before then even the discerning enemy will not refuse to pay me his respect." here in Nuernberg towards the prosecution. He voluntarily submitted a voluminous handwritten report of more than 50 pages, a fews days after his first interrogation by Mr. Wartenberg in the presence of Mr. Walton, even before he was acquainted with the indictment and before he had knowledge of even one of the documents exhibited. And everything he submitted in his draft repeated almost verbatim on the witness stand. Not only that, his statements and data correspond in almost every detail to the documents although the latter have been given from memory after nearly 6 years. establish with it right at the start that the statements of the defendant Schulz have not been conceived for the specific purposes of to the truth, openly and honestly without adding any embellishments. Although his membership in the SS and Gestapo up to 1 September 1939 does not constitute a count of the indictment, I have to stress this period too, in a short and concise manner, in order to present a generally comprehensive picture. After the end of thefirst World War from which the defendant returned as a 17-year old soldier and fater passing examination (Abiturientexamen) Schulz had to face a situation which had destroyed his life ambition to become a Physician.
The sudy of law which he had taken up without any inward inclination also and to be interrupted. After a period of practical work in a bank and in a business enterprise he entered the Bremen police force on 5 November 1923. For this vocation he possessed three very essential qualifications: in the first place, his education in the home of his parents. His father was a soldier of long service and subsequently a civil servant. By him he was educated to a sense of duty, conscientiousness, and straigthforwardness of character. Secondly, his inward inclination and disposition towards helping in distress who need assistance, which had manifested itself in his wish to become a doctor and thirdly his study of law. Even though this study had not been completed it had taught him to think and reason along legal lines. These basic principles he always applied as the guide of his actions regardless of the situation in which he was placed. and activity during the first years since they are immaterial to this trial and were described in detail by the defendant on the witness stand. sents an important event which was to determine his life decisively. With reference to his activity here until 1933 Alfred Faust, at that time Social-Democratic member of the Reichstag and chief editor of the Social-Domocraticnewspaper "Bremer Volkszeitung", states in Exhibit no. 35, Scgulz Document No. 11.
I quote: "Long before HITLER'S usurpation of power under the Weimar Republic Schulz was an officer in the Bremen Political Police."
"During the period of my political activity in Bremen I knew Herr Erwin Schulz. I never knew him as a Nazi. He is the typical decent German officer". End of quotation.
On page 31 he continues: I quote:
"In my overall judgment I can only rmember Hauptmann Schulz with respect and gratitude. During his entire term of office in Bremen he always treated correctly and I have no cause whatsoever to bring accusations and charges against him." End of quotations. Reich Banner Black-Red-Gold," the militant organization of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, and at present leader of all sports activities in Bremen, says in Schulz Exhibit No. 30, Schulz Document No. 2 Volume I, p.7: I quote:
"I know the subsequent official in charge of the State Police office Bremen, Erwin Schulz, already from the time before 1933. Herr Erwin Schulz was at that time First Lieutenant of the Police and was employed in the Polizeidirektion in the department political police. At that time I was the leader of the Reichsbanner (para-military organization of the democratic parties) Bremen and therefore I had to contact him several times when I was making preparations ofr political demonstrations and meetings. Already that time I came to know Herr Erwin Schulz as a quiet and prudent who always endeavoured to balance political emotions and to prevent clashes of a political nature". - End of quotation.
In his statement in Schulz Exhibit No. 21, Polizeisenator Theodor Laue explains as follows: I quote:
"I was known that Police Captain Schulz already before 1933 fulfilled his duties quite objectively assiting members of all political parties if he though it right and necessary out of human considerations." End of quotation.
Schulz did not change his attitude after 1933. Experiencing how for opportunistics reasons now many persons in responsible positions became obedient instruments of the Party outdoing each other in courting it and uncritically not only tolerating but even supporting what was considered right by ill-advised fanatics.
He on the contrary was opposed to all this ad because he was unable to reconcile such behavior with his inner attitude and with his relief in the purity of the National Socialist movement. Thus in indignation he approached the responsible Polizeisenator in Bremen with a public report ruthless disclosing to him the abuses going in the temporary concentration camp in Bremen established at the request of the Party of which he had been confidentially informed.
Here I again refer to the Schulz Exhibit No. 21 Schulz Document No. 60, where the witness Theoder Laue states: I quote:
"In 1933 Schulz submitted t me a report on his then chief Captain Kruse, concerning the temporarily protective custody camp in the Missler Halls in Bremen which had been established in Bremen and in which the SS-guards had resorted to exesses. His report enabled me to take immediate action and to stop the reported shortcomings. The SS-guards were immediately relieved of their duty and the Police first Lieutenant who was responsible was also, immediately transferred as a disciplinary measure. This incident proves, too, that Schulz did not approve of any incorrect actions, not even then as has been unfortunately noticed so frequently when it was a matter of "expediency considerations." -End of quotation. the consequences resulting thereform. Schulz took a heavy burden on himself, for he had to know that he made enemies with such behavior. But he accpeted this consequence without hesitation. already quoted, above says in Schulz Exhibit No. 35, as follows, and I quote:
"Thus it required a good deal of pluck to oppose the hatred of subordinate departments. "End of quotation.
When I single out Schulz' behavior immediately following the so-called seizure of power. I do so because this period in particular with its first ugly appearances of political opportunism gives the best possibility of appraising persons value. But in order to deal moredirectly with the main subject I an not able, unfortunately to discuss in detail the defendant's Bremen period in the time at my disposal especially as - as stated by the Prosecution - this period is not refer red to in the indictment. What kind of difficulties he will have to overcome at a later date, he himself possibly have to account for in Bremen. But I would like to state that when he took over his office in 1934 as the responsible official, he conducted a ruthless purge and at all times supported straightforwardness and justice, which course he also taught his subordiantes.
As for sixteen years without any interruptions, Schulz owrked in the Bremen police force, I deliberately collected a great number of affidavits dating back to that period and submitted them to the court. I did this not only because it was a matter of course that I could obtain the greatest possible number from those sources, but also because I am of the opinion that the person who conducted himself unimpeachably and in an exemplary fashion for sixteen years in one and the same town will by necessity act in the same manner in thesubsequent years, which is also incontestably proved by the documents of that particular period. person as is the case here. In another part of my plea I shall refer to the essential points in those affidavits and proceed to summarize them. Oberlandses erischtsrat Dr. Stegemann as public prosecutor with the Hansatic Court of Appeals at Hamburg, Dr. Stegemann was in charge of the Bremen high treason cases. From those activities he knew the defendant in the period from 1934 to 1939. He states in Schulz Exhibit No. 28, and I quote:
"In the then Captain Schulz I found a man with a complete understanding of the requirements of justice who differed in a very advantageous way from many of the State Police Leaders likewise known to me though his always equitable, humane, and decent manner. Herr Schulz was free from any strict, narrow, fanatical disposition . He never took part in the war of the State Police against the department of justice which was waged by many State Police officers. At that time I learned to appreciate Herr Schulz especially for his frank, straightforward and decent character, his brave, fearless masculinely strong personality." End of quotation. friendly or intimate relations between Dr. Stegemann and the defendant Schulz, outside their official intercourse which could favorably influence the evaluation of the defendant.
During my client's stay in Bremen, he was appointed in the spring of 1938 to take up duties in Graz following the occupation in Austria. For this period, too, I have submitted a considerable number of affidavits which were mostly given by such persons as had been in protective custody, and which consitute a unanimous eulogy for the defendant, unreservedly praising his humane feelings, his chivalry, and his kindness. I deem these documents particularly important because they prove that even in the year 1938 the defendant did not change his attitude and never made nay concessions to the party for opportunistics reasons or even vain ambitions, which he could not reconcile with his conscience and his professional ideals. Apart from this humane a ttitude, the documents prove that his measures and decisions were definitely not favorably received by the Party.
5 Feb 1943_A_MSD_24_1_Gross (Hildesheimer) account who, as an official, parson or convinced Party follower, acted in accordance with the dictates of duty and conviction, and he applied this maxim to his own action. Only an offense against the existing laws or any preceding arbitrary actions could make it necessary to call a person to account. Whoever violated that principle acted, in the defendant's opinion, from reprehensible motives of revenge, which were to be rejected as unjust. mention in particular the testimony given by the Jewish professor, Professor Dr. Loewi, who is now working in New York as professor at the New York University College of Medicine. This is the Schulz Exh. No. 91, Professor Loewi says, and I quote:
"On 6 May 1938 Herr Schulz discharged me from protective custody. The discharge tood place in the kindest form in the presence of my wife whom Herr Schulz on his own initiative had invited to be present." dealing with Jewish persons, had no other guiding principles than that of justice. And quite determinedly he saw to it that his views prevailed although it was especially this release from detention which after a short time was responsible for its turning into a highly controversial matter. In this case, too, it required his personal intervention and all his skill to justify and motivate those measures. by Dr. Loewi's assistant, Dr. Hellauer, in Schulz Exh. No. 99. article in the "Tagespost", a Graz paper, dated 2 July 1938, which the witness Schmid had in her possession and the original of which has been submitted to the court. In this article, the defendant quite frankly announces his professional ideals by asking his officials and employees to allow humane feelings to assert themselves in thier particular 5 Feb 1948_A_MSD_24_2_Gross (Hildesheimer) work, regardless of likes or dislikes.
This does not show sentimentality. If one was not sure that humane sentiments should be permitted expression in a particular job, one had better refrain from that job. Although applying strict rules in the execution of one's duties, this would not exclude a certain amount of chivalry. but also to all those present of whom many had critized the defendant's measures which were motivated by kindness and justice. I consider this newspaper article particularly important, because it proves which ideals guide the defendant, and that he cannot be swayed from this course. Openly defending his views; for there can be no more pronounced action than announcing one's views in the press in order to stamp them as one's beliefs. However, these declarations are really a profession of belief, because word and deed coincide quite difinitely, a fact which is again evidenced by the statements of the political opponents who, according to their positions in life, which they held at that time and are holding again today, must be considered persons whose judgment is both substantial and valuable, because they are excluded from all suspicion or superficiality or an unjustified favoritism. assigned to Assig in the former Sudeten province, which took place in the fall of 1938, and to Olmuetz in the former Protectorate in the spring of 1939. These events are important because the Einsa zgruppen for these assignments had already been activated, and Schulz had been commissioned to lead an Einsatzkommando. A I have only a limited amount of time at my disposla, I can only briefly deal with those periods. the Einsatzkommandos were merely assigned to the primary task of arranging for working space with its necessary billets and providing 5 Feb 1948_A_MSD_24_3_Gross (Hildesheimer) technical means for the regular offices, which were to be set up subsequently, and securing the operations of the invading troops by establishing a communication service.
This is proved by the aforementioned article in the Graz "Tagespost" Schulz Exh. No. 74 in which reads, and I quote:
"He - the defendant - expressed his happiness that he was able to conclude his four months of building, which had created the outer form by being able to turn over this neat building to its function........ Now there follows the second part of the task, the development of the contents, which he unfortunately could not do himself." As in Graz, the same also applied in Olmuetz. And as in Graz, his arrival in Aussig and Olmuetz also meant the arrival of justice, humane feelings, and genuine friendship, which the documents of his former political opponents prove unanimously. include many tasks for the defendant, as the planned setting up of a state police branch office in Aussig had been dropped. Aussig became only a secondary branch of the Reichenberg State Police exactly according to the scheduled three stages, as provided by the Munich agreement, in which after the departure of the Czech troops and authorities, the German troops and administrative offices followed according to a mutual understanding. The whole operation rolled off smoothly under the supervision of Lord Runciman, who had been appointed for this task. That in this instance, too, the defendant Schulz proceeded according to his principles of chivalry is proved by the fact of his attitude towards the Czech Police Chief, Dr. Benda, whose planned arrest he not only prevented, but beyond this even initiated a certain release procedure for the public which had as its aim removing this sting from this action against Herr Dr. Benda. I refer to the affidavit by the defendant, 5 Feb 1948_A_MSD_24_4_Gross (Hildeshimer) Schulz Exh.
No. 88 and the newspaper attached to this affidavit. This action on the part of the defendant could not have been achieved either if he had not personally intervened, for he was obliged to give a motive whenever he deviated from the given orders. As in this case, he never chose the convenient course of blindly obeying orders, but he wanted to be just. His efforts overcame the difficulties and were also successful for the simple reason that a well-meaning man backed them up. It should be obvious, however, that his attitude towards "the smaller fry" was not less well-meaning, even though he protected them "big-shots". The above mentioned newspaper article also proves, as it shows, that the Oberlandrat was the superior authority for Schulz in the Protectorate. Yet another action on the part of the defendant signifies his chivalrous attitude. Completely ignoring the wish of his superior authorities, he did not billet the men in his office in the city hall rooms of Olmuetz, but he allowed the Czech authorities to stay there without imposing any changes, and he soon established cordial relations with them on the basis of mutual respect. He himself only claimed two modest rooms, while members of his Kommando were billetted in the vacant floor of a nearby private house. He replied to the charges of authority and representation brought against him by stating that according to his opinion, authority and representation did not depend on external matters, but were based on behavior and results. After having taken over as ordered, he returned to Bremen in the following weeks, in order to hand over his office there to his successor and to his subordinates to whom he was for many years both a respected and much-liked leader. However, the actual transfer was delayed because hes successor was taken ill, so that he did not return to Reichenberg before July of 1939, approximately. The office he found there required a thoeough reorientation if it was to be in accordance with his views. As a primary measure, therefore, he introduced his 5 Feb 1948_A_MSD_24_5_Gross (Hildesheimer) new subordinate to his professional ideals.
After that, he paid special attention to the task of definitely settling the irresponsible disorder that prevailed in the treatment of assets which were left behind by Jews, most of whom had escaped. For this purpose, he appointed two responsible officials. In this instance, too, he had to overcome the most difficult obstacles, as he had to proceed ruthlessly, in order to regain the property which had already been appropriated by others. To prove this, I refer to the statement by Kriminalrat Hasse, Schulz Exh. No. 78. However, this, his principal attitude, must also be considered as shown by this particular statement. Hasse states the following and I quote:
"He - the defendant - considered it his principal task to train his subordinate officials and clerks in such a way - and he devoted a large part of his time to this activity - that they would always act in a correct, honest, and above all decent and humane way. I shall never forget that he often said to me that true police officers should be only men of spiritual greatness, with an instinct for honesty, with heart and tactfulness. In this respect he was an example to me, and - this is no exaggeration - the one great teacher of my life. I owe him much. He frequently emphasized to me the need for waging a war on political opponents in a humane manner. In the question of protective custody, Herr Schulz was more than cautious. I also know very well that Herr Schulz frequently released prisoners after a personal warning." a policy no different from the one he had followed in all the preceding years. This is also confirmed by the statement of Polizeiobersekretaer Fritz Weise from the same office Schulz Exhibit No. 41, in which he says, among other things and I quote:
"On the contrary, he was an exemplary, modest and plain person, who looked after his officials like a father......Especially as far as morals were concerned, he demanded utmost decency, both of himself 5 Feb 1948_A_MSD_24_6_Gross (Hildesheimer) and his subordinates.
his testimony on the witness stand (Eng. transcript. p. 1113/14; German transcript p. 1131), according to which he opposed the intention of the Gauleiter to arrest the leading Czechs at the beginning of the war and succeeded in imposing his conviction. me to discover character witnesses from the former areas of the Sudetengau and the Protectorate. However, I am convinced that I would have succeeded with little effort in locating witnesses for these areas who were credible in every respect and unobjectionalbe as to character and education - and my introduction of evidence is based solely upon such witnesses. But I firmly believe that the court has been given sufficient proof by the documents which have been submitted, in order to enable them to form a judgment concerning the defendant Schulz' attitude and character. I might even say that the documents have a double value as proof, insofar as documents from subordinates of my client are concerned, because they not only present a judgment of their former superior, but beyond that illustrate the decency, and sincerity of his policy of issuing orders. In my opinion this is important because I know from my experience that many times nowadays former subordinates try to hide their own weaknesses, mistakes and undependability behind the orders of their former superiors. tion, because the entire activity of my client in Aussig and Olmuotz and the greater part of his activity in Reichenberg falls outside the time under indictment, namely before 1 September 1939. However, in the Reichenberg period, there is only the campaign against Poland, which had no effects at all upon Reichenberg, especially since Schulz had prevented the arrest of Czech inhabitants which the Gauleiter had demanded. However, after the Polish campaign had come to an end, Schulz left Reichenberg in April 1940, before the campaign in the 5 Feb 1948_A_MSD_24_7_Gross (Hildesheimer) West had begun.
inspector. This event is of far-reaching importance because from this time on until the capitulation. my client withdrew from his former subordinate position under the office of the Gestapo in Berlin and and or the office IV of the RSHA and belonged to Amt I, in the offices of which he was directly employed in the following period. sort. In this connection, I refer to his own statements on the witness stand and the testimony of Regierungsrat Broder in Schulz Exhibit No. 42. This witness, who knows the defendant not only from his own experience but also from the judgment of the widest circles of the Security Police and the SD, above and beyond the spheres of local activity, here draws such a comprehensive picture of the defendant as a person and as a superior in his official as well as in his private life, in his conception of his profession and in his concept of life, that I would like to call it especailly to the attention of the court. This description clearly shows that the complete harmony between word and deed is scared to the defendant when he sets his fundamental principle above all else: "The living example is the best training." because now I shall start the Russian Campaign.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess until tomorrow morning 0930.
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal II.
Military Tribunal II is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
DR. DURCHHOLZ (Attorney for the defendant Schulz): Your Honor, I should like to proceed now in delivering my final plea. We proceed on page 23, paragraph 7:
As early as March 1941, my client was recalled from Hamburg. It is unusual to advance from inspector to Gruppenleiter in the RSHA. But Schulz acceded to the request of the Chief of Personnel at that time, who told him that because of his particular inclination and capacity for leading men, he urgently needed him. He became Gruppenleiter I B (training and education) and Commander of the Leadership School. With his inherent devotion, he dedicated himself to his new work, which he approached with all the greater happiness, as he believed that where he would be able to set the lofty duties of their profession before the eyes of the people. with moving from Hamburg to Berlin, he was taken completely by surprise by his transfer to Russia as Fuehrer of Einsatzkommando 5. tions and circumstantial details. My client has described the latter in detail on the witness stand, I have listed the former in detail in my trial brief submitted to the Court. Therefore I will limit myself - presupposing the totality of events so for as they affect my client - to dividing my subsequent statements into the following topics:
"Schulz, the man. in his relation to the events in Russia and the orders issued."
he knew nothing whatsoever about the comprehensive Fuehrer Order. He was only familiar with the statements of Heydrich in the Prinz Albrecht palace, in which not a word was mentioned concerning the shooting of the Jews and their wives and children, the Gypsies and functionaries. This is also to be regarded as proved by the fact that the co-defendant Ohlendorf likewise took part in this discussion, but together with other co-defendants clearly testifies that the Fuehrer Order was only made public by Streckenbach in Pretsch by order of Heydrich. Although Schulz was in the company of the defendant Rasch, the Chief of his Einsatzgruppe, for 2 days in Schmiedeberg and even took his meals with several officers, neither Rasch nor anyone else of those present spoke of this order made public by Streckenbach. The same statements were also made by the defendants von Radetzky, Graf and Fendler, who belonged to the same Einsatzgruppe. Further, this was nothing extraordinary, for the order was made known to only a very limited circle and the statements of several co-defendants have shown that they likewise were uninformed of this comprehensive order in their stations of Pretsch, Schmiedeberg and Dueben. Since by its very nature it was strictly confidential, it is also not surprising that news of this order did not reach Schmiedeberg, the station of the Einsatzgruppe Rasch; for even it if had been discussed in Dueben or Pretsch, it did not necessarily have to reach Schmiedeberg, which was located several kilometers from these places. Unfortunately the elimination of the defendant Rasch as a witness in the witness stand has deprived me of any possibility of clarifying these and several other points as well in favor of my client. However, from the opening statement of my colleague, Dr. Surholt, regarding his client Rasch, I must conclude that Dr. Rasch probably consciously refrained from making that particular Fuehrer Order public.
I refer to subsection 1 of this opening statement which I quote:
"The Einsatzgruppen were established in the early summer of 1941 in accordance with such principles as are generally recognized as admissible from the viewpoint of international law in the event of war..... a nature as the Prosecution is now quoting under the name of Crimes against Humanity and war Crimes was not given, neither could it be surmised. Thus the defendant Dr. Rasch had no reason to reject the command over Einsatzgruppe C with which he was charged." End of quotation. nor did it become known to him. important to me that he cannot remember ever again having seen Dr. Rasch after he had made his final report, before his departure on 24 September 1941. Without any knowledge of the indictment or the prosecution documents, he gave his testimony, which fully agrees with the statements in the above mentioned opening statement, to Herr Wartenberg orally already on 4 March 1947, and on 9 March 1947, in the presence of Dr. Walton gave Wartenberg this information in voluminous written form. However, this happened at a time in which he simply did not know where Dr. Rasch was. Since Dr. Rasch also was not transferred to the prison, but was completely isolated in the hospital, there was no possibility at all of a verbal agreement, quite apart from the fact that he would have had nothing to do with such a thing. ing route were discussed. Schulz personally took over the command of the convoy of his completely motorized Kommando. duties. But as long as everything was in flux and nothing at all was known of what would happen, these thoughts took no tangible form.
to have stood their ground and then a war of position would have to have been fought which would have made it necessary for the Kommando to have become active in the Reich area of even for the German troops to have been overwhelmed. Since my client holds the position that all tentative plans are out of place because they hinder or disturb decisions in unexpected developments, he always tried to let things develop first. He never once thought that he would have to undertake shootings, since up until that time in his entire career with the police he neither received nor issued an order to shoot a man. As he already stated on the witness stand, he pictured the course of his future activity to be similar to that which he had experienced in his previous assignments, although he probably realized that they would be of a far more serious and dangerous character. like change. In the foreground were the conditions already mentioned which suddenly and glaringly brought into focus all the difficulties of future events and the mercilessness of the coming war.
The announcement by Dr. Rasch of the first order concerning our own war measures in the East stood in direct connection with the thousands of dead, who were found, among whom were also m any German soldiers and officers. Those participants to whom this order was made public, completely overlooked the fact that that order - compiled from the so-called Commissar Order and the Barbarossa Order - had been published even before the beginning of the war with Russia, since they learned of this order only after the war had begun and had to consider it justified by the events which h ad taken place. The effect of the orders published, through the combination of circumstances, was different from what it would have been if they had learned of it before the beginning of the war. One could see from reports and stories that Lemberg was no exception.
witness stand , again agrees with the statements of my colleague Dr. Surholt, in his Opening Statement under Sub-Section 2 (Engl. transcript p. 311, German transcript p. 316), where it says, and I quote:
"Accordingly, the assignment of the Gruppen, or at any rate that of Gruppe C headed by Rasch, was motivated by military necessity. The orders he passed on to the subordin ate Kommandos were based on adequate prerequisites. Executions were only to be carried out if the actual facts of the crime were established, they had thus to be limited to cases involving persons who had participated in murders, looting, acts of sabotage, etc." End of quotation.
Rasch's order also contained the instructions that all political functionaries and agents were to be shot. Of course the partisans also fell under this heading. tion and the lack of a regular court martial, because in its consequence he saw the dangers of arbitrary action, especially since the decision according to the Keitel order was left to officers who lacked any sort of training in the field of law. However, as he testified, he was under the influence of the events of Lemberg. In spite of this his feelings struggled against it. He knew his tendency toward conciliation and his constant inclination toward the good, which have again and again been brought out in all the documents I have submitted and which have so often been falsely characterized as meekness and ascribed his conflict to his predisposition. According to the given facts, he believed that he had to force himself to a greater severity. When he conscientiously considered this with the exclusion of all emotion, he believed that he had to acknowledge the fact that right and emotion could differ, without right thereby becoming wrong. From this conflict however, he came to the conclusion that he would have to limit the not very closely limited order by requiring that the guilt of the political functionaries and agents be proved in advance.
ordered by the Fuehrer of the Jews guilty of and participating in the Lemberg murders. which followed in the wake of the Lemberg murders, in order to be able even to comprehend such a severe order. But from a purely legal point of view he was unable to produce any sound arguments against the order, especially since in addition the attention of the world had been focused on these events and representatives of foreign powers had appeared in Lemberg in order to convince themselves of what had happened. Everything was fully discussed before this public. The Fuehrer gave the order with the explicit reference that it was a matter of reprisals (retaliation). However, such reprisals are perfectly permissible according to international law. Perhaps in such circumstances, any other belligerent power would have done the same. It could appear thoroughly comprehensible that they were also carried out for the murdered Ikrainians, since Germany had placed the Government General under its protection and by so doing had to represent the interests of the Poles. However, those persons murdered in Lemberg were for the most part former Polish citizens. In addition, the population of Lemberg itself demanded these reprisals. According to Rasch's descriptions, the measures were executed by order of the competent Wehrmacht commander in chief in cooperation with the militia under its command. Schulz even endeavored to urge Dr. Rasch to leave these reprisal measures to the Wehrmacht itself. He did this, although Einsatzkommando 6 in connection with Sonderkommando Schoengarth was already commissioned with the investigations and the execution, and therefore he personally was not at all concerned and did not have to be concerned that his Kommando would participate. In spite of this, he further endeavored to advance with his Kommando in order to remove it from this entire event and the depressing experiences in Lemberg, but he did not receive marching orders.
Meanwhile the Jews were arrested, and hearings were constantly being conducted. In the course of time, from the approximately 2500 to 3000 persons arrested, a rather large number was singled out. Schulz saw all this, since he was satying in the same house. He had, therefore, to arrive at the convictions that a somewhat conscientious investigation was being carried out especially since men of the Lemberg authorities were included and Dr. Rasch took a personal interest in the events. that on the afternoon of the day of the shooting, his Kommando would have to carry out the executions. His efforts to have this order rescinded, since neither he nor his men were prepared for such a task, were without result. It would perhaps have been senseless to refuse, since they could not have changed anything in the execution of the order. Even Einsatzkommando 6 would prob ably not have understood if he had demanded of it what he refused himself. He therefore had to accede to the order given by Dr. Rasch. He did it, while conscientiously creating all the conditions under which the execution would be dignified and soldierly for those to be executed and for his men. He could do no more; one cannot in justice either demand or expect more from him. Here, too, I must repeat that the Einstatzkommando was acting only as a Peloton-Kommando. The guilty persons were led out and buried in that locale by Einsatzkommando 6, Sonderkommando Schoengarth and indigenous militia. He and his men performed their duty, more or less with clenched teeth, and in the clear knowledge that they were committing no injustice, since according to information which the group received, only those who were guilty and had participated in the murders were being executed. But the defendant Schulz was made all the more happy that on a day which was so bitter for him, he could free those who were still under arrest, almost 2,000 Jews, and could save the lives of several who were marked for execution. He is almost thankful for the excesses of the Wehrmacht because they m ade it possible for him to do this.