Q Your Honor, with reference to tho beginning of this fighting on Corfu, an affidavit has something to say about this, which is to be found in Lanz document book No. 4 on page 59, Lanz determent book No. 4, page 59, it is document No. 137. This receives exhibit No. 83. This is an affidavit by one Karl Rampf, who states at the beginning that he was tho detachment commander of the German unit on the land of Corfu from the riddle of May, 1943 until the 8/9 September 1943. I will read parts of this affidavit only and to begin with, the first paragraph on page 39 where the affiant states:
"In May 1943 I was ordered by Air Fleet 2 (Italy), with about 40 men, to the island of Corfu. The German Air Force was greatly interested in establishing an aircraft warning service in tho area between Otrant -- this is in the south of Italy -- and the Greek - Albanian border." "At this time many planes (probably British) flew over Corfu to Serbia to provide the Tito Partisans with arms by air. This supply service was to be disrupted because the losses of the German Army through the Partisans increased steadily."
I will skip the next paragraphs. They contain military details, which are of less interest here and then I will read on page 60 the next page, the paragraph which starts in the middle with the words:
On 8 Sept. 1943 Capt. Lenz told me that the British had left Africa and that a number of shipswere approaching Corfu. Since we had received no orders from the Air Fleet from Italy), we called an alert for the German detachments, but prepared for capture in case of a landing. On the afternoon of the same day a state of unrest became apparent among the Italians. I found out from an Italian friend that the Italians (the Italian Regimental Commander, a colonel whose name I no longer recall) had received orders from Badoglio to disarm the Germans and not to consider them as allies any longer. I learned this from the Italian lieutenant de Angeli. Since my detachments were spread over the island, I thought it advisable to remain at the focal point, i.c. in the city of Corfu itself.
Towards evening I took all the German soldiers from the city and the hotels to the airport in my car. We were willing to make a deal with the Italians in order to be able to depart for Greece without a fight, in case it should become necessary. We only had a few machine guns and hand grenades.
I will skip the next paragraph too, which again contains military details and then I continue on page 61 in the middle:
I left Corfu on the morning of 9 September 1943 in this plane at about six o'clock, after I had warned my non-commissioned officers of all the detachments by telephone against any rash acts, and above all against the shedding of any blood by the Germans, on account of its senselessness.
The Italians tried to give us some trouble when our plane left, but did not find the courage because, on the air field, the German forces were superior.
Hardly had I arrived in Athens at noon, than I heard that my detachment in Argirades was sending SOS calls and reported that it was being attacked by the Italians. A few minutes later the radio report arrived that the equipment had been destroyed according to orders and that the garrison was attempting to reach the Greek mainland in boats.
I again skip the next paragraph and read the last but one:
The detachment in Argirades (40 men) were told to surrender in the afternoon of 9 September 1943. Thereupon the German soldiers blew up the secret instruments. After an untimatum, the soldiers were taken prisoner by the Italians. There was about one Italian battalion in this area, which effected the capture. Two German soldiers were shot while trying to escape. In a like manner the other small detachments were overpowered without a fight, because the Italians were greatly superior. The German soldiers were robbed of all their belongings, they could not even retain a handkerchief. They were turned over to the British and put into captivity in Africa (Benghasi).
Then I leave out the next paragraph, again military details, and just road the last one, which states:
"Civilian acquaintances wrote me that the Italians shot (antiaircraft) against German planes after 9 September 1943. One plane is said to have crashed after being shot upon."
The affidavit is duly signed by Rampf, who was Detachment Commander on Corfu. It is properly certified and duly sworn to. Witness, how did things develop on Corfu?
A We tried, through officers, who were sent to the island as negotiators, for the surrender to persuade the commandant to cease hostilities and by describing to him the conditions, we tried to convince him that he should give up his arms to the Germans and should surrender the Island.
Q And then, did you also tell the Italian commandant that if he did not follow those orders he himself would be held personally responsible because of mutiny or some other point of view?
A Yes, it can be assumed because the resistance which occurred on Kephalonia was very recent and the situation as a whole, that is the surrender of the Italian army to the German High Command, was quite clear and that had already happened sometime ago.
Q Your Honors, in this connection I would like to read a further part of document No. 178. This is to be found in Lanz document book No. 3 on page 29. I repeat, document No. 178 in Lanz document book No. 3, page 29. This document has already been submitted here and received the exhibit No. 73. The last part of this document which is to be found on page 30, I have already read in another connection, and now with reference to the Corfu operation, I would like to read the reports on page 29. That is the reports dated 11 September 1943, is a daily report which, as can be seen from the heading, came from the Corps Headquarters of the XXII Mountain Army Corps, that is from General Lanz or Ms staff on 11 September, 1943 at 0900 hours and was sent to the High Command Army Group E as a daily report. It states therein "Captain Spindler, Commander Mountain Army Group E Battalion 54 is being sent to the island of Corfu, as truce-bearer, to carry through the laying down of arms on the part of the Italian units on Corfu.
"Captain Spindler's negotiations in Corfu are unsuccessful whereupon Captain Spindler returns on 12 September 1943 to Joannina. Those occupying the island of Corfu allege that they have no orders to surrender from their superior authority."
And then the report on the 13th of September 1943 heading: -- the island of Corfu at 0600 hours:
"Major von Hirschfeld, 1st Mountain Division, crosses with the Chief of General Staff 26th Italian Army Corps to Corfu and takes over to the Italian Commandant on the island, the order to lay down arms; otherwise surrender would be enforced by force of arms. The Italian Chief of Staff, at the same time, brings over an instruction of the Commanding General 26th Italian Army Corps, which says that those occupying the island must behave exactly as the Italian troops on the mainland."
And then from the same day at 1140, radio message of Major von Hirschfeld: "Report refusal!"
General Lanz wishes this document to be presented to the Tribunal so that it is made quite clear that the Italian troops on Corfu were told by the Chief of Staff of their own Italian corps that they should at once give up their arms, but , nevertheless, in spite of that order, they did not give up their arms and fought openly against the German troops.
Q. General Lanz, what was the result of the orders of this Italian High command in Athens and the Italian Corps Hq.in Joannina to the Italian Commandant in Corfu, in which he received the order to lay down his arms and to surrender, and what was the result achieved by this truce bearer who was sent by the Germans to the Italian commandant?
A. All these efforts remained unfortunately without success.
Q. What did you do?
A. Well, of course, I reported currently about the position to the army group. The army group then became impatient and ordered me to send a battalion at once to Corfu in order that this battalion should carry out the disarming of the Italians, and so that in this way the island should be taken into German hands. By reason of this order on the , I think it was the 13th of September a battalion of the 1st Mountain Division was embarked on the ships which were available at that time. They were mostly small fishing boats, and from Igumenica they were sent to Corfu. But the whole thing was not as simple as we had imagined. When this battalion , which was distributed amongst the several ships neared the town of Corfu suddenly violent artillery fire was started by the Italians through which, as far as I know, two ships were very quickly sunk and about 60 soldiers were drowned. Other ships were damaged and the troops, of course, couldn't defend themselves on the ships, -this was technically impossibly and therefore, we could do nothing else except to have this battalion turn around and come back to the mainland.
Q. And, witness, what were the consequences of this situation for your further treatment of the matter?
A. From this incident it was then completely clear that the Italian commandant was determined to protect the island by force of arms, and thereupon and rightfully we had to conclude that the Italian commandant had the same attitude as General Gandin, that is, with force of arms he was going to resist the surrender which had been ordered him, and refused to deliver up his arms, and nothing remained for us except to crush this resistance of the Italians against the surrender by force of arms.
Q. And then, General Lanz, how then did the fighting on the island of Gorfu develop?
A. First of all, as on Kephalonia, we had to organize enough troops on the island in order to attack the Italians.
For this purpose, on the two following days, as far as I knew, two Mountain Light Infantry Battalions of the 1st Mountain Division -- I assume by night -- were landed on the southern tip of the island of Corfu. The troops were landed in spite of enemy resistance. A bridgehead was established after fighting, and then these troops attacked along the two roads which ran from the southern part of the island of Corfu to the north and which led to the town of Corfu. The Italians, then fighting a delaying action all the time, gradually withdrew towards the center of the island and then on the pass heights southwest of the town of Corfu, the decisive battle there took place.
These pass heights, which I myself subsequently saw very frequently are very suitable for a defense. There is a narrow pass there through which one has to go if one wishes to reach the town of Corfu, and there fighting was carried on against the Italians. Both sides incurred heavy losses, but the Italians were defeated and when the German troops marched down from the pass heights towards the town of Corfu, the Italians realized that resistance was useless, and laid down their arms.
Q. And then what did the Italian island commandant do?
A. The Italian commandant -- this was the regimental commander -who was first of all in the town of Corfu, then fled with the majority -of the Italian officers from the town into the northern part of the island when he saw that the battle was lost.
Then in the northern part of the island, it was significantly his own troops who took him prisoner, and brought him to Corfu.
Q. And then was it reported to you at that time that this Italian commandant had fled to the northern part of the island because he had left his troops and he wanted to be taken by boat to Italy from the Northern part of the island?
A. Yes, as far as I can remember, that is correct. He certainly tried, after he saw that his efforts had been in vain, he tried to flee and probably hoped that from Corfu he could escape to Italy.
Q. General Lanz, what were the losses incurred by the German troops through this fighting which you wanted to avoid?
Q. I have already mentioned that there Were losses during the shelling of the ships, and then during the course of the fighting there wore further losses, but they weren't terribly great. I estimate the German losses to be about 80 to a hundred men.
Q. And the Italian losses?
A. I can't tell you in detail, they were probably higher.......but I don't know exactly.
Q. General Lanz, the prosecution submitted Document NOKW-865........this is to be found in Document Book Prosecution KIK, page 124 of the German and page 99 of the English, Exhibit 452. In this document in the passage given there, you will find a report of your crops to the 1st Mountain Division which states that by order of high authority no prisoners arc to be taken during the operation "Verrat".........have you got this report there?
A. Yes; in the meantime I know it by heart.
Q. What is this operation "Verrat"?
A. The operation "Verrat" is the German attack against the island of Corfu.
Q. In this order high authority forbids any kind of prisoners to be taken. By reason of your own experience as a general, what do you think about the admissability of this order?
A. This is an obvious violation of the Hague Land Warfare Convention, Paragraph 23.
Q. And how then do you explain that it was just in connection with this operation, which had the code name "Verrat" (treason), that this kind of order(which was against international law) was issued?
A. I can only explain this order in connection with the Hitler order which I mentioned concerning the case of Kephalonia. As far as I remember, it stated that all Italians belonging to the Gandin Division were to be shot because of mutiny. I can only assume that this order which I received in this case had some connection with his. At any rate, that's the only way in which I can explain the order.
Q. Witness, did you know about this order which stated that no prisoners were to be taken when you carried out the operation against Corfu?
A. I cannot answer this with absolute exactitude, but I think I must assume that it was not known to me before, because I must assume rightfully then that in this event I would have protested against this in the same way as I protested in the case of Kephalonia.
Q. And now, witness, this order issued by higher authority, according to which no prisoners were to be taken during the operation ''Verrat"......that is, everyone had to be shot.......was this order carried out by you and by your troops?
A. No, this order was not carried out.
Q. But?
A. But the Italians were taken prisoner, many thousands of them.
Q. And now, in this connection I would like to offer another document in evidence. This is to be found in Lanz Document Book No. III, page 46, Document No. 83 which receives Exhibit No. 84, Lanz No. 84. This is an affidavit by Karl Keinz Rothfuchs, the same affiant who has given affidavits in other connections here.
The affiant Dr. Rothfuchs, 36 years old, states at the beginning of his affidavit that he was Ic with the 1st Mountain Division.......that is, under General Lanz, during the period of Juno 1942 until the end of the war. This Ic with the 1st Mountain Division, Dr. Rothfuchs, then states......and I read from page 46:
"After".......and the subject is: "Operation 'Verrat' against the Uprising Italians on the Island of Corfu in the Middle of September 1943." The affiant states:
"After the Italian capitulation, the disarming of the Italians was ordered. This was carried out within the sphere of the First Mountain Division and first without any difficulty. The arms were collected in certain places and the Italians were put together in small groups in order to be sent to Florina. Some few of those Italians, mainly the officers could keep their sidearms and several rifles and guns, so they could defend themselves against possible partisan attacks during their march. Some of the Italians went over to the partisans, especially in the Albanian coastal area. Other Italians fled to the mountains during their march back and three joined the partisans. On the Ionic islands Kefalonia and Korfu the Italians carried out organized resistance. This was the division of General Gandin which was in Kefalonia with the largest part and about 1 regiment in Korfu. Although this division also had been ordered by their own AXVI Army Corps in Joannina, to give up arms, they refused this command and fought against us. They even attacked and captured German troops. Thus German leaders were forced to land troops on the islands and to defeat the uprising Italians in fighting which lasted for several days, was very difficult and resulted in many losses.
The attack on the Italians was carried out by the First Mountain Division under the name "Verrat" (treason) about the end of September 1943. For this, 2 Mountain Jaeger Battalions were landed on the southwest coast of Korfu and they attacked in a northerly direction towards the town of Korfu. The German attack pushed forward to the mountain passes in southwestern Korfu, broke the last Italian resistance and from there reached the town. Thereupon the Italians capitulated. In spite oi an order by the Fuehrer of which I heard not to take any prisoners, those Italians who wore not killed during combat on Korfu were taken prisoner and concentrated on the air field. There were about 8 to 10,000 Italians, some of whom had fled to Korfu from the Albanian coastal area, with the probable intention of escaping from there to Italy. The Italian Commander was captured in the northern part of the island.
I do not remember that the Italian commander was shot. During the following days the Italians were sent as prisoners of war to Florina via Igumenico. The island was then mopped up. After the mopping up and the transfer of the Italians, the island remained quiet. German troops took over the protection against an expected landing by the enemy.
The affidavit is signed by the affiant, Dr. Rothfuchs, and is duly sworn to and properly Certified and this shows the Tribunal that General Lanz again opposed an explicit Fuehrer order and, therefore, saved the lives of thousands of Italians.
Q. General Lanz, this order was not carried out by the 1st Mountain Division. Did the Commander of the 1st Mountain Division know your attitude towards such things, especially towards such draconic Fuehrer orders?
A. Well, I must assume that the division knew my attitude, and Certainly knew that this order was not in accordance with my views.
Q In connection with this fighting on Korfu and with this noncarrying out of the order--about not taking prisoners--we have three other affidavits which are to be found in Lanz Document Book III. They are the next three documents: Document No. 84, which receives Exhibit No. 85, on Page 48; Document No. 85, on Page 49, which becomes Exhibit No. 86; and Document No. 86, on Page 50, which receives Exhibit No. 87. These are three short affidavits. The first one, No. 84, is by Wolf Christian von Loeben, with whom we are already acquainted here, and it is dated 1 October 1947. Herr von Loeben was, from 24 August 1943 until 25 June 1944, as he states, Ia with the Corps Headquarters of the XXIInd Mountain Army Corps. The subject is: "Order from a higher instance, not to take prisoners during the Operation "Verrat" (fight for the island of Korfu) in September of 1943." On Page 48 the affiant states: " I do not remember the receipt or forwarding of the above order. I also do not know that General Lanz gave such an order to the First Mountain Division. It is most improbable, because General Lanz several days prior to this objected to such an order by the Fuehrer against the Italian troops on Kefalonia and thus prevented its execution. I positively do know that when Korfu was taken a large number of Italians were captured and later sent of via Florina according to the order of Army Group E." The affidavit is duly signed by the affiant and properly sworn to and certified.
The next document is Document No. 85, Exhibit No. 86, by Dr. KarlHeinz Rothfuchs, from whom I have already read some affidavits, and, as is known, he was Ic with the First Mountain Division from June 1942 until the end of the war. With regard to this matter the subject is: "Radio message of 24 September 1943 not to take any prisoners during the Operation "Verrat" on the basis of higher orders." The affiant has sworn to the following statement: "I heard that there was an order by the Fuehrer that no prisoners were to be taken. The above-mentioned radio message concerning the application of this general order to the Operation "Verrat" is not known to me. In my capacity as Ic I would have had to learn that such a basic decree had become effective.
Actually, all Italians in Korfu were treated as prisoners of war and sent to Florina." The affiant has sworn to his statements and the affidavit is properly signed and certified.
The last document in this connection is Document No. 86, on Page 50, Exhibit No. 87, which is an affidavit by the former Captain Matthias Starl, from whom we have already had several other affidavits. He was, as he states, First ADC with the XXIInd Mountain Army Corps from 3 September 1943 until 14 November 1943, and Ia with the Combat Group Steyrer from 14 November 1943 until 8 august 1944. With reference to the order not to take any prisoners during the Operation "Verrat" (attack on Korfu in September 1943), the affiant Starl has sworn to the following statement, and I read again from Page 50:
An order that during the operation "Verrat" (fight for the island Korfu) by the German troops against the Italian island occupation of the division "Aqui" no prisoners were to be taken as stated by higher orders, was not given by General Lenz to the First Mountain Division, which was assigned to this operation.
This probably is confused with the order by the Fuehrer to shoot all Italians in Kefalonia(Division "Aqui" as on Korfu) an order which was prevented from execution at that time by General Lenz' immediate objection.
During the fighting in Korfu and the capture of the island by the German troops, a few thousand Italians were taken prisoner (prisoner collection center air field Korfu) and in the days following sent via Igumenica to Fiorina. During this action a part of the prisoners as well as of the officers kept their side arms in defense against possible partisan attacks.
The affidavit has been duly sworn to by the affiant Starl and properly certified. Therefore, with this document the Defendant Lanz wishes to show the Tribunal that he again resisted a Fuehrer Order, and thereby saved the lives of thousands of Italians.
Q Witness Lanz, in the document, to which we have just referred, there is another order, according to which a company belonging to the Brandenburg Regiment was supposed to have been in action on the island of Korfu, dressed in Italian uniforms and with Italian equipment. During the examination of General von Leyser this Regiment Brandenburg was also talked about. Now I am interested to know whether you ordered this action, or how did the operation undertaken by one company of the Regiment Brandenburg come about?
AAs I found out afterwards, the operation carried out by this company was ordered by the OKW to the commanders in. chief with the Army Group E. And the commanders in chief of Army Group E, thereupon ordered it.
Q And you had no knowledge of this at all beforehand, General Lanz?
A No, I didn't know anything at all about this matter before it happened, and I also wasn't asked about it beforehand.
Q In this connection I would like to submit another document to the Tribunal in evidence. This is to be found in Lanz Document Book III, Document No. 87, on Page 52. This document receives Lanz Exhibit No. 88. This is a very short affidavit by August Winter, who states at the beginning, that from August 1943 until March 1944 he was Brigadier General and Chief of Staff of Army Group E. His testimony concerns the assignment of the above-mentioned company of the Brandenburg Regiment to the First Mountain Division for the Operation against the island of Korfu in the middle of Sept. 1943, and he states:
"The subordination of the above mentioned company of the Second Regiment "Brandenburg" to the First Mountain Division was carried out after repeated urgent requests by the commander in chief of army group E to the Wehrmacht commanding staff. No request by the XXII Mountain Army Corps was on hand. I can confirm the fact that the company was not assigned. I also remember that the commander at that time of the Second Regiment "Brandenburg" complained via the XXII Mountain Army Corps (General Lanz) that the company was not assigned."
The affiant Winter has signed this affidavit, which is dated 23 September 1947, he has sworn to it, and the affidavit is properly certified. The affiant states, General Lanz, that the company was not assigned. Is that correct? And can you give us the reason?
AAs far as I know this is correct, and the reason, I think, was that when the company was transferred from the mainland to Korfu during the night it lost its way on the sea, and, after several hours, instead of landing on the island of Korfu it landed back on the mainland again. In the meantime, however, the Operation "Korfu" had been concluded. The company, at any rate, had only landed on the very last day and, therefore, it could not possibly have been assigned. It was superfluous.
Q And then was this the end of the whole matter? Was there any kind of after-effects against you?
A Well, in itself the matter was concluded. The company withdrew again, but the regimental commander was angry about it--about the fact that his company had not been in action. He thought that it was my fault and he complained about me. All the matters, of course, could be quite easily clarified; therefore, no notice was taken of the complaint.
Q And another question with regard to this, Witness: At that time did you know any more details about the special tasks and about the compilation of this Regiment Brandenburg? If so, what did you know about it at that time?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A What I knew about Regiment Brandenburg at that time I cannot state so exactly because I am under oath here, but I can say what I know today about it--if you think this is important, then, of course, I can say that.
Q Is it something new? Is it something which we haven't heard up till now? Then, of course, we shall be interested in it.
AAs far as I know the Brandenburg units...
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Your Honors please, I think it should be clarified first, before General Lanz testifies, whether the information he is about to talk about is something he heard since the war ended or whether it is information which he knew at the time. I submit that unless it's the latter it's irrelevant here.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the witness stated that he had learned it subsequent to that time.
BY DR. SAUTER:
A Unfortunately I can't make quite absolute exact statements because I don't know whether I actually got all my information. During the years, of course, one learns about a lot of things, and one isn't always in a position to track down information of this kind,-to determine its source. But I think that what I know is probably correct. The Brandenburg units, as far as I know, were used for two purposes: First, quite normally as every other troops--that is, purely tactically; and secondly, for so-called special tasks--as in this case about which we are talking here. This is such a special commitment. When the troops are used normally, as any other troop, then it was subordinate to a division or a corps. That wasn't anything special. But when it received a special task, then this task, as far as I know, was ordered by the OKW because the Brandenburg units were subordinate for their special tasks exclusively to the OKW. At any rate I was informed. And from this case it can be seen--in this case too--the order, or at least the suggestion for the employment of the company came from the OKW. That is what I can say about it.
Q Witness, during the fighting on the island of Korfu were you personally present on the island?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A No, I wasn't on the island of Korfu during the fighting. I was occupied with Kephalonia at the time.
Q And then, after the fighting, did you go to Korfu again?
A Yes, after the fighting I was in Korfu in order to find out about the situation. The Divisional Commander, who was in charge of the operation. reported to me about the situation. Of course, we also discussed how the island was to be secured. That, of course, was the most important thing for us. I gave him a few directions about this, and then, as far as I remember, we discussed the further treatment of the prisoners, there were several thousands of them, we discussed their food and their transport, and this was rather difficult because of the scarce shipping space available.
Q General Lanz, which orders did you then give with regard to the treatment of captured Italian officers? Were the orders which you gave on Korfu the same or similar to those for Kephalonia, or did you give other orders on Korfu?
AAs far as I remember I told the Divisional Commander that those Italian officers, and especially the Island Commander--whoever were guilty for the revolt--should be sentenced by summary court martial. But it is also possible--I don't know quite accurately whether the Divisional Commander suggested that to me and I approved it--I don't know that exactly any more. But one thing is certain--that the officers who took part in the revolt, in the mutiny, the people who were responsible for this, were court martialed in a similar way as the people on Kephalonia.
Q And can you tell us anything about the results of these court martial proceedings?
A I recall with certainty that the Commandant of the Island, the Regimental Commander, who was primarily responsible for the revolt, was tried, was found guilty, and was shot. I also think I remember, but not with sufficient certainty, that other officers also--I vaguely remember the number, 8 or 10, but I can't say it with certainty--were in the same way found guilty and that the sentence was carried out.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q And were these officers also--that is, the officers on Korfu-sentenced to death and shot because the fact of mutiny was assumed-that is an action against the express orders of their own commanders, and an action against the occupation power, as far as you know?
A Yes, the opinion was the same here as n Kephalonia. The incidents, of course, were the same. The sentence was based on the reasons which I have already mentioned in connection with Kephalonia that is, that this was a case of armed revolt by troops which had capitulated and which, therefore, were subordinate to the laws of war of the protective power as PW's and that the efforts were useless in this case, as we have already heard, that the orders of the Italian superior officers were not obeyed. So there was nothing else to do except to crush the revolt by force of arms, and, following this, to call to account the people responsible for it.
Q Witness, then what happened to all the other Italian officers, and what happened to all the Italian NCO's and men, as far as you know?
A Well, they were treated in the same way as the others on Kephalonia, They were transported away when the necessary shipping space was available. This took a certain time. Of course in both cases there were several thousand men who now had to be brought to the mainland by boat.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Pardon me. Before recessing we'd like to announce that the Tribunal finds it necessary to continue in session until 12:30, after which they will recess until two o'clock. The Tribunal will be in recess for its usual morning recess period.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom please take your seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Yon may proceed, Dr. Sauter.
DR. SAUTER: If the Tribunal please, may I put a question to the Tribunal? Next Thursday I believe is a holiday and I presume there won't be a session here?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: No, there will be no session on Thursday or Friday. We will adjourn Wednesday night until Monday morning.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you very much for this information. I shall inform my colleagues.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. General Lanz, it goes without saying--and any layman will see the points at once--that when you were on Kephalonia and Korfu, you found yourself in an exceptionally difficult position because you had to act quickly. How looking back today, having gained distance of some years from these events, looking back, I am saying, on those events, on Kephalonia and Korfu, what is your judgment today of what you did at the time?
A. I naturally have thought and reflected a good deal on those events, and I can only regret it, above all, that it was not possible at the time to move General Gandin to settle the whole matter peacefully as was the case with all the other Italian divisions in the Greek area. But as fate, as I am inclined to put it, decided to the effect that there was to be an aroused conflict all its consequences, which I regretted and regret, I had to be consent with the facts which I found. These were the faces: first of all, I had an assignment to carry out which was to prevent an Allied landing on the Ionian Islands or the west coast of Greece with such moans and forces as were at my disposal.