General von Leyser, without having knowledge of any documents of the prosecution, stated, in the witness stand the following, in regard to the attitude of the commissars: the troops knew from experience that commissars defended themselves in battle to the utmost and incited their comrades also the greatest resistance. Therefore, the most bitter battles took place where ever commissars were fighting with the Russian troops, and many commissars were killed after fierce resistance.
According to their orders and their training, commissars who were captured also engaged in activities against the German troops behind the German lines, as they had been ordered; they formed partisan groups and carried out acts of sabotage. The army had also to take steps against this conduct of the commissars.
One can, therefore, say that commissars were not treated differently by the 269th Inf. Div. than any other member of the Russian army under the sane circumstances.
The fact that, in spite of this, commissars who were killed in battle or shot as saboteurs, were mentioned separately in the reports, is based on orders according to which commissars had to be reported separately, and on the intention of the troops to emphasize the special importance of this problem in reports to higher commands.
General von Leyser's statement in the witness stand to this effect could also not be shaken by the documents introduced during the cross-examination. Because in none of these documents the reasons or the circumstances are mentioned, under which these commissars were killed. May I briefly discuss the individual documents, because of the great importance of this problem. Exhibit 611 reports the shooting of a woman commissar. As only men were assigned as commissars to the Russian army, this cannot refer to the shooting of a member of the army. No reasons for the shooting are mentioned in the document. As, however, the same report mentioned the combatting of partisans, it may be assumed, that the woman commissar is a civilian who was engaged in activities against the German Wehrmacht.
By the way, the incident was recorded by the information section of the division, thus by a unit which operated in the rear area. This fact, too, supports the conclusion that this matter concerned the combatting of partisans or saboteurs behind the German lines.
The exhibit 615, which was also submitted, reports the shooting of two Russian prisoners, a Kommissar and a higher Russian officer. The contents of this report show clearly that it was not a question of an application of the Kommissar order, but of the squashing of a mutiny among the prisoners of war.
The prosecution asserts that exhibit 616, which was the last of the documents submitted, is supposed to be a teletype of the 269th Infantry Division. In connection with this prosecution exhibit it must be said that already for formal reasons it his no probative value whatsoever. The document has no signature and does not give the sender's name. There is no way of telling whether this alleged report is a summary of reports covering incidents over an extended period of time, or whether it concerns only one incident. Moreover, this document does not contain any proof for the fact that this report had ever been submitted to General von Leyser.
With regard to the actual contents, I can refer to the statements I have already made in connection with the rest of the documents. This document does not show which Kommissars were involved and why they were killed.
May I be permitted to add the following with regard to this count of the indictment as a whole:
In the Russian Army a Kommissar was attached to each company. We know the numbers of prisoners taken during the first months of the war against Russia. At that time many hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers in active service were captured by the Germans.
If the Kommissar order had really been carried out, entirely different figures would have appeared in the reports than actually did appear. The small number of Kommissars mentioned therein is an additional proof that their death was not connected with the Kommissar decree. I skip the next sentence.
This finishes the discussion of the prosecution material as far as it concerns the Kommissar order. Thus, I can conclude my discussion of count III of the indictment with the statement that no proof whatsoever has been submitted in support of the charge made against General von Leyser in this connection.
And now, Your Honors, I pass over to count IV of the indictment. Here all defendants are charged with having assisted in clearing the South East of Europe of inferior persons, such as Jews and Gypsies, and of politically unreliable elements, such as democrats and nationalists. Furthermore, all defendants are charged with having assisted in enslaving and deporting the population of the occupied territories to Germany or to other occupied territories as forced labor. In any case the chief prosecutor, in his opening speech, interpreted the indictment in this way. Therefore, this count of the indictment, too consists of two major parts. The alleged clearing operations on the one hand, the deportation for forced labor on the other hand.
Now, as far as the alleged operations are concerned, I can limit my statement. Among the entire evidence submitted by the prosecution against General von Leyser there is not one document which might serve to support this charge. I omit the rest of the paragraph. It just contains details.
Only one document has been submitted during the cross examination which could have a faint connection with this count of the indictment. It contains a note stating that 25 Jews were deported to Fiume.
However, this point was clarified beyond doubt by the witness Kobe. The correctness of this explanation was supported by the way the report was formulated, because, contrary to the other persons arrested who were mentioned, no mention is made of an arrest of these Jews.
B. Thus I can pass over to the second part of count 4 of the indictment, the alleged forced labor program of the German Wehrmacht. Here the Prosecution have stated that this count of the indictment was in no way connected with any military operations. The defendants here are supposed to have acted as hangmen of Sauckel and Himmler. With regard to this count of indictment I can state again that the prosecution have not taken too much trouble about the production of evidence. They have made assertions without being able to prove them.
With regard to the area under General von Leyser they stated that thousands of square miles and thousands of islands were stripped of their population. 150 to 200,000 Croats were deported from their homes and farms and were pressed into camps. There they were examined, the weaker ones were sent to the concentration camps and the rest were deported to Germany for forced labor.
1.) However, the prosecution did not submit any kind of proof for its assertion. They were satisfied with submitting orders which concerned the evacuation of areas in the interior of the country, and the planned evacuation of the coastal region and the islands lying in front of it. However, the most important fact has not been proved: The assertion that the evacuees were used for forced labor in the country or were deported for slave labor in Germany.
As to the point that troops subordinated to General von Leyser had anything to do with the later employment of the evacuees, the prosecution has submitted no evidence whatsoever. The documents of the prosecution even prove the contrary, i.e. that only Croatian offices, in collaboration with German territorial offices and the German Embassy, were authorized to decide about the later employment of the evacuees.
Beyond this the material submitted by the defense has clearly proved that the Corps, i.e. General von Leyser had nothing at all to do with these questions.
The registration of labor was entrusted to some German offices which carried out the recruiting of voluntary labor in close cooperation with the competent offices of the Croatian authorities. As the statement of the witness Persch proves, these labor registration offices were by no means subordinated to General von Leyser.
The registration of workers for the construction of fortifications, as far as it was done at all, was supposed to be carried out by mixed commissions consisting of one Croatian Army Officer and one officer of the Ustacha militia, to whom a German officer was to be attached only for the purpose of liaison with the German offices. These commissions were to cooperate with the local Croatian authorities. Thus the Corps Headquarter of the XV A.K. bears no responsibility whatsoever. Neither could the Prosecution prove it that General von Leyser had any connection with the administration of camps, either for evacuees or for P.W.'s. To begin with, I do not know why the prosecution submitted a great number of documents in connection with this point, which prove nothing except the fact that bandits were arrested. Does the prosecution mean to assert that the arrest of such bands is contrary to the law of warfare? Or is it going to assert that the sending off of P.W.'s from the combat area is not in accordance with the regulations of the Geneva Convention? In view of General von Leyser's official position as tactical commander of troops it is clear that on principle he had nothing to do with the administration of P.W. camps, nor with the administration of camps for evacuees. The planned camp for evacuees would have been subordinated to Croatian authorities, respectively to German territorial offices, prisoners of war matters were handled by German territorial offices both of which were not under the military jurisdiction of General von Leyser.
Before dealing with the evidence of the prosecution, I want to make clear the following point of view: The forces under the command of General von Leyser were committed in the area of Croatia. All measures planned and executed in this territory were carried out with the strictest approval of the Croatian authorities, who, in turn, had the right of sovereignty. An independent State, however, has the right to order and to carry out such measures towards the native inhabitants. This also applies to evacuation, labor allocation, and the drafting into military service. The troops merely supported the Croatian authorities in exercising their sovereign rights.
I have already set forth above that even this point of view concerning the rights of a State has no important bearing on the case, when considering the appointment of General von Leyser and the duties he had; for his duties would have been the same even if he had functioned in an occupied country.
I omit the rest of this paragraph and continue with figure 2 on page 73 at the top.
2.) After this basic clearing of the facts I now come to the accusation made against General von Leyser in the indictment. It is stated, under No. 15g that on 3 December 1943 during the operation "Panther" General von Leyser had given orders to his troops to deport to Germany for forced labor all able-bodied people from numerous Croatian villages. The prosecution presented the following argumentation hereto in the opening statement:
"In one single action of operation 'Panther' more than 6000 people were deported to the Reich for forced labor."
Operation "Panther" this represents - according to the conception of the prosecution - an outstanding case in the forced labor program of the German Wehrmacht.
What, however, can be extracted from the evidence submitted on this case? General von Leyser, when examined, presented the whole operation with the help of the documents submitted by the prosecution and several other documents submitted by the defense.
According to this the region of the Petrova Gora and the Samarika had for a long time previously been a supporting territory of bands, where strong bandit forces and their supply-bases were located. In order to clear this territory, the XVth Corps suggested on 27 November 1943 to the 2nd Panzer Army that operation "Panther" be carried out. According to this proposal only those men who were able to bear arms were to be deported in order to take away from the bands the possibility to fill up their personnel by forced recruitings, that is to say for purely tactical reasons. Nothing is said at all about further employment of those to be evacuated, let alone mention of the fact of a deportation for forced labor in Germany. This was outside the scope of tasks of the XVth Corps.
The documents in a later chronological order did not originate with General von Leyser or his Corps. It follows from this correspondence between the 2nd Panzer Army and the Plenipotentiary German General that the Corps, and thus General von Leyser, had nothing to do with the subsequent employment of the persons to be evacuated, and that this was the task of other Croatian and German offices.
I just want to mention the following points from this correspondence. The Plenipotentiary German General, not subordinate to the XVth Corps, says that in his opinion, an evacuation of 6000 persons was to be expected. It is from this document that the prosecution has taken this figure which they claim represents the actual number of deportations carried through. The document however shows that this was merely an estimate.
According to the same teletype, camps for the persons to be evacuated were to be established by Feldkommandantur 1036 which was a territorial office not subordinate to the XVth Corps.
Furthermore, the original proposition to evacuate those who were able to bear arms was to be changed to the effect that only strangers in the localities and those who were found outside of the villages should be evacuated.
Such persons, however, could be justly suspected of being a danger to the aims of the occupying power.
And what actually happened in this operation? The result itself is elucidated by the final reports on this operation - evidence so to speak, the accuracy of which cannot be disputed by the prosecution.
In this final report the following are enumerated: 191 prisoners, 21 deserters from the enemy and 96 evacuated persons. The explanation too for this small number is found in this document. It says that the villages were previously forcibly evacuated by the Communists.
It is thus established that merely 96 persons were evacuated from this region instead of the estimated 6000 persons to be evacuated according to the teletype by the Plenipotentiary German General. Even for these numbers all proof are lacking that they had actually been taken to Germany to work there. I believe that I need not say any more on operation "Panther".
3.) The rest of the documents submitted by the prosecution deals exclusively with orders to carry out planned evacuations. Evacuations as such are not a self-contained point of indictment according to the prosecution's exposition. I therefore aver that this group of documents would only then have a bearing on the decision of this case if it followed from them that the evacuated persons were employed contrary to international law. All these documents, however, have this in common that nothing of this nature is indicated therein. Thus I believe I can forego discussing these documents individually.
I just want to elucidate one more point. If the prosecutor claims that these evacuations were not justified for tactical reasons, then he is subject to error. The opposite can be proven from the orders submitted by the prosecution. May I be permitted to refer to the order of the 2nd Panzer Army of 15 September 1943, Herein, under No. 7, par.
2 the following terrain is listed for evacuation: pass-roads and strips of country along particularly endangered railway lines.
After, as has been shown above, such particular points had often been subject to attacks, it is clear that these evacuations were planned as a measure to protect vital military localities, that is to say for purely military reasons.
The same applies to the order of the 2nd Panzer Army of 13 March 1944 covering the evacuation of the coast and the adjoining islands. Here too the reason can already be found in the preamble to the order. It says that the great number of men on the islands and the coast who are able to bear arms would constitute a serious threat to the defense, and that, in addition, the presence of the whole population would greatly impede defensive measures. From this and from the evidence submitted by the defense it can be seen that these orders too were only issued for military and tactical expedience.
The evidence submitted shows that the evacuation was not carried out to the extent required from the military point of view.
Reasons of humanity and other practical reasons prevented the carrying out of these measures.
To this the fact has to be added that the issuing of orders in this field was not carried out by the Corps, but was directed in a greater frame by the Army.
The prosecution has submitted no evidence whatsoever to support its assertion that 150 to 200,000 Croats were evacuated. But it seems t o be interesting to clarify here how the prosecution arrived at this number. In an entry in the war diary of the XVth Army Corps it is mentioned, that 150 to 200,000 persons have still to be evacuated from the coastal region. This entry refers clearly to the report requested by the Army on the total number of persons who should be evacuated in case of enemy landings.
This number, roughly estimated for this special case, causes the prosecution to assert that these persons have actually been evacuated. Contrarily to that the entry shows that a total of about 1200 persons was evacuated from the islands. But here too it has not been proven that these persons were evacuated from the coastal region.
But I do not want to take up the time of the Tribunal by discussing in this final plea all the individual documents referring to these matters, because they would be of importance only if they would actually prove that evacuations were really carried out and that the persons evacuated were deported for slave labor. As no documents of this kind have been submitted, I can desist from discussing these documents in detail.
I may refer to the interrogation of my client in the witness stand as well as to the statements of the witnesses Einbeck, Pfafferott, Gereis, Persch, and Kobe.
All these statements show clearly that the evacuations would have been necessary for military reasons, but that if they were started at all, they could by far not be carried out as planned. But also the deportations restricted to persons suspected of band activity were not carried out by the troops, but, as I already have stated above, by the Croatian authorities.
In this connection I would like to draw the attention of the High Tribunal to only one document. It is the Special Directives of the XV Mountain Corps of 20 June 1944. The excerpt submitted here by the prosecution is the only document of this kind which refers to the deportation of Croats for labor assignment in the Reich. With this document the prosecution apparently wanted to prove that General von Leyser was responsible for this deportation. However, this conclusion is disproved already by the document itself, because it states that the deportation measures were to be stopped immediately. Thus, if the document itself proves anything, it proves only the fact that General von Leyser prohibited such measures being taken, but not that he ordered them.
For the rest I may refer to the statements of the witness H. v. Tucher which proved that such measures were not taken at all in the area of the XV A.K., but that this order was taken over m a general directive of the Army issued for the entire area. Moreover it is especially Exhibit 394 which proves that the hiring and registration of persons volunteering for work had to be carried out by the Plenipotentiary General for labor allocation and that the troops had no part in it.
Thus, summarizing I can therefore state to the first part of this count of the indictment, which refers to the alleged extermination of so-called inferior people, as well as to the second part which refers to the forced deportations, that General von Leyser has no guilt in this connection either.
I may come to the end and I again summarize the decisive facts. The assertion of Count I of the Indictment that General von Leyser is responsible for the murder of hundreds of thousands of civilians has not been proven by any evidence submitted. On the contrary, the submission of evidence proved clearly that no decimation measures were carried out by the troops of General von Leyser. If reprisal measures were carried out at all in the area of the XV A.K. and the XXI A.K., they were carried out only in the most urgent cases of emergency and to an extent which is justified by international law and which was made necessary by military requirements.
General von Leyser did not issue any orders for the carrying out of reprisal measures. Such measures were not included in his field of responsibility. This applies especially for the execution of hostages in the area of the division "Skonderbeg" mentioned in the indictment.
The assertion of Count 2 of the Indictment that the troops of General von Leyser, in violation of the laws governing warfare, carried out senseless destructions which were not justified by any military necessity with the aim, to weaken the economic and industrial potential of Croatia - Albania for decades and to slow down reorganization and reconstruction is, as far as Croatia and Albania is concerned, absurd, because these States were Allied States.
On the contrary, the Allied German Wehrmacht was highly interested in supporting, not in preventing the reconstruction of these countries. I proved beyond any doubt that the assertion of the prosecution concerning the destruction of 4 Croatian villages mentioned in the Indictment is incorrect, so that any additional discussion of this point is superfluous.
To Count 3 of the Indictment the defense proved that neither in the area of the XV nor the XXI Corps the German Wehrmacht was fighting against opponents which, according to the internal conditions of these respective states and according to their own behavior could be regarded as regular troops. Exceeding that it was proved that these opponents were treated in accordance with the international law.
With regard to the assertion that the Commissar order was carried out by the 269th Division which in Russia was subordinated to General von Leyser, the submission of evidence by the defense has shown that from the beginning it was not intended to issue this order and also that it was not carried out. The documents submitted by the prosecution on this point were, in their actual meaning, no evidence that this order was really carried out.
There is also no proof for the assertion that the Commissar order was issued somehow by General von Leyser's troops. But even prosecution documents showed that members of commando troops were treated as PW's, a fact which, with regard to the military mission, is also proved by a number of defense documents.
General von Leyser did not participate at all in measures taken against the surrendered Italian Army, because at that time he was not in Croatia.
To the assertion laid down in Count 4 of the Indictment referring to the deportation of the civilian population into camps and its employment as forced labor, it has to be stated that my client, on account of his official position as tactical commander of troops had nothing to do with them. The assertion of the prosecution that during operation "Banther" he ordered his troops to deport the ablebodied population of numerous villages to Germany for forced labor cannot be maintained in any way. The prosecution states that operation "Panther" led to the deportation of 6,000 persons. The final reports on this operation show that a total of 96 persons was evacuated As far as the evacuation of the islands and the coastal region is concerned, the difference between the assertions of the prosecution and reality is even greater. According to the evidence submitted, only a very small number of persons was evacuated from places of military importance. But the prosecution asserts and has no proof that 150,000 to 200,000 Croats were evacuated.
Furthermore the prosecution asserts facts about the fate of these persons after they were evacuated, which have not been proven at all.
I would like to insert something here: Counsel for the Prosecution stated that the XVth Army Corps was at the top of the crime list of the German army. I don't know what leads him to this statement. The facts submitted during the case-in-chief do not support his contention. On the contrary, these facts show that General von Leyser's troops adhered in every respect to the rules and customs of war.
If the High Tribunal agrees to the point of view of the Prosecution, namely that these men are not indicted because they are Generals and that they are to be acquitted, if, according to the evidence submitted, they cannot be made responsible for crimes, then I do not need to submit a special motion on behalf of General von Leyser because then the decision is absolutely clear.
DR. WEISGERBER (For General Speidel.)
May it please the Tribunal, General Speidel - who in the course of his military duties was fated to be committed in Greece during the period from October 1942 to May 1944 - concluded his examination-inchief with the following words: "It is every military leaders most noble duty to do everything in his power for his soldiers; that was the motive behind our actions. Our soldiers were loyal behind us and we generals protected them, that was our moral duty and also our fate."
This attitude - impregnated with a deep sense of responsibility and an expression of lofty military ideals - was shared by all the German generals dragged into this dock. It will be contradicted only by those who refuse to consider with an open mind the avents which happened in the South Eastern theater during the war years, because they deliberately misunderstand the facts and malevolently assume criminal intent.
It is worth while to stress a remark made by the prosecution in the opening statement on the 15th July 1947. I quote:
"We have not sought and will not seek in this case to make murderers out of soldiers for the violation of the rules framed in 1907." End of the quotation.
Therefore, it is not the issue of the charges that the defendants committed, in the course of warfare, acts which were prohibited by the Hague Rules on Land Warfare. I take it that the statement of the prosecution quoted above is binding, and I conclude, your Honors, that according to the prosecution's own submission this Court is not expected to decide upon possible violations of the Hague Rules on Land Warfare. What then is the real meaning and purport of the charge? The prosecution continued on page 14 (I quote:) "On the contrary we charge that these men insugurated and executed a deliberate program of terror and extermination." End of quotation.
The imputation of the prosecution with regard to the actions of the defendants is, therefore, quite different in character; these actions are described as part of a program which, exceeding the war aims proper, aimed at the extermination of peoples considered inferior. It may be safely assumed that the prosecution framed this sentence as a basis for the entire proceedings instituted by them. The prosecution stands and falls by the proof of the intent wrongly imputed to the defendants. A review of the 26 weeks, the hearings in this trial have lasted, shows that the prosecution has not even tried to produce this proof. In open contradiction to the declaration made in the opening statement, the prosecution has again and again referred to the Hague Rules on Land Warfare.
The prosecution has not produced one single document nor called one single witness testifying to the fact that the defendants sponsored, a program of extermination for national or racial reasons. On the contrary: All orders produced by the prosecution and pertaining to the combat of partisans or to reprisals stress -- without any exception purely military aims. The witnesses and the defendants agree in the description of the German military positions in the Balkans as vital for the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean, in Africa and in Russia. They make it clear beyond any doubt that the wide-spread band and sabotage activities, in which large groups of the population participated, were a threat to the very nerve of the German armed forces in the east and across the Mediterranean.
It was this threat which the defensive warfare of the Germans in the South Eastern theater tried to neutralize. As to the forms in which this defensive action was carried out, the generals in the dock are not responsible for them. The guilt rests with those who, by planning and ordering treacherous attacks and acts of sabotage placed themselves outside of international law and imperiled the German forces in the Southeastern theatre.
A.
I. My client is the only one among the Generals arraigned here who held the position of a military commander. This fact necessitates all the more a presentation of the extent of his authority, based on the evidence submitted by the prosecution.
A distinction must here be drawn between two periods:
1.) October 1942 to the end of August 1943. During this period General Speidel was the commander of Southern Greece. The Italian Forces were the occupying power in Greece. General Speidel had command authority merely over a minute part of the territory of Southern Greece, viz. a sector of the port of Piraeus with an adjoining strip of coast, the islands in the Saronian Gulf and a small area to the North-East of Athens with a few localities. Even the city of Athens was not under the jurisdiction of the Commander Southern Greece.
To illustrate the position and the duties of the Commander Southern Greece I refer to Speidel Doc. 15, Speidel Exh. 6.
2.) The period from September 1943 until the 2nd half of May 1944 covers General Speidel's employment as Military Commander of Greece. His position and duties are shown in the Speidel Doc. 17.
II. 1.) The titles "Commander Southern Greece," and "Military Commander Greece" are apt, no doubt, to cause the impression of regional and material authority. If, in addition, these prima facie mental pictures are impregnated - as I must say beforehand - with a quite hazy conception of "the executive power", then it is no wonder that to outsiders the "Commander Southern Greece" and "Military Commander Greece" seemed to be surrounded by a halo of omnipotency.
But was this so?
2.) The power of a military leader or commander depends on the available to the military commander, and on their equipment with arms and other accessories. Subordinate to the Commander Southern Greece were: 1 supply battalion, 3 Home Defense battalions which were exclusively assigned to guard duty, several smaller supplying units and, for training purposes only, the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division, the tactical employment of which had been reserved to Army Group E, and 40-50 year old guards are not an imposing force for a commander; and when we come to the forces of the Military Commander Greece, we find only a security battalion. It was merely for the period from the end of August till the beginning of November 1943 that elements of the 18th Police-MountainJaeger-Regiment were placed under the command of the Military Commander Greece for the purpose of securing the roads. After this task had been completed, the subordination of this regiment to the Military Commander Greece was terminated. I shall go into this later on, in connection with another matter. It might now be advanced that the Military Commander was also a territorial commander. What does this conception reveal? General Speidel took a stand to this question when he was directly examined. I refer to the transcript of 11 December 1947. The authorization of territorial command in Greece had nothing to do with the disposal over military forces.
3.) The surprising fact that the Military Commander Greece had practically no forces at his disposal is explained by the tasks given to the Military Commander Greece. The field tasks he had as Commander Southern Greece fell away; the supply task also fell away, and the staff readjusted to cope with purely administrative tasks. Furthermore, the political tasks and the basic economic tasks were handled by the Special Delegate of the Reich. Thus, the Commander was also dependent in this field, in contrast to a Military Commander in other countries. 4.) It may be countered that the Military Commander had the executive power. This conception is apt to cause confusion. Even General Felber who - as Military Commander South East - was Speidel's superior had to confess during his examination:
"I had no clear conception of the nature of executive power". My client stated his conception of the term "executive power" when he was under direct examination. I refer to these expositions. As far as I know, no deep-scooping investigations were made in this connection to ascertain just what is meant by "executive power". I can limit myself to the established fact that the Military Commander Greece had no executive power there, where other military commands, not subordinate to the Military Commander, as well as semimilitary and civilian offices were competent.
This is also expressed in this service instructions according to which he was to exercise the exercise the executive power only to the extent delegated upon him. The commanding generals of the XXIInd Mountain Corps and the LXVIIIth Corps, as well as the Commander Salonica-Aegaeis as a tactical command post with all the forces under their command were tactically never subordinate to the Military Commander Greece. They were subordinate to the C-in-C of Army Group E. The territorial relationship of subordination was limited to tasks of administration and soldiers' welfare and can therefore never be taken as grounds for a responsibility of the Military Commander on such measures as were carried out by the forces on their own responsibility in accordance with the tasks assigned to them. Even the prosecution was aware of this, for it says in the opening statement of 15 July 1947. I quote: "In the interest of an effectual pacification and of security it was naturally required that the regular tactical forces under Felmy and Lanz closely co-operated with the district and regional police units under Speidel's command." End of the quotation. It will now be shown that this quotation contains -- besides a correct judgment of the complete independence of the commanding generals of the XXII and Mountain Corps and the LXVIIIth Corps, as well as the Commander Salonica-Aegaeis, as a tactical command post, from the Military Commander Greece -- a quite inaccurate claim regarding the subordination of police units under General Speidel.
The police units referred to in the a fore-mentioned quotation could only have meant the police units of the Higher SS and Police Leader. The institution of the higher SS-and police leader is expounded as follows in the judgment of the IMT:I quote: "Himmler established a system wherein higher SS-and police leaders, as his personal representatives, functioned as executives in the alignment of tasks for the regular police, the security police, the SD, and the general SS in their spheres of command."
End of the quotation. With the higher SS-and police leaders an institution appears in 1943 -- in the occupied Russian territories even earlier--which was equally unpopular with all Wehrmacht Offices. Himmler with an unsatiable craving for power took advantage of his position as Chief of German Police -- which he was since 1937 -- in order to get the occupied territories under his control too. The infiltration of higher SS -- and police officers into the body of the Wehrmacht was just as impervious to scrutiny as the entire police organization of Himmler. Himmler's ambition to subordinate the entire German Wehrmacht under his jurisdiction as Reich Fuehrer-SS met, in 1943, with certain restrictions. We know from the opening statement of the prosecution in case II which is now tried at Nurenberg that it was planned for Himmler to take over the command over the entire German Wehrmacht in 1945 after he had already become C-in-C of the replacement army on 20 July 1944. As certain considerations had still to be taken, higher SS-and police leaders were subordinated to the military commander as matter of form. This, however, was all camouflage. Himmler had no inhibitions when it came to carry through any priority claims for his institutions, be it the Waffen-SS, the regular SS, or the police in all its shades. And their members were absolutely convinced of the privileges enjoyed by Himmler's institutions and acted accordingly too.
I deemed it necessary to make this brief exposition of conditions which have become well known from the procedure before the IMT in order to find an answer to the question: "What was the actual state of this subordination of higher SS-and police leaders under the Military Commander Greece?" Did a higher SS-and police leader -- that is to say a personal representative of the omnipotent Reich Fuehrer-SS -- really ever think of actually subordinating himself to a Wehrmacht General?
An all comprising and pointed answer to this is given by the struggle of the Military Commander South East i.e., -- General Felber and his Chief of Staff, General von GEITHNER against "Himmler's strivings for power; I refer to the documents Doc.