2.) If the weapons are not surrendered, the German Wehrmacht will enforce this surrender.
3.) I hereby state that the division under your command, which fired at German troops and two German ships this morning at 7.00 hours causing casualties of 5 killed and 8 wounded, has committed an open and unmistakable act of hostility," The document is signed "Lanz, General of the Mountain Infantry."
Q. Witness, in consideration of the concluding sentence that the Division Gandin has committed an act of hostility, I would like to make an interpolation; do you know when the declaration of War of Italy to Germany was issued?
A. I gathered that from the documents that were given to us in Nurnberg. According to these the declaration of war was issued on the October 1943.
Q. On the 13th?
A. On October 13.
Q. On the 13 October?
A. I knew that.
Q. And we are here dealing with the date of 13 September?
A. Yes.
Q. At that time there was not yet a declaration of war from Italy to Germany, is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Did you believe, General Lanz, that this order which General Gandin received from you on his request would once and for all straighten out this ratter difficult situation?
A. At that time I was optomistic enough to believe that, especially after General Gandin, had, as I have described, told me on the telephone that he would act in this way.
He himself asked me to give him such an order. I had described the situation to him and now there could be no doubt about anything. He knew his army had surrendered. He had an order from his own Army. He furthermore had an order from me. He knew my attitude that I wanted to deal with the situation without applying force, and he gave me to understand that everything would be in order. I flew back to Joannina and told my officers, and that everything would be allright. I was firmly convinced that that was so.
Q. And that was on 13 September 1943?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. You flew back to Joannina and what did the Italian General Gandin do?
A. He contacted Lt. Col Barge and continued negotiations with him. If I recollect correctly he agreed on a surrender of arms in three different stages. I believe on the 14th, 15th, and 16th of September, Lt. Col. Barge reported this to me and asked me whether I would agree to this procedure. I did not want to start a dispute and had Barge informed of my agreement to a procedure that General Gandin undertook his surrender in three stages. I said that I had to demand, however, that it was started on the very next day. If he agreed to do that I would consent to the procedure and General Gandin was to be informed that his Division, as well as all other Italian Divisions, would be eventually transported to Italy. If he surrendered and delivered his arms, as was done by all others, nothing would happen to him. That is what I asked to be told to him. All was bona fide, because I believed everything would be in order.
Q If it please the Tribunal, this fact can also be proven as having been related correctly through the war diary which came from Washington. I would ask the Court to read a document in Document Book V on page 18 of this document book. It is Document No. 168, which will be offered under Exhibit No. 65. The following document on page 19, which is Document 169 will be offered under Exhibit No. 66.
First of all, I am going to read from page 18, Document No. 168, it is an excerpt from a teletype message No. 141, dated 14 September, 1943, that is the day after the 13th of September which we had discussed.
"SECRET - From Headquarters of the XXII Mountain Corps To High Command of Army Group E Saloniki."
From this healing you can see that it is a message from the defendant Lanz to his immediate superior the Commander in Chief of the Army Group. The report reads and I quote:
German Island Commander on Keffalonia reports:
"Surrender of arms to be effected in 3 stages:
1.) In the Argostolion area on 14 September 1943;
2.) In the area comprising the southeastern part of Keffalonia on 15 September.
3.) In the Samni area on 16 September. There, the disarmed troops will be collected.
To this plan General Gandin has promised his full support for evacuating the positions and the handing over of weapons. Evacuation in the area around Argostolion already in progress."
That is the end of the report from the Island Commander to Lanz. Lanz goes on to report and I quote the next passage:
"I (meaning Lanz) intend waiting for today's results. If the handling over of weapons is completed. I agree to the above proposal. Failing that, the surrender will be enforced tomorrow."
The message is signed "Lanz, Commanding General XXII Mountain Army Corps."
Then the file note of the diary and then an illegible signature, General Staff Major.
From the same day, 14 September, 1943, we have the next document, which is Document 169, Exhibit 66. I am reaming from page 19, an excerpt from the war diary. "XXII Mountain Amy Corps, Headquarters, Commanding General, Corps H.Qu., dated 14 September 1943. To Lieutenant Colonel Barge", that was the Island Commander of Keffalonia. I quote:
The order I submitted yesterday in writing to General Gandin remains effective; I agree to your proposal by which the handing over will be done on 14, 15, and 16 September. General Gandin has to be informed that his division, after peacefully surrendering their arms, will be returned to Italy like all other Italian divisions.
Report to me by 20.00 hours today over the radio whether the surrender of weapons has taken place as scheduled for 14 September.
Signed, General Lanz.
These are the two documents, which are to confirm what the witness has just now told you about September 14th.
General Lanz, how did the events on Keffalonia develop after this, did General Gandin keep his promise or did he not?
A General Gandin unfortunately did not keep his premise. The arms were not surrendered. It was reported that a pant of the Italian Island Occupation Forces refused to surrender their weapons and it was further reported that three Italian commanders, who wanted to give up their arms, were shot at by their own troops. Therefore the situation was that a resistance group, or whatever I want to call it, was in Keffalonia, which dominated the opinion there and refused the delivering up of arms and retained their hostile altitude toward us.
After this report had been received I had, to make a decision. In the meantime, my superior agency had rather unpleasantly taken me to task and pressed me continuously to take action and kept after me as to what was the matter with Keffalonia and General Gandin, why this matter was not in order, why I did not take any steps against them and why I did not take any decisive action.
The Army Group in turn was being pressed by the O.K.W. and in the final analysis by Hitler himself. Thus, there was an increasing nervousness among all present because the affairs on the Islands of Keffalonia and later Korfu could not be put in order, as expressed by the Army Group. In this matter I was more or less held as the responsible person who was too slack to put matters to order there. In actual facts, all I had tried was to endeavor in my negotiations with General Vecchiarelli to deal with the situation without any dispute or hostility.
I now had, whether I wanted to or not, to make a decision to take steps against the Italians in Keffalonia. I informed myself among my staff which of the troops were at my immediate disposal, whether there was sufficient shipping space to transport troops to Keffalonia. That was not quite easy as the Island was in the Adriatic Sea and there could be no doubt that the two fortress battalions and one company, which was also stationed on Keffalonia, would be surpressed by the Italians and that was what almost happened. I therefore ordered to the 1st Mountain Division to send two battalions, one Mountain Artillery Battalion and to the 114th Rifle Division to send one Rifle Regiment immediately to the collecting point from where these troops were to be provisionally transported to Keffalonia.
That happened in due course. I reported to the Army Group, which in the meantime became rather unpleasant and unfriendly, that the troops had been sent to Keffalonia and that as soon as they arrived there the Italian surrender of arms would be enforced.
Q Did any fighting come about later and if so, who started the attack?
A On the basis of the relation of strength, the Italians were the ones who attacked. The Italians first of all attacked our troops, the two fortress battalions stationed there.
One battalion on the northern part of the Island faced a very difficult position, so that for some time we thought that battalion was lost. At first there was nothing I could do because I had no forces. When the troops, which I had mentioned before, arrived on the Island they landed on the southwest corner of the peninsula Lixuri. The Italian Coast Battalions shot with considerable strength at the landing troops and considerable losses were suffered. The area of the landing had to be transferred to another spot, but eventually we managed to land the troops. The troops were collected and were first of all committed, to relieve the Germans on the northern part of the Island, to defeat the Italians who were there.
Q If it please the Tribunal, I would like to ask the Tribunal to accept a few more documents, which I am submitting for the purpose of giving the Tribunal an opportunity to check on the truthfulness of General Lanz' statements. These again are three documents, which we found among the War Diary entries of the XXII Mountain Corps when these arrived from Washington. The documents concerned are contained in Document Book Lanz V, Document No. 170 on page 20, Document No. 171 on page 21 and Document No. 172 on page 22. Document No. 170 is offered under Exhibit 67, Document No. 171 will become Exhibit 68 and Document No. 172 will become Exhibit 69.
I will first of all read from Document No. 170 on page 20. This again is an excerpt from a Radio Message which has been submitted in photostat, it is radio message No. 38, dated 14 September, that is the same day on which the two previously read orders were dated. This Radio Message, dated 14 September 19.00 hours was transmitted from Keffalonia and addressed to the XXII Corps -- Top Priority. From the signature you can see that the transmitting post Keffalonia is identical with the German Island Commander, whom we repeatedly mentioned, Lt. Col. Barge. I will read from the message and I quote:
"Negotiations about details concerning the surrender have delayed surrender and evacuation for 14 September as was originally scheduled. Tomorrow the following will be taken over: 1 Naval Battery 15 em."
I may add that that seems to be the battery, which General Lanz mentioned before, that it was put at the disposal for transport to Kephalenia, the only battery. The radio message continues:
"Divisional Staff has already evacuated Argestelien. Negotiations are difficult because Italian soldiers fired on 3 commanding officers, who were prepared to hand over weapons. Leaflets concerning Italy's capitulation are urgently required."
The radio message is signed "Barge" and there is one addition "by telephone to Commanding General," then the initial "L", 22.05 Hours and the certification "Arnold."
The next document, which I am going to read, is the one on the next page, document No. 171, which I have offered as exhibit 68 for Lanz. This again is an excerpt from a radio message No. 145. It bears the same date, 14 September from XXII Mountain Corps Headquarters to Brigadier General Helle, X. Airforce Corps, Athens. The radio message reads:
"Refusing to surrender arms, General Gandin refers to the promise which Lieut. Colonel Busch of your staff has allegedly give him on 13 September 1943. I request information what promises, and on whose orders, Lieut. Colonel Busch has given the Italian General Gandin."
The radio message is signed: "Lanz, Commanding General, XXII Mountain Army Corps."
Then the War Diary letter, then "secret" and on the left you have the certification from "Loeben. General Staff Major." That is the same General von Loeben, who has furnished a number of affidavits which have been submitted to the court.
The answer to this inquiry of von Loeben to the Air Force General in Athens can be found on the next page, page 22, Document 172, which has been offered as exhibit 79. Here again we have excerpts from a radio message No. 0677, dated 14 September 1943 ---- the same day -Enclosure No. 53, to General Lanz, Commanding General XXII Mountain Corps Jannina, relating to teletype message Lanz 143, 14 September 1943:
"The military Commander Southeast instructed me to bring General Gandin to Vienna by plane to report to the Duce." That is Mussolini. "Lieut. Colonel Pusch was instructed to take care of this mission. The mission was unsuccessful as General Gandin refused to fly to Vienna. He has not been promised anything after his refusal."
Then, we have the signature, Holle, Brigadier General X, Airforce Corps Headquarters, the war diary numbers and "Secret."
Witness, when did you for the first time learn that General Gandin at the very last moment stated that he had been made any promises by a Lt. Col. of the Air Force and what did you learn about this; did you take General Gandin's statements seriously, or if not, what did you think about the whole thing?
A I cannot remember the details of the Busch affair. I only recall the whole affair through reading the documents here. At the time I had been under the impression that General Gandin tried to find a pretext not to surrender his arms. Even today, after examining the whole affair thoroughly, I feel inclined to still assume this attitude of Gandin's. He gave new reasons continuously in order not to surrender his arms, although he knew quite well what the situation was, his army had ordered the surrender, his army had surrendered and I had issued an order to surrender his arms. He could not help being aware of these facts, but he always tried to find a reason not to have to surrender his arms. Eventually he simply forced me to use force against him. Originally, I did not want to do that.
Q Was the Island Kephalenia stormed by German troops after that?
A I said that the German troops, one battalion, which on the north island, was stuck there between rocks and the sea was relieved and the Italians were defeated. I myself have later inspected that area. That gave me the hope that the Italians would realize everything was quite senseless, which it was.
When I flew to Kephalenia the second time I took leaflets along which were especially produced in Joannina, many thousands of leaflets, in order to drop them over the Italian front and to try and make these people reasonable at the very last moment if possible. In the meantime, after for days there had been an uncertain state of affairs, pressure was exerted by the Army Group and all of a sudden a Fuehrer Order arrived.
Q Just a moment, witness. Perhaps before you come to that chapter you can tell us whether you yourself led the battle of Kephalonia or did you commission another officer to do that and if so who was the officer who was in charge of this; I am asking you this question because it is a question which will play a part on later occasions?
A I had mentioned that originally the German Island Commander, who was the commander of the two Fortress Batteries, Lt. Colonel Barge had been the man in charge. Barge honestly tried to cope with General Gandin, but he did not succeed. I am sure it was not his fault that he could not deal with him. After the troops had to be sent to Kephalenia, which I have just described, a commander of these troops arrived with them, a Major von Hirschfeld. For tactical reasons among others, I appointed Major von Hirschfeld Island commander of Kephalenia and Lt. Colonel Barge after that time only had the area of the peninsula Lixuri left to him. Later on Barge left Kephalenia and was transferred because they were not satisfied with him because he did not take strong enough measures. He was later in Crete where he was taken as a British Prisoner of War. I believe he is in Egypt today.
Q If Your Honors please, I would like to submit one further document from document book 5 for Lanz. This is document 173 on page 23, which will receive exhibit No. 70. I am submitting this document in order to show that in spite of the contradicting and delaying actions of General Gandin, the German agencies and General Lanz tried again and again to Prevent bloodshed. This document is dated 15 September.
I have read just before three documents from the proceeding day, the 14th of September, those were exhibits 67, 68 and 69 and exhibit 70 is the one we are dealing with now. It is dated 15 September, 01,00 Hours, Top Priority, a radio message from Lieut. Colonel Barge to General Lanz, Reply to No. 83/43, Secret:
"Relating to 1) Part of the Italian troops refuse to surrender their weapons. 3 commanding officers were fired at who wanted to execute this order.
"to 2) General Gandin himself requested me to see him once more. I informed him that after peacefully surrendering their weapons, his division will be returned to Italy."
The radio message is signed Barge, Lieut. Colonel, the German Island Commander and below on the left hand side we have the certification by a certain Herbst.
I would like to ask the Tribunal, because of the second remarks, under paragraph 2, to compare this sentence with the sentence which is contained in General Lanz' order to General Gandin.
Q. Witness, a few minutes ago you touched upon a subject with which I shall deal now. You said that during these days you received a Fuehrer order. What kind of an order was it?
A. During those says a Fuehrer Order arrived. I can no longer say whether it was a teletype or a radio message. To the best of my recollection, it was a very short order which expressed that all Italians of the division Gandin were to be shot for mutiny. This is an order which, if not in the exact text but at least in substance, has been mentioned here by General Foertsch. This Fuehrer Order put me into a very difficult conflict of loyalties. For me I might almost say it was impossible to have all these Italians shot. It was not feasible. When I received the order, therefore, I refused in front of my officers to carry out such an order. I was shocked by such a request. For at least two days I didn't quite know what I should really do.
DR. SAUTER: If it please the Tribunal -
A. I remember that situation quite well.
DR. SAUTER: If the Tribunal please, we cannot submit this Fuehrer order although in various documents of the war diary it has been referred to frequently: but the order itself is not contained in the war diary. Therefore, I would ask the Tribunal to accept an affidavit in this connection which deals with this chapter. This affidavit is contained in Document Book no. IV for Lanz. It is Document 134 in that document book on page 51; I repeat; Document Book IV for Lanz, Document No. 134, page 51. This document will be offered under Exhibit No. 71. It is an affidavit by Horst Freiher Treusch von Buttlar-Brandenfels. The affidavit has been duly sworn to and signed by the witness. It is properly certified. The affiant says -- I am reading from page 51, the second paragraph:
"From 1 January 1942 until 16 November 1944 I was first General Staff Officer of the Army and Chief of the operational division (Army) in the WEST. My statements refer to this period, in regard to band-warfare to the period from autumn 42 until 16 November 44, because my division was charged with the tasks of band-warfare not before autumn 1942.
"In regard to the events on the island of Korfu resp. Kephalonia in 1943 I state:
"I know about the resistance of Italian troops under General Gandin on Korfu and Kephalonia. I remember it particularly well because it is the only case within the sphere of the Italian 11 Army, where under breach of the capitulation agreement concluded by the Italian High Command, resistance to the surrender was offered, and this happened under the command of General Gandin, who was considered a faithful friend of Germany and had personal ties with the Chief WEST Lt. General Jodl, as well as with the military attache in Rome General von Rintelen.
"It is known to me that Lt. General Jodl expected much from the cooperation of General Gandin for the reconstruction of the Italian Army on Germany's side, and therefore, after the capitulation of the Italian Army, he ordered General Gandin brought by special airplane to the Fuehrer's headquarters for a conference on further measures for the reconstruction of an Italian Army faithful to the Axis.
"As to the course of the events I remember that the Italian Commanders of the islands were called upon to surrender and when the demand was unsuccessful the disarming in Korfu was carried out with military means against little resistance.
In Kephalonia, where Gandin personally was in command, the small German forces met with strong Italian resistance, so that the disarming could not be carried out there and considerable own losses were suffered. Hitler was very excited about that and ordered to break the resistance by means of stronger forces and to treat as mutineers any Italian soldiers captured.
"Lt. General Jodl at this time advocated another attempt to induce voluntary surrender on the part of Gandin, before carrying out the Fuehrer-Order.
But this attempt failed also.
"As far as I know the resistance was broken with the help of parts of the 1st Mountain Division under heavy own losses. I do not know how far the Fuehrer-Order about the treatment of captured Italians was sustained and actually carried out. However, I do recall that the Commander Southeast, at least once, but probably several times, asked to cancel or to limit the order on the treatment of Italians captured on Kephalonia. I cannot say how far this attempt was successful, I only remember that, at least as far as the person of General Gandin was concerned, Hitler refused clemency. I remember this event more closely because Jodl told me in connection with that, he must appreciate the attitude of Hitler for objective reasons, but that humanly he regretted very much not to have been able to gain mercy for General Gandin whom he esteemed highly. As far as I know, General Gandin and some officers were shot after a court martial sentence."
The affidavit is signed by the affiant, Horst Freiherr Treusch von Buttlar Brandenfeld. This, then, is Exhibit 71 and in this connection I would like to read two more affidavits in Document Book IV for Lanz, Document No. 131 on page 44; I repeat: Document 131, page 44. This document will be given exhibit number 72. This affidavit has also been duly sworn to and properly certified. It is signed by the affiant. me affidavit is executed by Otto Timmermann who is 40 years of age and the affidavit concerns the Fuehrer order in regard to the Italian occupation forces in Kephalonia.
The affiant says:
"During the second half of September 1943 I newly joined the Corps Staff as the director of the map-collection office. Since the Corps Staff then newly created did not have any cartographic office yet, I worked part-time at the 0 1 office. Therefore I chanced to over hear a telephone talk (this was done regularly by the 0 1. on tactical reports or during conferences for the purpose of writing the war diary; The phone was connected with that of the 01.)
The conversation was conducted by General Lanz in high excitement with the Army Group E because of the Fuehrer-Order, according to which the Fuehrer, i.e., Adolf Hitler , demanded that an "example be set" because of the occurrences on Kefalonia.
"In a voice known to become hoarse when excited, General Lanz reported to the Army Group that he could not carry out the FuehrerOrder because the Italians on Kefalonia either were taken prisoner during battle or had surrendered. To shoot them would be contrary to International Law and he could not expect any of his officers or soldiers to execute the order.
"Apart from that,he continued in a scornful and caustic voice he did not have enough ammunition to shoot Italians according to the Fuehrer-Order.
"When on the other end of the wire, i.e., the Army Group objections were raised concerning the non-compliance with an order of the Fuehrer, General Lanz replied, as I believe to recall literally: 'I fully know what that means for me and put my person at your disposal.'" The affiant continues:
"On the other end the answer merely was that the message will be passed on. I have no knowledge of what happened further in this matter."
This affidavit is signed: "Bad Sassendorf, 30 September 1947" by "Dr. Otto Timmerman."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, please, we will take our afternoon recess.
(A recess was taken).
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Your Honors, I read before the recess document 131, exhibit No. 72, the affidavit by Dr. Otto Timmermann. This document is to prove to the Tribunal that the order mentioned by General Lanz had been issued, and secondly, that General Lanz had objected to this in spite of the dangers, which he knew. This can be seen from Timmermann's affidavit. This Fuehrer order was not to be found in the war diaries because, as in the case of other orders, it had to be destroyed after having been noted, but I am now able to submit to you a further document from the war diaries, which also is proof of the Fuehrer order. This is contained in Lanz document book No. 5, it is document No. 178 on page 29 and this will receive exhibit No. 73, Lanz No. 73. This is an excerpt from War Diary No. 1 from the Corps Headquarters of the XXII Mountain Army Corps for the period from 24 August, 1943 until 31 December, 1943. The last paragraph of this document, which is to be found on page 30, under date of 23 September, 1943, I read from this third paragraph. It states:
"23 September 1943 ...... 18,00 Hours. Return of the Commanding General from. Cophalonia. Following this report made by Chief of General Staff concerning Fuehrer Order. Commanding General inquires afresh from the Army Group as to whether the Fuehrer Order is applicable also to all 5,000 captured Italians."
Therefore this document shall prove in which sense the Fuehrer order was issued and that General Lanz repeatedly objected to it.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, this document is two typewritten pieces of paper with a certificate by Dr.Sauter.
I have no doubt whatever that the pages are correct. I believe if the original photostatic copy has come from Washington that it should be introduced into evidence rather than that document. This is important because of various initials that I suppose appear on the original photostat.
DR. SAUTER: Just one moment, please. This copy which I have submitted is a literal copy of the excerpt concerned from the War Diaries and consists of two pages. In Lanz document book there is an affidavit by me to the effect that the copies submitted correspond to the original. I think in this way the objection of the prosecution is ruled out.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, in the case of other documents, which we have had introduced this afternoon, documents which have originally come from Washington, the photostatic copy has been put into evidence. I see no reason why the same procedure should not be followed for this as well as other documents which Dr. Sauter intends to offer later.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, do you have a photostatic copy of the original?
DR. SAUTER: I think I have one other photostatic copy and I will try to get this by tomorrow morning. The matter can be explained like this, Your Honor; when at the time we submitted these copies so that the document book should be compiled as soon as possible and so that the proceedings would not be prolonged, we had not yet received the photostat copy. Therefore we only submitted a copy certified to by me, but I will try to get a photostatic copy by tomorrow morning ...
THE PRESIDENT: Subject to your obtaining the photostatic copy, which you state will be furnished later, the Tribunal will withhold any ruling on this particular document.
By your reference to tomorrow, unless you have in mind there is a week-end recess, it will be Monday morning.
DR. SAUTER: Yes, of course, I mean Monday.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Witness Lanz, you have already talked about this Fuehrer order and about the fact that you opposed this Fuehrer order, perhaps you would like to tell us again what in the main, without quoting literally, was ordered in the Fuehrer order; who was to be shot according to the original Fuehrer order?
A The Italians belonging to the Gandin division were to be shot as mutineers.
Q Did I understand you correctly that the Fuehrer order stated that originally that all Italians were to be shot?
A Yes, to the best of my recollection.
Q And you protested against this as you have told us and as also can be seen from the War Diaries; how many Italians would have had to be shot, according to the Fuehrer order - how many approximately?
A Well, I should estimate in Kephalonia there were about 7,000 - 6,000 to 7,000.
Q And you refused to do that?
A Yes, I refused to do that.
Q You repeatedly rejected it and refused to do it, as you said?
A I can only say I refused to do it. I cannot confirm it in more detail, but in any case I refused to do it.
A I am only asking you if you did it repeatedly, because this can be soon from the document, which I have just read and you could perhaps use this to aid your memory?
A Yes, that resulted from my attitude.
Q. Witness, and then how did the matter go on?
A. I object to this Fuehrer Order, and I expressed the fact that I could not carry out this order. And then, as far as I remember, the decision came that the men can be spared but that only officers should be shot because of munity. I thought that this decision also went too far, and I expressed my point of view again that only the guilty should be punished and that some kind of a category should be fixed so that only the guilty came into the question. And, as far as I know, I didn't get any further decision from the OKM with regard to this renewed objection of mine.
Q. And then did you yourself fly again to Kephalonia?
A. Yes, on the 17th or 19th-at any rate about this time---I flew back again to Kephalonia in order to talk future steps over with the Island Commander there. In the meantime, as I have reported, the Italians in the northern part of the island had been defeated, on the battle field, of course, and then I discussed with the Island Commander what had to be done tactically in case the Italians did not refrain from resistance. I brought the leaflets with me, and on my return flight I dropped them over the from myself. There was still a certain hope that the Italians would then stop fighting because in itself this fighting was, in my opinion, quite senseless.
Q. Your Honors, with regard to this point, as the witness has just spoken a bout the leaflets which he mentioned previously, I would like to refer to Document No. 174, in Lanz Document Book V. The document is on Page 24, and this receives the Exhibit No. 74. This is one of the leaflets which we also found in the War Diaries as enclosure to a teletype of the Commander of the XXIInd Army Corps. I would ask that judicial notice be taken of the contents, without my reading it here. As further evidence I offer from Lanz Document Book V Document No. 175, on Page 25. This becomes Exhibit No. 75. This is an affidavit by Fritz Doeppenschmitt, who swore to this affidavit before me in Nurnberg on September 26, 1947, and he signed it, and I, as defense counsel, properly certified it.
I read this document because I think it is particularly important. The affiant Doeppenschmitt, 54 years of age, states that he was clerical officer to General Lanz from August, 1943 until August, 1944. This is the same Doeppenschmitt who has already given another affidavit which we have dealt with here. He states concerning occurrences on the island of Kephalonia. I read from Page 25:
"Approximately in the time from 15 till 20 September 1943 I was ordered to accompany General Lanz on a flight to the island of Kephalonia. The flight was done by 2 seaplanes of the Arado type. Before we left, General Lanz informed me that the situation on the island had become more serious because of the resistance offered by the Italian troops, and that he wanted to get more detailed information. In order to avoid any further bloodshed, he had leaflets made to be dropped over the Italian positions, in which the Italians were once more asked to lay down their arms. Several packages with leaflets were put in each of the airplanes, and Lanz instructed me to join him in dropping them over the Italian positions when he gave the signal. This was done after the targets were reached. Afterwards General Lanz had a number of talks with German commanders on the island. After our return General Lanz remarked to me that he was very worried about this Kephalonia matter. He was particularly indignant about a telegram which he had received from the Army High Command the OKW as far as I can recollect, in which he was ordered to execute by shooting all Italian prisoners. He stated, making no bones about his intentions, that he would never obey this order, but that, on the other hand, he was absolutely clear about the possible consequences such a refusal would have for him.
Nuernberg, dated 26 September 1947. Signed: Fritz Doeppenschmitt"
Q. Witness, did you talk with the new Island Commander, Major von Hirschfeld also about this order?
A. Yes, of course, I talked to him because I was caused a lot of trouble by this matter. The situation in which I found myself, at that time, was very soultorturing and difficult.
As a result I did not only talk with the officers of my staff about it, but also of course with Major von Hirschfeld. And I also told him that it was simply not possible to do anything of this kind, and Hirschfeld completely agreed with me. I said to him that I had objected to this order and I hoped that the objection could be sustained. I said that I would tell him what decision was reached about it. But I told him, at the same time, that as soon as possible he should check and investigate this Gandin affair and find the responsible people for this mutiny, and that they should be sentenced according to court martial. He agreed with this and said he would do his very best.
Q. And did your request to Major von Hirschfeld coincide with the second suggestion which you made to the Army Group, and to which you did not receive an order?
A. Of course it coincided with the application which I had made, namely, that the guilty people should be found and made responsible for the matter. I said that some category of men, fixed for some formal reason, should not be sentenced or shot.
Q. An intermediary question, Witness. You said, with regard to this second proposal in which you suggested that only the guilty officers concerned in the mutiny should be shot---not a whole category. You didn't get any answer to this. Did you find out why you didn't got any answer to this second suggestion?
A. I can't remember, but perhaps this suggestion didn't get through or wasn't passed on or got stuck somewhere.
Q. Therefore, you don't know whether this second proposal was passed on by the Army Group or whether it was rejected by Hitler? You don't know anything about this?
A. No.
Q. You said you didn't get any answer, if I understood you correctly. You then gave Major von Hirschfeld the direction based on your second proposal. You dropped a large number of leaflets. The affiant Doeppenschmidt has confirmed that.