159, Exh. 33; Doc. 170, Exh. 142 and Doc. 173, Exh. 164, contained in Document Book von Geitner, Vol. VI. Here, moreover, the command organization of the Military Commander South-East differed completely from that of the Military Commander Greece as the former was also the tactical commander for the Serbian area whilst the Military Commander Greece had no field-tasks whatsoever.
In the middle of September, 1943, that is, shortly after my client had been appointed Military Commander Greece, a higher SS -- and police leader arrived in Athens. His service instructions, which I shall briefly go into, bear the date 7 September 1943 and can be found in Prosecution Document NOKW-1438, If, under No. 2 of these service instructions a subordination under the military commander is mentioned, then this stipulation can only be construed in connection with numbers 307 of the service instruction. The question of jurisdiction is settled for 2 categories of tasks to be handled by higher SS-and police leaders:
a) Police tasks -
b) the combatting of bands In regard to a): Those police tasks which corresponded to those of the Reich Fuehrer-SS in the Reich were carried out by the higher SSand police leader independently who received his instructions directly from the Reich Fuehrer-SS.
This has been stipulated beyond the shadow of a doubt in numbers 3 and 7 of the service instructions for the higher SS-and police leader. I ask that the translation of the next word be changed. Directives on cases for the police only were never submitted to General SPEIDEL. Even Army Group E was not advised in this connection. Cf. affidavit Winter, Speidel Exh. 14, Speidel Document Book 1, page 12.
The witness von dem Bach-Zelewski also confirmed in his interrogation of 14 January 1948 that the higher SS- and police leader was not subordinate in any form to the Military Commander Greece in matters of police.
The witness Felber corroborated this fact when he was examined on 22 January 1948. No responsibility can therefore be laid on General Speidel in this connection. Of great purport is also the consecutive statement made by the witness von dem Bach-Zelewski on 14 January 1948 that the police could carry out independent operations against house-partisans within the scope of their police duties. To complete the picture, may I refer to No. 3, paragraph 2 of the service instructions whereby the higher SS- and police leader had, in matters of police, the right of advising and supervising Greek authorities and police forces. It follows from the circular dated 19 October 1943 contained in Doc. Speidel No. 84, that the Higher SS --- and Police Leader Greece suffered no interference with his exclusive authority. This announcement was published without the knowledge of the Military Commander Greece. Thus it is not the Military Commander Greece who orders the subordination of the Greek police force to the higher SS-and police leader as one would expect with such a weighty measure; no, the higher SS-- and police leader orders and promulgates this measure himself and even warns of reprisal measures if members of the Greek police are wounded or murdered by irresponsible elements. Does the Higher SS-- and Police Leader Greece publically announce the subordination of the Greek police in the name of the Military Commander Greece? No, not a word is said about the latter; on the contrary, the higher SS-and police leader acts in the capacity of a completely independent office for the whole police force of Greece, who does not trace his authorization and authority to the Military Commander Greece but who exercises authority as a personal representative of Himmler and who is subjected to nobody else except directly to Himmler. To him and not to the Military Commander Greece does the higher SS-- and police leader trace his authorization to institute reprisal measures. A responsibility can only be assumed where there are rights and duties. Did the Military Commander Greece then have any rights over the Higher SS--- and Police Leader Greece?
It is clearly shown, not only by the service instructions, but also by the actual practice that this was not the case. I refer in comparison to the testimony of the witness Felber, a witness of the prosecution on 11 August 1947, who stated under direct examination that the Higher SS -- and Police Leader Meissner and also the other higher SS--and police leaders in the Southeast were subordinate to the Reich Fuehrer SS where police matters were concerned.
And now I ask the court: By what command authority, authorization, competence, jurisdiction -- or whatever one may call the legal basis -- could General Speidel, as Military Commander Greece, have given orders to the higher SS -- and police leader where police matters were concerned? No legal basis existed here, and thus any responsibility on General Speidel's part is eliminated.
I also want to touch this question briefly: Was it not the duty of the Military Commander Greece to interfere in spite of his indisputable incompetency? There existed at the most a moral obligation, if any, but it cannot offer a basis for a condemnation according to the recognized principles of the Criminal Law. Otherwise, however, it is necessary for reasons of legal security to warn over and over again of the tendency to construct a responsibility for the guilt of other individuals', a tendency which appears just in the so-called war criminal trials.
I turn now to digit 4 of the service instruction which emphasizes as "main task of the Senior SS and Police Leader the leadership of the SS and Police Formations in the fight against bands and sabotage under their own responsibility according to the general directives of the Reichfuehrer SS". The combatting of bands and sabotage belongs to the security tasks and is consequently a matter of tactics. It should be repeated merely for reasons of the completeness that the police conducted independent operations against resident partisans within the limits of its police tasks, as was explained by the witness Bachzelewski.
The carrying out of security tasks is consequently a task of the troops and the commander of the troops. The Military Commander Greece was in charge of security tasks only in as far as such tasks were transferred to him by the Commander in Chief of the Army Group E. General Speidel was charged with securing three defiles in the time from the end of August till the beginning of November 1943. For this reason parts of the Mountain Infantry Regiment 18 of the Police were assigned and subordinated to him. This security task was completed with the becoming valid with the service instruction of the Senior SS-and Police Leader Greece which originated from the Commander in Chief South East on 11 October 1943.
That the Military Commander Greece was charged by Army Group E with further tasks of troop leadership in the following period of time, is something the prosecution had to prove. It follows unequivocally from figure 4 of the above mentioned service instruction for the Military Commander Greece that he could be "put in charge of tasks of troop leadership temporarily only" and this by the Commander in Chief of Army Group E. That the Military Commander was normally not in charge of the troop leadership was already demonstrated by me previously. I add something here. Therefore he the Military Commander Greece had no possibility for it because no troops were subordinated to him. Further on it would have been up to the prosecution to prove that some more security tasks were assigned to General Speidel by the Army Group after the task of securing the defiles was concluded.
It must be demonstrated quite distinctly that the prosecution had neither offered nor produced any evidence in this respect. It belongs to the generally recognized rules of evidence that he who assorts that a departure from the rule occurred is burdened with evidence. The general assertion that the police in Greece was subordinated to General Speidel is still less good because such an assertion is absolutely contradictory to the facts.
I have already explained that the police units of the Senior SS and Police Leader Greece were not subordinated to General Speidel in their own sphere of activity viz the police. If the police formations should be deployed for military tasks outside their proper sphere of tasks, a special order of Army Group E was needed for this. This follows unequivocally from Figure 4 of the service instructions for the Military Commander Greece. Was the prosecution able to submit such an order?
It is in vain that one looks for such an order in all the documents presented at the trial.
It is proved in its total extent by the evidence produced that General SPEIDEL was not put in charge of security tasks after the beginning of November 1943:
a) General Felber declared in the stand on 11 August 1947 that General Speidel had as good as no troops at all "contrary to myself that is to Felber.
b) General Felber declared in the stand on 22 January 1948 Police Leader Greece was not subordinated to the Military Commander Greece in the military sphere.
c) General Winter, Chief of the General Staff of the Army Group E, declares in his affidavit of 20 September 1947 -- that General Speidel was not subordinated to the Commander in Chief of the Army Group E.
d) General Winter declares in the same affidavit that the Commander in Chief of the Army Group E transferred a permanent security area to the Senior SS and Police Leader together with the Mountain Infantry Regiment 18 of the Police which was subordinated to him. The first named person was alone responsible with his forces for securing the operational communications.
3) The service instruction for the Senior SS and Police Leader Greece says in Figure 4 that the leadership of the SS and Police Units in the combat against bands and sabotage is transferred to the Senior SS and Police Leader under his own responsibility according to the general rules of the Reichfuehrer SS.
both of them officers of the staff of General Speidel and both employed in the section Ia of the staff, deposed in conformity with each other that the Senior SS and Police Leader was no inferior of the Military Commander Greece in the combat against bands and sabotage.
g) It is said the War Diary of the 68th Corps -- under the 7 January 1944 that the commander of the Mountain Infantry Regiment 18 of the SS-Police is appointed combat commander for the Theben and Levadia area.
Corps Headquarters 68. Corps Proposes to the Army Group E on 17 February 1944 - Felmy exh. 40, page 19 -- to put the Mountain Infantry Regiment 18 of the Police under his command for the operation entitled "Gummibaum".
On 18 February 1944 the Army Group E gives the information that the suggestion is rejected. It can be proved by the War Diary of the 68th Corps that the Senior SS and Police Leader Greece sent a teletype to the 68th Corps with the suggestion to pacify the Peloponnese by the Mountain Infantry Regiment 18 of the SS-Police within 2 months. General Felmy declared as a witness -- that the Major General Schinama answered in the negative the question, whether he getsin touch with him (General Felmy) by order of the Military Commander Greece and added that he acted on the order of the Anti-Partisan warfare Central Officer.
It would be possible to increase considerably still the number of examples. The Military Commander Greece appears in no way at any place; neither did General Speidel order that the formation should be placed under his command, nor did any bureau apply to him for it concerning the Police Regiment 18. It is obvious, however, that Army Group E which had the tactical leadership in the Greek area made all the decisions; but in no way as the superior bureau of the military Commander Greece in questions of tactics, for he was not under the command of Commander in Chief of the Army Group E, as explained by the witness Winter.
However, the witness Bach-Zelewski deposed as witness of the prosecution that the Senior SS and Police Leader was subordinated to the Military Commander Greece with regard to military tasks.
But the witness Pad to admit that he was not acquainted with the conditions of subordination and command with Army Group E. Thus the deposition of this witness concerning the previously mentioned assertion does not possess the slightest probative value. For the local conditions are decisive. The witness Bach-Zelewski was not acquainted with them, but he had to admit himself that the Chief of the General Staff of Army Group E had to be acquainted with them better than himself. Otherwise Bach-Zelewski could make depositions only about tho matters, told to him by the higher SS and Police Leader on the occasion of his visit in Athens. This visit took place in the October of 1943. It is correct that the Senior SS and Police Leader was deployed at that time with parts of the Police Regiment 18 for security tasks under the Military Commander Greece. However, this new regulation took place only in the beginning of November 1943 so that Bach-Zelewski cannot state anything about the conditions as they were after this time. This must be quite particularly taken into consideration when the deposition of this witness is considered.
A glaring light is thrown, however, on the readiness of the Senior SS and Police Leader to be placed under the Military Commander in military matters by the affidavit of the General Scheurlen. When the General took up duties he was told by the SS and Police Leader that he would take no orders from him in order to prevent from the outset an intrusion in his independence.
His tendencies for independence went so far that he finally also refused obedience to the Army Group E.
I would like to say a few words to the question whether the Senior SS and Police Leader was authorized to take so-called "reprisal measures". I would like to point to the fact that reprisal measures must be put into the chapter "reprisals" in conformity with the terminologies as known by international law so far.
That the Senior SS and Police Leader could independently take reprisal measures in the police sphere follows from the proclamation issued by him on 19 October 1943 without the knowledge of the Military Commander. This right can scarcely be contested in consideration of his position as personal representative of Himmler. Neither can the authority of the Senior SS and Police Leader be doubted as far as reprisals are in question which are connected with the carrying out of security tasks. He had the rank and the position of a commander of a division and had an independent task under his own responsibility. Reprisals within the limits of security measures were the charge of the troops and not administrative matters. This distinct separation is emphasized in Fig. 1 of the order of the Commander in Chief South East of 10 August 1943 -
General Speidel, however, was exclusively in charge of administrative tasks and not of military tasks from the beginning of November 1943.
Just this means the basic difference which does not permit a comparison of the Military Commander South East with the competency and thus also with the responsibility of the Military Commander Greece.
And this difference grows the more distinct the closer the tasks are looked on. General Felber was permanent tactical commander and had at his disposal 70,000 - 80,000 soldiers.
The Senior SS and Police Leader Meissner was subordinated to General Felber within the limits of military tasks. For this reason General Felber could also give orders to his Senior SS and Police Leader for the execution of reprisals. General Speidel had no military tasks starting from November 1943; thus the Senior SS and Police Leader could not be subordinated to him and General Speidel had therefore no obligation at all and, as I have shown already, also no possibility to decide on reprisals of the Senior SS and Police Leader in connection with military deployment.
7.) It is doubtlessly a question which seems rather complicated, whether there existed at all a subordination of the Senior SS and Police Leader under the Military Commander, and if so to what extent. It cannot be decisive in attempting to create here clarity what theoretical subordination conditions will be created by theorists after 5 years for certain objects. Decisive, however, is the form of the subordination relationship, in case that the service instruction for the Senior SS and Police Leader was sensibly interpreted, and how it was carried out in practice. In this connection the former attitude of General Speidel is of decisive importance. A responsibility for the activity of the Senior SS and Police Leader did neither existed according to his conception in the police sphere nor with regard to the security tasks with which the Senior SS and Police Leader was charged from November 1943 onwards. This was deposed by General Speidel on the stand.
If General Speidel had been conscious of his responsibility he had not failed to make a move, had taken over an actual leadership. It can only be understood from the power conditions of that time as described by me that this leadership was no matter of course.
General Speidel always took care energetically and scrupulously of all affairs for which he was distinctly responsible and felt himself responsible. But he refused a joint responsibility for measures which were ordered and carried out by other bureaus who had a very far reaching authority, viz. the Reichfuehrer SS and his personal representative, the Senior SS and Police Leader. General Speidel was weaker than they were and his standpoint was clear and sensible, namely, to reject the responsibility for measures, if third persons who were stronger than he gave orders for the execution of these measures.
PRESIDENT: We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
Only those people who pass over the facts and conditions, which existed in Germany from 1933 to 1945 and were felt very badly by a considerable part of the Wehrmacht, and who does not want to see them, only such a person cannot be influenced, when forming judgment on the possibilities of a fight for power between the Reichsfuehrer SS and the original three parts of the Wehrmacht. Such an influence must come from the difficulties, the slights, the frequent sentiment of impotency the necessity to recede before the strongest man of the NS regime, which was presented frequently to the leaders. But whoever values the things of this world sensibly and impartially, as it behaves a wise judge, such a person cannot demand of a military leader who sat himself at the periphery of the events that he should take part in the actual combat in the field of internal politics. General Speidel could only limit himself to drawing a distinct dividing line between his own and alien competencies.
III. The prosecution is basing their assertions mainly on daily reports, other regular routine reports and monthly reports. In the course of this trial and on behalf of my client, in particular, the question how these reports were compiled and to what extent they justify conclusions with regard to the responsibility of the senders, has explicitly been dealt with. It is, therefore, sufficient for me to point out that those reports allow conclusions establishing the responsibility of the sender only to a minor extent. Especially, the so-called Icreports are particularly unsuitable in this respect. The section I c was, as it were, a kind of news agency; its job was to report all incidents whatsoever, including those which were outside of the scope of the responsibility of the commanding officer, and to transmit these reports to the superior authority through the so-called I c -- channels ac-cording to a system prescribed by OKW . The I c was not obliged to submit these reports in detail to his superior or to the commanding officer. IV. These basic explanations concerning the command authority of General Speidel -- which I could submit only briefly for lack of time -- serve the purpose of establishing the scope and the limits of my clients responsibility.
I shall conclude this general part of my plea by dealing briefly with the legal criteria of the criminal responsibility of my client.
The sentence of the IMT states (I quote) "It is one of the most essential legal principles that criminal guilt is personal." This is in accordance with both the principles generally established and with those recognized by the IMT, according to which the criminal guilt of the perpetrator requires not only that he is cognizant of the relevant facts but also that he realizes that the act in question is unlawful . Furthermore, the perpetrator must have acted either with intend or by negligence. However, according to the established principles governing criminal responsibility, negligence constitutes criminal responsibility only in those cases in which this is expressly provided by law. Neither the charter nor central council Law # 10 contain this provision. In consequence, only acts committed with intent can be punished, This agrees with the own point of view of the Prosecution, because in all the four counts the defendants are charged with having committed the incriminated acts with intent and willfully. Thus, a conviction cannot be based on the consideration that General Speidel negligently omitted to ascertain whether his own interpretation of the limits of his jurisdiction and responsibility was correct. This has rightly been pointed out in the opening statement of the prosecution: (I quote) "We would not have brought charges against these men, if they were to be accused of mere carelessness..." It is true that according to established legal opinion criminal responsibility for intent does not require cognizance of the specific legal provision violated by the act. It is sufficient that the perpetrator realizes in a general way that he is acting against the law, which disapproves of his act. This has been stated by the IMT when dealing with the guilt of the individual defendants. (I quote:) "They must have known that they were acting in defiance of ...interna ional law".Which indications, then were available to Speidel enabling him to realize that the actions charged to him were unlawful in the meaning of International Law?
It will seem obvious to everybody that the principles of humanity, international ethics and common decency are hardly apt to serve as a standard of what is good or evil in war. In war, good and evil, lawful and unlawful, human and inhuman are often separated but by a hair's breadth. Actions considered murder, arson and the like in peace time are, in war time, acts of war covered by international law. By general standards , all acts of violence committed as necessary acts of war are inhuman; this applies to the whole range from the killing of an unknown enemy who never wronged any soldier on the other side personally, to the heavy bombing of inhabited cities, the result of which we are seeing every day when looking through the window. The only clear limitation is this: If an act is not dictated any more by the purpose of the war, if it is outside of the conduct of the war, then good and evil can be ascertained by common ethical standards. Rape, robbery committed for personal enrichment, are instances of this kind. However, in the case of acts which serve the conduct of war, the intrinsic necessity of committing inhuman acts in the course of warfare, renders it hopeless to draw a borderline between inhuman acts still permitted and inhuman acts which are forbidden.
If we recognize the fundamental fact that warfare as such is an inhuman and cruel activity and that the conceptions of good and evil cannot be applied in warfare at all, and if we admit war as a given fact, then a borderline can only be drawn between acts which are permitted and acts which are prohibited. This delimitation cannot be derived from the conceptions of good and evil; it must rather be established by clear-out rules of international law. The perpetrator must be cognizant of these rules, otherwise he cannot be charged with intent.
If the defendant had in the years from 1942 to 1944 tried to tackle these questions, the very nature of the subject matter would have made this task quite as hopeless as if he had attempted to go by his sense of good and evil. This becomes more evident, if we survey the present even legal position prevailing in this field of International Law. No International Law at all has been laid down by statutes with regard to reprisals and to the taking of hostages. Whoever seeks information on this subject can only refer to the second source of International Law applicable to "warfare, viz. to the customs of war. However, it has been fully demonstrated in the legal statements submitted by no other than the prosecution what the customs of war amounted to before this world war. It has been clearly shown that all belligerent armies have from ancient times to date used the taking and executing of hostages as a reprisal whenever they were forced to do so. The fact that this measure was used by the Germans more frequently than by others during the last fifty years is explained by the simple reason that they entered foreign territory more often than their enemies during this period. If it happened from time to time that professors or certain politicians voiced their opposition to this kind of military action, this was only a criticism of this custom of war, but it could not abolish it.
I am now proceeding to the individual charges against General Speidel.
I.
1.) During his examination-in--chief, General Speidel has admitted that he ordered reprisals in two cases. The first case occurred in January 1943, the second case in June 1943. With regard to the first instance, General Speidel has made a full statement and has accepted the responsibility for it, although it was not clear whether the prosecution intended to charge him with it at all. I would like to stress this particularly. By an explicit statement, General Speidel has demonstrated the military situation prevailing in the period in question, the nature and the importance of the acts of sabotage involved, and the urgent necessity of preventing further acts of sabotage by reprisals.
The port of the Piraeus, the island of Salamis and the naval installations located there were as vitally important for the German armed forces in the Mediterranean and for the supplying of the German forces in Africa and on the Mediterranean islands, as every ton of loading space. At the turn of the years l942/43, naval installations, transports, and freighters were the targets of permanent assaults and attempts of sabotage by an enemy, who did not openly oppose the German armed forces, but committed his criminal acts under the cloak of the night, and remained in hiding. It became evident that these assaults and acts of sabotage followed a concerted plan; it was impossible to neglect their serious impact on the conduct of the war. The argument submitted by the prosecution "that a few shots fired at night did not amount to muc, and that particularly no damage was caused" misses the point altogether. Sabotaging of ships resulting in the loss of vital shipping space cannot be considered a negligible incident. Is there any army in the world which remains inactive spectator if its security and its mission as an occupation force were threatened? Is there any responsible general or troop commander who remains an inactive spectator if he is confronted with assaults and acts of sabotage which he recognize as parts of a large scale action impairing the security of his forces? Every occupying power is entitled both in law and by the customs of war to order the inhabitants of the country to surrender all arms and to prohibit armed resistance and armed aggression. This has been fully developed in the preceding pleas; the same applies to the legal absurdity put forward by the prosecution which denies the German armed forces any status of an occupying power, as far as events in the Balkans during the last war are concerned.
Part of the rulings issued by the American occupying power in Germany have been laid down in ordinance # 1 promulgated by Military Government.
According to the maxim "jura no vit curia" I may assume that the Court is conversant with this ordinance. According to the ordinance, possession of arms, armed aggression or resistance are crimes subject to capital punishment. The German power of occupation in Greece upheld the identical principle.
Your Honors, question of military necessity should be judged upon by military experts.
However, the military necessity for action to prevent further assaults and acts of sabotage has been explained by my client in such a convincing way that I can renounce the opinion of military experts on this matter.
The prosecution has not denied that reprisals form part of the existing customs of war. Nor has the prosecution claimed that this specific custom of war is "unlawful. Reprisals as measures of warfare are not measures of revenge nor are they a punishment; they are a form of self-defense provided in International Law, and a method of coercion admitted in International Law. It is true that reprisals as measures of warfare are partly rejected in jurisprudence; on the other hand, there are authors who consider them the only possible method of coercion and the only sanction available under the law governing warfare.
The decisive criterion is whether this custom of war is actually still in use. This, too, cannot be denied. When producing evidence for General Speidel, I have described a case of the shooting of hostages which occurred in Reutlingen in the French Zone on 24 April 1945. My only purpose in introducing this incident was to prove that the custom of war consisting in the shooting of hostages is known, recognized and practiced on the side of the Allies, too. Otherwise, the fact that one of the executed hostages was not only a Lt. Colonel of the medical corps -- in other words a medical officer protected by the International Red Cross -- but a Prisoner of War at the same time, would call for further discussion. But back now to the reprisal measures of General Speidel. General Speidel was responsible as commander of Southern Greece for the supplies going to the Greek islands and Africa -- as long as German troops were there. The naval installations were the object of surprise attacks and acts of sabotage; considerable damage had taken place. General Speidel was confronted with a situation which compelled him to take measures unless he would violate in the worst manner the duties which derived from his official position.
What was it that General Speidel did now?
a.) He looked on for a long time in spite of the accumulation of acts of sabotage around the turn of the year 1942/43;
b.) He initiated investigations on the perpetrators;
c.) He took conscientiously into consideration the military necessity and the success to be expected;
d.) He made sure for himself of the admissibility according to the principles of international law of the intended measures by asking for the legal opinion of his chief legal adviser.
a.) He obtained the agreement of his immediate superior;
f.) He took the hostages from a circle of individuals who were under suspicion as a result of the investigations;
g.) He published the measures.
General Speidel also started first an investigation in the case of the Citta di Savona. This case took place in June of 1943. The investigation, however, did not result in the apprehension of the perpetrator after 5 days. Otherwise General Speidel proceeded in the same way as in the first case.
The measures which General Speidel ordered in these two cases had the success that he had planned. Acts of sabotage were discontinued for quite a period of time in the first time. No more new acts of sabotage happened on Salamis in the following time. No more acts of sabotage against ships happened at all after the June reprisal was carried out.
Thus it cannot be denied that the reprisals were successful. The assertion of the prosecution is thus completely refuted that the measures, ordered by General Speidel meant "letting loose a torrent of senseless death and blind foolishness" or as said in the opening statement of the prosecution at another place a deliberate program of terror and extermination was inaugurated and executed which was boundless in its arrogant contempt for the inhabitants of the lands merely because they were regarded as inferior."
2.) Under count 1 General Speidel with the execution of 50 communists by troops under the command and the authority of the Military Commander Greece on, or approximately on, 10 January 1944, as retaliation for the murder of 2 German policemen. This case is contained in Exhibits 432 and 437.
It follows unequivocally from these two documents; in question were
a) murdered members of the Mountain Infantry Regiment 18 of the SS/Police
b) a measure during an operation in the Eastern part of Beotia.
Beotia was the combat area against the bands of the Senior SS and Police Leader. It was assigned to him under his own responsibility by the Army Group E. Subordinated to him was the Mountain Infantry Regiment 18 of the Police. The Military Commander Greece had neither the command nor the authority over this regiment on or approximately about 10 January 1944.
Count 1 digit 5 concern execution of 52 hostages in Tripolis, 44 in Sparta, 59 in Korinth, prosecution document contained in Speidel document 33.
From that it follows unequivocally that this reprisal was carried out by the 117th Rifle Division. General Felmy also called this case in his direct examination a measure of the 117, Rifle Division. The 117th Rifle Division was not subordinated to the Military Commander Greece. It is not to be understood how the prosecution arrives at the assertion that the executing unit was under the command and the authority of the Military Commander. Last, it must be pointed out that the carrying out of the reprisal was already reported under the 13 March 1944.