The attack on the Italians was carried out by the First Mountain Division under the name "Verrat" (treason) about the end of September 1943. For this, 2 Mountain Jaeger Battalions were landed on the southwest coast of Korfu and they attacked in a northerly direction towards the town of Korfu. The German attack pushed forward to the mountain passes in southwestern Korfu, broke the last Italian resistance and from there reached the town. Thereupon the Italians capitulated. In spite oi an order by the Fuehrer of which I heard not to take any prisoners, those Italians who wore not killed during combat on Korfu were taken prisoner and concentrated on the air field. There were about 8 to 10,000 Italians, some of whom had fled to Korfu from the Albanian coastal area, with the probable intention of escaping from there to Italy. The Italian Commander was captured in the northern part of the island.
I do not remember that the Italian commander was shot. During the following days the Italians were sent as prisoners of war to Florina via Igumenico. The island was then mopped up. After the mopping up and the transfer of the Italians, the island remained quiet. German troops took over the protection against an expected landing by the enemy.
The affidavit is signed by the affiant, Dr. Rothfuchs, and is duly sworn to and properly Certified and this shows the Tribunal that General Lanz again opposed an explicit Fuehrer order and, therefore, saved the lives of thousands of Italians.
Q. General Lanz, this order was not carried out by the 1st Mountain Division. Did the Commander of the 1st Mountain Division know your attitude towards such things, especially towards such draconic Fuehrer orders?
A. Well, I must assume that the division knew my attitude, and Certainly knew that this order was not in accordance with my views.
Q In connection with this fighting on Korfu and with this noncarrying out of the order--about not taking prisoners--we have three other affidavits which are to be found in Lanz Document Book III. They are the next three documents: Document No. 84, which receives Exhibit No. 85, on Page 48; Document No. 85, on Page 49, which becomes Exhibit No. 86; and Document No. 86, on Page 50, which receives Exhibit No. 87. These are three short affidavits. The first one, No. 84, is by Wolf Christian von Loeben, with whom we are already acquainted here, and it is dated 1 October 1947. Herr von Loeben was, from 24 August 1943 until 25 June 1944, as he states, Ia with the Corps Headquarters of the XXIInd Mountain Army Corps. The subject is: "Order from a higher instance, not to take prisoners during the Operation "Verrat" (fight for the island of Korfu) in September of 1943." On Page 48 the affiant states: " I do not remember the receipt or forwarding of the above order. I also do not know that General Lanz gave such an order to the First Mountain Division. It is most improbable, because General Lanz several days prior to this objected to such an order by the Fuehrer against the Italian troops on Kefalonia and thus prevented its execution. I positively do know that when Korfu was taken a large number of Italians were captured and later sent of via Florina according to the order of Army Group E." The affidavit is duly signed by the affiant and properly sworn to and certified.
The next document is Document No. 85, Exhibit No. 86, by Dr. KarlHeinz Rothfuchs, from whom I have already read some affidavits, and, as is known, he was Ic with the First Mountain Division from June 1942 until the end of the war. With regard to this matter the subject is: "Radio message of 24 September 1943 not to take any prisoners during the Operation "Verrat" on the basis of higher orders." The affiant has sworn to the following statement: "I heard that there was an order by the Fuehrer that no prisoners were to be taken. The above-mentioned radio message concerning the application of this general order to the Operation "Verrat" is not known to me. In my capacity as Ic I would have had to learn that such a basic decree had become effective.
Actually, all Italians in Korfu were treated as prisoners of war and sent to Florina." The affiant has sworn to his statements and the affidavit is properly signed and certified.
The last document in this connection is Document No. 86, on Page 50, Exhibit No. 87, which is an affidavit by the former Captain Matthias Starl, from whom we have already had several other affidavits. He was, as he states, First ADC with the XXIInd Mountain Army Corps from 3 September 1943 until 14 November 1943, and Ia with the Combat Group Steyrer from 14 November 1943 until 8 august 1944. With reference to the order not to take any prisoners during the Operation "Verrat" (attack on Korfu in September 1943), the affiant Starl has sworn to the following statement, and I read again from Page 50:
An order that during the operation "Verrat" (fight for the island Korfu) by the German troops against the Italian island occupation of the division "Aqui" no prisoners were to be taken as stated by higher orders, was not given by General Lenz to the First Mountain Division, which was assigned to this operation.
This probably is confused with the order by the Fuehrer to shoot all Italians in Kefalonia(Division "Aqui" as on Korfu) an order which was prevented from execution at that time by General Lenz' immediate objection.
During the fighting in Korfu and the capture of the island by the German troops, a few thousand Italians were taken prisoner (prisoner collection center air field Korfu) and in the days following sent via Igumenica to Fiorina. During this action a part of the prisoners as well as of the officers kept their side arms in defense against possible partisan attacks.
The affidavit has been duly sworn to by the affiant Starl and properly certified. Therefore, with this document the Defendant Lanz wishes to show the Tribunal that he again resisted a Fuehrer Order, and thereby saved the lives of thousands of Italians.
Q Witness Lanz, in the document, to which we have just referred, there is another order, according to which a company belonging to the Brandenburg Regiment was supposed to have been in action on the island of Korfu, dressed in Italian uniforms and with Italian equipment. During the examination of General von Leyser this Regiment Brandenburg was also talked about. Now I am interested to know whether you ordered this action, or how did the operation undertaken by one company of the Regiment Brandenburg come about?
AAs I found out afterwards, the operation carried out by this company was ordered by the OKW to the commanders in. chief with the Army Group E. And the commanders in chief of Army Group E, thereupon ordered it.
Q And you had no knowledge of this at all beforehand, General Lanz?
A No, I didn't know anything at all about this matter before it happened, and I also wasn't asked about it beforehand.
Q In this connection I would like to submit another document to the Tribunal in evidence. This is to be found in Lanz Document Book III, Document No. 87, on Page 52. This document receives Lanz Exhibit No. 88. This is a very short affidavit by August Winter, who states at the beginning, that from August 1943 until March 1944 he was Brigadier General and Chief of Staff of Army Group E. His testimony concerns the assignment of the above-mentioned company of the Brandenburg Regiment to the First Mountain Division for the Operation against the island of Korfu in the middle of Sept. 1943, and he states:
"The subordination of the above mentioned company of the Second Regiment "Brandenburg" to the First Mountain Division was carried out after repeated urgent requests by the commander in chief of army group E to the Wehrmacht commanding staff. No request by the XXII Mountain Army Corps was on hand. I can confirm the fact that the company was not assigned. I also remember that the commander at that time of the Second Regiment "Brandenburg" complained via the XXII Mountain Army Corps (General Lanz) that the company was not assigned."
The affiant Winter has signed this affidavit, which is dated 23 September 1947, he has sworn to it, and the affidavit is properly certified. The affiant states, General Lanz, that the company was not assigned. Is that correct? And can you give us the reason?
AAs far as I know this is correct, and the reason, I think, was that when the company was transferred from the mainland to Korfu during the night it lost its way on the sea, and, after several hours, instead of landing on the island of Korfu it landed back on the mainland again. In the meantime, however, the Operation "Korfu" had been concluded. The company, at any rate, had only landed on the very last day and, therefore, it could not possibly have been assigned. It was superfluous.
Q And then was this the end of the whole matter? Was there any kind of after-effects against you?
A Well, in itself the matter was concluded. The company withdrew again, but the regimental commander was angry about it--about the fact that his company had not been in action. He thought that it was my fault and he complained about me. All the matters, of course, could be quite easily clarified; therefore, no notice was taken of the complaint.
Q And another question with regard to this, Witness: At that time did you know any more details about the special tasks and about the compilation of this Regiment Brandenburg? If so, what did you know about it at that time?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A What I knew about Regiment Brandenburg at that time I cannot state so exactly because I am under oath here, but I can say what I know today about it--if you think this is important, then, of course, I can say that.
Q Is it something new? Is it something which we haven't heard up till now? Then, of course, we shall be interested in it.
AAs far as I know the Brandenburg units...
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Your Honors please, I think it should be clarified first, before General Lanz testifies, whether the information he is about to talk about is something he heard since the war ended or whether it is information which he knew at the time. I submit that unless it's the latter it's irrelevant here.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the witness stated that he had learned it subsequent to that time.
BY DR. SAUTER:
A Unfortunately I can't make quite absolute exact statements because I don't know whether I actually got all my information. During the years, of course, one learns about a lot of things, and one isn't always in a position to track down information of this kind,-to determine its source. But I think that what I know is probably correct. The Brandenburg units, as far as I know, were used for two purposes: First, quite normally as every other troops--that is, purely tactically; and secondly, for so-called special tasks--as in this case about which we are talking here. This is such a special commitment. When the troops are used normally, as any other troop, then it was subordinate to a division or a corps. That wasn't anything special. But when it received a special task, then this task, as far as I know, was ordered by the OKW because the Brandenburg units were subordinate for their special tasks exclusively to the OKW. At any rate I was informed. And from this case it can be seen--in this case too--the order, or at least the suggestion for the employment of the company came from the OKW. That is what I can say about it.
Q Witness, during the fighting on the island of Korfu were you personally present on the island?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A No, I wasn't on the island of Korfu during the fighting. I was occupied with Kephalonia at the time.
Q And then, after the fighting, did you go to Korfu again?
A Yes, after the fighting I was in Korfu in order to find out about the situation. The Divisional Commander, who was in charge of the operation. reported to me about the situation. Of course, we also discussed how the island was to be secured. That, of course, was the most important thing for us. I gave him a few directions about this, and then, as far as I remember, we discussed the further treatment of the prisoners, there were several thousands of them, we discussed their food and their transport, and this was rather difficult because of the scarce shipping space available.
Q General Lanz, which orders did you then give with regard to the treatment of captured Italian officers? Were the orders which you gave on Korfu the same or similar to those for Kephalonia, or did you give other orders on Korfu?
AAs far as I remember I told the Divisional Commander that those Italian officers, and especially the Island Commander--whoever were guilty for the revolt--should be sentenced by summary court martial. But it is also possible--I don't know quite accurately whether the Divisional Commander suggested that to me and I approved it--I don't know that exactly any more. But one thing is certain--that the officers who took part in the revolt, in the mutiny, the people who were responsible for this, were court martialed in a similar way as the people on Kephalonia.
Q And can you tell us anything about the results of these court martial proceedings?
A I recall with certainty that the Commandant of the Island, the Regimental Commander, who was primarily responsible for the revolt, was tried, was found guilty, and was shot. I also think I remember, but not with sufficient certainty, that other officers also--I vaguely remember the number, 8 or 10, but I can't say it with certainty--were in the same way found guilty and that the sentence was carried out.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q And were these officers also--that is, the officers on Korfu-sentenced to death and shot because the fact of mutiny was assumed-that is an action against the express orders of their own commanders, and an action against the occupation power, as far as you know?
A Yes, the opinion was the same here as n Kephalonia. The incidents, of course, were the same. The sentence was based on the reasons which I have already mentioned in connection with Kephalonia that is, that this was a case of armed revolt by troops which had capitulated and which, therefore, were subordinate to the laws of war of the protective power as PW's and that the efforts were useless in this case, as we have already heard, that the orders of the Italian superior officers were not obeyed. So there was nothing else to do except to crush the revolt by force of arms, and, following this, to call to account the people responsible for it.
Q Witness, then what happened to all the other Italian officers, and what happened to all the Italian NCO's and men, as far as you know?
A Well, they were treated in the same way as the others on Kephalonia, They were transported away when the necessary shipping space was available. This took a certain time. Of course in both cases there were several thousand men who now had to be brought to the mainland by boat.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Pardon me. Before recessing we'd like to announce that the Tribunal finds it necessary to continue in session until 12:30, after which they will recess until two o'clock. The Tribunal will be in recess for its usual morning recess period.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom please take your seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Yon may proceed, Dr. Sauter.
DR. SAUTER: If the Tribunal please, may I put a question to the Tribunal? Next Thursday I believe is a holiday and I presume there won't be a session here?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: No, there will be no session on Thursday or Friday. We will adjourn Wednesday night until Monday morning.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you very much for this information. I shall inform my colleagues.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. General Lanz, it goes without saying--and any layman will see the points at once--that when you were on Kephalonia and Korfu, you found yourself in an exceptionally difficult position because you had to act quickly. How looking back today, having gained distance of some years from these events, looking back, I am saying, on those events, on Kephalonia and Korfu, what is your judgment today of what you did at the time?
A. I naturally have thought and reflected a good deal on those events, and I can only regret it, above all, that it was not possible at the time to move General Gandin to settle the whole matter peacefully as was the case with all the other Italian divisions in the Greek area. But as fate, as I am inclined to put it, decided to the effect that there was to be an aroused conflict all its consequences, which I regretted and regret, I had to be consent with the facts which I found. These were the faces: first of all, I had an assignment to carry out which was to prevent an Allied landing on the Ionian Islands or the west coast of Greece with such moans and forces as were at my disposal.
Had the Allies succeeded at that time in occupying these islands and from there would have taken the next obvious stop, namely to invade the mainland, this would have meant that a situation had been established which would not only, as far as the Balkans are concerned but even perhaps for the whole Eastern front, would have created consequences which could not have been foreseen. I might recall here the historic events of 1913 where the collapse of the German fronts also started from the Balkans. The fact of the matter is that both the tactical and the operational situation were favorable for the Allies who were then fighting in Southern Italy only a few miles so to speak away from me, to make a landing and an invasion of the Western Coast of Greece.
Why the invasion did not take place I don't know but I could not foresee that at the time.
The second factor which influenced my actions was the attitude of my superior officers. Although I always endeavored in wartime to preserve a certain amount of independence, and I thereby faced many an unpleasant situation, in this particular situation the order and the assignment by my superior officer was as far as I was concerned of decisive importance. My superiors, all of them, insisted, starting from the army group right up to Hitler, and the pressure they put on me increased from day to day to settle the Gandin affair--as I would like to call it quite generally--once and for all. That is to say, the insurrection of the Italians at that time was to be smashed. How much pressure was put on me can be seen among other things from the orders which were issued by my superiors which I have mentioned here and I attempted to evade them inasmuch as I could.
The third factor influencing my actions particularly decisively was the things my enemy did and the attitude he took.
I think that I have endeavored to describe in a plausible and clear manner in accordance with the truth how the events developed on those two islands, and that I on my part did everything within my potentialities in order to have a peaceful and friendly settlement, but the attitude taken up by my opponent who for reasons which are not clear to me decided to attack my troops.
Court No. V, Case No. VII He even wanted to exterminate the German troops.
This attitude I say forced me to take such action as I took. All the more so as General Gandin knew that his own 11th Italian Army had laid down its arms as far as the German High Command was concerned. They had surrendered, although General Gandin had received the order by his own Italian superior quite clearly to lay down arms and to surrender as all the other Italian units had done already, and although he asked me for an order which he received. An order, which in my opinion was perfectly clear and although he must have been aware of the fact that no State of War existed between Italy and Germany.
Q General Lanz, if you asked your own conscience quite positively and without passion about the events of that time, do you today reach the result that in what obviously you thought in 1943 merely that General Gandin, who through his insubordination and treachery put himself outside the Military Law, and therefore he could be regarded and treated as a franctireur, is that still year honest opinion today?
A The attitude behind my actions and the motives why I acted as I did I have expressed since, I hope very clearly. At that time I faced a dramatic situation. I was compelled to take action and I also had to follow the call of my conscience. Of course I was no expert in International Law, nor was I a legal man. I did not even have any court marshal or legal agency in my staff. I had to follow my own conceptions of law and my conscience, and I made honest efforts to offset it. I had no doubt at the time, and I feel no doubt today that through his action Gandin put himself outside the marshal law. I am still firmly convinced of this today. As far as his soldiers were concerned, I mean the men, I could not hold them responsible for something of which they are not guilty. That I would have regarded as the wrong. That is why I passionately opposed the idea of carrying out orders which I did not regard just, but on the other hand I had to insist on having those who were responsible for this wrong, as I saw it, that is those who had caused the insurrection and themselves lead it, that those people must be brought before Court No. V, Case No. VII.
justice, because after all, I alone lost more than 300 men from my troops, and I was responsible to my own soldiers. These losses were unnecessary in my firm conviction. They could have been avoided.
Q Witness, as you have described it, you have in the case of Kephalonia and Korfu, attacked orders frequently, and in the end you moderated one order by Hitler on your own initiative when you did not receive a reply. How did your superiors react towards these independent actions on your part?
AAt that time I merely had the impression that the way I conducted myself was not very popular. I believe I expressed once before I was regarded as too slack to cope with that particular matter. After the event I found in the documents, which were given me here, that as far as judgment of my actions at the time was concerned, that this was written down in a derrogatory manner. I was reproached for not having shown sufficient severity. Two cases were held against me as far as lacking severity was concerned, one my negotiations with Vecchiarelli, and secondly my actions against Gandin.
Q The case of Vecchiarelli, General Lanz, you obviously mean the obliging attitude you showed toward the Italian Commander in Chief Vecchiarelli in the problem of disarming, which I believe you described to us some days ago, is that correct-in opposition to a Fuehrer Order?
A I have described that I had attempted to oblige General Vecchiarelli as much as I could, but that this attempt was turned down in no uncertain manner, and that when I negotiated with him for the second time I, at least, advocated to leave the Italians their rifles in order not to offend their conception of honor. That was disapproved of higher up, as I now read from the documents.
DR. SAUTER: This document to which General Lanz has had reference just now is contained in Prosecution Document Book 19, page 7. It is Document 1780, Exhibit 444, and it is a judgment of General Lanz, which was bestowed on him by his Commander-in-Chief, after the events on Korfu and Kephalonia. This same matter has been mentioned here before. Perhaps Court No. V, Case No. VII.
I could read it briefly. It is the judgment of 10 July 1944, in Document 1780, Exhibit 444), and it reads as follows. Under Paragraph a his personal courage and gallantry were described, and Paragraph b reads as follows:
"He sometimes suffers from changes of moods, so that his achievements are not always even. In estimating difficult situation he does not always show that severity which he otherwise displays in his personal actions, and in his mastery of tactical combat action. Thus in the course of the disarmament of the Italian Army and the fighting connected with it, his activity did not come up to standard in two cases. It was only due to the intervention of the Commander in Chief of Army Group E that no instant disadvantages resulted from that."
Your Honors will recall that at that time the Commander in Chief of Army Group E was General Loehr, and I would ask the Tribunal in connection with this document to look at the consequences, so that it might become clear that the defendant Lanz was not only given this judgment in connection with the actions against the Italians, but that he was even disqualified because under Paragraph C it says, "Conclusion," and I quote: "He fulfills his position as Commanding General well. However, I have serious objections to his assignment as Army Commander, because he is of unstable temper." "Unstable temper" as eve allege, consists in his chivalrous attitude, and his yielding, I would also like the Tribunal to compare with this the proceeding opinion given about General Lanz before the Italian event, by the same Commander in Chief. This is the opinion about him which is given on 21 February 1943, at which time he was not yet called an "unstable character", as he was called after the Italian affair. But, and I quote from there: "Very glad to accept responsibility. Very strong-willed, He has clear trained insight for pertinent needs. Above average. Pronounced leader. Personality of outstanding qualities." And the last remark is "Commander in Chief of an Army." That means that he is being recommended to be promoted to be a Commander in Chief of an Army, and qualified for Court No. V, Case No. VII.
this position and 6 months later he was an "unstable character" b cause he hadn't had all the Italian officers shot.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q General Lanz, this brings me to a different chapter; let me ask you this, apart from the fighting on Korfu and Kephalonia, did you have any other fighting against the Italians?
A In the area of my corps was encountered the Southermost part of Albania. In this southern tip of Albania there was a large number of Italians who were part of the Italian 9th Army stationed in Albania. On 24 September 1943 I ordered the First Commando Division to disarm these Italians, and then they were to be sent to where the other Italians were. I think you have this order verbatim in your documents.
DR. SAUTER: May it please the Tribunal, the order now referred to is a document contained in Document Book Lanz V. It is Document 180, on page 31, which is also Exhibit 89. This is an order which is called Order No. 3 by the Corps Headquarters from the 22nd Mountain Army. The date is 24 September 1943.
"In connection with the Operation 'Treason' it is necessary that the mopping up and taking possession of the SarandeDelvine area is completed at an early date, in order to prevent that reinforcements, bandits or Italians, reach the enemy island occupation forces via Sarande."
And then comes the actual order issued by General Lanz for that purpose. I shall not read it here, and recommend it for the Court's attention. Under Number 2. It says.
"I am fully aware, and have today reported accordingly to the Supreme Commander, that by this measure the coastal protection forces in the area on both sides of Igumencia can only be supplies with 1 battalion. Considering the present situation, as our forces are fighting on Korfu, I shall put up with this."
Under Paragraph 3.:
"I shall try to secure the cooperation of our neighbor to the right." But these technical details are of no interest here.
Paragraph 5.:
"I ask the division to inform me by 26 September of the time Court No. V, Case No. VII.
lag required for the execution of this operation, which has the code name "Spaghetti," as well as of the time when it will be executed."
This document has been signed by General Lanz. It is addressed first to First Mountain Division, which the distribution list shows.
I would like to draw the Tribunal's speciaL attention to the last sentence of Paragraph 1, where it says that the Italians about to be disarmed after they are disarmed are, with a small escort to be sent on the main road, so that they can join from here the other Italians, via Lescovie to Korea, General Lanz submitted this document for the reason that he wanted to show that he saw to it always that the Italians who had been taken prisoner were transported into their P.W. camps under proper conditions.
Q General Lanz, what happened now after this order?
A By virtue of this order the First Mountain Division issued an order in its territory to have this operation carried out, an order dated 27 September.
DR. SAUTER: Your Honors, that order to which General Lanz has just had reference, and which was issued by the First Mountain Division, is contained in Prosecution Document Book 19 on page 126, at page 102 of the English. It is NOKW Document 867, which was offered as Exhibit 453.
Q That is the order, isn't it, Witness, to which you had reference?
A Yes, indeed it is.
Q What happened at the time?
A What we found was that some thousands of Italians who were in the Southern part of Albania, sold their arms to the bands and handed them over to them, and that a large number of the Italians had gone over to the bands.
Q General Lanz, under Paragraph 6 of the order of the First Mountain Division you just mentioned of 27 September 1943, the Document.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
NOKW 867, which was Exhibit 453, the First Mountain Division under the paragraph, "Methods of Warfare," has reference to the fact that armed individuals showing a hostile attitude are to be shot forthwith. Do you know this order and since when do you know it; this order by the First Mountain Division, which was then under your command?
AAs the distribution list shows one copy of this order was sent to my headquarters for purposes of information. I do not recall today any more whether I read the order or not, but it is quite possible that I did.
Q Well, let us assume for a moment, General, that you saw the order at the time and read it; did you have any objections at the time to these methods of warfare as ordered by the First Mountain Division, and did you have no misgivings, and why?
A This is a measure concerning methods of warfare, as it says so explicitly. That is to say, conduct of the troops in combat. As a matter of principle I had no misgivings against the troops in combat shooting an enemy who showed a hostile attitude in combat, though that after all is the essence of fighting. Therefore, insofar as it was a practical method of combat and nothing else I had no fear or misgivings, because after all troops must have the right to use their arms before the enemy does so. That is what I wanted to state as a principle.
Q Witness this fighting with the Italians and the bands) is that connected with the shooting of Italian officers by the 1st Mountain Division? Witness, in document NOKW-960) which is exhibit 448, contained in document book 19 on page 33 of the English, 32 of the German, the shooting of Italian officers by the 1st Mountain Division is reported; is this action connected with the fighting which you have described to us against the Italians and the bands?
A Yes, they are connected.
Q Did you, as the commanding general of the Corps, order the shooting?
A No, I did not order it.
Q What order did you issue concerning the treatment of Italians?
A The order was read before.
Q Is this the order of 24 September that you mean?
A Yes.
Q Well, that order was to the effect that Italians were to be disarmed and sent enroute; is that correct?
A Yes, quite.
Q I see and on whose orders was the shooting of Italian officers carried out, which is mentioned in NOKW 960?
A Without any doubt, by the orders of the 1st Mountain Division.
Q Could you imagine, General Lanz, on the basis of your order the commander of the 1st Mountain Division issued this measure?
A Well, I am sure this was ordered on the basis of the Fuehrer order of 15 September) 1943 where it says quite clearly that officers of Italian units who threw their lot in with the bands were to be shot after a summary Court martial. I believe that is what is says roughly.
Q When did you hear for the first time of the shooting of such Italian officers by the 1st Mountain Division.
A I cannot give you the date. I can only state here that I heard of it after the event.