AAs you said yourself, one report says four hostages and the other report says four civilians. I don't know why these reports mention the same thing in a different way. As for the incident itself, I might give you my comments briefly.
I should like to state first that I did not order that these four people be shot. The incident concerned was a surprise attack by the bands on my own escort, of which I knew nothing. On the 3rd of October in the morning I went from Joannina to Provesa to the funeral of Lt. Col. Salminger, who had been killed by the bands shortly before that. On that trip, I had taken along a small escort because of the danger from the bands, lest I run the danger of disappearing without trace. Some of the escort had a break-down in their motor cars, whore as the remainder went along with me. I did not know anything about their breakdown and the ones who remained behind were ambushed by the bands.
Q When was it, General, that you heard about this incident; you said that you did not order this, when was it that you hoard about it?
A I cannot tell you that with absolute certainty, because it would be quite impossible to remember all those small details and incidents. I heard about it either in provesa after the funeral I suppose or I heard about it in Agrinion, because after the funeral I went on to Agrinion.
Q When was the attack on your escort made, what time of the day roughly?
A I think it must have been nine in the morning, judging by the report. I believe the report says at nine in the morning.
Q It says, "in the course of the morning." You are saying that either in Provesa or in Agrinion this was reported to you. What time of the day did you leave Provesa?
A Well the funeral in Provesa took place at 10:30, I think. I suppose I might have learned about it around lunch time in Provesa and if I heard about it in Agrinion, that would have been in the evening because it takes about at least three hours to reach Agrinion from Provesa.
As I used these trips to control and check-up on our strong points and to make sure that all was in order, it possibly took longer even. I reached Agrinion in the evening, but what time of the day I don't know.
Q The city of Provesa, which you just mentioned where you arrived about lunch time, is situated south of Agrinion, according to the map and to the west of the gulf of Arta, is that correct?
A Yes, it is.
Q And the village of Agrinion, which you reached in the evening, is situated in the southern tip of your area. Messelongien lies still further down and to the north of it on the big road through Agrinion where you stayed the evening?
A Yes, that was part of the area of the 4th division to which I went.
Q Can you tell us roughly, because you cannot see that from the map, and much depends on the quality of the road in these things, how long it takes you on the average, to reach Provesana from Agrinion?
A Well, I think that would have taken about three hours.
Q And how long does it take in your sort of car, with the escort, to go back from Prevesa by automobile around the Gulf of Arta down to Agrinion?
AAbout four hours, of course, I had to adjust my speed to the slowest car.
Q Now, what was it that they reported to you either at luncheon time in Prevesaor in the evening in Agrinion, how was it described to you, particularly as far as the killing of these people was concerned?
A I no longer recall the details of the report. What I do remember is that a surprise attack on some of my escort had been made, that is the only thing I remember.
Q General Lanz, when you made these overland trips, did you take along hostages on these trips to be protected from attacks by the bands? Hostages, that is to say, who were to be shot if attacks were made by bands on you; did you do anything like that?
A No. I never took hostages along.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: At this time we will take our afternoon recess.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Witness, we had discussed the so-called four hostages as they are called in the indictment of the prosecution. I now ask you the following question: What is your impression today if this whole matter after you have seen and read all the documents concerning it? Would you today assume that they were hostages who, as it says further in the indictment, were executed immediately or what is it that you assume today?
A. The shooting of hostages was not known to me personally and in the documents which were accessible to me. I could not find anything about that clearly. The two reports speak of different things in a different manner. I don't know what the troops who reported at the time meant by these hostages. I can only assume that those were four civilians who had taken pare in the attack in some way or other and who, when the attack was being defeated -- or in connection with the attack -were shot. There is no other explanation which I can give.
DR. SAUTER: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I would like to offer an affidavit. It can be found in Document Book III for Lanz. The number of the document is 68 and the page number is 20. This affidavit will be offered under Exhibit No. 53. It is an affidavit from the very same Dr. Karl-Heinz Rothfuchs who executed affidavits in a different connection, one of which we have already seen during this trial.
The affiant, Dr. Karl-Heinz Rothfuchs was, according to his statements, Ic with the 1st Mountain Division during the period from June 1942 until the end of the war. He held this position, therefore, at the time with which we are now concerned.
I don't have to read this affidavit. It is identical with the statements made by the defendant, General Lanz. We attach particular importance to this affidavit because the Ic of the division is mainly informed of such matters. I, therefore, recommend this affidavit to the judicial notice of the Tribunal.
Q. Following up this problem, I would like to ask you the following question, witness; in the report to your staff dated the 3rd of October 1943 it says:
"Further counter measures on the part of the troops are about to be taken."
Can you tell us what these further counter measures consisted of or what they could have been?
A. I did not know anything about these further counter measures until I read this document. I have now endeavored to establish what could be meant. In a photostat of a daily report of the 1st Mountain Division dated the 3rd of October 1943 I found that at that time a platoon, a small unit of a troop unit of the 1st Mountain Division, was commissioned to clean up the area of the attack and to get the partisans out of that particular district. When that platoon reached the spot designated it found itself under such strong fire from the partisans that the platoon could not fulfill its task. After that it was ordered that two companies be committed in order to disperse the partisans there and I have to assume that the further measures reported here concerned the platoon which could not fulfill its task because of the strong enemy resistance.
As I said, this knowledge I derived from the documents after the acts had occurred. In this connection I might add that the whole incident of the attack on the convoy with the four civilians did not play any important part at all in the course of all the incidents at the time.
Surprise attacks were almost a daily routine and I had to deal with more important matters and I had other things on my mind than to concern myself with such minor matters as this one. That was not part of my task.
DR. SAUTER:
Before we leave this count of the indictment, I would like to offer two more affidavits to the Tribunal which deal with attacks of the bands on General Lanz's convoy on the 3rd of October 1943. Both these affidavits are contained in Document Book III for Lanz which is the same document book which contains the affidavits read before. One of the affidavits in Document No. 67 on page 15 of the Document Book Lanz III and the other one is Document No. 69 on page 21 of Document Book III for Lanz. Document 67 will be offered under Exhibit No. 54 and Document 69 will be offered under Exhibit No. 55. Document No. 67, Exhibit 54, is an affidavit duly sworn to and properly certified and executed by Curt Mueller. In the initial sentences of this affidavit the affiant states that he was a master sergeant of the military police in the military police troop A, motorized 422, during the period from September 1943 until June 1945. I am only rending a few excerpts from this affidavit and I recommend the balance of the document to the judicial notice of the Tribunal. I will first of all read from the beginning of the second paragraph on page 15 towards the middle of the page where the affiant says:
"As far as I recall, already a week after our reporting for duty with the staff of the 22nd Mountain Army Corps in Jannina, an escort had to be supplied by the military police troop 422 for the commanding general, General Lanz.
It was probably for the trip on 3 October 1943."
I skip the following sentences and read the first sentence from the next paragraph and I quote:
"The very same morning a message of a guerrilla attack on part of the escort approximately 12 kilometers south of Jannina reached those of us left in the garrison."
I skip the next sentences and read from page 16, the second paragraph, which starts: "The following explanations." I quote:
"The following explanations I can render only as they were given by the other fellows that were overtaken by the attack, after their return to the garrison and as I have preserved them in my memory."
I am skipping the next part of it. The witness there describes the attack by bands on the vehicle which remained behind which belonged to one secort of General Lanz and the affiant says that the two damaged vehicles driving back slowly were attacked with gunfire from ambush while climbing a winding road.
On the bottom of page 1b I am reading the following passage:
"Having passed the curve they met the passenger car waiting here and, according to the account of NCO of the military police Hess, he only now discovered that the side-car was empty, that Corporal of the military police Meinel, who had been sitting there, was missing.
"How Meinel had left the sidecar Hess was unable to explain as he at the sudden opening of fire had ducked his head, thinking of nothing but keeping the machine rolling and bringing it safely through the next curve. As the now 4 or 5 soldiers then tried to find out what had become of their lost comrade, they were again exposed to heavy fire and had to drive on with the passenger car only, leaving the immobile motorcycle behind.
After a drive of approximately 1 kilometer they stopped, and now a motor truck arrived from the direction of Jannina carrying about 10 soldiers of the signal corps 422 and a lieutenant as a commanding officer; they had been out as trouble shooters. As far as I am able to recall the account, the soldiers that had been attacked returned to the place of the attack together with the soldiers from the signal corps. The abandoned motorcycle had disappeared completely from the road. As they advanced further, they found the missing Corporal MEINEL lying on the road; he had been completely stripped and robbed and was already dead, the body was in a miserable condition.
Towards noon, on 3 October 1943 a motor truck -- probably the truck of the signal corps - arrived in Jannina, carrying the body of Corporal MEINEL, I was able to convince myself of the horrible state of the body. MEINEL was completely stripped and had been robbed of all his belongings. On the body 4 face shots were found obviously discharged at the shortest range. The belly had been slashed, and the entrails were hanging from the abdomen. Regarding the condition of the corpse of MEINEL Dr. LINDNER, at that time chief surgeon, might be able to state further particulars. He examined the body."
I skip the following sentences of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice and I continue reading on page 18, the last paragraph, which reads, and I quote:
"General LANZ cannot have been informed of the attack on the two motor vehicles belonging to the escort prior to his return to Jannina, but at the earliest time possible after his arrival in Prevesa. As stated above the two damaged vehicles were already on their return trip to Jannina as the attack took place, whereas the escort had already continued its drive to Prevesa, that means it was driving in the opposite direction at a place far away from the place of the attack."
On page 19 the affiant says;
"Not one single case of shooting of hostages in connection with the attack is known to me. Shootings of hostages did not take place during the time of my assignment to the staff of the XXII Mountain Army Corps neither there nor in the garrison district of Jannina.
"Neither was any case of shootings of hostages at any time mentioned by soldiers of the divisions with which I came into contact."
This affidavit, if it please the Tribunal, is dated the 14th of October 1947. It has been duly sworn to by Curt Mueller Master Sergeant of the military police and properly certified.
The other affidavit which I gave Exhibit number 55 is the next but one document in the same document book, page 21 in Document Book Lanz No. III. It is document No. 69 and the exhibit number is 55. It is quite brief. It was executed by Matthias Starl who is at present residing in Lindau on the Lake of Constance and who has already executed one other affidavit which has been exhibited here. He was a capttain and administrative officer with the 22nd Mountain Corps during the period from 3 September 1943 until 14 November 1943. As such he was one of the closest collaborators of General Lanz.
He says in his affidavit dated the 5th of October 1943, which was properly sworn to and certified, the following about the attack on the escort:
"Nothing is known to me pertaining to the shooting of hostages as a result of the attack on 1 October 1943 on the escort of the commanding general south of Jannina by local guerrillas on which occasion 1 noncommissioned officer of the military police was killed.
"General Lanz never carried hostages in his escort. Apparently the four civilians alleged to have been shot must have been members of the guerilla group that were shot in the beating off of the guerrilla attack."
If your honors please, I notice just now that the witness in this affidavit is talking about a surprise attack on the 1st of October 1943. I don't know whether it is a typographical error in my copy or whether the same mistake is contained in the original but I don't think it is necessary to correct this because the statements of the affidavit show very clearly that he is talking about that attack which was carried out on General Lanz's escort irrespective of whether it took place on 1st of October 1943.
I have just had a look at the criminal and in the original it says, "3 October 1943," as it should read. If the English copy also reads, "1 October 1943," I would ask your honors to correct it.
PRESIDENT JUDGE BURKE: The correction will be made.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you, your Honor.
Q. General Lanz. that concludes this particular count of the indictment. We have dealt with it and cleared it up to the best of our capacity on the basis of the available material.
I would now like to turn to the next count of the indictment as far as it concerns you and this is point 9 of
PRESIDENT JUDGE BURKE: There is another correction, perhaps, that should be made in the English document. The date of the affidavit is given as, "Lindau 5 October 1943."
DR. SAUTER: Just a moment, please.
PRESIDENT JUDGE BURKE: Page 21 of Exhibit 55.
DR. SAUTER: I will have a look at the original in a moment. I just notice, your Honors, that, strangely enough, even the original says: "5 October 1943." Of course, it should read "5 October 1947."
PRESIDENT JUDGE BURKE: The correction will be made. One mistake apiece -- the mistakes balance.
DR. SAUTER: The typist who typed rut the affidavit in the City Administration of Lindau typed the wrong date and typed "1943" instead of "1947." I don't believe it will be necessary to send the original back and have it corrected, will it?
PRESIDENT JUDGE BURKE: We can't have the intelligence of the Tribunal insulted by any such procedure as that. We will make the correction.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you very much, your Honor.
Q. General Lanz, this brings me to the next point of the indictment with which you are charged. This is point 9f of the indictment and this concerns the case Akmotopos. I believe the locality "Akmotopos"-
DR. SAUTER: If your Honors are interested, the locality concerned is contained in the map which has been submitted to you. It is just above and on the lefthand side of the place Arta which has been under discussion previously. Northwest of Arta we have this new place, Akmotopos. This is the place which is connected with this count and which is repeatedly referred to here, Akmotopos.
Q. General Lanz, the point 9f of the indictment deals with Document NOKW-1552 which became Exhibit 333. This document is contained in Document Book 13 of the prosecution on page 96 of the German text which is page 126 of the English document book. Another of the documents is concerned with this problem. It is contained in Document Book XIX. It is Document NOKW-909, Exhibit 454, Document Book XIX, page 142 of the German text and 128 of the English. The first document is contained in Document Book XIII; the second one in Document Book XIX.
Q. Will you please look at those documents? In the Indictment it is asserted that on 5 October, or around that date, in 1943, troops under your command and under your jurisdiction destroyed the Greek place, Akmotopos and executed all inhabitants of that place. According to the Indictment this was done as a reprisal for the murder of one regimental commander and for a sabotage act. Did you order the destruction of Akmotopos, General? Please read the document yourself first.
A. I did not order the destruction of Akmotopos.
Q. Can you explain to us how the destruction of this place came about?
A. The mountain village Akmotopos had been occupied by bands and was being defended by bands; so German troops attacked the place. We shall have to discuss that in detail. German troops conquered the place and the band members who had descended into the village were killed in combat. During that combat action the village was burned down.
Q. Has it been possible for you to establish, General Lanz, whether the band members who were shot were only band members who wore uniforms, or were they civilians. If so, were these civilians members of the bands or were they not?
A. I believe this morning I had occasion, when I talked about fightings for band villages, to say that when such localities were defended civilians participated in the defense. It is difficult to establish in suck cases whether these civilians who fought side by side with the bands were inhabitants of that village or whether they came from another village. That was difficult to say at that time and it's even more difficult today to say for sure which was the case. They were civilians who took part and who fought side by side with the bands.
That's all I can say basically about this problem.
Q. Is it known to you, Witness, whether, in this particular case, the place had already been left by those civilians who did not participate in the fight and who were not members of the bands?
A. Yes, in this individual, particular case I happened to be in a position to prove this with documentary evidence, but that is just luck. Just a minute please. In Document Book XIX, on Page 146 of the German. I don't know the English page number.
Q. Page 129 of the English text of Document Book XIX. I believe the document starts on Page 125, and it covers a number of pages.
A. We have here a detailed report of a non-commissioned officer who took part in that operation for a special reason, which I shall mention later. This NCO wrote a report about everything that occurred during the operation long before he could possibly know that I would have to give an account of the operation.
Q. Can you give me the date of the document? Is it contained in the document? If so, will you please give it to me?
A. The date of the report is the 5th of October 1943.
Q. It's dated the 5th of October 1943?
A. Yes? it is.
Q. Can you also establish who this NCO is or of what troop unit he was a member?
A. The letterhead reads "Group Secret Field Police 621 Command of the 1st Mountain division." It doesn't give the name of the NCO, and I don't know him.
Q. And what does he report about this point about which I have just asked you, namely whether or not that place had been evacuated of civilian population to the extent to which they did not take part in the fighting or support of the bands in any shape or form?
A. In the next to the last paragraph of the report there is one sentence which reads, "Also from this village (which means the village of Akmotopos) all inhabitants have withdrawn to the mountains." This is only an incidental proof for what I said this morning as a general rule. This is a fact based on experiences that the inhabitants, before an operation even started, learned about the intention, and then those inhabitants who did not fight with the bands left their village and withdrew to the mountains or the woods. And that is what happened in this case.
Q. Witness, what was the immediate cause of this mopping-up operation which was started against the village of Akmotopos and against the partisans who were found in the village?
A. I believe I mentioned this cause just before, we I said that on 3rd October I had to go to Prevesa to the Burial of Lt. Col. Salminger. The immediate cause for this mopping-up operation was the killing of Lt. Col. Salminger. During that time, on the road from Joannina to Arta the bands made a road-block of telephone and telegraph poles and wire and a few stones which they had fetched. Lt. Col. Salminger got into this road trap during the night, and when he was caught, as had been intended, he was shot in the dark. That is, his car was shot at amongst other places he was shot in the stomach. When he tried to leave the car to defend himself against his invisible enemies he collapsed and died of the severe wound.
Q. Near this particular spot of the road do you know whether, at the same time, several sabotage acts had occurred at almost every moment.
This was our most important highway and, of course it was obvious for the enemy that he attacked us there all the time. Besides the terrain was very favorable for such attacks. It was mountainous terrain. The mountains were from 50 to 60 meters high along this road. I frequently passed along this highway. I know it well. It was, of course, very easy to block such a road and to carry out attacks on people passing along. If one went along this highway, one could never be sure whether one would reach the other end alive. Therefore, in order to interpolate here, when I made an agreement with Zervas I asked as one of my first favors to leave this particular highway alone, as his area bordered on the west side of this road and the other side of the road bordered on a Communist area. Zervas was kind enough later to assure me that he would take over the securing of this road with his own forces, which he did. I shall discuss that later. In any case, along this highway, during September, there were repeated surprise attacks of a very serious nature, which caused us heavy losses. One of the victims of such an attack was Lt. Col. Salminger, as well as his driver, who was also killed on this occasion. That had filled the measure, and something had to be done against it. After all we could not allow matters to go on like this.
Q. Witness, immediately prior to this incident a Captain Stuetzinger was shot on the same spot. I believe that's one incident which you have not yet mentioned.
A. That was not on the same spot; it was near this spot on the same road.
Q. I see.
A. Yes, it was on this same road; that is correct. This man who was shot from ambush was chief of our bakers' company.
I don't know exactly what happened.
Q. And quite close to this spot, around the same time, a motorized column was supposed to have been attacked, where a number of German soldiers were supposed to have been killed. Is that known to you, General?
A. That's also correct.
Q. And did you have any indications whether all these attacks, a few examples of which you have mentioned, were carried out by the same Communist band? Or were there several hands involved?
A. We were of the opinion that it was one certain band which carried out these attacks. This band was located between the road and the Arachtos sector, but, of course, one could never be absolutely certain about such things in wartime. One could see Italian shells along the Communist part of the road, with which our men had been killed. There was no doubt about that. And those shells were found. What could be concluded was that Italian weapons had been used in the attacks.
Q. And this place, Akmotopos, which we discussed earlier, was situated somewhere near this spot of attacks was it not?
A. This place Akmotopos is important only because it was particularly strongly defended by the bands. It is situated approximately 8 Km. distant from this spot, way up in the mountains.
Q. Did your staff know, at that time, or did you personally know, that this place Akmotopos, because it was so difficult and so inaccessible, was a proper stronghold of the bands? Was it known at that time?
A. No, not in the way in which you put it. All we knew was that Akmotopos was situated in the area where the Communist bands stayed. There were several villages in that area.
They were small mountain villages.
Q. This incident of the Regimental Commander Salminger and other incidents led, then, to the mopping-up operation. How was this mopping-up operation carried out? Who ordered it? Can you give us your comments?
A. The procedure was approximately the following: When, during my time, Lt. Col. Salminger had been shot, the division, of course, received a report to that effect. I learned about it from the division. The division sent out one command early in the morning around 7 o'clock, at dawn--it was in October--in order to search for Lt. Col. Salminger. Originally,-I don't know why--the report had said that the band had carried him away. Captain Eisl, with a number of soldiers, was sent out to search along the road for Lt. Col. Salminger. The report read," that he (Salminger) had been kidnapped by the band." As he searched along the road he came across the spot of the attack. This spot has, in all details, be described by the Master Sergeant of the Police. I also described it briefly. When looking at the place where the attack took place it was established that Salminger had not been kidnapped, but that he was dead. To the best of my knowledge his driver had somehow come underneath the car which had over-turned, and Lt. Col. Salminger, who was dead, lay nearby. The officer who found out these facts reported to the division. Subsequently General von Stettner ordered that on the next day he and two companies, which were put at his disposal for that purpose, were to mop up the district between the street and the Arachtos, which is a mountain river. That was the district where the Communist groups, as was well known to us, had stayed for sometime. The reason for this mopping-up operation was that once and for all these attacks on the highways had to cease. Captain Eisl, around noon of the 1st of October, received this order from the 1st Mountain Division.
Q. And how was the mopping-up operation carried out?
A. Around noon or early afternoon of the 1st of October Captain Eisl received the necessary troops from Joannina. The whole locality was about 30 Km distant from Joannina. After the arrival of these troops Captain Eisl sent his men, on the 2nd of October, very early, and they climbed up this mountainous area and started to systematically clean up the district of all the bandits who stayed there. As he writes in his report, when they approached the village of Akmotopos, from the village and from the heights surrounding the village they were covered by machine gun and rifle fire. Thereupon, quite rightly, Captain Eisl put his own guns into position in the customary military manner. He covered the enemy with these guns and possibly also with grenade throwers. The village of Akmotopos, of course, suffered under this fire, as was only natural, and nothing could be done about it. After the preparations for firing had been carried out the two companies attacked. Probably the village was set aflame in the meantime through the fire. The companies conquered the village, and the partisans who defended themselves in the village were killed or shot or wiped out. Undoubtedly there was a contain number of civilians amongst them. Whether or not they were inhabitants of the village I did not know. According to the report the actual inhabitants of the village had escapted, and during the fight the village burned down completely. It was quite a battle about thus place Akmotopos, as has been laid down in the reports.
Q. You say, General Lanz, that the order for this moppingup operation was given to Captain Eisl by the Commander of the 1st Mountain Division, and you also gave us the name of this General; he was General von Stettner. Is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Was it possible for you to establish at an earlier date or now during the trial when General Stettner, as Commanding General of the 1st Mountain Division, issued this order for the mopping-up operation and passed it on to Captain Eisl? Can that possibly be seen from reports or from orders which have been submitted, or if not, what else do you know about it?
A. General von Stettner gave this order to Captain Eisl during the course of this 1st of October. Possibly it was around noon or in the early hours of the afternoon. Then the troops marched off.
Q Did General von Stettner discuss the facts with you before he gave the order for the mopping-up operation? What I mean is did he discuss with you whether an order was to be given, and, if so, which order?
A This is possible, but I cannot be sure any longer. It is possible. On that day I myself issued one order concerning Salminger.