Q. Witness, a few minutes ago you touched upon a subject with which I shall deal now. You said that during these days you received a Fuehrer order. What kind of an order was it?
A. During those says a Fuehrer Order arrived. I can no longer say whether it was a teletype or a radio message. To the best of my recollection, it was a very short order which expressed that all Italians of the division Gandin were to be shot for mutiny. This is an order which, if not in the exact text but at least in substance, has been mentioned here by General Foertsch. This Fuehrer Order put me into a very difficult conflict of loyalties. For me I might almost say it was impossible to have all these Italians shot. It was not feasible. When I received the order, therefore, I refused in front of my officers to carry out such an order. I was shocked by such a request. For at least two days I didn't quite know what I should really do.
DR. SAUTER: If it please the Tribunal -
A. I remember that situation quite well.
DR. SAUTER: If the Tribunal please, we cannot submit this Fuehrer order although in various documents of the war diary it has been referred to frequently: but the order itself is not contained in the war diary. Therefore, I would ask the Tribunal to accept an affidavit in this connection which deals with this chapter. This affidavit is contained in Document Book no. IV for Lanz. It is Document 134 in that document book on page 51; I repeat; Document Book IV for Lanz, Document No. 134, page 51. This document will be offered under Exhibit No. 71. It is an affidavit by Horst Freiher Treusch von Buttlar-Brandenfels. The affidavit has been duly sworn to and signed by the witness. It is properly certified. The affiant says -- I am reading from page 51, the second paragraph:
"From 1 January 1942 until 16 November 1944 I was first General Staff Officer of the Army and Chief of the operational division (Army) in the WEST. My statements refer to this period, in regard to band-warfare to the period from autumn 42 until 16 November 44, because my division was charged with the tasks of band-warfare not before autumn 1942.
"In regard to the events on the island of Korfu resp. Kephalonia in 1943 I state:
"I know about the resistance of Italian troops under General Gandin on Korfu and Kephalonia. I remember it particularly well because it is the only case within the sphere of the Italian 11 Army, where under breach of the capitulation agreement concluded by the Italian High Command, resistance to the surrender was offered, and this happened under the command of General Gandin, who was considered a faithful friend of Germany and had personal ties with the Chief WEST Lt. General Jodl, as well as with the military attache in Rome General von Rintelen.
"It is known to me that Lt. General Jodl expected much from the cooperation of General Gandin for the reconstruction of the Italian Army on Germany's side, and therefore, after the capitulation of the Italian Army, he ordered General Gandin brought by special airplane to the Fuehrer's headquarters for a conference on further measures for the reconstruction of an Italian Army faithful to the Axis.
"As to the course of the events I remember that the Italian Commanders of the islands were called upon to surrender and when the demand was unsuccessful the disarming in Korfu was carried out with military means against little resistance.
In Kephalonia, where Gandin personally was in command, the small German forces met with strong Italian resistance, so that the disarming could not be carried out there and considerable own losses were suffered. Hitler was very excited about that and ordered to break the resistance by means of stronger forces and to treat as mutineers any Italian soldiers captured.
"Lt. General Jodl at this time advocated another attempt to induce voluntary surrender on the part of Gandin, before carrying out the Fuehrer-Order.
But this attempt failed also.
"As far as I know the resistance was broken with the help of parts of the 1st Mountain Division under heavy own losses. I do not know how far the Fuehrer-Order about the treatment of captured Italians was sustained and actually carried out. However, I do recall that the Commander Southeast, at least once, but probably several times, asked to cancel or to limit the order on the treatment of Italians captured on Kephalonia. I cannot say how far this attempt was successful, I only remember that, at least as far as the person of General Gandin was concerned, Hitler refused clemency. I remember this event more closely because Jodl told me in connection with that, he must appreciate the attitude of Hitler for objective reasons, but that humanly he regretted very much not to have been able to gain mercy for General Gandin whom he esteemed highly. As far as I know, General Gandin and some officers were shot after a court martial sentence."
The affidavit is signed by the affiant, Horst Freiherr Treusch von Buttlar Brandenfeld. This, then, is Exhibit 71 and in this connection I would like to read two more affidavits in Document Book IV for Lanz, Document No. 131 on page 44; I repeat: Document 131, page 44. This document will be given exhibit number 72. This affidavit has also been duly sworn to and properly certified. It is signed by the affiant. me affidavit is executed by Otto Timmermann who is 40 years of age and the affidavit concerns the Fuehrer order in regard to the Italian occupation forces in Kephalonia.
The affiant says:
"During the second half of September 1943 I newly joined the Corps Staff as the director of the map-collection office. Since the Corps Staff then newly created did not have any cartographic office yet, I worked part-time at the 0 1 office. Therefore I chanced to over hear a telephone talk (this was done regularly by the 0 1. on tactical reports or during conferences for the purpose of writing the war diary; The phone was connected with that of the 01.)
The conversation was conducted by General Lanz in high excitement with the Army Group E because of the Fuehrer-Order, according to which the Fuehrer, i.e., Adolf Hitler , demanded that an "example be set" because of the occurrences on Kefalonia.
"In a voice known to become hoarse when excited, General Lanz reported to the Army Group that he could not carry out the FuehrerOrder because the Italians on Kefalonia either were taken prisoner during battle or had surrendered. To shoot them would be contrary to International Law and he could not expect any of his officers or soldiers to execute the order.
"Apart from that,he continued in a scornful and caustic voice he did not have enough ammunition to shoot Italians according to the Fuehrer-Order.
"When on the other end of the wire, i.e., the Army Group objections were raised concerning the non-compliance with an order of the Fuehrer, General Lanz replied, as I believe to recall literally: 'I fully know what that means for me and put my person at your disposal.'" The affiant continues:
"On the other end the answer merely was that the message will be passed on. I have no knowledge of what happened further in this matter."
This affidavit is signed: "Bad Sassendorf, 30 September 1947" by "Dr. Otto Timmerman."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, please, we will take our afternoon recess.
(A recess was taken).
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Your Honors, I read before the recess document 131, exhibit No. 72, the affidavit by Dr. Otto Timmermann. This document is to prove to the Tribunal that the order mentioned by General Lanz had been issued, and secondly, that General Lanz had objected to this in spite of the dangers, which he knew. This can be seen from Timmermann's affidavit. This Fuehrer order was not to be found in the war diaries because, as in the case of other orders, it had to be destroyed after having been noted, but I am now able to submit to you a further document from the war diaries, which also is proof of the Fuehrer order. This is contained in Lanz document book No. 5, it is document No. 178 on page 29 and this will receive exhibit No. 73, Lanz No. 73. This is an excerpt from War Diary No. 1 from the Corps Headquarters of the XXII Mountain Army Corps for the period from 24 August, 1943 until 31 December, 1943. The last paragraph of this document, which is to be found on page 30, under date of 23 September, 1943, I read from this third paragraph. It states:
"23 September 1943 ...... 18,00 Hours. Return of the Commanding General from. Cophalonia. Following this report made by Chief of General Staff concerning Fuehrer Order. Commanding General inquires afresh from the Army Group as to whether the Fuehrer Order is applicable also to all 5,000 captured Italians."
Therefore this document shall prove in which sense the Fuehrer order was issued and that General Lanz repeatedly objected to it.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, this document is two typewritten pieces of paper with a certificate by Dr.Sauter.
I have no doubt whatever that the pages are correct. I believe if the original photostatic copy has come from Washington that it should be introduced into evidence rather than that document. This is important because of various initials that I suppose appear on the original photostat.
DR. SAUTER: Just one moment, please. This copy which I have submitted is a literal copy of the excerpt concerned from the War Diaries and consists of two pages. In Lanz document book there is an affidavit by me to the effect that the copies submitted correspond to the original. I think in this way the objection of the prosecution is ruled out.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, in the case of other documents, which we have had introduced this afternoon, documents which have originally come from Washington, the photostatic copy has been put into evidence. I see no reason why the same procedure should not be followed for this as well as other documents which Dr. Sauter intends to offer later.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, do you have a photostatic copy of the original?
DR. SAUTER: I think I have one other photostatic copy and I will try to get this by tomorrow morning. The matter can be explained like this, Your Honor; when at the time we submitted these copies so that the document book should be compiled as soon as possible and so that the proceedings would not be prolonged, we had not yet received the photostat copy. Therefore we only submitted a copy certified to by me, but I will try to get a photostatic copy by tomorrow morning ...
THE PRESIDENT: Subject to your obtaining the photostatic copy, which you state will be furnished later, the Tribunal will withhold any ruling on this particular document.
By your reference to tomorrow, unless you have in mind there is a week-end recess, it will be Monday morning.
DR. SAUTER: Yes, of course, I mean Monday.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Witness Lanz, you have already talked about this Fuehrer order and about the fact that you opposed this Fuehrer order, perhaps you would like to tell us again what in the main, without quoting literally, was ordered in the Fuehrer order; who was to be shot according to the original Fuehrer order?
A The Italians belonging to the Gandin division were to be shot as mutineers.
Q Did I understand you correctly that the Fuehrer order stated that originally that all Italians were to be shot?
A Yes, to the best of my recollection.
Q And you protested against this as you have told us and as also can be seen from the War Diaries; how many Italians would have had to be shot, according to the Fuehrer order - how many approximately?
A Well, I should estimate in Kephalonia there were about 7,000 - 6,000 to 7,000.
Q And you refused to do that?
A Yes, I refused to do that.
Q You repeatedly rejected it and refused to do it, as you said?
A I can only say I refused to do it. I cannot confirm it in more detail, but in any case I refused to do it.
A I am only asking you if you did it repeatedly, because this can be soon from the document, which I have just read and you could perhaps use this to aid your memory?
A Yes, that resulted from my attitude.
Q. Witness, and then how did the matter go on?
A. I object to this Fuehrer Order, and I expressed the fact that I could not carry out this order. And then, as far as I remember, the decision came that the men can be spared but that only officers should be shot because of munity. I thought that this decision also went too far, and I expressed my point of view again that only the guilty should be punished and that some kind of a category should be fixed so that only the guilty came into the question. And, as far as I know, I didn't get any further decision from the OKM with regard to this renewed objection of mine.
Q. And then did you yourself fly again to Kephalonia?
A. Yes, on the 17th or 19th-at any rate about this time---I flew back again to Kephalonia in order to talk future steps over with the Island Commander there. In the meantime, as I have reported, the Italians in the northern part of the island had been defeated, on the battle field, of course, and then I discussed with the Island Commander what had to be done tactically in case the Italians did not refrain from resistance. I brought the leaflets with me, and on my return flight I dropped them over the from myself. There was still a certain hope that the Italians would then stop fighting because in itself this fighting was, in my opinion, quite senseless.
Q. Your Honors, with regard to this point, as the witness has just spoken a bout the leaflets which he mentioned previously, I would like to refer to Document No. 174, in Lanz Document Book V. The document is on Page 24, and this receives the Exhibit No. 74. This is one of the leaflets which we also found in the War Diaries as enclosure to a teletype of the Commander of the XXIInd Army Corps. I would ask that judicial notice be taken of the contents, without my reading it here. As further evidence I offer from Lanz Document Book V Document No. 175, on Page 25. This becomes Exhibit No. 75. This is an affidavit by Fritz Doeppenschmitt, who swore to this affidavit before me in Nurnberg on September 26, 1947, and he signed it, and I, as defense counsel, properly certified it.
I read this document because I think it is particularly important. The affiant Doeppenschmitt, 54 years of age, states that he was clerical officer to General Lanz from August, 1943 until August, 1944. This is the same Doeppenschmitt who has already given another affidavit which we have dealt with here. He states concerning occurrences on the island of Kephalonia. I read from Page 25:
"Approximately in the time from 15 till 20 September 1943 I was ordered to accompany General Lanz on a flight to the island of Kephalonia. The flight was done by 2 seaplanes of the Arado type. Before we left, General Lanz informed me that the situation on the island had become more serious because of the resistance offered by the Italian troops, and that he wanted to get more detailed information. In order to avoid any further bloodshed, he had leaflets made to be dropped over the Italian positions, in which the Italians were once more asked to lay down their arms. Several packages with leaflets were put in each of the airplanes, and Lanz instructed me to join him in dropping them over the Italian positions when he gave the signal. This was done after the targets were reached. Afterwards General Lanz had a number of talks with German commanders on the island. After our return General Lanz remarked to me that he was very worried about this Kephalonia matter. He was particularly indignant about a telegram which he had received from the Army High Command the OKW as far as I can recollect, in which he was ordered to execute by shooting all Italian prisoners. He stated, making no bones about his intentions, that he would never obey this order, but that, on the other hand, he was absolutely clear about the possible consequences such a refusal would have for him.
Nuernberg, dated 26 September 1947. Signed: Fritz Doeppenschmitt"
Q. Witness, did you talk with the new Island Commander, Major von Hirschfeld also about this order?
A. Yes, of course, I talked to him because I was caused a lot of trouble by this matter. The situation in which I found myself, at that time, was very soultorturing and difficult.
As a result I did not only talk with the officers of my staff about it, but also of course with Major von Hirschfeld. And I also told him that it was simply not possible to do anything of this kind, and Hirschfeld completely agreed with me. I said to him that I had objected to this order and I hoped that the objection could be sustained. I said that I would tell him what decision was reached about it. But I told him, at the same time, that as soon as possible he should check and investigate this Gandin affair and find the responsible people for this mutiny, and that they should be sentenced according to court martial. He agreed with this and said he would do his very best.
Q. And did your request to Major von Hirschfeld coincide with the second suggestion which you made to the Army Group, and to which you did not receive an order?
A. Of course it coincided with the application which I had made, namely, that the guilty people should be found and made responsible for the matter. I said that some category of men, fixed for some formal reason, should not be sentenced or shot.
Q. An intermediary question, Witness. You said, with regard to this second proposal in which you suggested that only the guilty officers concerned in the mutiny should be shot---not a whole category. You didn't get any answer to this. Did you find out why you didn't got any answer to this second suggestion?
A. I can't remember, but perhaps this suggestion didn't get through or wasn't passed on or got stuck somewhere.
Q. Therefore, you don't know whether this second proposal was passed on by the Army Group or whether it was rejected by Hitler? You don't know anything about this?
A. No.
Q. You said you didn't get any answer, if I understood you correctly. You then gave Major von Hirschfeld the direction based on your second proposal. You dropped a large number of leaflets. The affiant Doeppenschmidt has confirmed that.
Did these leaflets have any kind of an effect and how did the situation on the island develop?
A. Unfortunately these leaflets had no effect at all, or perhaps I should say that they had the absolutely opposite effect apparently, because it was reported, as far as I can remember, that new reserves from the southern part of the island were brought up to the front. That is, in order to continue the fighting, and the fighting was actually continued. Our expectation that the fighting would stop was not fulfilled.
DR. SAUTER: Your Honors, in connection with the question of the continuance of the fighting by the Italians against the German troops, I would like to submit another document. This is in Lanz Document Book No. V, Document No. 176; this is on page 27; I repeat, Document No. 176, on page 27, and this, when received, will be Lanz Exhibit No. 76. This is also a document which we are able to submit here because we found it in the documents which came from Washington. This is the order which General Gandin at that time gave to his troops to attack the German troops, dated 20th September 1943.
I would like to direct the special attention of the Tribunal to this date because from this it can be seen that the actual way in which General Gandin acted was in direct contrast to the negotiations which the same General Gandin had conducted with General Lanz and the Island Commander. From this order, Document No. 176, on page 27, I will only quote Figure I and from the introduction, and I would ask that judicial notice be taken of the rest.
On the left, at the top, "Headquarters Infantry Division Acqui, Section I; then local headquarters, 20th September 1943, subject; attack on enemy positions of Kardakata Angonas. To: Headquarters 317th Infantry Regiment; to: Headquarters artillery Division; and for information to Headquarters Engineer Division.
"I. Morning 21st September advance resumed to wipe out German forces in the area Kardakata - Angonas." I would like especial notice to be taken of these words "to wipe out".
Then, the order continues:
"I intend to hold the enemy in the front sector Curuclata by fire; to take possession of the central position of Kardakata; to wipe out the enemy forces cut off in the sector Codogurata-Curuclata and then in the sector Angonas."
And in Paragraph II and III to VII I will not read. They are only the tactical executive regulations for the carrying out of the order as stated in the first part of the first paragraph by Gandin, that is to wipe out the enemy forces. The order is signed by the Division Commander, Antonio Gandin. In this connection, your Honors, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that this order was not only set down in the War Diary of the 22nd Army Corps, but also in Italian. Of course, I have only submitted the German translation to you, which is also contained in the War Diary. If the Tribunal would be at all interested in the Italian form of this, that is also available. It is contained in the War Diary of the 22nd Army Corps.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Well, General Lanz, after this order, how did the affairs continue. The order of the Italian General Gandin dated the 20th September 1943?
A. On the 20th of September, after the hopelessness of our efforts became clear to us; we finally prepared ourselves for the attack, and on the 21st of September this attack started. As far as I can remember, it lasted about one and a half days. The tactical details are of no interest here. In any case after rather difficult and violent fighting, we were successful in driving over the mountains into the southern part of the island, and when the town of Argostoli was reached, the Italians finally surrendered.
Q. With General Gandin?
A. Yes, also General Gandin.
DR. SAUTER: In this connection then, as exhibit No. 77, Lanz Exhibit No. 77, I would like to offer another document which is to be found in Document Book IV, on page 40.
This is Document No. 130; I repeat, Document Book IV, page 40, Document No. 130, and this becomes Exhibit No. 77. The affidavit is properly sworn to; signed by the affiant and properly certified; it is given by the former Captain Matthias Starl. I have already submitted one affidavit by him before. He states he was a captain and first ADC in the 22nd Mountain Corps from the 3d of September 1943 until the 14th of November 1943. Because of the importance of the whole affair, I would like to read the main part of this affidavit. The affaint Matthias starl, thirty-three years old, resident in Lindau, Lake Constance, states about the occurrences on Kephalonia.
I read from page 40, in the middle:
"While the disarming of the Italians in the area of the XXII Mountain Army Corps in Epirus was carried out without substantial difficulties, the troops of the Italian Division "Aqui" commanded by General Gandin, offered armed resistance on the islands of Corfu and Kephalonia. When, on 12 September 1943, the report was received at Corps Headquarters in Joanina, that the Italians on Kephalonia refused to lay down arms as ordered and had gone over to attack the German Fortress Battalion there, General Lanz went early by plane on 13 September 1943 to Argostoli, to settle matters by a discussion with General Gandin. In the afternoon, General Lanz returned to Joanina and informed the Chief of staff of the Corps HQ, Colonel Dietel, in my presence, of the fact that he could not land in Argostoli because his plane was fired on there so that he was compelled to land out of range of fire on the northern side of the island and to go from there to Lixuri, the Command lost of the German Commander on the Island. From here he was able to phone to Argostoli and speak with General Gandin. The latter replied to the remonstrances of General Lanz that he had no clear orders and asked General Lanz for an order, which had been given immediately for the cessation of hostilities and the handing over of arms and the island.
General Lanz then believed confidently that the matter was settled. Next day, however, bad news came unexpectedly. The Italians continued to fight and fired on two ships, which were to go from Lixuri to Argostoli carrying German soldiers, suddenly, with their coastal artillery, as a result of which one ship sank and the other had to return damaged to the peninsula Lixuri.
General Lanz was very provoked by the behavior of the Italians then because he felt he had been deceived by General Gandin.
He ordered the Chief of staff to ascertain at once which troops were most quickly available, to put down the Italian revolt on Kephalonia because the fortress troops there were by no means adequate. Now the order was given, I think it was on 15 September 1943, that 2 Battalions and a Mountain Artillery Battalion of the 1 mountain Division under command of a Regimental Headquarters, for special tasks with Major v. Hirschfeld were to be taken over to the Island with the order to prepare to attack, after landing in the northwest part of the Island, to rout the Italians in the northern part first of all. All German troops on Kephalonia were put under Major von Hirschfeld, and, the former Commander on the Island until then, Lieutenant Colonel Barge was relieved. The landing at night of the units of the 1 Mountain Division on the Southwest corner of the peninsula Lixuri experienced even then heavy losses on account of fire from the Italian coastal batteries in the vicinity of Argostoli so that the landing point had to be moved. Approximately on the 17 September, enough forces were assembled to attack the 2 to 3 Battalions of Italians who had encircled the Germans occupying the northern part of the Island and had placed them in a very perilous position.
In bitter fighting, with heavy losses on both sides, the Italians were routed, and all Italians were called upon to surrender by pamphlets dropped from planes. The Corps headquarters Staff hoped again in this way to be able to put an end to the fighting. The Italians, however,did not cease firing, but brought up reserves from the southern part of the Island to the front in the North. General Lanz flow to Kephalonia again, I think it was on the 18 September, and took an officer of Corps Headquarters with him whom he left as Liaison Officer with v. Hirschfeld's staff, so as to have better communication and orientation for the imminent battles. He induced major v. Hirschfeld, too, if I remember right, before the start of the actual attack to contact General Gandin once more to try to avoid a last battle. Gandin is supposed to have replied that he could not prevent the battle because his officers no longer obeyed him. On 19 or 20 September approximately, after all preparations had been made for the decisive attack southwards on Argostoli and the Italians kept on fighting with equal intensity, the attack began on the part of the Germans in 2 columns.
On approximately 15 September, A Fuehrer Order was received at Corps Headquarters in Joanina concerning Army Group E, I think which said that all Italians on Kephalonia were to be shot. It was a question of a Special Order which, when cognizance had been taken of it, was to be destroyed. General Lanz was very agitated about this order and rejected it with sharp words. In a detailed teletype which I personally had to transmit to the Army Group, he begged to renounce these measures and call only the guilty to account.
As reply to this, an altered 2 Order came from the Fuehrer Headquarters that the enlisted men could be spared, that all officers, however, were to be shot.
This order came in the night hours as a teletype to the Corps Headquarters and was brought by me personally to General Lanz in his quarters. Since the 1 Fuehrer Order had perturbed him very much and he was battling with his conscience, he received the new order, it is true, with Certain relief, declared himself, however, immediately, in favour of a revision of this order too as he considered this unjust, too, He ordered me, in conjunction with the Chief of staff to protest immediately against this order, also, in the sense that only the guilty officers should be punished. As far as I remember, however, this renewed protest was turned down.
I do not need to read the next paragraph: it is only concerned with the carrying out of the mopping up of operation on the Island. I now read the last paragraph. He states, on page 43:
"Obviously he instructed the latter at the same time...." (that is, Lanz and v. Hirschfeld) "...to investigate the Gandin affair and to pass judgment upon it according to martial law.
I still remember that the Chief of Staff of Gandin, a Colonel, had organized the fight against the Germans and that a large proportion of the officers had joined him. General Gandin, his Chief of Staff, and several of his officers were shot on the 23rd or 24th of September, according to martial law."
The affidavit, by Matthias Starl, former captain and first A.D.C. to the defendant, General Lanz, is duly sworn and properly certified.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Witness, how often did you personally fly to Cephalonia because of this matter?
AAs far as I remember, I was there three times.
Q. Three times, personally?
A Yes.
Q And then what did Major v. Hirschfeld tell you about the investigation of the Gandin affair, after you had entrusted him with this investigation?
A Major von Hirschfeld reported to me that the resistance originated from Gandin, principally from the Chief of Staff, and obviously with the agreement of General Gandin a large number of officers had joined this resistance group.
Q Did he report to you, as a result, whether individual officers or individual parts of troops of the Italians wore for the regular carrying out of the capitulation?
A Well, this can already be seen from former reports which we have already discussed. It was also similar, as on Corfu, that there was a resistance group there which organized its resistance despite all requests to stop fighting.
In spite of the previous capitulation and orders which we sent them they did not stop their resistance but the fighting was continued to the uttermost. There can be no doubt that at this stage this was a completely irregular fight.
Q Now, witness, what was the task which you gave Major von Hirschfeld with regard to the judicial settlement of the case of Gandin?
A I have already stated once that on my second visit to Cephalonia I said that the affair had to be investigated and that the guilty people had to be sentenced according to a court martial; as far as I know, I repeated this commission again to Major Hirschfeld when I was there for the third time.
Q And did the court martial sit in order to sentence the guilty officers?
A I remember that when the sentence of the court martial was announced against the guilty men, General Gandin, as far as I remember, asked that he be allowed to speak either to Field Marshal Keitel or to General Jodl; he referred again to his connections which have alreadybeen mentioned. This, however, was turned down by the Island Commander, since General Gandin, by how whole conduct, had no right to do this; he had been given sufficient time.
Q Witness, the prosecution maintains that all officers of the Gandin staff were shot. Is that correct?
A I tried, in the files which were available to me, to find material to repute this assertion, but I could not find any figures. I personally can say that as far as I recall, that is not correct. Gandin and his Chief of Staff and several officers were shot but I do not know that all the officers were shot.
Q You mean all the officers of the staff?
A Yes. But unfortunately I could not find any proof of this.
Q Even if you are not a legal man, can you give us some indication as to the basis, the paragraphs, or the point-of-view, on which the sentencing of General Gandin and the guilty officers was carried out?
I mean according to the court martial proceedings of what had they made themselves guilty?
Q Of course we thought a lot about these things at the time. The legal position, the position on which we based our assumptions was, as far as I remember, the following: After General Vecchiarelli's army had capitualed, the members of this army were therefore prisoners of war. Whether they wanted this or not, from the legal point of view was not important. Well then, if these prisoners of war, in spite of the orders which we sent to them, and in spite of the negotiations which were carried on with them, and in spite of the summonses which were given to them, goodness knows that was done in this case, if, in spite of all this, they continued their resistance with their weapons in their hands, then of course that is mutiny. If a prisoner of war fights with his weapon in his hand against the power which he was formerly fighting, then, of course, this is mutiny according to German conception, and probably also according to other conceptions.
Q General, you have already said that sentenced and shot were only General Gandin and the guilty officers who had committed this mutiny or this revolt. What happened to the other officers?
A Well, there were several thousand Italians on the Island who actually, according to the order mentioned, were supposed to have been shot. The Italians were transported away in ships?
Q With the officers?
A Yes, of course. All the Italians who were taken prisoner, apart from the officers who were sentenced, were transported away as prisoners of war. As far as I know, first of all to Patras and then after that to Piraeus. As far as I remember, there were over 5,000.
Q. What were the German losses during this fighting which you have just described to us was caused by the Italians--I mean the German losses?