Here too I can save myself the trouble to discuss all documents once more. However, I want once more to prove the correctness of my assertion by summing up and by a few examples.
I will omit the rest of this page and continue on page 46.
Another incident, which I would like to discuss, can be found in a report of the 373rd Infantry division. Here the destruction of houses is reported as retaliatory measures for the blowing up of a railroad line. This same report has been submitted by the prosecution four times, In spite of this, the reason for these retaliatory measures is not apparent. I have, therefore, submitted supplements to document 075, offered by the prosecution, in the form of von Leyser exhibit 29.
I think I can omit the rest of that page which contains details which I do not want to read; also page 47, I continue on page 48 at the bottom:
I believe I do not need to discuss this count of the indictment any further. The prosecution was not able to offer any evidence proving that, from a military point of view, these destructions were unjustified. The defense, on the other hand, has proved that the reported destructions were necessary from a military point of view and therefore justified.
May I now come to paragraph 2 of Count 2 of the indictment. The prosecution asserts that General von Leyser has ordered his troops to loot from the Croatian civilian population or, at least, has tolerated these plunderings.
However, at the end of the argumentation, no evidence whatsoever has been submitted to prove this fact.
None of the evidence submitted by the prosecution shows that troops commanded by General von Leyser looted civilian property. According to the discussion on operation Dreznica the documents submitted by the prosecution merely describe the removal of military equipment which was the property of the former Italian Army. If, in connection with an operation it is mentioned that stores are to be cleared and cattle is to be removed, this order too is evidently directed to deprive the bands of their base of supply, to empty their supply stores and to remove the cattle necessary for their maintenance. In addition, may I add that according to a number of documents submitted, the bands requisitioned by force cattle and food from the civilian population. The German Wehrmacht, however, after it had confiscated this cattle, handed it over to the peaceful civilian population.
I will skip page 50 and page 51 since they only contain details and I would just like to draw the judicial attention of the Tribunal to these details. I will continue to page 52.
Summing up Count II of the Indictment, I conclude that the troops of General von Leyser did neither commit wanton destruction nor looting. What happened was justified through military necessity and, therefore, legal. No charge against General von Leyser can, therefore, even be upheld under this count.
I would like to make one more remark in regard to this Count. The prosecution entirely overlooked that the troops of General von Leyser wore stationed in a state allied to Germany. An allied force is not interested in the reckless destruction or plundering of the country;
it would rather endeavour to set the economy of that country on its feet and try to protect it from the ravages of war. The troops of the XVth Army Corps, who took this viewpoint as a matter of course, acted accordingly.
And now, Your Honors, I would like to over to Count III of the indictment.
The prosecution has charged all defendants, including my client, of having treated Regular Forces as Irregular Guerillas and, tens of thousands of prisoners of war were murdered when orders they had given in this connection were carried out.
I have already explained above that these assertions of the prosecution are entirely incorrect as far as the period General von Leyser spent in Croatia is concerned. I had mentioned, and for the sake of elucidation I repeat, that in accordance with an order issued by the OKW on 18 August 1943 the partisans had to be treated as prisoners of war by the troops of the German Wehrmacht. I also stated above that the troops of General von Leyser in Croatia obeyed this order to the word. As the important facts of this Count have already been explained above, I can now limit myself to discuss the relevant prosecution documents. To begin with, I would like to say one thing: The troops of General von Leyser conducted absolutely regular warfare against the so-called large bands just like against any other enemy, although it was known at that time and is known today that according to International Law these large bands did not constitute regular forces. The Prosecution has been unable to produce one document wherein the slightest proof is shown that the troops of General von Leyser did not pay attention to the International Law in conducting these battles. The documents, which were submitted in this connection, show clearly that the troops of General von Leyser took prisoners.
There are reports on prisoners, on deserters from the enemy, on prisoner of war camps; all these are points which prove that the division commanded by General von Leyser conducted a fair warfare. In connection with this Count may I also refer to the statements made by my client himself and also to the statements of the witness Kobe.
Now, what did the prosecution produce in order to prove that the way the partisans were treated by General von Leyser was a violation of the International Law? Here too I may be permitted to prove that nothing which could incriminate my client has been offered. No order was submitted by the prosecution, which my client has issued during the months he commanded the XVth and XXIst Corps which would direct that no prisoners should be taken or that captured partisans should be shot. The prosecution could never have submitted such orders, because such orders were never issued by General von Leyser. The prosecution have not taken too much trouble in producing evidence supporting their charges that partisans were killed by troops of General von Leyser contrary to the rules of the International Law. The prosecution submitted all reports of the subordinated divisions available to them in which mention is made of members of bands who were shot to death. The prosecution, apparently, believed that they proved that this shooting to death took place after the prisoners were captured and in the prosecutions opinion was thus a violation of the Martial Law. I do not need to trouble myself with the question which Law governs warfare with irregular forces. It is sufficient to point out that even according to the Rules of Land Warfare members of irregular troops cannot claim treatment as members of fighting forces.
However, this viewpoint does not apply for the evaluation of the material submitted by the prosecution, because no evidence at all has been produced which would prove that captured bandits were not treated as prisoners of war.
To arrest persons who are suspected of being partisans is as such without doubt in accordance with the International Law and perfectly justified. This corresponds also to the legal principle laid down in Control Council Law No. 38 which refer to the internment of persons, who are not guilty of any particular crime but can be considered dangerous to the aims of the occupying powers. I can, therefore, disregard those documents which deal merely with arrests of persons suspected of being partisans.
It is comparatively easy to prove that the reports submitted by the prosecution, concern battle incidents in the course of which the bandits were killed. In general already the documents submitted are a proof for that fact; in any case if they prove it are presented and considered as complete documents, not as excerpts. However, in this connection I would like to point out that the prosecution, as a rule, presented only piece of the report which shows the shooting to death of the partisan in question, even if in the original the entire incident was recorded and it could be seen from the record that it concerned a military operation.
The following paragraphs contain details. I will omit them, and continue with the second paragraph on page 46.
This group of documents does not prove that troops of General v. Leyser had shot to death bandits just because they were bandits. The bandits fell in battle or fell through the legal employment of weapons in case they did not stop when called upon to do so. Therefore, all these instances have no connection whatsoever with the charges made by the prosecution.
To Count III of the indictment the prosecution submitted an additional document concerning incidento in the area of tho XXIst Army Corps. On account of its importance I would like to discuss it briefly. In a daily report submitted by the XXIst Army Corps dated 30 August 1944 the killing of 20 bandits is reported. In this case, too, the prosecution was apparently under the impression that these men were executed for the sole reason of being bandits. This conclusion drawn by the prosecution is in severe contradiction to the chain of command existing at that time and is utterly arbitrary and not proved by anything. This execution is listed in the general survey of the daily report of the corps without reference to any detailed specifications. As German troops wore ordered to report to their higher offices all incidents which came to their knowledge and could be of significance to the higher command, this report does not prove at all, that these men were executed by troops under the command of General von LEYSER.
Furthermore, from the excerpt submitted one cannot determine the reason for this execution.
This surprise attack is reported under Korueck 1024, a rear Army office, which was not subordinated to the XXIst Corps. The description given by General v. LEYSER Proves, that no troops subordinated to him were stationed in the area in question. The commander of the rear army area was, on principle, directly subordinated to the Army and not to a Corps. Thus, my client is not responsible for these incidents and the evidence submitted by the prosecution is not sufficient to prove that General v. LEYSER was responsible.
Therefore exhibit 401 belongs to the group of prosecution documents which deals with incidents of units not subordinated to my client. It refers to incidents involving the Ustaschaor Cetnic groups and in one case a Croatian fighting unit. In all these documents, there, is however, only one factor to be considered: The actions reported were not carried out by subordinated troops, but by Croatian units.
It was proven by the evidence presented by the defense that the Croatian army was generally and on principle subordinated to the command of the Croat Ministry for the armed forces, independent of the German Wehrmacht. Croatian troops could only be subordinated to a German commander for tactical deployment, in individual cases. But also in these cases the German commander did not have any disciplinary or judicial authority.
No German commander of the troops was independently authorized to take steps against the Croatian army. In case he disapproved of something, he could only report it to his superior, through the official channel, via the plenipotentiary German General, in order to induce the Croat government or the Croatian army to take steps.
I refer, in this connection, to the statements of my client on the witness stand, and, in particular, to the detailed statements of the witness KOBE. In addition, I refer to the statements of the witness KLEIN.
If this viewpoint was taken, in regard to regular units of the Croatian army, the Domobranes and Ustascha battalions, it was even more the case in regard to anything which occurred at the self-defense units of the inhabitants, that is at the Chetnik units, at the civilian Ustascha and at the Croatian battle units. No chain of command existed there, much less any subordination. Those units acted completely on their own. The German troop commander could again, only report such cases to his superiors, in order to obtain an intervention by the Croat Government or in order to inform the higher command of the incident.
As shown by evidence, such incidents were included in reports of the troops, in a quite unequivocal wording. I refer also in this connection to the statements of my client, as well as to the statements of the witness KOBE and KLEIN, which, partly, unequivocally clarify these incidents.
Before I finish with this count of the indictment, I want to discuss briefly exhibits 673 and 674 which were introduced during the rebuttal proceedings against General von Leyser. Both documents have in common that they concern measures of units which were not oven according to the charges of the prosecution subordinated to General von Leyser.
The 1st document concerns an action planned by the division Brandenburg against Tito. It does not state that General von Leyser ever learned of this plan. I omit the next few sentences.
Exhibit 674 is a report to the XV AK to the effect that a reprisal measure is planned and that the action concerned is to be carried out by the V SS-corps.
This corps has, obviously, also suggested the reprisal measure, as results from the letter referred to. The V SScorps was not subordinated to General von LEYSER, as the counsel for the prosecution recognized himself at the submitting of the document. It is, therefore, the plan of a superior office, suggested by a unit which was not subordinated to General von Leyser, to order the execution of these reprisal measures. I do not know, how, in view of these facts, General von Leyser can be held responsible for it.
Concluding I may say that the prosecution has brought no evidence against General von Leyser, in regard to count III of the indictment, as far as it has been discussed until now.
After the discussion of these document groups, I come now to the other point of count III of the indictment, concerning the issuing, transmitting and execution of the commissar order, of the commando order and of the so-called order against Italians.
I will omit the rest of the page, also the beginning of page 61 and continue at the bottom, the paragraph before last, on page 61:
As General von Leyser did not take part in the capitulation of the Italian army, I must not discuss the legal problems of that issue.
I come, now to the commando order. This order was issued and transmitted in October, as shown by the exhibit submitted by the army. General von Leyser belonged at that time, to the Fuehrer-Reserve. He did not take over another command until November 1942, at which date he took over a corps on the Russian front. The commando order could, therefore, neither have been received, nor transmitted by General von Leyser. Neither did he receive the supplementary order of the Wehrmacht Commander South East of 28 October 1942.
In addition, no document was produced by the prosecution which proves that the commando order was carried out in the zone of the XV and XXI A.K. Army Corps.
The same is true of the supplement to the commando order referring to allied military missions, which was submitted by the prosecution. The documents, which were introduced subsequently during the rebuttal proceedings, do not refer to units subordinated to General von Leyser.
The defense could, on the other hand, prove the fact that the commando order was not carried out.
The next paragraph concerns details and I continue on page 63 at the top:
May I, furthermore, point to a number of defense documents confirming the fact that the commando order had not been carried out.
It has to be emphasized, in this connection, that the prosecution has proved neither the transmission, nor the carrying-out of the commando order, in regard to General von Leyser. On the other hand, the defense has brought evidence that both orders were not carried out in the zone of General von Leyser.
The documents and orders discussed in the above refer to General von Leysers assignment in Croatia and Albania; the commissar order which is also mentioned in count III of the indictment refers to my client's assignment in Russia.
The prosecution submitted in its evidence only the commissar order as such. It did not even attempt to prove that this order had been transmitted by General von Leyser, neither that it had been carried out by the troops under his command.
General von Leyser has stated and his statement was confirmed by affidavits -- that he was informed about this order, but that it had been pointed out explicitly that it was not to be carried out. It was also interpreted and handled in this manner in the zone of the 269th Infantry Division.
General von Leyser, without having knowledge of any documents of the prosecution, stated, in the witness stand the following, in regard to the attitude of the commissars: the troops knew from experience that commissars defended themselves in battle to the utmost and incited their comrades also the greatest resistance. Therefore, the most bitter battles took place where ever commissars were fighting with the Russian troops, and many commissars were killed after fierce resistance.
According to their orders and their training, commissars who were captured also engaged in activities against the German troops behind the German lines, as they had been ordered; they formed partisan groups and carried out acts of sabotage. The army had also to take steps against this conduct of the commissars.
One can, therefore, say that commissars were not treated differently by the 269th Inf. Div. than any other member of the Russian army under the sane circumstances.
The fact that, in spite of this, commissars who were killed in battle or shot as saboteurs, were mentioned separately in the reports, is based on orders according to which commissars had to be reported separately, and on the intention of the troops to emphasize the special importance of this problem in reports to higher commands.
General von Leyser's statement in the witness stand to this effect could also not be shaken by the documents introduced during the cross-examination. Because in none of these documents the reasons or the circumstances are mentioned, under which these commissars were killed. May I briefly discuss the individual documents, because of the great importance of this problem. Exhibit 611 reports the shooting of a woman commissar. As only men were assigned as commissars to the Russian army, this cannot refer to the shooting of a member of the army. No reasons for the shooting are mentioned in the document. As, however, the same report mentioned the combatting of partisans, it may be assumed, that the woman commissar is a civilian who was engaged in activities against the German Wehrmacht.
By the way, the incident was recorded by the information section of the division, thus by a unit which operated in the rear area. This fact, too, supports the conclusion that this matter concerned the combatting of partisans or saboteurs behind the German lines.
The exhibit 615, which was also submitted, reports the shooting of two Russian prisoners, a Kommissar and a higher Russian officer. The contents of this report show clearly that it was not a question of an application of the Kommissar order, but of the squashing of a mutiny among the prisoners of war.
The prosecution asserts that exhibit 616, which was the last of the documents submitted, is supposed to be a teletype of the 269th Infantry Division. In connection with this prosecution exhibit it must be said that already for formal reasons it his no probative value whatsoever. The document has no signature and does not give the sender's name. There is no way of telling whether this alleged report is a summary of reports covering incidents over an extended period of time, or whether it concerns only one incident. Moreover, this document does not contain any proof for the fact that this report had ever been submitted to General von Leyser.
With regard to the actual contents, I can refer to the statements I have already made in connection with the rest of the documents. This document does not show which Kommissars were involved and why they were killed.
May I be permitted to add the following with regard to this count of the indictment as a whole:
In the Russian Army a Kommissar was attached to each company. We know the numbers of prisoners taken during the first months of the war against Russia. At that time many hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers in active service were captured by the Germans.
If the Kommissar order had really been carried out, entirely different figures would have appeared in the reports than actually did appear. The small number of Kommissars mentioned therein is an additional proof that their death was not connected with the Kommissar decree. I skip the next sentence.
This finishes the discussion of the prosecution material as far as it concerns the Kommissar order. Thus, I can conclude my discussion of count III of the indictment with the statement that no proof whatsoever has been submitted in support of the charge made against General von Leyser in this connection.
And now, Your Honors, I pass over to count IV of the indictment. Here all defendants are charged with having assisted in clearing the South East of Europe of inferior persons, such as Jews and Gypsies, and of politically unreliable elements, such as democrats and nationalists. Furthermore, all defendants are charged with having assisted in enslaving and deporting the population of the occupied territories to Germany or to other occupied territories as forced labor. In any case the chief prosecutor, in his opening speech, interpreted the indictment in this way. Therefore, this count of the indictment, too consists of two major parts. The alleged clearing operations on the one hand, the deportation for forced labor on the other hand.
Now, as far as the alleged operations are concerned, I can limit my statement. Among the entire evidence submitted by the prosecution against General von Leyser there is not one document which might serve to support this charge. I omit the rest of the paragraph. It just contains details.
Only one document has been submitted during the cross examination which could have a faint connection with this count of the indictment. It contains a note stating that 25 Jews were deported to Fiume.
However, this point was clarified beyond doubt by the witness Kobe. The correctness of this explanation was supported by the way the report was formulated, because, contrary to the other persons arrested who were mentioned, no mention is made of an arrest of these Jews.
B. Thus I can pass over to the second part of count 4 of the indictment, the alleged forced labor program of the German Wehrmacht. Here the Prosecution have stated that this count of the indictment was in no way connected with any military operations. The defendants here are supposed to have acted as hangmen of Sauckel and Himmler. With regard to this count of indictment I can state again that the prosecution have not taken too much trouble about the production of evidence. They have made assertions without being able to prove them.
With regard to the area under General von Leyser they stated that thousands of square miles and thousands of islands were stripped of their population. 150 to 200,000 Croats were deported from their homes and farms and were pressed into camps. There they were examined, the weaker ones were sent to the concentration camps and the rest were deported to Germany for forced labor.
1.) However, the prosecution did not submit any kind of proof for its assertion. They were satisfied with submitting orders which concerned the evacuation of areas in the interior of the country, and the planned evacuation of the coastal region and the islands lying in front of it. However, the most important fact has not been proved: The assertion that the evacuees were used for forced labor in the country or were deported for slave labor in Germany.
As to the point that troops subordinated to General von Leyser had anything to do with the later employment of the evacuees, the prosecution has submitted no evidence whatsoever. The documents of the prosecution even prove the contrary, i.e. that only Croatian offices, in collaboration with German territorial offices and the German Embassy, were authorized to decide about the later employment of the evacuees.
Beyond this the material submitted by the defense has clearly proved that the Corps, i.e. General von Leyser had nothing at all to do with these questions.
The registration of labor was entrusted to some German offices which carried out the recruiting of voluntary labor in close cooperation with the competent offices of the Croatian authorities. As the statement of the witness Persch proves, these labor registration offices were by no means subordinated to General von Leyser.
The registration of workers for the construction of fortifications, as far as it was done at all, was supposed to be carried out by mixed commissions consisting of one Croatian Army Officer and one officer of the Ustacha militia, to whom a German officer was to be attached only for the purpose of liaison with the German offices. These commissions were to cooperate with the local Croatian authorities. Thus the Corps Headquarter of the XV A.K. bears no responsibility whatsoever. Neither could the Prosecution prove it that General von Leyser had any connection with the administration of camps, either for evacuees or for P.W.'s. To begin with, I do not know why the prosecution submitted a great number of documents in connection with this point, which prove nothing except the fact that bandits were arrested. Does the prosecution mean to assert that the arrest of such bands is contrary to the law of warfare? Or is it going to assert that the sending off of P.W.'s from the combat area is not in accordance with the regulations of the Geneva Convention? In view of General von Leyser's official position as tactical commander of troops it is clear that on principle he had nothing to do with the administration of P.W. camps, nor with the administration of camps for evacuees. The planned camp for evacuees would have been subordinated to Croatian authorities, respectively to German territorial offices, prisoners of war matters were handled by German territorial offices both of which were not under the military jurisdiction of General von Leyser.
Before dealing with the evidence of the prosecution, I want to make clear the following point of view: The forces under the command of General von Leyser were committed in the area of Croatia. All measures planned and executed in this territory were carried out with the strictest approval of the Croatian authorities, who, in turn, had the right of sovereignty. An independent State, however, has the right to order and to carry out such measures towards the native inhabitants. This also applies to evacuation, labor allocation, and the drafting into military service. The troops merely supported the Croatian authorities in exercising their sovereign rights.
I have already set forth above that even this point of view concerning the rights of a State has no important bearing on the case, when considering the appointment of General von Leyser and the duties he had; for his duties would have been the same even if he had functioned in an occupied country.
I omit the rest of this paragraph and continue with figure 2 on page 73 at the top.
2.) After this basic clearing of the facts I now come to the accusation made against General von Leyser in the indictment. It is stated, under No. 15g that on 3 December 1943 during the operation "Panther" General von Leyser had given orders to his troops to deport to Germany for forced labor all able-bodied people from numerous Croatian villages. The prosecution presented the following argumentation hereto in the opening statement:
"In one single action of operation 'Panther' more than 6000 people were deported to the Reich for forced labor."
Operation "Panther" this represents - according to the conception of the prosecution - an outstanding case in the forced labor program of the German Wehrmacht.
What, however, can be extracted from the evidence submitted on this case? General von Leyser, when examined, presented the whole operation with the help of the documents submitted by the prosecution and several other documents submitted by the defense.
According to this the region of the Petrova Gora and the Samarika had for a long time previously been a supporting territory of bands, where strong bandit forces and their supply-bases were located. In order to clear this territory, the XVth Corps suggested on 27 November 1943 to the 2nd Panzer Army that operation "Panther" be carried out. According to this proposal only those men who were able to bear arms were to be deported in order to take away from the bands the possibility to fill up their personnel by forced recruitings, that is to say for purely tactical reasons. Nothing is said at all about further employment of those to be evacuated, let alone mention of the fact of a deportation for forced labor in Germany. This was outside the scope of tasks of the XVth Corps.
The documents in a later chronological order did not originate with General von Leyser or his Corps. It follows from this correspondence between the 2nd Panzer Army and the Plenipotentiary German General that the Corps, and thus General von Leyser, had nothing to do with the subsequent employment of the persons to be evacuated, and that this was the task of other Croatian and German offices.
I just want to mention the following points from this correspondence. The Plenipotentiary German General, not subordinate to the XVth Corps, says that in his opinion, an evacuation of 6000 persons was to be expected. It is from this document that the prosecution has taken this figure which they claim represents the actual number of deportations carried through. The document however shows that this was merely an estimate.
According to the same teletype, camps for the persons to be evacuated were to be established by Feldkommandantur 1036 which was a territorial office not subordinate to the XVth Corps.
Furthermore, the original proposition to evacuate those who were able to bear arms was to be changed to the effect that only strangers in the localities and those who were found outside of the villages should be evacuated.
Such persons, however, could be justly suspected of being a danger to the aims of the occupying power.
And what actually happened in this operation? The result itself is elucidated by the final reports on this operation - evidence so to speak, the accuracy of which cannot be disputed by the prosecution.
In this final report the following are enumerated: 191 prisoners, 21 deserters from the enemy and 96 evacuated persons. The explanation too for this small number is found in this document. It says that the villages were previously forcibly evacuated by the Communists.
It is thus established that merely 96 persons were evacuated from this region instead of the estimated 6000 persons to be evacuated according to the teletype by the Plenipotentiary German General. Even for these numbers all proof are lacking that they had actually been taken to Germany to work there. I believe that I need not say any more on operation "Panther".
3.) The rest of the documents submitted by the prosecution deals exclusively with orders to carry out planned evacuations. Evacuations as such are not a self-contained point of indictment according to the prosecution's exposition. I therefore aver that this group of documents would only then have a bearing on the decision of this case if it followed from them that the evacuated persons were employed contrary to international law. All these documents, however, have this in common that nothing of this nature is indicated therein. Thus I believe I can forego discussing these documents individually.
I just want to elucidate one more point. If the prosecutor claims that these evacuations were not justified for tactical reasons, then he is subject to error. The opposite can be proven from the orders submitted by the prosecution. May I be permitted to refer to the order of the 2nd Panzer Army of 15 September 1943, Herein, under No. 7, par.
2 the following terrain is listed for evacuation: pass-roads and strips of country along particularly endangered railway lines.
After, as has been shown above, such particular points had often been subject to attacks, it is clear that these evacuations were planned as a measure to protect vital military localities, that is to say for purely military reasons.
The same applies to the order of the 2nd Panzer Army of 13 March 1944 covering the evacuation of the coast and the adjoining islands. Here too the reason can already be found in the preamble to the order. It says that the great number of men on the islands and the coast who are able to bear arms would constitute a serious threat to the defense, and that, in addition, the presence of the whole population would greatly impede defensive measures. From this and from the evidence submitted by the defense it can be seen that these orders too were only issued for military and tactical expedience.
The evidence submitted shows that the evacuation was not carried out to the extent required from the military point of view.
Reasons of humanity and other practical reasons prevented the carrying out of these measures.
To this the fact has to be added that the issuing of orders in this field was not carried out by the Corps, but was directed in a greater frame by the Army.
The prosecution has submitted no evidence whatsoever to support its assertion that 150 to 200,000 Croats were evacuated. But it seems t o be interesting to clarify here how the prosecution arrived at this number. In an entry in the war diary of the XVth Army Corps it is mentioned, that 150 to 200,000 persons have still to be evacuated from the coastal region. This entry refers clearly to the report requested by the Army on the total number of persons who should be evacuated in case of enemy landings.
This number, roughly estimated for this special case, causes the prosecution to assert that these persons have actually been evacuated. Contrarily to that the entry shows that a total of about 1200 persons was evacuated from the islands. But here too it has not been proven that these persons were evacuated from the coastal region.
But I do not want to take up the time of the Tribunal by discussing in this final plea all the individual documents referring to these matters, because they would be of importance only if they would actually prove that evacuations were really carried out and that the persons evacuated were deported for slave labor. As no documents of this kind have been submitted, I can desist from discussing these documents in detail.
I may refer to the interrogation of my client in the witness stand as well as to the statements of the witnesses Einbeck, Pfafferott, Gereis, Persch, and Kobe.
All these statements show clearly that the evacuations would have been necessary for military reasons, but that if they were started at all, they could by far not be carried out as planned. But also the deportations restricted to persons suspected of band activity were not carried out by the troops, but, as I already have stated above, by the Croatian authorities.
In this connection I would like to draw the attention of the High Tribunal to only one document. It is the Special Directives of the XV Mountain Corps of 20 June 1944. The excerpt submitted here by the prosecution is the only document of this kind which refers to the deportation of Croats for labor assignment in the Reich. With this document the prosecution apparently wanted to prove that General von Leyser was responsible for this deportation. However, this conclusion is disproved already by the document itself, because it states that the deportation measures were to be stopped immediately. Thus, if the document itself proves anything, it proves only the fact that General von Leyser prohibited such measures being taken, but not that he ordered them.