A Of course I don't know the details any more. I could not say anything about this, unless I had not found an indication in the files. It said, there were about 50 to 60 dead; about 150 wounded; and some missing; that is more than 200 losses.
Q Witness, you told us before that General Gandin and those officers who acted together with him, according to your personal opinion as a soldier, not as a legal man, had made themselves guilty of mutiny or revolt. Are you convinced that this conception of law of yours was also shared by your superiors, not only by your collaborators but by your superiors, or did you at that time or later on hear any kind of counter opinion on the part of your superiors?
A What I heard from my superior officers rather went along the lines which I have already stated today, that I did not intervene enough, that is, that I was much too lenient; also among the superiors, the Army Group or the O.K.W., there was only the one idea that the whole thing was a revolt or mutiny. All the orders which I received or which I can remember, talked about the revolting Italians and of insurgents and similar things. The opinion which I have mentioned here was, without doubt, fundamentally the same as that of my superior officers. Amongst other things this can be seen from the affidavit by General von Buttlar, which you read, and which, in a certain sense, represents the opinions of the O.K.W.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Your Honor, with regard to this point, I would like to offer a few documents. I have submitted one Document No. 191, one single document which, whether I wanted to or not, I had to call as "Document Book No. VII". I don't know whether the Tribunal has yet received the translation of this document book?
Well then, this is submitted as Document 191. Should I read it? It is here in the German translation.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute.
Q Or would the Tribunal think it better if I wait until the document has been translated into English?
THE PRESIDENT: It will make a better record for us, Dr. Sauter, if you wait until it is delivered to us so that we can index it and indicate the number on the document--I am advised that it has not been delivered to the Courtroom yet.
Q Yes. Then I will leave this document out for the moment and will read as the next document one from Document Book IV, Lanz Document Book No. IV. This is Document No. 132 on page 46, and to this I give Exhibit No. 78. This is an affidavit by Gebhard von Lenthe from whom we have already mentioned some other affidavits. The affiant von Lenthe, fifty-five years old, was from September, 1943, until the end of the war Ic with the XXII Mountain Army Corps--that is, with General Lanz. With regard to the events on the island of Kephalonia, he can--I am reading on page 46--he can state the following. I will only read part of this.
"On about 13 September 1943 General Lanz had a long-distance telephone talk with General Gandin on Kefalonia. At this occasion Lanz told General Gandin that the Italian Commander Vecchiarelli in Athens has ordered the surrender of the Italian Army. At the same time General Lanz as Commanding General of that area transmitted to the Italian General Gandin upon the latter's own request the order to carry out the capitulation and surrender of arms of all those Italian units that were under his (Gandin's) command. Since General Gandin did not object to Court No. V, Case No. VII.
this order General Lanz was upon his return from Kefalonia convinced that Gandin would carry out this order.
"In addition, I know in this connection for sure that General Lanz emphatically objected with the Army Group E to an "Order of the Fuehrer" approximately saying, "all Italians on Kefalonia are to he shot."
"He also opposed a second "Fuehrer Order", which followed his objection and which ordered the shooting of all Italian officers. I recall further that on orders of General Lanz a pamphlet had to be printed in Joannina during action on the island of Kefalonia which he (Lanz) personally dropped from an airplane over Kefalonia. It contained the demand to the Italian garrison of Kefalonia to surrender their arms in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed.
"Particulars as to further developments in this matter I could not observe any more, since I became sick and had to stay in bed."
I can leave out the next paragraph. It is signed by Gebhard von Lenthe 14 October 1947 and the signature is duly certified and the affidavit properly sworn to. Then I would like to offer as Exhibit No. 79 the next document in the same document book.
It is Document No. 133 on page 48. This document is also duly sworn to and properly certified. It is an affidavit - no, I must correct myself. It is Document 133 on page 48, and this receives Exhibit No. 79. As I have stated, it is given by Dr. Karl Werkmeister who has duly sworn to it and it has been properly certified. The affiant says, "As I recall it..." I am reading from page 48:
"As I recall it General Hubert Lanz paid me a visit on the occasion of his vacation trip to Germany in January 1944. As always on such visits, resulting from a year long personal relationship, we discussed the general political and military situation and also the difficulties with which General Lanz in particular had to struggle. So, he then told me that because of his independent actions, he had again fallen in to disgrace with Hitler. Since I knew that because of his attitude during his service at the Russian front, he had already been more or less left Court No. V, Case No. VII.
out in the cold and transferred to the minor war theater of Greece, I was naturally particularly interested for what reason he again had made himself disliked.
"Of what he told me the following remained clearly in my memory: General Lanz happened to he in Athens, when Italy's capitulation became known. Since he happened to be the rank-oldest German General in Athens, he received from his superior headquarters, the Army Group, the order to make the Italian Commander in Greece capitulate and surrender his arms. Since he felt such action to be of special hardship, he objected to his superior headquarters against this order and tried to convince them the Italians should be permitted to keep at least some of their weapons. However, this wan denied to them by explicit order. In spite of this order he has, nevertheless, after difficult negotiations with the Italian Commander whose name I cannot recall any more, by virtue of his own authority agreed that the Italians should deliver only their heavy weapons. This agreement, for which he incurred serious censure, was kept by all Italians with the exception of a fighting unit on the island of Kephalonia. In connection with this, he did not execute a Fuehrer-Order that was issued shortly after that. The Italian Commander within the sphere of the island of Kephalonia did not capitulate, in spite of the expressed orders of the Italian Commander in Greece, but ordered the attack on the German island occupation and took part of it prisoner. Because of this event he received a Fuehrer - Order to shoot all Italians who participated in the fight against the German Army in Kephalonia. Against this order he immediately raised sharpest protest with his superior Commander, since the ordered measure was contrary to his human, religious and soldierly feelings. By this protest he was able to accomplish a mitigation of the order to the effect that only the Italian officers, who participated in the fight, should be shot, but not the Italian troops. However, he also protested against this order, so in vain. Thereupon he tried through personal intervention by way of telephone with the Italian General in Kephalonia, whose name I cannot Court No. V, Case No. VII.
recall to make him capitulate. The Italian General asked him then to issue an appropriate order because the orders of his Italian Commander in Athens were unclear. On that he ordered him to stop hostilities against the German troops immediately, and to surrender his arms. The General accepted this order without objection. Therefore he returned relieved to his Staff headquarters.
"However it was soon reported to him that the Italian General did not stop hostilities, but is continuing the fight against German troops. This fact made an attack upon the island necessary, which he then ordered. But at the same time he tried again to change the mind of the Italian Commander to my memory through an emissary or through pamphlets in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, but in vain.
"Prior to the attack and contrary to the explicit Fuehrer Order, he gave orders to the German Commanders of the attacking troops not to shoot all Italian officers that participated in the fight, but to conduct an investigation and court-martial only those who were guilty of mutiny, for mutiny it was.
"During this operation the German forces suffered heavy losses. As far as I remember, General Lanz then told me, that the German Commander found the Italian Commander of the island and some of his officers guilty of mutiny and these were then shot on the basis of a Court Martial sentence. I still remember very well that General Lanz regretted this turn of events, but on the other hand, he was glad that he could, through personal intervention, save the lives of the greater part of the Italian officers and of several thousands of Italian soldiers. He further said that through his independent action he incurred displeasure with his highest superiors and that he is exception soon to be sent home because of "failing health"."
This affidavit is duly sworn to and that brings me to the end of the Kephalonia case and I must reserve the right that when further affidavits are translated, I may be able to submit these. After this I have to deal with the case of Korfu. Shall I start today with the case Court No. V, Case No. VII.
of Korfu or would that not be expedient?
THE PRESIDENT: You'd better keep going.
Q Well then, your Honors, I would like to bring to your attention the German law regulation which in the opinion of General Lanz can be applied in this case. These German legal regulations are reproduced in Document Book IV, Document No. 127, Document No. 128, Document No. 129. Document No. 127 on page 36 receives Exhibit No. 80; Document No. 128 on page 37 receives Exhibit No. 81; and Document No. 128 on page 38 receives Exhibit No. 82; and Document No. 129 on page 39 receives Exhibit No. 83. The legal regulations which, in the opinion of General Lanz, applied to him in the legal procedure against General -- as German General and as judicial -- Gandin, are first of all set down here in Document No. 27 from the German military penal code, paragraph 57.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, that will be a good place to stop. We have some of the preliminaries out of the way. The Tribunal will be in recess until next Monday morning at 9:30.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 24 November 1947 at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII, in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, 24 November 1947, 0930 Judge Carter, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please take their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain as to whether or not all defendants are present in the Courtroom.
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors, all the defendants are present in the Courtroom, with the exception of the defendant von Weichs, who is in the hospital and the defendant Dohner, who has been excused by the Tribunal for today.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter will preside at this day's session.
JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
KARL HUBERT LANZ DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Your Honors, during the last session on Friday, General Lanz discussed the case of Kephalonia and from the Washington documents a number of documents were submitted to the Tribunal, from which General Lanz showed the extraordinary difficult position in which he found himself at the time. On the one hand the Hitler orders which categorically demanded first of all the shooting of all Italians and which General Lanz then succeeded in getting confined to the shooting of the Italian officers and which then Lanz, on his own initiative, reduced to the shooting only of those officers, whose guilt had been established by a court martial procedure. Then on the other hand, there were the Italians who obviously wanted to delay the whole matter until an Allied landing took place.
Your Honors, before I leave the Kephalonia case, I would like to offer a photostat. This is a photostat of the document in Lanz document book 5 on pages 29 to 30. These documents in the Lanz book I already offered in evidence last week. Mr. Fenstermacher objected to this because no photostatic copy was submitted. I now offer this photostat copy, in which these passages which are contained in document book 5, pages 29 and 30 are contained and are marked in the margin with a red pencil. This will remove the formal obstruction to the document mentioned. I think Mr. Fenstermacher will have no more misgivings about the admissablility of this document as evidence.
JUDGE BURKE: May I inquire.....?
DR. SAUTER: It is Lanz Exhibit 73, Lanz document 178, Document No. 178, Lanz exhibit 73.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, please. My notes show that a ruling was withheld on this matter because of some questions as to certification; is that correct?
DR. SAUTER: No, it was not withheld because of that reason, your Honors, but last week I was only able to submit a copy, a mimeographed copy, and Mr. Fenstermacher asked that a photostat of this document should also be submitted and then I stated that I would try to get this photostatic copy and then the Tribunal withheld its decision until this photostat copy was procured. I have now obtained this photostat and Mr. Fenstermacher has received it from me.
THE PRESIDENT: There is no question now, Mr. Fenstermacher, as to this document; is that correct?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: No, your Honor, everything is in order now.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Pardon me for the interruption at this point. I assume then the record will show that any objections made are over-ruled and the exhibit offered is accepted in evidence.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: That is correct, your Honor.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Before I conclude the Kephalonia case, I would like to correct an exhibit number.
On Friday, I offered as last documents from Document Book Lanz No. 4: Documents 127, 128 and 129 and these three documents were given Exhibit Nos. 80, 81, 82 and 83 by me. That was a mistake because page 38 in Lanz Document Book No. 4. is not a document by itself, but just a part of Document No. 128, therefore, I would like to correct it in this way. Document No. 127 on page 36 becomes Exhibit No. 80, so that there will be no mistake and document 129 on page 39 becomes exhibit No. 82, so that the next exhibit number to be used will be exhibit No. 83 I would ask please that you correct this also in your document books.
THE PRESIDENT: This correction will be made.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Thank you, witness Lanz, this brings us to the end for the moment of the case of Kephalonia. There will be another document about this matter, which I cannot submit at the moment. This will be document No. 191, but it has not yet been translated and as a result I will have to submit it to the Tribunal later. But, for the moment, the case of Kephalonia is concluded and now we come to the case of Cerfu. You have already told us that also on Cerfu, the same General Gandin was commandant and that on Cerfu there were parts of the Acqui Division stationed which were under the command of General Gandin; is that correct?
A Yes, it is correct insofar as parts of the division of General Gandan were stationed on Cerfu. This means that Gandin division was stationed with about two-thirds in Kephalonia and with approximately one-third on the Island of Cerfu.
Q When and how then did the fighting start on Cerfu?
AAs far as I know, the fighting on Cerfu started even before any of my troops landed on Cerfu, namely against the German Air Force, Occupying Forces which were there. I think I have already stated that on Cerfu there was a German Airforce Occupation of approximately one hundred men strong, they were mainly for the air field there and in addition, as far as I know, there were a few naval engineers on Cerfu.
But only a very few men. When the Italian capitulation became known among the Italians on Cerfu, that is the capitulation of the Italians to the Allies, the Italians tried to force the German airforce in Cerfu to surrender. They attacked parts of this Airforce Occupation and finally they took the Germans on Cerfu prisoners. That was the beginning of the fighting on Cerfu.
Q Your Honor, with reference to tho beginning of this fighting on Corfu, an affidavit has something to say about this, which is to be found in Lanz document book No. 4 on page 59, Lanz determent book No. 4, page 59, it is document No. 137. This receives exhibit No. 83. This is an affidavit by one Karl Rampf, who states at the beginning that he was tho detachment commander of the German unit on the land of Corfu from the riddle of May, 1943 until the 8/9 September 1943. I will read parts of this affidavit only and to begin with, the first paragraph on page 39 where the affiant states:
"In May 1943 I was ordered by Air Fleet 2 (Italy), with about 40 men, to the island of Corfu. The German Air Force was greatly interested in establishing an aircraft warning service in tho area between Otrant -- this is in the south of Italy -- and the Greek - Albanian border." "At this time many planes (probably British) flew over Corfu to Serbia to provide the Tito Partisans with arms by air. This supply service was to be disrupted because the losses of the German Army through the Partisans increased steadily."
I will skip the next paragraphs. They contain military details, which are of less interest here and then I will read on page 60 the next page, the paragraph which starts in the middle with the words:
On 8 Sept. 1943 Capt. Lenz told me that the British had left Africa and that a number of shipswere approaching Corfu. Since we had received no orders from the Air Fleet from Italy), we called an alert for the German detachments, but prepared for capture in case of a landing. On the afternoon of the same day a state of unrest became apparent among the Italians. I found out from an Italian friend that the Italians (the Italian Regimental Commander, a colonel whose name I no longer recall) had received orders from Badoglio to disarm the Germans and not to consider them as allies any longer. I learned this from the Italian lieutenant de Angeli. Since my detachments were spread over the island, I thought it advisable to remain at the focal point, i.c. in the city of Corfu itself.
Towards evening I took all the German soldiers from the city and the hotels to the airport in my car. We were willing to make a deal with the Italians in order to be able to depart for Greece without a fight, in case it should become necessary. We only had a few machine guns and hand grenades.
I will skip the next paragraph too, which again contains military details and then I continue on page 61 in the middle:
I left Corfu on the morning of 9 September 1943 in this plane at about six o'clock, after I had warned my non-commissioned officers of all the detachments by telephone against any rash acts, and above all against the shedding of any blood by the Germans, on account of its senselessness.
The Italians tried to give us some trouble when our plane left, but did not find the courage because, on the air field, the German forces were superior.
Hardly had I arrived in Athens at noon, than I heard that my detachment in Argirades was sending SOS calls and reported that it was being attacked by the Italians. A few minutes later the radio report arrived that the equipment had been destroyed according to orders and that the garrison was attempting to reach the Greek mainland in boats.
I again skip the next paragraph and read the last but one:
The detachment in Argirades (40 men) were told to surrender in the afternoon of 9 September 1943. Thereupon the German soldiers blew up the secret instruments. After an untimatum, the soldiers were taken prisoner by the Italians. There was about one Italian battalion in this area, which effected the capture. Two German soldiers were shot while trying to escape. In a like manner the other small detachments were overpowered without a fight, because the Italians were greatly superior. The German soldiers were robbed of all their belongings, they could not even retain a handkerchief. They were turned over to the British and put into captivity in Africa (Benghasi).
Then I leave out the next paragraph, again military details, and just road the last one, which states:
"Civilian acquaintances wrote me that the Italians shot (antiaircraft) against German planes after 9 September 1943. One plane is said to have crashed after being shot upon."
The affidavit is duly signed by Rampf, who was Detachment Commander on Corfu. It is properly certified and duly sworn to. Witness, how did things develop on Corfu?
A We tried, through officers, who were sent to the island as negotiators, for the surrender to persuade the commandant to cease hostilities and by describing to him the conditions, we tried to convince him that he should give up his arms to the Germans and should surrender the Island.
Q And then, did you also tell the Italian commandant that if he did not follow those orders he himself would be held personally responsible because of mutiny or some other point of view?
A Yes, it can be assumed because the resistance which occurred on Kephalonia was very recent and the situation as a whole, that is the surrender of the Italian army to the German High Command, was quite clear and that had already happened sometime ago.
Q Your Honors, in this connection I would like to read a further part of document No. 178. This is to be found in Lanz document book No. 3 on page 29. I repeat, document No. 178 in Lanz document book No. 3, page 29. This document has already been submitted here and received the exhibit No. 73. The last part of this document which is to be found on page 30, I have already read in another connection, and now with reference to the Corfu operation, I would like to read the reports on page 29. That is the reports dated 11 September 1943, is a daily report which, as can be seen from the heading, came from the Corps Headquarters of the XXII Mountain Army Corps, that is from General Lanz or Ms staff on 11 September, 1943 at 0900 hours and was sent to the High Command Army Group E as a daily report. It states therein "Captain Spindler, Commander Mountain Army Group E Battalion 54 is being sent to the island of Corfu, as truce-bearer, to carry through the laying down of arms on the part of the Italian units on Corfu.
"Captain Spindler's negotiations in Corfu are unsuccessful whereupon Captain Spindler returns on 12 September 1943 to Joannina. Those occupying the island of Corfu allege that they have no orders to surrender from their superior authority."
And then the report on the 13th of September 1943 heading: -- the island of Corfu at 0600 hours:
"Major von Hirschfeld, 1st Mountain Division, crosses with the Chief of General Staff 26th Italian Army Corps to Corfu and takes over to the Italian Commandant on the island, the order to lay down arms; otherwise surrender would be enforced by force of arms. The Italian Chief of Staff, at the same time, brings over an instruction of the Commanding General 26th Italian Army Corps, which says that those occupying the island must behave exactly as the Italian troops on the mainland."
And then from the same day at 1140, radio message of Major von Hirschfeld: "Report refusal!"
General Lanz wishes this document to be presented to the Tribunal so that it is made quite clear that the Italian troops on Corfu were told by the Chief of Staff of their own Italian corps that they should at once give up their arms, but , nevertheless, in spite of that order, they did not give up their arms and fought openly against the German troops.
Q. General Lanz, what was the result of the orders of this Italian High command in Athens and the Italian Corps Hq.in Joannina to the Italian Commandant in Corfu, in which he received the order to lay down his arms and to surrender, and what was the result achieved by this truce bearer who was sent by the Germans to the Italian commandant?
A. All these efforts remained unfortunately without success.
Q. What did you do?
A. Well, of course, I reported currently about the position to the army group. The army group then became impatient and ordered me to send a battalion at once to Corfu in order that this battalion should carry out the disarming of the Italians, and so that in this way the island should be taken into German hands. By reason of this order on the , I think it was the 13th of September a battalion of the 1st Mountain Division was embarked on the ships which were available at that time. They were mostly small fishing boats, and from Igumenica they were sent to Corfu. But the whole thing was not as simple as we had imagined. When this battalion , which was distributed amongst the several ships neared the town of Corfu suddenly violent artillery fire was started by the Italians through which, as far as I know, two ships were very quickly sunk and about 60 soldiers were drowned. Other ships were damaged and the troops, of course, couldn't defend themselves on the ships, -this was technically impossibly and therefore, we could do nothing else except to have this battalion turn around and come back to the mainland.
Q. And, witness, what were the consequences of this situation for your further treatment of the matter?
A. From this incident it was then completely clear that the Italian commandant was determined to protect the island by force of arms, and thereupon and rightfully we had to conclude that the Italian commandant had the same attitude as General Gandin, that is, with force of arms he was going to resist the surrender which had been ordered him, and refused to deliver up his arms, and nothing remained for us except to crush this resistance of the Italians against the surrender by force of arms.
Q. And then, General Lanz, how then did the fighting on the island of Gorfu develop?
A. First of all, as on Kephalonia, we had to organize enough troops on the island in order to attack the Italians.
For this purpose, on the two following days, as far as I knew, two Mountain Light Infantry Battalions of the 1st Mountain Division -- I assume by night -- were landed on the southern tip of the island of Corfu. The troops were landed in spite of enemy resistance. A bridgehead was established after fighting, and then these troops attacked along the two roads which ran from the southern part of the island of Corfu to the north and which led to the town of Corfu. The Italians, then fighting a delaying action all the time, gradually withdrew towards the center of the island and then on the pass heights southwest of the town of Corfu, the decisive battle there took place.
These pass heights, which I myself subsequently saw very frequently are very suitable for a defense. There is a narrow pass there through which one has to go if one wishes to reach the town of Corfu, and there fighting was carried on against the Italians. Both sides incurred heavy losses, but the Italians were defeated and when the German troops marched down from the pass heights towards the town of Corfu, the Italians realized that resistance was useless, and laid down their arms.
Q. And then what did the Italian island commandant do?
A. The Italian commandant -- this was the regimental commander -who was first of all in the town of Corfu, then fled with the majority -of the Italian officers from the town into the northern part of the island when he saw that the battle was lost.
Then in the northern part of the island, it was significantly his own troops who took him prisoner, and brought him to Corfu.
Q. And then was it reported to you at that time that this Italian commandant had fled to the northern part of the island because he had left his troops and he wanted to be taken by boat to Italy from the Northern part of the island?
A. Yes, as far as I can remember, that is correct. He certainly tried, after he saw that his efforts had been in vain, he tried to flee and probably hoped that from Corfu he could escape to Italy.
Q. General Lanz, what were the losses incurred by the German troops through this fighting which you wanted to avoid?
Q. I have already mentioned that there Were losses during the shelling of the ships, and then during the course of the fighting there wore further losses, but they weren't terribly great. I estimate the German losses to be about 80 to a hundred men.
Q. And the Italian losses?
A. I can't tell you in detail, they were probably higher.......but I don't know exactly.
Q. General Lanz, the prosecution submitted Document NOKW-865........this is to be found in Document Book Prosecution KIK, page 124 of the German and page 99 of the English, Exhibit 452. In this document in the passage given there, you will find a report of your crops to the 1st Mountain Division which states that by order of high authority no prisoners arc to be taken during the operation "Verrat".........have you got this report there?
A. Yes; in the meantime I know it by heart.
Q. What is this operation "Verrat"?
A. The operation "Verrat" is the German attack against the island of Corfu.
Q. In this order high authority forbids any kind of prisoners to be taken. By reason of your own experience as a general, what do you think about the admissability of this order?
A. This is an obvious violation of the Hague Land Warfare Convention, Paragraph 23.
Q. And how then do you explain that it was just in connection with this operation, which had the code name "Verrat" (treason), that this kind of order(which was against international law) was issued?
A. I can only explain this order in connection with the Hitler order which I mentioned concerning the case of Kephalonia. As far as I remember, it stated that all Italians belonging to the Gandin Division were to be shot because of mutiny. I can only assume that this order which I received in this case had some connection with his. At any rate, that's the only way in which I can explain the order.
Q. Witness, did you know about this order which stated that no prisoners were to be taken when you carried out the operation against Corfu?
A. I cannot answer this with absolute exactitude, but I think I must assume that it was not known to me before, because I must assume rightfully then that in this event I would have protested against this in the same way as I protested in the case of Kephalonia.
Q. And now, witness, this order issued by higher authority, according to which no prisoners were to be taken during the operation ''Verrat"......that is, everyone had to be shot.......was this order carried out by you and by your troops?
A. No, this order was not carried out.
Q. But?
A. But the Italians were taken prisoner, many thousands of them.
Q. And now, in this connection I would like to offer another document in evidence. This is to be found in Lanz Document Book No. III, page 46, Document No. 83 which receives Exhibit No. 84, Lanz No. 84. This is an affidavit by Karl Keinz Rothfuchs, the same affiant who has given affidavits in other connections here.
The affiant Dr. Rothfuchs, 36 years old, states at the beginning of his affidavit that he was Ic with the 1st Mountain Division.......that is, under General Lanz, during the period of Juno 1942 until the end of the war. This Ic with the 1st Mountain Division, Dr. Rothfuchs, then states......and I read from page 46:
"After".......and the subject is: "Operation 'Verrat' against the Uprising Italians on the Island of Corfu in the Middle of September 1943." The affiant states:
"After the Italian capitulation, the disarming of the Italians was ordered. This was carried out within the sphere of the First Mountain Division and first without any difficulty. The arms were collected in certain places and the Italians were put together in small groups in order to be sent to Florina. Some few of those Italians, mainly the officers could keep their sidearms and several rifles and guns, so they could defend themselves against possible partisan attacks during their march. Some of the Italians went over to the partisans, especially in the Albanian coastal area. Other Italians fled to the mountains during their march back and three joined the partisans. On the Ionic islands Kefalonia and Korfu the Italians carried out organized resistance. This was the division of General Gandin which was in Kefalonia with the largest part and about 1 regiment in Korfu. Although this division also had been ordered by their own AXVI Army Corps in Joannina, to give up arms, they refused this command and fought against us. They even attacked and captured German troops. Thus German leaders were forced to land troops on the islands and to defeat the uprising Italians in fighting which lasted for several days, was very difficult and resulted in many losses.