Did these leaflets have any kind of an effect and how did the situation on the island develop?
A. Unfortunately these leaflets had no effect at all, or perhaps I should say that they had the absolutely opposite effect apparently, because it was reported, as far as I can remember, that new reserves from the southern part of the island were brought up to the front. That is, in order to continue the fighting, and the fighting was actually continued. Our expectation that the fighting would stop was not fulfilled.
DR. SAUTER: Your Honors, in connection with the question of the continuance of the fighting by the Italians against the German troops, I would like to submit another document. This is in Lanz Document Book No. V, Document No. 176; this is on page 27; I repeat, Document No. 176, on page 27, and this, when received, will be Lanz Exhibit No. 76. This is also a document which we are able to submit here because we found it in the documents which came from Washington. This is the order which General Gandin at that time gave to his troops to attack the German troops, dated 20th September 1943.
I would like to direct the special attention of the Tribunal to this date because from this it can be seen that the actual way in which General Gandin acted was in direct contrast to the negotiations which the same General Gandin had conducted with General Lanz and the Island Commander. From this order, Document No. 176, on page 27, I will only quote Figure I and from the introduction, and I would ask that judicial notice be taken of the rest.
On the left, at the top, "Headquarters Infantry Division Acqui, Section I; then local headquarters, 20th September 1943, subject; attack on enemy positions of Kardakata Angonas. To: Headquarters 317th Infantry Regiment; to: Headquarters artillery Division; and for information to Headquarters Engineer Division.
"I. Morning 21st September advance resumed to wipe out German forces in the area Kardakata - Angonas." I would like especial notice to be taken of these words "to wipe out".
Then, the order continues:
"I intend to hold the enemy in the front sector Curuclata by fire; to take possession of the central position of Kardakata; to wipe out the enemy forces cut off in the sector Codogurata-Curuclata and then in the sector Angonas."
And in Paragraph II and III to VII I will not read. They are only the tactical executive regulations for the carrying out of the order as stated in the first part of the first paragraph by Gandin, that is to wipe out the enemy forces. The order is signed by the Division Commander, Antonio Gandin. In this connection, your Honors, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that this order was not only set down in the War Diary of the 22nd Army Corps, but also in Italian. Of course, I have only submitted the German translation to you, which is also contained in the War Diary. If the Tribunal would be at all interested in the Italian form of this, that is also available. It is contained in the War Diary of the 22nd Army Corps.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Well, General Lanz, after this order, how did the affairs continue. The order of the Italian General Gandin dated the 20th September 1943?
A. On the 20th of September, after the hopelessness of our efforts became clear to us; we finally prepared ourselves for the attack, and on the 21st of September this attack started. As far as I can remember, it lasted about one and a half days. The tactical details are of no interest here. In any case after rather difficult and violent fighting, we were successful in driving over the mountains into the southern part of the island, and when the town of Argostoli was reached, the Italians finally surrendered.
Q. With General Gandin?
A. Yes, also General Gandin.
DR. SAUTER: In this connection then, as exhibit No. 77, Lanz Exhibit No. 77, I would like to offer another document which is to be found in Document Book IV, on page 40.
This is Document No. 130; I repeat, Document Book IV, page 40, Document No. 130, and this becomes Exhibit No. 77. The affidavit is properly sworn to; signed by the affiant and properly certified; it is given by the former Captain Matthias Starl. I have already submitted one affidavit by him before. He states he was a captain and first ADC in the 22nd Mountain Corps from the 3d of September 1943 until the 14th of November 1943. Because of the importance of the whole affair, I would like to read the main part of this affidavit. The affaint Matthias starl, thirty-three years old, resident in Lindau, Lake Constance, states about the occurrences on Kephalonia.
I read from page 40, in the middle:
"While the disarming of the Italians in the area of the XXII Mountain Army Corps in Epirus was carried out without substantial difficulties, the troops of the Italian Division "Aqui" commanded by General Gandin, offered armed resistance on the islands of Corfu and Kephalonia. When, on 12 September 1943, the report was received at Corps Headquarters in Joanina, that the Italians on Kephalonia refused to lay down arms as ordered and had gone over to attack the German Fortress Battalion there, General Lanz went early by plane on 13 September 1943 to Argostoli, to settle matters by a discussion with General Gandin. In the afternoon, General Lanz returned to Joanina and informed the Chief of staff of the Corps HQ, Colonel Dietel, in my presence, of the fact that he could not land in Argostoli because his plane was fired on there so that he was compelled to land out of range of fire on the northern side of the island and to go from there to Lixuri, the Command lost of the German Commander on the Island. From here he was able to phone to Argostoli and speak with General Gandin. The latter replied to the remonstrances of General Lanz that he had no clear orders and asked General Lanz for an order, which had been given immediately for the cessation of hostilities and the handing over of arms and the island.
General Lanz then believed confidently that the matter was settled. Next day, however, bad news came unexpectedly. The Italians continued to fight and fired on two ships, which were to go from Lixuri to Argostoli carrying German soldiers, suddenly, with their coastal artillery, as a result of which one ship sank and the other had to return damaged to the peninsula Lixuri.
General Lanz was very provoked by the behavior of the Italians then because he felt he had been deceived by General Gandin.
He ordered the Chief of staff to ascertain at once which troops were most quickly available, to put down the Italian revolt on Kephalonia because the fortress troops there were by no means adequate. Now the order was given, I think it was on 15 September 1943, that 2 Battalions and a Mountain Artillery Battalion of the 1 mountain Division under command of a Regimental Headquarters, for special tasks with Major v. Hirschfeld were to be taken over to the Island with the order to prepare to attack, after landing in the northwest part of the Island, to rout the Italians in the northern part first of all. All German troops on Kephalonia were put under Major von Hirschfeld, and, the former Commander on the Island until then, Lieutenant Colonel Barge was relieved. The landing at night of the units of the 1 Mountain Division on the Southwest corner of the peninsula Lixuri experienced even then heavy losses on account of fire from the Italian coastal batteries in the vicinity of Argostoli so that the landing point had to be moved. Approximately on the 17 September, enough forces were assembled to attack the 2 to 3 Battalions of Italians who had encircled the Germans occupying the northern part of the Island and had placed them in a very perilous position.
In bitter fighting, with heavy losses on both sides, the Italians were routed, and all Italians were called upon to surrender by pamphlets dropped from planes. The Corps headquarters Staff hoped again in this way to be able to put an end to the fighting. The Italians, however,did not cease firing, but brought up reserves from the southern part of the Island to the front in the North. General Lanz flow to Kephalonia again, I think it was on the 18 September, and took an officer of Corps Headquarters with him whom he left as Liaison Officer with v. Hirschfeld's staff, so as to have better communication and orientation for the imminent battles. He induced major v. Hirschfeld, too, if I remember right, before the start of the actual attack to contact General Gandin once more to try to avoid a last battle. Gandin is supposed to have replied that he could not prevent the battle because his officers no longer obeyed him. On 19 or 20 September approximately, after all preparations had been made for the decisive attack southwards on Argostoli and the Italians kept on fighting with equal intensity, the attack began on the part of the Germans in 2 columns.
On approximately 15 September, A Fuehrer Order was received at Corps Headquarters in Joanina concerning Army Group E, I think which said that all Italians on Kephalonia were to be shot. It was a question of a Special Order which, when cognizance had been taken of it, was to be destroyed. General Lanz was very agitated about this order and rejected it with sharp words. In a detailed teletype which I personally had to transmit to the Army Group, he begged to renounce these measures and call only the guilty to account.
As reply to this, an altered 2 Order came from the Fuehrer Headquarters that the enlisted men could be spared, that all officers, however, were to be shot.
This order came in the night hours as a teletype to the Corps Headquarters and was brought by me personally to General Lanz in his quarters. Since the 1 Fuehrer Order had perturbed him very much and he was battling with his conscience, he received the new order, it is true, with Certain relief, declared himself, however, immediately, in favour of a revision of this order too as he considered this unjust, too, He ordered me, in conjunction with the Chief of staff to protest immediately against this order, also, in the sense that only the guilty officers should be punished. As far as I remember, however, this renewed protest was turned down.
I do not need to read the next paragraph: it is only concerned with the carrying out of the mopping up of operation on the Island. I now read the last paragraph. He states, on page 43:
"Obviously he instructed the latter at the same time...." (that is, Lanz and v. Hirschfeld) "...to investigate the Gandin affair and to pass judgment upon it according to martial law.
I still remember that the Chief of Staff of Gandin, a Colonel, had organized the fight against the Germans and that a large proportion of the officers had joined him. General Gandin, his Chief of Staff, and several of his officers were shot on the 23rd or 24th of September, according to martial law."
The affidavit, by Matthias Starl, former captain and first A.D.C. to the defendant, General Lanz, is duly sworn and properly certified.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Witness, how often did you personally fly to Cephalonia because of this matter?
AAs far as I remember, I was there three times.
Q. Three times, personally?
A Yes.
Q And then what did Major v. Hirschfeld tell you about the investigation of the Gandin affair, after you had entrusted him with this investigation?
A Major von Hirschfeld reported to me that the resistance originated from Gandin, principally from the Chief of Staff, and obviously with the agreement of General Gandin a large number of officers had joined this resistance group.
Q Did he report to you, as a result, whether individual officers or individual parts of troops of the Italians wore for the regular carrying out of the capitulation?
A Well, this can already be seen from former reports which we have already discussed. It was also similar, as on Corfu, that there was a resistance group there which organized its resistance despite all requests to stop fighting.
In spite of the previous capitulation and orders which we sent them they did not stop their resistance but the fighting was continued to the uttermost. There can be no doubt that at this stage this was a completely irregular fight.
Q Now, witness, what was the task which you gave Major von Hirschfeld with regard to the judicial settlement of the case of Gandin?
A I have already stated once that on my second visit to Cephalonia I said that the affair had to be investigated and that the guilty people had to be sentenced according to a court martial; as far as I know, I repeated this commission again to Major Hirschfeld when I was there for the third time.
Q And did the court martial sit in order to sentence the guilty officers?
A I remember that when the sentence of the court martial was announced against the guilty men, General Gandin, as far as I remember, asked that he be allowed to speak either to Field Marshal Keitel or to General Jodl; he referred again to his connections which have alreadybeen mentioned. This, however, was turned down by the Island Commander, since General Gandin, by how whole conduct, had no right to do this; he had been given sufficient time.
Q Witness, the prosecution maintains that all officers of the Gandin staff were shot. Is that correct?
A I tried, in the files which were available to me, to find material to repute this assertion, but I could not find any figures. I personally can say that as far as I recall, that is not correct. Gandin and his Chief of Staff and several officers were shot but I do not know that all the officers were shot.
Q You mean all the officers of the staff?
A Yes. But unfortunately I could not find any proof of this.
Q Even if you are not a legal man, can you give us some indication as to the basis, the paragraphs, or the point-of-view, on which the sentencing of General Gandin and the guilty officers was carried out?
I mean according to the court martial proceedings of what had they made themselves guilty?
Q Of course we thought a lot about these things at the time. The legal position, the position on which we based our assumptions was, as far as I remember, the following: After General Vecchiarelli's army had capitualed, the members of this army were therefore prisoners of war. Whether they wanted this or not, from the legal point of view was not important. Well then, if these prisoners of war, in spite of the orders which we sent to them, and in spite of the negotiations which were carried on with them, and in spite of the summonses which were given to them, goodness knows that was done in this case, if, in spite of all this, they continued their resistance with their weapons in their hands, then of course that is mutiny. If a prisoner of war fights with his weapon in his hand against the power which he was formerly fighting, then, of course, this is mutiny according to German conception, and probably also according to other conceptions.
Q General, you have already said that sentenced and shot were only General Gandin and the guilty officers who had committed this mutiny or this revolt. What happened to the other officers?
A Well, there were several thousand Italians on the Island who actually, according to the order mentioned, were supposed to have been shot. The Italians were transported away in ships?
Q With the officers?
A Yes, of course. All the Italians who were taken prisoner, apart from the officers who were sentenced, were transported away as prisoners of war. As far as I know, first of all to Patras and then after that to Piraeus. As far as I remember, there were over 5,000.
Q. What were the German losses during this fighting which you have just described to us was caused by the Italians--I mean the German losses?
A Of course I don't know the details any more. I could not say anything about this, unless I had not found an indication in the files. It said, there were about 50 to 60 dead; about 150 wounded; and some missing; that is more than 200 losses.
Q Witness, you told us before that General Gandin and those officers who acted together with him, according to your personal opinion as a soldier, not as a legal man, had made themselves guilty of mutiny or revolt. Are you convinced that this conception of law of yours was also shared by your superiors, not only by your collaborators but by your superiors, or did you at that time or later on hear any kind of counter opinion on the part of your superiors?
A What I heard from my superior officers rather went along the lines which I have already stated today, that I did not intervene enough, that is, that I was much too lenient; also among the superiors, the Army Group or the O.K.W., there was only the one idea that the whole thing was a revolt or mutiny. All the orders which I received or which I can remember, talked about the revolting Italians and of insurgents and similar things. The opinion which I have mentioned here was, without doubt, fundamentally the same as that of my superior officers. Amongst other things this can be seen from the affidavit by General von Buttlar, which you read, and which, in a certain sense, represents the opinions of the O.K.W.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Your Honor, with regard to this point, I would like to offer a few documents. I have submitted one Document No. 191, one single document which, whether I wanted to or not, I had to call as "Document Book No. VII". I don't know whether the Tribunal has yet received the translation of this document book?
Well then, this is submitted as Document 191. Should I read it? It is here in the German translation.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute.
Q Or would the Tribunal think it better if I wait until the document has been translated into English?
THE PRESIDENT: It will make a better record for us, Dr. Sauter, if you wait until it is delivered to us so that we can index it and indicate the number on the document--I am advised that it has not been delivered to the Courtroom yet.
Q Yes. Then I will leave this document out for the moment and will read as the next document one from Document Book IV, Lanz Document Book No. IV. This is Document No. 132 on page 46, and to this I give Exhibit No. 78. This is an affidavit by Gebhard von Lenthe from whom we have already mentioned some other affidavits. The affiant von Lenthe, fifty-five years old, was from September, 1943, until the end of the war Ic with the XXII Mountain Army Corps--that is, with General Lanz. With regard to the events on the island of Kephalonia, he can--I am reading on page 46--he can state the following. I will only read part of this.
"On about 13 September 1943 General Lanz had a long-distance telephone talk with General Gandin on Kefalonia. At this occasion Lanz told General Gandin that the Italian Commander Vecchiarelli in Athens has ordered the surrender of the Italian Army. At the same time General Lanz as Commanding General of that area transmitted to the Italian General Gandin upon the latter's own request the order to carry out the capitulation and surrender of arms of all those Italian units that were under his (Gandin's) command. Since General Gandin did not object to Court No. V, Case No. VII.
this order General Lanz was upon his return from Kefalonia convinced that Gandin would carry out this order.
"In addition, I know in this connection for sure that General Lanz emphatically objected with the Army Group E to an "Order of the Fuehrer" approximately saying, "all Italians on Kefalonia are to he shot."
"He also opposed a second "Fuehrer Order", which followed his objection and which ordered the shooting of all Italian officers. I recall further that on orders of General Lanz a pamphlet had to be printed in Joannina during action on the island of Kefalonia which he (Lanz) personally dropped from an airplane over Kefalonia. It contained the demand to the Italian garrison of Kefalonia to surrender their arms in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed.
"Particulars as to further developments in this matter I could not observe any more, since I became sick and had to stay in bed."
I can leave out the next paragraph. It is signed by Gebhard von Lenthe 14 October 1947 and the signature is duly certified and the affidavit properly sworn to. Then I would like to offer as Exhibit No. 79 the next document in the same document book.
It is Document No. 133 on page 48. This document is also duly sworn to and properly certified. It is an affidavit - no, I must correct myself. It is Document 133 on page 48, and this receives Exhibit No. 79. As I have stated, it is given by Dr. Karl Werkmeister who has duly sworn to it and it has been properly certified. The affiant says, "As I recall it..." I am reading from page 48:
"As I recall it General Hubert Lanz paid me a visit on the occasion of his vacation trip to Germany in January 1944. As always on such visits, resulting from a year long personal relationship, we discussed the general political and military situation and also the difficulties with which General Lanz in particular had to struggle. So, he then told me that because of his independent actions, he had again fallen in to disgrace with Hitler. Since I knew that because of his attitude during his service at the Russian front, he had already been more or less left Court No. V, Case No. VII.
out in the cold and transferred to the minor war theater of Greece, I was naturally particularly interested for what reason he again had made himself disliked.
"Of what he told me the following remained clearly in my memory: General Lanz happened to he in Athens, when Italy's capitulation became known. Since he happened to be the rank-oldest German General in Athens, he received from his superior headquarters, the Army Group, the order to make the Italian Commander in Greece capitulate and surrender his arms. Since he felt such action to be of special hardship, he objected to his superior headquarters against this order and tried to convince them the Italians should be permitted to keep at least some of their weapons. However, this wan denied to them by explicit order. In spite of this order he has, nevertheless, after difficult negotiations with the Italian Commander whose name I cannot recall any more, by virtue of his own authority agreed that the Italians should deliver only their heavy weapons. This agreement, for which he incurred serious censure, was kept by all Italians with the exception of a fighting unit on the island of Kephalonia. In connection with this, he did not execute a Fuehrer-Order that was issued shortly after that. The Italian Commander within the sphere of the island of Kephalonia did not capitulate, in spite of the expressed orders of the Italian Commander in Greece, but ordered the attack on the German island occupation and took part of it prisoner. Because of this event he received a Fuehrer - Order to shoot all Italians who participated in the fight against the German Army in Kephalonia. Against this order he immediately raised sharpest protest with his superior Commander, since the ordered measure was contrary to his human, religious and soldierly feelings. By this protest he was able to accomplish a mitigation of the order to the effect that only the Italian officers, who participated in the fight, should be shot, but not the Italian troops. However, he also protested against this order, so in vain. Thereupon he tried through personal intervention by way of telephone with the Italian General in Kephalonia, whose name I cannot Court No. V, Case No. VII.
recall to make him capitulate. The Italian General asked him then to issue an appropriate order because the orders of his Italian Commander in Athens were unclear. On that he ordered him to stop hostilities against the German troops immediately, and to surrender his arms. The General accepted this order without objection. Therefore he returned relieved to his Staff headquarters.
"However it was soon reported to him that the Italian General did not stop hostilities, but is continuing the fight against German troops. This fact made an attack upon the island necessary, which he then ordered. But at the same time he tried again to change the mind of the Italian Commander to my memory through an emissary or through pamphlets in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, but in vain.
"Prior to the attack and contrary to the explicit Fuehrer Order, he gave orders to the German Commanders of the attacking troops not to shoot all Italian officers that participated in the fight, but to conduct an investigation and court-martial only those who were guilty of mutiny, for mutiny it was.
"During this operation the German forces suffered heavy losses. As far as I remember, General Lanz then told me, that the German Commander found the Italian Commander of the island and some of his officers guilty of mutiny and these were then shot on the basis of a Court Martial sentence. I still remember very well that General Lanz regretted this turn of events, but on the other hand, he was glad that he could, through personal intervention, save the lives of the greater part of the Italian officers and of several thousands of Italian soldiers. He further said that through his independent action he incurred displeasure with his highest superiors and that he is exception soon to be sent home because of "failing health"."
This affidavit is duly sworn to and that brings me to the end of the Kephalonia case and I must reserve the right that when further affidavits are translated, I may be able to submit these. After this I have to deal with the case of Korfu. Shall I start today with the case Court No. V, Case No. VII.
of Korfu or would that not be expedient?
THE PRESIDENT: You'd better keep going.
Q Well then, your Honors, I would like to bring to your attention the German law regulation which in the opinion of General Lanz can be applied in this case. These German legal regulations are reproduced in Document Book IV, Document No. 127, Document No. 128, Document No. 129. Document No. 127 on page 36 receives Exhibit No. 80; Document No. 128 on page 37 receives Exhibit No. 81; and Document No. 128 on page 38 receives Exhibit No. 82; and Document No. 129 on page 39 receives Exhibit No. 83. The legal regulations which, in the opinion of General Lanz, applied to him in the legal procedure against General -- as German General and as judicial -- Gandin, are first of all set down here in Document No. 27 from the German military penal code, paragraph 57.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, that will be a good place to stop. We have some of the preliminaries out of the way. The Tribunal will be in recess until next Monday morning at 9:30.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 24 November 1947 at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII, in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, 24 November 1947, 0930 Judge Carter, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please take their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain as to whether or not all defendants are present in the Courtroom.
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors, all the defendants are present in the Courtroom, with the exception of the defendant von Weichs, who is in the hospital and the defendant Dohner, who has been excused by the Tribunal for today.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter will preside at this day's session.
JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
KARL HUBERT LANZ DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Your Honors, during the last session on Friday, General Lanz discussed the case of Kephalonia and from the Washington documents a number of documents were submitted to the Tribunal, from which General Lanz showed the extraordinary difficult position in which he found himself at the time. On the one hand the Hitler orders which categorically demanded first of all the shooting of all Italians and which General Lanz then succeeded in getting confined to the shooting of the Italian officers and which then Lanz, on his own initiative, reduced to the shooting only of those officers, whose guilt had been established by a court martial procedure. Then on the other hand, there were the Italians who obviously wanted to delay the whole matter until an Allied landing took place.
Your Honors, before I leave the Kephalonia case, I would like to offer a photostat. This is a photostat of the document in Lanz document book 5 on pages 29 to 30. These documents in the Lanz book I already offered in evidence last week. Mr. Fenstermacher objected to this because no photostatic copy was submitted. I now offer this photostat copy, in which these passages which are contained in document book 5, pages 29 and 30 are contained and are marked in the margin with a red pencil. This will remove the formal obstruction to the document mentioned. I think Mr. Fenstermacher will have no more misgivings about the admissablility of this document as evidence.
JUDGE BURKE: May I inquire.....?
DR. SAUTER: It is Lanz Exhibit 73, Lanz document 178, Document No. 178, Lanz exhibit 73.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, please. My notes show that a ruling was withheld on this matter because of some questions as to certification; is that correct?
DR. SAUTER: No, it was not withheld because of that reason, your Honors, but last week I was only able to submit a copy, a mimeographed copy, and Mr. Fenstermacher asked that a photostat of this document should also be submitted and then I stated that I would try to get this photostatic copy and then the Tribunal withheld its decision until this photostat copy was procured. I have now obtained this photostat and Mr. Fenstermacher has received it from me.
THE PRESIDENT: There is no question now, Mr. Fenstermacher, as to this document; is that correct?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: No, your Honor, everything is in order now.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Pardon me for the interruption at this point. I assume then the record will show that any objections made are over-ruled and the exhibit offered is accepted in evidence.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: That is correct, your Honor.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Before I conclude the Kephalonia case, I would like to correct an exhibit number.
On Friday, I offered as last documents from Document Book Lanz No. 4: Documents 127, 128 and 129 and these three documents were given Exhibit Nos. 80, 81, 82 and 83 by me. That was a mistake because page 38 in Lanz Document Book No. 4. is not a document by itself, but just a part of Document No. 128, therefore, I would like to correct it in this way. Document No. 127 on page 36 becomes Exhibit No. 80, so that there will be no mistake and document 129 on page 39 becomes exhibit No. 82, so that the next exhibit number to be used will be exhibit No. 83 I would ask please that you correct this also in your document books.
THE PRESIDENT: This correction will be made.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Thank you, witness Lanz, this brings us to the end for the moment of the case of Kephalonia. There will be another document about this matter, which I cannot submit at the moment. This will be document No. 191, but it has not yet been translated and as a result I will have to submit it to the Tribunal later. But, for the moment, the case of Kephalonia is concluded and now we come to the case of Cerfu. You have already told us that also on Cerfu, the same General Gandin was commandant and that on Cerfu there were parts of the Acqui Division stationed which were under the command of General Gandin; is that correct?
A Yes, it is correct insofar as parts of the division of General Gandan were stationed on Cerfu. This means that Gandin division was stationed with about two-thirds in Kephalonia and with approximately one-third on the Island of Cerfu.
Q When and how then did the fighting start on Cerfu?
AAs far as I know, the fighting on Cerfu started even before any of my troops landed on Cerfu, namely against the German Air Force, Occupying Forces which were there. I think I have already stated that on Cerfu there was a German Airforce Occupation of approximately one hundred men strong, they were mainly for the air field there and in addition, as far as I know, there were a few naval engineers on Cerfu.
But only a very few men. When the Italian capitulation became known among the Italians on Cerfu, that is the capitulation of the Italians to the Allies, the Italians tried to force the German airforce in Cerfu to surrender. They attacked parts of this Airforce Occupation and finally they took the Germans on Cerfu prisoners. That was the beginning of the fighting on Cerfu.