For the rest I may refer to the statements of the witness H. v. Tucher which proved that such measures were not taken at all in the area of the XV A.K., but that this order was taken over m a general directive of the Army issued for the entire area. Moreover it is especially Exhibit 394 which proves that the hiring and registration of persons volunteering for work had to be carried out by the Plenipotentiary General for labor allocation and that the troops had no part in it.
Thus, summarizing I can therefore state to the first part of this count of the indictment, which refers to the alleged extermination of so-called inferior people, as well as to the second part which refers to the forced deportations, that General von Leyser has no guilt in this connection either.
I may come to the end and I again summarize the decisive facts. The assertion of Count I of the Indictment that General von Leyser is responsible for the murder of hundreds of thousands of civilians has not been proven by any evidence submitted. On the contrary, the submission of evidence proved clearly that no decimation measures were carried out by the troops of General von Leyser. If reprisal measures were carried out at all in the area of the XV A.K. and the XXI A.K., they were carried out only in the most urgent cases of emergency and to an extent which is justified by international law and which was made necessary by military requirements.
General von Leyser did not issue any orders for the carrying out of reprisal measures. Such measures were not included in his field of responsibility. This applies especially for the execution of hostages in the area of the division "Skonderbeg" mentioned in the indictment.
The assertion of Count 2 of the Indictment that the troops of General von Leyser, in violation of the laws governing warfare, carried out senseless destructions which were not justified by any military necessity with the aim, to weaken the economic and industrial potential of Croatia - Albania for decades and to slow down reorganization and reconstruction is, as far as Croatia and Albania is concerned, absurd, because these States were Allied States.
On the contrary, the Allied German Wehrmacht was highly interested in supporting, not in preventing the reconstruction of these countries. I proved beyond any doubt that the assertion of the prosecution concerning the destruction of 4 Croatian villages mentioned in the Indictment is incorrect, so that any additional discussion of this point is superfluous.
To Count 3 of the Indictment the defense proved that neither in the area of the XV nor the XXI Corps the German Wehrmacht was fighting against opponents which, according to the internal conditions of these respective states and according to their own behavior could be regarded as regular troops. Exceeding that it was proved that these opponents were treated in accordance with the international law.
With regard to the assertion that the Commissar order was carried out by the 269th Division which in Russia was subordinated to General von Leyser, the submission of evidence by the defense has shown that from the beginning it was not intended to issue this order and also that it was not carried out. The documents submitted by the prosecution on this point were, in their actual meaning, no evidence that this order was really carried out.
There is also no proof for the assertion that the Commissar order was issued somehow by General von Leyser's troops. But even prosecution documents showed that members of commando troops were treated as PW's, a fact which, with regard to the military mission, is also proved by a number of defense documents.
General von Leyser did not participate at all in measures taken against the surrendered Italian Army, because at that time he was not in Croatia.
To the assertion laid down in Count 4 of the Indictment referring to the deportation of the civilian population into camps and its employment as forced labor, it has to be stated that my client, on account of his official position as tactical commander of troops had nothing to do with them. The assertion of the prosecution that during operation "Banther" he ordered his troops to deport the ablebodied population of numerous villages to Germany for forced labor cannot be maintained in any way. The prosecution states that operation "Panther" led to the deportation of 6,000 persons. The final reports on this operation show that a total of 96 persons was evacuated As far as the evacuation of the islands and the coastal region is concerned, the difference between the assertions of the prosecution and reality is even greater. According to the evidence submitted, only a very small number of persons was evacuated from places of military importance. But the prosecution asserts and has no proof that 150,000 to 200,000 Croats were evacuated.
Furthermore the prosecution asserts facts about the fate of these persons after they were evacuated, which have not been proven at all.
I would like to insert something here: Counsel for the Prosecution stated that the XVth Army Corps was at the top of the crime list of the German army. I don't know what leads him to this statement. The facts submitted during the case-in-chief do not support his contention. On the contrary, these facts show that General von Leyser's troops adhered in every respect to the rules and customs of war.
If the High Tribunal agrees to the point of view of the Prosecution, namely that these men are not indicted because they are Generals and that they are to be acquitted, if, according to the evidence submitted, they cannot be made responsible for crimes, then I do not need to submit a special motion on behalf of General von Leyser because then the decision is absolutely clear.
DR. WEISGERBER (For General Speidel.)
May it please the Tribunal, General Speidel - who in the course of his military duties was fated to be committed in Greece during the period from October 1942 to May 1944 - concluded his examination-inchief with the following words: "It is every military leaders most noble duty to do everything in his power for his soldiers; that was the motive behind our actions. Our soldiers were loyal behind us and we generals protected them, that was our moral duty and also our fate."
This attitude - impregnated with a deep sense of responsibility and an expression of lofty military ideals - was shared by all the German generals dragged into this dock. It will be contradicted only by those who refuse to consider with an open mind the avents which happened in the South Eastern theater during the war years, because they deliberately misunderstand the facts and malevolently assume criminal intent.
It is worth while to stress a remark made by the prosecution in the opening statement on the 15th July 1947. I quote:
"We have not sought and will not seek in this case to make murderers out of soldiers for the violation of the rules framed in 1907." End of the quotation.
Therefore, it is not the issue of the charges that the defendants committed, in the course of warfare, acts which were prohibited by the Hague Rules on Land Warfare. I take it that the statement of the prosecution quoted above is binding, and I conclude, your Honors, that according to the prosecution's own submission this Court is not expected to decide upon possible violations of the Hague Rules on Land Warfare. What then is the real meaning and purport of the charge? The prosecution continued on page 14 (I quote:) "On the contrary we charge that these men insugurated and executed a deliberate program of terror and extermination." End of quotation.
The imputation of the prosecution with regard to the actions of the defendants is, therefore, quite different in character; these actions are described as part of a program which, exceeding the war aims proper, aimed at the extermination of peoples considered inferior. It may be safely assumed that the prosecution framed this sentence as a basis for the entire proceedings instituted by them. The prosecution stands and falls by the proof of the intent wrongly imputed to the defendants. A review of the 26 weeks, the hearings in this trial have lasted, shows that the prosecution has not even tried to produce this proof. In open contradiction to the declaration made in the opening statement, the prosecution has again and again referred to the Hague Rules on Land Warfare.
The prosecution has not produced one single document nor called one single witness testifying to the fact that the defendants sponsored, a program of extermination for national or racial reasons. On the contrary: All orders produced by the prosecution and pertaining to the combat of partisans or to reprisals stress -- without any exception purely military aims. The witnesses and the defendants agree in the description of the German military positions in the Balkans as vital for the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean, in Africa and in Russia. They make it clear beyond any doubt that the wide-spread band and sabotage activities, in which large groups of the population participated, were a threat to the very nerve of the German armed forces in the east and across the Mediterranean.
It was this threat which the defensive warfare of the Germans in the South Eastern theater tried to neutralize. As to the forms in which this defensive action was carried out, the generals in the dock are not responsible for them. The guilt rests with those who, by planning and ordering treacherous attacks and acts of sabotage placed themselves outside of international law and imperiled the German forces in the Southeastern theatre.
A.
I. My client is the only one among the Generals arraigned here who held the position of a military commander. This fact necessitates all the more a presentation of the extent of his authority, based on the evidence submitted by the prosecution.
A distinction must here be drawn between two periods:
1.) October 1942 to the end of August 1943. During this period General Speidel was the commander of Southern Greece. The Italian Forces were the occupying power in Greece. General Speidel had command authority merely over a minute part of the territory of Southern Greece, viz. a sector of the port of Piraeus with an adjoining strip of coast, the islands in the Saronian Gulf and a small area to the North-East of Athens with a few localities. Even the city of Athens was not under the jurisdiction of the Commander Southern Greece.
To illustrate the position and the duties of the Commander Southern Greece I refer to Speidel Doc. 15, Speidel Exh. 6.
2.) The period from September 1943 until the 2nd half of May 1944 covers General Speidel's employment as Military Commander of Greece. His position and duties are shown in the Speidel Doc. 17.
II. 1.) The titles "Commander Southern Greece," and "Military Commander Greece" are apt, no doubt, to cause the impression of regional and material authority. If, in addition, these prima facie mental pictures are impregnated - as I must say beforehand - with a quite hazy conception of "the executive power", then it is no wonder that to outsiders the "Commander Southern Greece" and "Military Commander Greece" seemed to be surrounded by a halo of omnipotency.
But was this so?
2.) The power of a military leader or commander depends on the available to the military commander, and on their equipment with arms and other accessories. Subordinate to the Commander Southern Greece were: 1 supply battalion, 3 Home Defense battalions which were exclusively assigned to guard duty, several smaller supplying units and, for training purposes only, the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division, the tactical employment of which had been reserved to Army Group E, and 40-50 year old guards are not an imposing force for a commander; and when we come to the forces of the Military Commander Greece, we find only a security battalion. It was merely for the period from the end of August till the beginning of November 1943 that elements of the 18th Police-MountainJaeger-Regiment were placed under the command of the Military Commander Greece for the purpose of securing the roads. After this task had been completed, the subordination of this regiment to the Military Commander Greece was terminated. I shall go into this later on, in connection with another matter. It might now be advanced that the Military Commander was also a territorial commander. What does this conception reveal? General Speidel took a stand to this question when he was directly examined. I refer to the transcript of 11 December 1947. The authorization of territorial command in Greece had nothing to do with the disposal over military forces.
3.) The surprising fact that the Military Commander Greece had practically no forces at his disposal is explained by the tasks given to the Military Commander Greece. The field tasks he had as Commander Southern Greece fell away; the supply task also fell away, and the staff readjusted to cope with purely administrative tasks. Furthermore, the political tasks and the basic economic tasks were handled by the Special Delegate of the Reich. Thus, the Commander was also dependent in this field, in contrast to a Military Commander in other countries. 4.) It may be countered that the Military Commander had the executive power. This conception is apt to cause confusion. Even General Felber who - as Military Commander South East - was Speidel's superior had to confess during his examination:
"I had no clear conception of the nature of executive power". My client stated his conception of the term "executive power" when he was under direct examination. I refer to these expositions. As far as I know, no deep-scooping investigations were made in this connection to ascertain just what is meant by "executive power". I can limit myself to the established fact that the Military Commander Greece had no executive power there, where other military commands, not subordinate to the Military Commander, as well as semimilitary and civilian offices were competent.
This is also expressed in this service instructions according to which he was to exercise the exercise the executive power only to the extent delegated upon him. The commanding generals of the XXIInd Mountain Corps and the LXVIIIth Corps, as well as the Commander Salonica-Aegaeis as a tactical command post with all the forces under their command were tactically never subordinate to the Military Commander Greece. They were subordinate to the C-in-C of Army Group E. The territorial relationship of subordination was limited to tasks of administration and soldiers' welfare and can therefore never be taken as grounds for a responsibility of the Military Commander on such measures as were carried out by the forces on their own responsibility in accordance with the tasks assigned to them. Even the prosecution was aware of this, for it says in the opening statement of 15 July 1947. I quote: "In the interest of an effectual pacification and of security it was naturally required that the regular tactical forces under Felmy and Lanz closely co-operated with the district and regional police units under Speidel's command." End of the quotation. It will now be shown that this quotation contains -- besides a correct judgment of the complete independence of the commanding generals of the XXII and Mountain Corps and the LXVIIIth Corps, as well as the Commander Salonica-Aegaeis, as a tactical command post, from the Military Commander Greece -- a quite inaccurate claim regarding the subordination of police units under General Speidel.
The police units referred to in the a fore-mentioned quotation could only have meant the police units of the Higher SS and Police Leader. The institution of the higher SS-and police leader is expounded as follows in the judgment of the IMT:I quote: "Himmler established a system wherein higher SS-and police leaders, as his personal representatives, functioned as executives in the alignment of tasks for the regular police, the security police, the SD, and the general SS in their spheres of command."
End of the quotation. With the higher SS-and police leaders an institution appears in 1943 -- in the occupied Russian territories even earlier--which was equally unpopular with all Wehrmacht Offices. Himmler with an unsatiable craving for power took advantage of his position as Chief of German Police -- which he was since 1937 -- in order to get the occupied territories under his control too. The infiltration of higher SS -- and police officers into the body of the Wehrmacht was just as impervious to scrutiny as the entire police organization of Himmler. Himmler's ambition to subordinate the entire German Wehrmacht under his jurisdiction as Reich Fuehrer-SS met, in 1943, with certain restrictions. We know from the opening statement of the prosecution in case II which is now tried at Nurenberg that it was planned for Himmler to take over the command over the entire German Wehrmacht in 1945 after he had already become C-in-C of the replacement army on 20 July 1944. As certain considerations had still to be taken, higher SS-and police leaders were subordinated to the military commander as matter of form. This, however, was all camouflage. Himmler had no inhibitions when it came to carry through any priority claims for his institutions, be it the Waffen-SS, the regular SS, or the police in all its shades. And their members were absolutely convinced of the privileges enjoyed by Himmler's institutions and acted accordingly too.
I deemed it necessary to make this brief exposition of conditions which have become well known from the procedure before the IMT in order to find an answer to the question: "What was the actual state of this subordination of higher SS-and police leaders under the Military Commander Greece?" Did a higher SS-and police leader -- that is to say a personal representative of the omnipotent Reich Fuehrer-SS -- really ever think of actually subordinating himself to a Wehrmacht General?
An all comprising and pointed answer to this is given by the struggle of the Military Commander South East i.e., -- General Felber and his Chief of Staff, General von GEITHNER against "Himmler's strivings for power; I refer to the documents Doc.
159, Exh. 33; Doc. 170, Exh. 142 and Doc. 173, Exh. 164, contained in Document Book von Geitner, Vol. VI. Here, moreover, the command organization of the Military Commander South-East differed completely from that of the Military Commander Greece as the former was also the tactical commander for the Serbian area whilst the Military Commander Greece had no field-tasks whatsoever.
In the middle of September, 1943, that is, shortly after my client had been appointed Military Commander Greece, a higher SS -- and police leader arrived in Athens. His service instructions, which I shall briefly go into, bear the date 7 September 1943 and can be found in Prosecution Document NOKW-1438, If, under No. 2 of these service instructions a subordination under the military commander is mentioned, then this stipulation can only be construed in connection with numbers 307 of the service instruction. The question of jurisdiction is settled for 2 categories of tasks to be handled by higher SS-and police leaders:
a) Police tasks -
b) the combatting of bands In regard to a): Those police tasks which corresponded to those of the Reich Fuehrer-SS in the Reich were carried out by the higher SSand police leader independently who received his instructions directly from the Reich Fuehrer-SS.
This has been stipulated beyond the shadow of a doubt in numbers 3 and 7 of the service instructions for the higher SS-and police leader. I ask that the translation of the next word be changed. Directives on cases for the police only were never submitted to General SPEIDEL. Even Army Group E was not advised in this connection. Cf. affidavit Winter, Speidel Exh. 14, Speidel Document Book 1, page 12.
The witness von dem Bach-Zelewski also confirmed in his interrogation of 14 January 1948 that the higher SS- and police leader was not subordinate in any form to the Military Commander Greece in matters of police.
The witness Felber corroborated this fact when he was examined on 22 January 1948. No responsibility can therefore be laid on General Speidel in this connection. Of great purport is also the consecutive statement made by the witness von dem Bach-Zelewski on 14 January 1948 that the police could carry out independent operations against house-partisans within the scope of their police duties. To complete the picture, may I refer to No. 3, paragraph 2 of the service instructions whereby the higher SS- and police leader had, in matters of police, the right of advising and supervising Greek authorities and police forces. It follows from the circular dated 19 October 1943 contained in Doc. Speidel No. 84, that the Higher SS --- and Police Leader Greece suffered no interference with his exclusive authority. This announcement was published without the knowledge of the Military Commander Greece. Thus it is not the Military Commander Greece who orders the subordination of the Greek police force to the higher SS-and police leader as one would expect with such a weighty measure; no, the higher SS-- and police leader orders and promulgates this measure himself and even warns of reprisal measures if members of the Greek police are wounded or murdered by irresponsible elements. Does the Higher SS-- and Police Leader Greece publically announce the subordination of the Greek police in the name of the Military Commander Greece? No, not a word is said about the latter; on the contrary, the higher SS-and police leader acts in the capacity of a completely independent office for the whole police force of Greece, who does not trace his authorization and authority to the Military Commander Greece but who exercises authority as a personal representative of Himmler and who is subjected to nobody else except directly to Himmler. To him and not to the Military Commander Greece does the higher SS-- and police leader trace his authorization to institute reprisal measures. A responsibility can only be assumed where there are rights and duties. Did the Military Commander Greece then have any rights over the Higher SS--- and Police Leader Greece?
It is clearly shown, not only by the service instructions, but also by the actual practice that this was not the case. I refer in comparison to the testimony of the witness Felber, a witness of the prosecution on 11 August 1947, who stated under direct examination that the Higher SS -- and Police Leader Meissner and also the other higher SS--and police leaders in the Southeast were subordinate to the Reich Fuehrer SS where police matters were concerned.
And now I ask the court: By what command authority, authorization, competence, jurisdiction -- or whatever one may call the legal basis -- could General Speidel, as Military Commander Greece, have given orders to the higher SS -- and police leader where police matters were concerned? No legal basis existed here, and thus any responsibility on General Speidel's part is eliminated.
I also want to touch this question briefly: Was it not the duty of the Military Commander Greece to interfere in spite of his indisputable incompetency? There existed at the most a moral obligation, if any, but it cannot offer a basis for a condemnation according to the recognized principles of the Criminal Law. Otherwise, however, it is necessary for reasons of legal security to warn over and over again of the tendency to construct a responsibility for the guilt of other individuals', a tendency which appears just in the so-called war criminal trials.
I turn now to digit 4 of the service instruction which emphasizes as "main task of the Senior SS and Police Leader the leadership of the SS and Police Formations in the fight against bands and sabotage under their own responsibility according to the general directives of the Reichfuehrer SS". The combatting of bands and sabotage belongs to the security tasks and is consequently a matter of tactics. It should be repeated merely for reasons of the completeness that the police conducted independent operations against resident partisans within the limits of its police tasks, as was explained by the witness Bachzelewski.
The carrying out of security tasks is consequently a task of the troops and the commander of the troops. The Military Commander Greece was in charge of security tasks only in as far as such tasks were transferred to him by the Commander in Chief of the Army Group E. General Speidel was charged with securing three defiles in the time from the end of August till the beginning of November 1943. For this reason parts of the Mountain Infantry Regiment 18 of the Police were assigned and subordinated to him. This security task was completed with the becoming valid with the service instruction of the Senior SS-and Police Leader Greece which originated from the Commander in Chief South East on 11 October 1943.
That the Military Commander Greece was charged by Army Group E with further tasks of troop leadership in the following period of time, is something the prosecution had to prove. It follows unequivocally from figure 4 of the above mentioned service instruction for the Military Commander Greece that he could be "put in charge of tasks of troop leadership temporarily only" and this by the Commander in Chief of Army Group E. That the Military Commander was normally not in charge of the troop leadership was already demonstrated by me previously. I add something here. Therefore he the Military Commander Greece had no possibility for it because no troops were subordinated to him. Further on it would have been up to the prosecution to prove that some more security tasks were assigned to General Speidel by the Army Group after the task of securing the defiles was concluded.
It must be demonstrated quite distinctly that the prosecution had neither offered nor produced any evidence in this respect. It belongs to the generally recognized rules of evidence that he who assorts that a departure from the rule occurred is burdened with evidence. The general assertion that the police in Greece was subordinated to General Speidel is still less good because such an assertion is absolutely contradictory to the facts.
I have already explained that the police units of the Senior SS and Police Leader Greece were not subordinated to General Speidel in their own sphere of activity viz the police. If the police formations should be deployed for military tasks outside their proper sphere of tasks, a special order of Army Group E was needed for this. This follows unequivocally from Figure 4 of the service instructions for the Military Commander Greece. Was the prosecution able to submit such an order?
It is in vain that one looks for such an order in all the documents presented at the trial.
It is proved in its total extent by the evidence produced that General SPEIDEL was not put in charge of security tasks after the beginning of November 1943:
a) General Felber declared in the stand on 11 August 1947 that General Speidel had as good as no troops at all "contrary to myself that is to Felber.
b) General Felber declared in the stand on 22 January 1948 Police Leader Greece was not subordinated to the Military Commander Greece in the military sphere.
c) General Winter, Chief of the General Staff of the Army Group E, declares in his affidavit of 20 September 1947 -- that General Speidel was not subordinated to the Commander in Chief of the Army Group E.
d) General Winter declares in the same affidavit that the Commander in Chief of the Army Group E transferred a permanent security area to the Senior SS and Police Leader together with the Mountain Infantry Regiment 18 of the Police which was subordinated to him. The first named person was alone responsible with his forces for securing the operational communications.
3) The service instruction for the Senior SS and Police Leader Greece says in Figure 4 that the leadership of the SS and Police Units in the combat against bands and sabotage is transferred to the Senior SS and Police Leader under his own responsibility according to the general rules of the Reichfuehrer SS.
both of them officers of the staff of General Speidel and both employed in the section Ia of the staff, deposed in conformity with each other that the Senior SS and Police Leader was no inferior of the Military Commander Greece in the combat against bands and sabotage.
g) It is said the War Diary of the 68th Corps -- under the 7 January 1944 that the commander of the Mountain Infantry Regiment 18 of the SS-Police is appointed combat commander for the Theben and Levadia area.
Corps Headquarters 68. Corps Proposes to the Army Group E on 17 February 1944 - Felmy exh. 40, page 19 -- to put the Mountain Infantry Regiment 18 of the Police under his command for the operation entitled "Gummibaum".
On 18 February 1944 the Army Group E gives the information that the suggestion is rejected. It can be proved by the War Diary of the 68th Corps that the Senior SS and Police Leader Greece sent a teletype to the 68th Corps with the suggestion to pacify the Peloponnese by the Mountain Infantry Regiment 18 of the SS-Police within 2 months. General Felmy declared as a witness -- that the Major General Schinama answered in the negative the question, whether he getsin touch with him (General Felmy) by order of the Military Commander Greece and added that he acted on the order of the Anti-Partisan warfare Central Officer.
It would be possible to increase considerably still the number of examples. The Military Commander Greece appears in no way at any place; neither did General Speidel order that the formation should be placed under his command, nor did any bureau apply to him for it concerning the Police Regiment 18. It is obvious, however, that Army Group E which had the tactical leadership in the Greek area made all the decisions; but in no way as the superior bureau of the military Commander Greece in questions of tactics, for he was not under the command of Commander in Chief of the Army Group E, as explained by the witness Winter.
However, the witness Bach-Zelewski deposed as witness of the prosecution that the Senior SS and Police Leader was subordinated to the Military Commander Greece with regard to military tasks.
But the witness Pad to admit that he was not acquainted with the conditions of subordination and command with Army Group E. Thus the deposition of this witness concerning the previously mentioned assertion does not possess the slightest probative value. For the local conditions are decisive. The witness Bach-Zelewski was not acquainted with them, but he had to admit himself that the Chief of the General Staff of Army Group E had to be acquainted with them better than himself. Otherwise Bach-Zelewski could make depositions only about tho matters, told to him by the higher SS and Police Leader on the occasion of his visit in Athens. This visit took place in the October of 1943. It is correct that the Senior SS and Police Leader was deployed at that time with parts of the Police Regiment 18 for security tasks under the Military Commander Greece. However, this new regulation took place only in the beginning of November 1943 so that Bach-Zelewski cannot state anything about the conditions as they were after this time. This must be quite particularly taken into consideration when the deposition of this witness is considered.
A glaring light is thrown, however, on the readiness of the Senior SS and Police Leader to be placed under the Military Commander in military matters by the affidavit of the General Scheurlen. When the General took up duties he was told by the SS and Police Leader that he would take no orders from him in order to prevent from the outset an intrusion in his independence.
His tendencies for independence went so far that he finally also refused obedience to the Army Group E.
I would like to say a few words to the question whether the Senior SS and Police Leader was authorized to take so-called "reprisal measures". I would like to point to the fact that reprisal measures must be put into the chapter "reprisals" in conformity with the terminologies as known by international law so far.
That the Senior SS and Police Leader could independently take reprisal measures in the police sphere follows from the proclamation issued by him on 19 October 1943 without the knowledge of the Military Commander. This right can scarcely be contested in consideration of his position as personal representative of Himmler. Neither can the authority of the Senior SS and Police Leader be doubted as far as reprisals are in question which are connected with the carrying out of security tasks. He had the rank and the position of a commander of a division and had an independent task under his own responsibility. Reprisals within the limits of security measures were the charge of the troops and not administrative matters. This distinct separation is emphasized in Fig. 1 of the order of the Commander in Chief South East of 10 August 1943 -
General Speidel, however, was exclusively in charge of administrative tasks and not of military tasks from the beginning of November 1943.
Just this means the basic difference which does not permit a comparison of the Military Commander South East with the competency and thus also with the responsibility of the Military Commander Greece.
And this difference grows the more distinct the closer the tasks are looked on. General Felber was permanent tactical commander and had at his disposal 70,000 - 80,000 soldiers.
The Senior SS and Police Leader Meissner was subordinated to General Felber within the limits of military tasks. For this reason General Felber could also give orders to his Senior SS and Police Leader for the execution of reprisals. General Speidel had no military tasks starting from November 1943; thus the Senior SS and Police Leader could not be subordinated to him and General Speidel had therefore no obligation at all and, as I have shown already, also no possibility to decide on reprisals of the Senior SS and Police Leader in connection with military deployment.
7.) It is doubtlessly a question which seems rather complicated, whether there existed at all a subordination of the Senior SS and Police Leader under the Military Commander, and if so to what extent. It cannot be decisive in attempting to create here clarity what theoretical subordination conditions will be created by theorists after 5 years for certain objects. Decisive, however, is the form of the subordination relationship, in case that the service instruction for the Senior SS and Police Leader was sensibly interpreted, and how it was carried out in practice. In this connection the former attitude of General Speidel is of decisive importance. A responsibility for the activity of the Senior SS and Police Leader did neither existed according to his conception in the police sphere nor with regard to the security tasks with which the Senior SS and Police Leader was charged from November 1943 onwards. This was deposed by General Speidel on the stand.
If General Speidel had been conscious of his responsibility he had not failed to make a move, had taken over an actual leadership. It can only be understood from the power conditions of that time as described by me that this leadership was no matter of course.
General Speidel always took care energetically and scrupulously of all affairs for which he was distinctly responsible and felt himself responsible. But he refused a joint responsibility for measures which were ordered and carried out by other bureaus who had a very far reaching authority, viz. the Reichfuehrer SS and his personal representative, the Senior SS and Police Leader. General Speidel was weaker than they were and his standpoint was clear and sensible, namely, to reject the responsibility for measures, if third persons who were stronger than he gave orders for the execution of these measures.