Q Did you meet a General Geitner?
A No. Well, at the moment I really can't remember. I don't think I would recognize him again.
Q But you were repeatedly in Belgrade?
A In Belgrade?
Q Yes, in Belgrade?
A Yes, I was in Belgrade.
Q In an official capacity, not for pleasure?
A Well, of course, -- naturally I was there officially in order to find out what was going on.
Q Well, then, didn't you go then to the Commander and the Commanding-General of Serbia when you were there?
A Yes.
Q I am asking you, witness, because I said to myself, "Well, of course, that would be the most obvious thing to do if you wanted to find out what was going on?"
A Yes, of course, I went to him to get some information, merely because I was not superior in the South East. I hadn't the power of command, I was merely more or less the chief who dealt with the matter. Of course, I didn't make the formal visits with this man and with that man, but I went in a sort of unofficial capacity and talked to all the responsible people there and met them all with Obergruppenfuhrer Meissner. We had a regular pleasant evening. There was General Felber, another general and General Bader.
Q And who?
A General Bader. I remember that name quite definitely.
Q You personally met General Felber?
A Yes, I spent the whole evening together with him.
Q Did you talk with General Felber about reprisal measures and about the experiences which he as Commanding-General and Commander in Serbia had in this sphere?
A Well, it was like this. My impression was that of harmony and friendship. We had good food and we had drinks, and, of course, there were toasts, and we talked shop but I can't remember details about it. Of course we talked about everything.
Q You talked about what?
A We talked about everything which happened in the area which was of interest.
Q But you didn!t go to General Felber's office and, talk for instance, with the Chief of Staff about official matters and about his experiences?
A No. You may doubt it today, but at that time in any case I felt myself officially so much higher than he was that I didn't talk to him officially but only to the Military Commander, one Wehrmacht Commander.
Q But then your conversations with the Commander-In-Chief consisted merely of a very nice dinner?
A Well, during a whole evening one can talk about everything.
Q Witness, did yon think that a conversation during dinner was sufficient in order to inform yourself about the necessity or about the effect of reprisal measures?
A Doctor, I received all the reports from General Felber and I read them.
Q Please answer my question, and I will come back again to this point later on. Do you think that a conversation during a good dinner was sufficient in order to inform yourself about the difficult problem of reprisal measures?
A I believe that it was exactly the opposite. The men found out things from me about the intentions of higher quarters. For instance, I could tell them how things were in the East.
I think I at any rate found out more at that time than Mr. Felber.
JUDGE BURKE: The conversation, I take it, was obiquitous.
Q You have told us, Witness, that the reprisal measures which were carried out had the effect of increasing the partisan movement?
A Yes.
Q Did you ascertain that from the reports which you received?
A Yes, and also mainly on the basis of the complaints made by the responsible people down there, who were of the same opinion.
Q Can you tell us which people complained in that sense? I stress "in that sense" that responsible people said that too many reprisal measures were being carried out? Who said that and who signed these statements?
A Protests came in continually. Of course, I can only remember protests from men with whom I worked for a long time. For instance, General Schenkendorf -- I read his protest myself.
Q But not in the Balkans?
A No.
Q Tell us people in Serbia, for instance with the Commander in Serbia? Did any of them protest in that way, and, if so, please tell me the names. That is what we want to hear.
A Well, I have stated that that was general there. I can't remember individual memoranda, and say that he did this or he said that. I really can't remember without the documents.
Q. Witness, but you have just said that protests came in continually. Then please tell me the name of one man who from the Balkan area, especially from Serbia, protested against this fact, and maintained that the reprisal measures contributed to the fact that the partisan movement was increasing.
A Yes, that was the impression I had from these discussions with General Felber, and with Mr. Meissner in his flat.
Q During the dinner?
A Well, the dinner took place afterwards. Excuse me, Dr., I don't eat all day long.
Q Can you tell me another man? Felber we have already had here as witness, but can you tell me the name of another man who in that sense at that time, in Belgrade or anywhere else in the Serbian area stated anything about this to you?
A Of course, I reported officially to the man I should report to and that was Field Marshall Weichs, who received me and showed me a map with the whole position and described everything to me and me talked about it.
Q Witness, do you really want to maintain here that General Field Marshall Milch -- Weichs told you that because of these reprisal measures, which were being carried out down here, the partisan movement was increasing? Do you want really to -- please wait a minute, witness.
A Doctor, I think are are both talking about different things. I am telling you that I can't say that in detail. I never asserted that I can say here on such and such a date, such and such a thing was said. I can only report about my general impression. No one can say today that in 1943 an individual really said such and such a thing.
Q. Can you tell me another name?
A. Well Felber we have already had here as a witness--he is always available.
Q. But can you tell me the name of another man who in that sense at that time in Belgrade or anywhere else in the Serbian area stated anything about this?
A. Of course, I reported officially to the man I should report to according to my rank and that was the C. in C. Fieldmarshal von Weichs who received me and showed me a map with the whole position and talked to me about it.
Q. Witness, do you really want to maintain here under oath that General Fieldmarshal Weichs, told you that because of these reprisal measures which are being carried out down here, the partisan movement is increasing? Do you really want to say that please wait a minute.
A. Doctor, I think we are both talking about different things, I am telling you that I can't say that in detail. I never asserted that I can say here on such and such a date, such and such a thing was said. I can only report about my general impression. No one can say things today about 1943, that an individual really said such and such a thing.
Q. Witness, you have maintained here repeatedly that from the reports you could see that the--or from some other source you could see that the reprisal measures did not cause a decrease but an increase in the partisan movement. I don't believe you and that is why I am asking you what sort of evidence you can show for this. If you maintain that General Fieldmarshal Weichs told you that, then we can examine him as a witness.
A. Doctor, I said that I know that from the original ten-day and monthly reports which I received and I must state as a basis if; for instance an area - or let's say Ruma, if before the operation it is quite obvious from the reports that in the week there were few blastings and after the operation there are twenty blastings, then I must conclude from that that there has been an increase in the partisan movement and that is how I collected my experience.
With regard to the conference, I can express myself quite clearly; with regard to details, I really cannot say anything any more.
Q. I see you cannot say anything about that. Well, in the reports to which you are referring, did these reports contain anything to the effect that the people who compiled the reports--for instance, Brigadier General von Geitner or General Felber--were also of the opinion that the increase of the partisan movement depended on such reprisal measures or did these reports give other reasons as to why the partisan movement temporarily increased?
A. Doctor, in these ten-day and monthly reports which I received already from another office, that is from the OKW, the name of the man who wrote the report wasn't contained and therefore I can't say that the report came from Herr Geitner or from Herr Felber or that it is an opinion of an army group or an opinion of lower commander, whose report was passed on accidentally, but I only evaluated the reports with regard to the whole situation map and then I had to say that this area here, for instance in pink, is a partisan suspect area and that later I have to draw that area in red showing it as a purely partisan area. I could only establish these reasons in general and these determinations which I found out from statistics were confirmed by the later reports which we exchanged; reports came in monthly in tens of thousands and memoranda also in thousands. I really can't say now that this man said such and such a thing.
Q. The reports which you received about which you are just now talking--were they merely from the OKW or were they for instance also from the army group or from the Commanding General?
A. Well, how the technical channel with the OKW was organized, whether the army group reported directly, I really don't know because for that area I received it from the Wehrmacht Operational Staff who exchanged reports with my men. I had my own Ia. How the channel was, how the report got there, I really don't know.
Q. Well, you received the reports. From the reports you could see from whom the report originated, the reports which you received. From whom did these reports originate?
A. These reports contained the words - Corps, Division - well at the beginning of the report was always the division. The divisions made the report, sent it to the Corps, the Corps sent it to the army, etc.
Q. And was there ever anything in the reports about the fact that the office which was reporting was of the opinion that the partisan movement was increasing because of the reprisal measures? Was that contained in the reports?
A. Doctor, I really don't understand your question because.....
Q. Well my question is quite clear.
A. Well the indignation about these reprisal measures was quite general. It was terrific indignation because the aim wasn't reached.
Q. Whom do you mean by quite general?
A. Well, all the men I spoke to. It was general indignation.
Q. For instance, you saw General Fieldmarshal von Weichs. Was he also indignant?
A. Yes, of course he kept on saying "I must have troops. I can't do anything about it without troops." They were all asking for troops because they said "These reprisal measures aren't any good alone it makes for more partisans. I must have troops, troops, troops, I wanted to have the troops for the East. I was angry about every single Police Regiment which I had to send to the South East. I had to look after police measures.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Just a minute, please, Dr. Sauter. I think we'd better slow this down a little bit just in fairness to the interpreter. It is very hard for them to keep up when the questions and answers come so close together.
DR. SAUTER: Yes, certainly, your Honor, but it doesn't depend on me, your Honor. It is the witness who can't give a clear answer.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Witness, well I will ask you another question. Perhaps you can give a clear answer to this. Are you the same Bach-Zelewski who took part in the bombardment of Warsaw?
A. Bombardment--that is a wrong expression.
Q. What was it then?
A. Well you also know the Wehrmacht report. I crushed the insurrection in two months' fighting and my troops had ten thousand dead and the Polish Attorney General had said "How is it possible that you rescinded a Fuehrer order? How is it possible that there and there you had a Brigade Commander shot according to court martial without loosing your life? This is quite clear I think.
Q. Has not the Polish Government asked for extradition?
A. I do not know.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, may I ask Dr. Sauter that he--I am probably committing the same mistake, but the he also waits until the witness has finished before he asks the next questions, so we get the witness's testimony into the record?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I think we ought to slow the questions down a little bit and consequently maybe the answers will slow down a little bit, and we can get along a little better here. I ask both of you to give a slight pause after each question and answer.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Well then, what sort of operation was it then, witness, about which we are just speaking?
A. We were talking about Warsaw and I must stress here, Doctor, that when you say we want to push something off the shoulders of the SS. I bear the responsibility for my corps in Warsaw then and today and when I was in command of troops I bear all the responsibility. That is a matter of course, because you will know that I am the only general who in Krakau, in the presence of--all the generals and the civil administration in the presence of all SS leaders, that is contained in the pleas of the IMT Trial.
....
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Just a moment please. Please advise the witness to give attention to the lights and not to proceed when the light is on.
MR. RAPP: Witness, would you please speak slowly, pay attention to the lights, and make a pause? Otherwise, all your testimony as far as the record is concerned, will be lost.
A. I wasn't quite finished, Doctor. In the same week, I - when Poland was first of all declared to be a band area, that was also in 1943, in this meeting which I mentioned, the whole policy in this area was criticized by me. Please read it in Franck's diary.
Q. I know about that very well witness, I am only interested in the operation about which we are now speaking. That was the fighting-against the insurrection in Warsaw.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, please Dr. Sauter. I do not wish to intrude on Judge Carter who is presiding here today, but it seems to me that we are getting, although I am not familiar with European geography probably sufficiently as I should---about 1500 miles away from the subject matter.
DR. SAUTER: I don't know whether your figure is correct, at the moment, your Honor. It could be. Perhaps it is even more, but I am interested in finding out from the witness how he himself acted in such a case and therefore that is why I want to hear from him! How many dead there were amongst the Poles during your operation in Warsaw--approximately.
A. You know that the enemy dead in a house-to-house-fight floorto-floor cannot be counted. I don't know how the enemy estimates it but I would only like to say that at that time, as Commanding General under the 9th Army under the Generals von Bormann and von Mettwitz, from whom I received my orders, I fought under them.
Q. I am not interested in what the names of the German generals were, generals to whom you are now trying to push the guilt. I am only interested to know how many Polish victims you estimated yourself at that time.
A. I really don't know. I only know my own losses and as I have already said, they were 10,000 dead.
Q. And the Polish estimate was?
A. Of course much higher because I had artillery and they hadn't.
Q. And witness, you also don't know how high you estimated these Polish losses during the Hitler time? How they were estimated at that time when you made your reports.
A. Have you read the reports?
Q. Yes, we received the reports from time to time.
A. Then, Doctor, you will also know that I was the first German general who called the partisans "belligerents," and on my own authority rescinded the Hitler order and had the Brigade Fuehrer Kaminski shot after summary court martial.
Q. But until 1945 you remained as SS Obergruppenfuehrer still, didn't you?
Q. Yes, by all means!
DR. SAUTER: Thank you, I have no further questions.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. Dr. Fritsch for General Rendulic. Witness, I think I only have one question. I am interested in the following. In October, 1943, you were in Ruma. I am coming back to this Ruma affair. At that time, you had to institute investigations about incidents which took place with the Cossack Division, about incidents which we are not interested in the detail here at the moment, but these investigations which you made in the army were carried out in the army area of the Second Army. You were asked by the prosecution who, at that time, was Wehrmacht Commander, who was in charge of the troops etc.
Did you at that time report to General Rendulic?
A. No, I did not report to General Rendulic because I did not carry out investigations. I had no judges with me but I informed myself with the responsible Commander and that was von Pannwitz.
Q Certainly, Pannwitz at that time, looking upwards, was via the corps under the 2nd Army.
A Well, I don't know what the formations of the 2nd Army were. I know about the corps but I don't know anything else. I assume that if that was in the area of the army then, of course.
Q Well, then you didn't think that it was necessary to report and to take up contact with the superior officer of the Cossack Division.
A Well, no, Pannwitz showed me documents and read the sentences and told me what he had done and I saw no reason to go to Rendulic.
Q Does that mean that these things did not concern the commanderin chief of the 2nd Army?
A Well, I had the impression that Pannwitz was doing his very best to clear up the matter on the spot with great energy. He talked about death sentences.
Q Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
DR. GAWLIK (Counsel for defendant Dehner):
Q Witness, you were talking about an Operation Ferdinand, Cornflower and Armin. Is that correct?
A Yes, I stated that they were various operations and those were the names.
Q On what is your knowledge of this operation based?
A I received these reports, of course, as far as the SS and Police were concerned, through a double route: first of all from the Wehrmacht and then the Higher SS and Police Leader as regards larger operations reported to Himmler.
Q From whom did you receive these reports?
A Well on the one side from the OKW Wehrmacht Operational Staff and from the other side from Himmler, the Adjutant of Himmler, who then passed it on to my staff.
Q Did these reports which you received contain these names?
A Well, I definitely remember Cornflower and also Ferdinand and Armin or Arnim. I can't remember - I supposed after the name of the prince.
Q You saw that name in the reports received from the Wehrmacht Operational Staff?
A Yes, as far as I remember.
Q But you can't say definitely?
A Well, so definitely, I really can't say. I assume it was Cornflower, Ferdinand, but it can have been... anyway, I know Cornflower was the first one. Cornflower!
Q Do you know that was contained in the reports from the Wehrmacht Operational Staff?
A No, I really, of course, can't remember that in detail.
Q You said that during this Operation Ferdinand the Cossack Division was in action.
A No, excuse me. I didn't say that - Ferdinand, no, I said, Armin. I was there myself, Doctor, and only once when Ruma was talked about did I remember the names, not everything from the report, I mean on the spot. It was like this. Not only from the reports. Cornflower was first of all; then came Ferdinand and then - and I must stress, that at the moment when the Cossack Division took command - the operation was called Armin. Well, one can't say that the Cossack Division was in charge during the second part - that is, during Ferdinand.
Q Well, perhaps we can divide it up in order to find out the basis of your knowledge. What do you know about the reports from the Wehrmacht Operational Staff?
A Well, Doctor, the main knowledge comes from my presence in Ruma and this happened like this....
Q All right, that is enough. How long were you in Ruma at that time?
A Only one day.
Q One day?
A Yes, I didn't stay there over night, just one day. I went through on to somewhere else - I don't know - Belgrade or Zagreb, somewhere.
Q And with whom did you speak during that one day?
A With whom did I what?
Q With whom did you speak that one day?
A With the Ia, that is - with the General, and with the Ia of the Division 170 or whatever it was, three numbers, I don't remember exactly.
Q That is all right, please continue!
A I don't remember the General - his name was Kanderwelsh or something like that, he was from Silesia, I think.
Q That's all right, just state the people to whom you talked, who else?
A With General von Pannwitz, with his Ia, and then with Kammerhofer. Kammerhofer had in his escort another SS-Fuehrer von Samen - that was the SS and Police Leader in Esseg and then the Ia belonging to the combat group Kammerhofer was also the Police lieutenant Col. Korn and I spoke with these men.
Q And your knowledge is based on the conversations held during this day?
A Yes, supplemented by the reports.
Q And now what did you find out definitely from the reports?
A Well, regarding what?
Q Regarding this operation.
A Well, I only remember how it went, it started from Belgrade.
Q No, only what you remember today that you learned from the reports.
A Well, I really can't separate that today.
Q You then said, witness, that the police were not allowed to take any step without the agreement of the Wehrmacht authorities.
A No, no, no, I never said that. I said "couldn't". I didn't say "wasn't allowed to", because it was dependent on material, not according to orders. Not that they had to ask anyone. I never said that. That must have been misunderstood. I said they could not take any steps because it was dependent on the material. I did not say it was not allowed to.
No, no, that is a mistake. There is a misunderstanding, I must stress that.
Q Then you want to say now, if I understand you correctly now, that according to orders they were independent?
A No, no, not as clear as that, Doctor. I just want to avoid the fact that the responsibility which the SS had - would you please ask the question again?
Q Do you want to say that the Police and SS - and my question only refers to Croatia - was subordinate to the Wehrmacht officers there?
A My answer to this is quite clear. First of all in the combatting...
Q Please answer the question with yes or no.
A Yes and no, because the combatting with regard to the large partisan groups "yes" and with combatting the house partisan groups "no".
Q Could the police also carry out operations independently?
A The police could take independent local small operations, against the house partisans, within the sphere of its police tasks in their area.
DR. GAWLIK: And now from the War Diary of the LXIXth Corps, Your Honors, I have already submitted as Document Dehner No. 16, Exhibit No. 10.
Q I would like to show you the entry dated the 10th of November 1943.
Q. Please read this entry, first of all, into the record.
A. On the 9th of November, SS Oberfuehrer and Colonel of the Police von Samen was requested to proceed with one battalion of the police, from Virovica to relieve Koprivnica. Colonel von Samen thereupon pointed out that he, with regard to operations outside his security area, could only act with the agreement of his superior agency, the Plenipotentiary of the Reich Leader of the SS in Croatia, SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lt. General of the Police Kammerhofer. The efforts on the part of the 69th Reserve Corps or the 187th Reserve Division to get this approval from Kammerhofer takes more than twelve hours. Approval arrives on the 10th of November, 0900 hours. That is at a time when the police battalion was already marching back from Virovica to Esseg. The intended releave of Koprivnica by police forces therefore failed.
Q. And now I would like to show you, in the same connection, a document, a teletype dated 1st of October 1943, Exhibit 375. Please read the comments under IIa Exhibit 375.
A. Should I read it?
Q. Yes, please.
A. Heading, the whole thing is a report -
Q. No, please only read from IIa.
A. 173, Division A. SS Gruppenfuehrer Kammerhofer has today continued operation in Syrmia but nevertheless not as originally planned in the western part of Fruska Gora but as a purely police operation against Communist invested villages and localities in the Sava Band and south of the line Inja-Ruma.
Q. Do you agree with me now witness that in Croatia there were special circumstances where the police could also carry out larger operations independently?
A. On the basis of this document, no.
Q. Can you give us more details about this?
A. Yes. In the first documents, there is a request by the subordinate of Kammerhofer, von Samen in Esseg and this inquiry reads that the police forces from the competent security area of von Samen should be put into action in another area.
Therefore it can easily be explained that for this reason he had to get the approval of his superior Kammerhofer and on the contrary the fact that in larger operations the Wehrmacht was the leading personality in these things can be seen from the fact that the Wehrmacht asked him to put police forces outside his area into action. He only refused to do it because he had first of all to get the approval he did not refuse on principle but only because he had to get the approval because Kammerhofer had to know where his formations were assigned.
Q. And you say the same thing about Croatia?
A. Yes.
Q. And now I show you a document as before, Document No. 16, Exhibit 10. Please read this entry here (indicating).
A. I can't find a date here at all. Is it the same operation?
Q. Well, here it refers to the 11th of November. That is therefore another operation.
A. The operation of the police is to be regarded as a failure since the bandits, in spite of their losses, have maintained themselves, It must now be urged that police forces only carry out larger operations after having informed the Wehrmacht.
Q. And this brings me to another point. Did you ever talk to General Dehner in Croatia?
A. No.
Q. Witness, you said that the reports had to be true.
A. Yes, of course.
Q. Is it correct that the greater part of the reports were not true?
A. You mean from the generals?
Q. No, I mean any reports, all the reports, quite generally from the Wehrmacht and the SS.
A. No, of course not. It is impossible.
Q. Did you read Himmler's speech in Posen in 1943?
A. 1943, no.
Q. You never heard Himmler's speech in Posen?
A. No, 1943, no!
Q. Did you hear any speech by Himmler in Posen?
A. Yes, in 1942.
Q. Well when in 1942, when all the Gruppenfuehrers were present?
A. Yes.
Q. Now I show you this speech. It is Document PS-1919, to which I give the number Dehner 55 for identification. I can only submit it as an exhibit when I have received the translation. Please read to us what-
MR. FULKERSON: I was under the impression the case had been closed and it seems to me that this is certainly not the proper time for them to be putting in new evidence.
DR. GAWLIK: This is checking the credibility of the testimony of this witness.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: If the evidence is proper in rebuttal, it will of course be received. Of course we do not know what it is yet. So, for the time being the objection will be overruled.
BY DR. GAWLIK:
Q. Please tell us whether that is the truth. Please read, Witness.
A. Well Himmler held a speech there and he always....
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Just a minute, please, Dr. Gawlik. Let's have just one of you talking at a time, please.
Q. Please read it and tell us whether it is true.
A. Well, they are just general statements.
Q. Please read it.
A. Heading, "The Truth." And before that it was "The Bravery." I now come to a fourth virtue, which is very rare in Germany, speaking the truth. One of the greatest evils which has been disseminated in the war is untruth in reports and statements by subordinate officers in civilian life, in the State, and in the Party, and in the Wehrmacht, which these people make to their superior officers. The report is the basis for every decision. Things are like this now: that in war in many places one can assume that ninety-five percent of all reports are untrue, or only half true, or only half correct.
DR. GAWLIK: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
DR. WEISSGERBER: Dr. Weissgerber for the defendant Speidel.
BY DR. WEISSGERBER:
Q. Witness, when did you visit the Higher SS and Police Leader Schimana in Athens?
A. I assume in October. You observe that it takes some thinking it over. I do not know for sure.
Q. And which year?
A. 1943.
Q. Was your visit an official one?
A. No.
Q. Then I would like to ask you to state, quite briefly, what the purpose of your visit was?
A. I was in Belgrade and I have already stated that I knew Schimana and of course if you are in Belgrade then you would like to go to Athens once and I flew back again on the next day.
Q. Well, then, it was a visit according to the slogan "Every one should see Athens once"?
A. Yes, that is right, of course I also wanted to, well I saw Athens once!
Q. And were you in Athens again afterwards?
A. No.
Q. Witness, in direct examination you talked about the service regulations of the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece. When did you read this service regulations for the first time?
A. My service regulation was the same. Every Higher SS and Police Leader had it, those were general service regulations. They were mostly the same. They were just sort of little deviations according to the localities, but on the whole service regulations that is the written ones were mostly all the same.
Q. Would you say that applies to all the SS and Police Leaders, in the east, in the north, and in all the theaters of war, and in all the occupied territories?
A. Well, in general they were all the same and then there were various additions according to the territory concerned.
Q. Did you ever see the service regulation at all for the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece and did you read it?
A. Well, I certainly received them and I know mine of course and because I myself was the Higher SS and Police Leader for Central Russia.
Q. If you have just said, "I know my own service regulation," then you mean with this the service regulations for the Higher SS and Police Leader, Army Group Center.
A. Yes.
Q. Well, then, my question still has not been answered and therefore I put it for the third time. Did you ever see the service regulation for the Higher SS and Police Leader, Greece, and did you read them?
A. Yes, I did that.
Q. You also read it?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. When did you read these service regulations for the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece for the last time?
A. Well, I read it at that time and a few things have been shown to me during the interrogation.
Q. What do you mean by "at that time"?
A. Well, at the end, I mean last of all I assume when I was with Schimana in Athens. He was very proud about it. It was a great jump upwards for him at that time and he had been making continuous complaints with Himmler and had always been unlucky.
Q. Then you say that you read these service regulations for the Higher SS and Police Leader with Schimana in Athens.
A. Well, or with my staff. I don't remember exactly, but I certainly received or read them.