PRESIDENT JUDGE BURKE: The correction will be made. One mistake apiece -- the mistakes balance.
DR. SAUTER: The typist who typed rut the affidavit in the City Administration of Lindau typed the wrong date and typed "1943" instead of "1947." I don't believe it will be necessary to send the original back and have it corrected, will it?
PRESIDENT JUDGE BURKE: We can't have the intelligence of the Tribunal insulted by any such procedure as that. We will make the correction.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you very much, your Honor.
Q. General Lanz, this brings me to the next point of the indictment with which you are charged. This is point 9f of the indictment and this concerns the case Akmotopos. I believe the locality "Akmotopos"-
DR. SAUTER: If your Honors are interested, the locality concerned is contained in the map which has been submitted to you. It is just above and on the lefthand side of the place Arta which has been under discussion previously. Northwest of Arta we have this new place, Akmotopos. This is the place which is connected with this count and which is repeatedly referred to here, Akmotopos.
Q. General Lanz, the point 9f of the indictment deals with Document NOKW-1552 which became Exhibit 333. This document is contained in Document Book 13 of the prosecution on page 96 of the German text which is page 126 of the English document book. Another of the documents is concerned with this problem. It is contained in Document Book XIX. It is Document NOKW-909, Exhibit 454, Document Book XIX, page 142 of the German text and 128 of the English. The first document is contained in Document Book XIII; the second one in Document Book XIX.
Q. Will you please look at those documents? In the Indictment it is asserted that on 5 October, or around that date, in 1943, troops under your command and under your jurisdiction destroyed the Greek place, Akmotopos and executed all inhabitants of that place. According to the Indictment this was done as a reprisal for the murder of one regimental commander and for a sabotage act. Did you order the destruction of Akmotopos, General? Please read the document yourself first.
A. I did not order the destruction of Akmotopos.
Q. Can you explain to us how the destruction of this place came about?
A. The mountain village Akmotopos had been occupied by bands and was being defended by bands; so German troops attacked the place. We shall have to discuss that in detail. German troops conquered the place and the band members who had descended into the village were killed in combat. During that combat action the village was burned down.
Q. Has it been possible for you to establish, General Lanz, whether the band members who were shot were only band members who wore uniforms, or were they civilians. If so, were these civilians members of the bands or were they not?
A. I believe this morning I had occasion, when I talked about fightings for band villages, to say that when such localities were defended civilians participated in the defense. It is difficult to establish in suck cases whether these civilians who fought side by side with the bands were inhabitants of that village or whether they came from another village. That was difficult to say at that time and it's even more difficult today to say for sure which was the case. They were civilians who took part and who fought side by side with the bands.
That's all I can say basically about this problem.
Q. Is it known to you, Witness, whether, in this particular case, the place had already been left by those civilians who did not participate in the fight and who were not members of the bands?
A. Yes, in this individual, particular case I happened to be in a position to prove this with documentary evidence, but that is just luck. Just a minute please. In Document Book XIX, on Page 146 of the German. I don't know the English page number.
Q. Page 129 of the English text of Document Book XIX. I believe the document starts on Page 125, and it covers a number of pages.
A. We have here a detailed report of a non-commissioned officer who took part in that operation for a special reason, which I shall mention later. This NCO wrote a report about everything that occurred during the operation long before he could possibly know that I would have to give an account of the operation.
Q. Can you give me the date of the document? Is it contained in the document? If so, will you please give it to me?
A. The date of the report is the 5th of October 1943.
Q. It's dated the 5th of October 1943?
A. Yes? it is.
Q. Can you also establish who this NCO is or of what troop unit he was a member?
A. The letterhead reads "Group Secret Field Police 621 Command of the 1st Mountain division." It doesn't give the name of the NCO, and I don't know him.
Q. And what does he report about this point about which I have just asked you, namely whether or not that place had been evacuated of civilian population to the extent to which they did not take part in the fighting or support of the bands in any shape or form?
A. In the next to the last paragraph of the report there is one sentence which reads, "Also from this village (which means the village of Akmotopos) all inhabitants have withdrawn to the mountains." This is only an incidental proof for what I said this morning as a general rule. This is a fact based on experiences that the inhabitants, before an operation even started, learned about the intention, and then those inhabitants who did not fight with the bands left their village and withdrew to the mountains or the woods. And that is what happened in this case.
Q. Witness, what was the immediate cause of this mopping-up operation which was started against the village of Akmotopos and against the partisans who were found in the village?
A. I believe I mentioned this cause just before, we I said that on 3rd October I had to go to Prevesa to the Burial of Lt. Col. Salminger. The immediate cause for this mopping-up operation was the killing of Lt. Col. Salminger. During that time, on the road from Joannina to Arta the bands made a road-block of telephone and telegraph poles and wire and a few stones which they had fetched. Lt. Col. Salminger got into this road trap during the night, and when he was caught, as had been intended, he was shot in the dark. That is, his car was shot at amongst other places he was shot in the stomach. When he tried to leave the car to defend himself against his invisible enemies he collapsed and died of the severe wound.
Q. Near this particular spot of the road do you know whether, at the same time, several sabotage acts had occurred at almost every moment.
This was our most important highway and, of course it was obvious for the enemy that he attacked us there all the time. Besides the terrain was very favorable for such attacks. It was mountainous terrain. The mountains were from 50 to 60 meters high along this road. I frequently passed along this highway. I know it well. It was, of course, very easy to block such a road and to carry out attacks on people passing along. If one went along this highway, one could never be sure whether one would reach the other end alive. Therefore, in order to interpolate here, when I made an agreement with Zervas I asked as one of my first favors to leave this particular highway alone, as his area bordered on the west side of this road and the other side of the road bordered on a Communist area. Zervas was kind enough later to assure me that he would take over the securing of this road with his own forces, which he did. I shall discuss that later. In any case, along this highway, during September, there were repeated surprise attacks of a very serious nature, which caused us heavy losses. One of the victims of such an attack was Lt. Col. Salminger, as well as his driver, who was also killed on this occasion. That had filled the measure, and something had to be done against it. After all we could not allow matters to go on like this.
Q. Witness, immediately prior to this incident a Captain Stuetzinger was shot on the same spot. I believe that's one incident which you have not yet mentioned.
A. That was not on the same spot; it was near this spot on the same road.
Q. I see.
A. Yes, it was on this same road; that is correct. This man who was shot from ambush was chief of our bakers' company.
I don't know exactly what happened.
Q. And quite close to this spot, around the same time, a motorized column was supposed to have been attacked, where a number of German soldiers were supposed to have been killed. Is that known to you, General?
A. That's also correct.
Q. And did you have any indications whether all these attacks, a few examples of which you have mentioned, were carried out by the same Communist band? Or were there several hands involved?
A. We were of the opinion that it was one certain band which carried out these attacks. This band was located between the road and the Arachtos sector, but, of course, one could never be absolutely certain about such things in wartime. One could see Italian shells along the Communist part of the road, with which our men had been killed. There was no doubt about that. And those shells were found. What could be concluded was that Italian weapons had been used in the attacks.
Q. And this place, Akmotopos, which we discussed earlier, was situated somewhere near this spot of attacks was it not?
A. This place Akmotopos is important only because it was particularly strongly defended by the bands. It is situated approximately 8 Km. distant from this spot, way up in the mountains.
Q. Did your staff know, at that time, or did you personally know, that this place Akmotopos, because it was so difficult and so inaccessible, was a proper stronghold of the bands? Was it known at that time?
A. No, not in the way in which you put it. All we knew was that Akmotopos was situated in the area where the Communist bands stayed. There were several villages in that area.
They were small mountain villages.
Q. This incident of the Regimental Commander Salminger and other incidents led, then, to the mopping-up operation. How was this mopping-up operation carried out? Who ordered it? Can you give us your comments?
A. The procedure was approximately the following: When, during my time, Lt. Col. Salminger had been shot, the division, of course, received a report to that effect. I learned about it from the division. The division sent out one command early in the morning around 7 o'clock, at dawn--it was in October--in order to search for Lt. Col. Salminger. Originally,-I don't know why--the report had said that the band had carried him away. Captain Eisl, with a number of soldiers, was sent out to search along the road for Lt. Col. Salminger. The report read," that he (Salminger) had been kidnapped by the band." As he searched along the road he came across the spot of the attack. This spot has, in all details, be described by the Master Sergeant of the Police. I also described it briefly. When looking at the place where the attack took place it was established that Salminger had not been kidnapped, but that he was dead. To the best of my knowledge his driver had somehow come underneath the car which had over-turned, and Lt. Col. Salminger, who was dead, lay nearby. The officer who found out these facts reported to the division. Subsequently General von Stettner ordered that on the next day he and two companies, which were put at his disposal for that purpose, were to mop up the district between the street and the Arachtos, which is a mountain river. That was the district where the Communist groups, as was well known to us, had stayed for sometime. The reason for this mopping-up operation was that once and for all these attacks on the highways had to cease. Captain Eisl, around noon of the 1st of October, received this order from the 1st Mountain Division.
Q. And how was the mopping-up operation carried out?
A. Around noon or early afternoon of the 1st of October Captain Eisl received the necessary troops from Joannina. The whole locality was about 30 Km distant from Joannina. After the arrival of these troops Captain Eisl sent his men, on the 2nd of October, very early, and they climbed up this mountainous area and started to systematically clean up the district of all the bandits who stayed there. As he writes in his report, when they approached the village of Akmotopos, from the village and from the heights surrounding the village they were covered by machine gun and rifle fire. Thereupon, quite rightly, Captain Eisl put his own guns into position in the customary military manner. He covered the enemy with these guns and possibly also with grenade throwers. The village of Akmotopos, of course, suffered under this fire, as was only natural, and nothing could be done about it. After the preparations for firing had been carried out the two companies attacked. Probably the village was set aflame in the meantime through the fire. The companies conquered the village, and the partisans who defended themselves in the village were killed or shot or wiped out. Undoubtedly there was a contain number of civilians amongst them. Whether or not they were inhabitants of the village I did not know. According to the report the actual inhabitants of the village had escapted, and during the fight the village burned down completely. It was quite a battle about thus place Akmotopos, as has been laid down in the reports.
Q. You say, General Lanz, that the order for this moppingup operation was given to Captain Eisl by the Commander of the 1st Mountain Division, and you also gave us the name of this General; he was General von Stettner. Is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Was it possible for you to establish at an earlier date or now during the trial when General Stettner, as Commanding General of the 1st Mountain Division, issued this order for the mopping-up operation and passed it on to Captain Eisl? Can that possibly be seen from reports or from orders which have been submitted, or if not, what else do you know about it?
A. General von Stettner gave this order to Captain Eisl during the course of this 1st of October. Possibly it was around noon or in the early hours of the afternoon. Then the troops marched off.
Q Did General von Stettner discuss the facts with you before he gave the order for the mopping-up operation? What I mean is did he discuss with you whether an order was to be given, and, if so, which order?
A This is possible, but I cannot be sure any longer. It is possible. On that day I myself issued one order concerning Salminger.
Q Just one moment, General Lanz. I will come back to that later. Before we do that, I would like to ask the Tribunal to accept one document which also deals with the Salminger instance and with Akmotopos. That is an affidavit of Captain Eisl whom defendant Lanz has repeatedly mentioned. He was the man who carried out the mopping-up-operation at that time. The affidavit is contained in Document Book IV for Lanz; it is Document 126 which will be given Exhibit No. Lanz 56. It is an affidavit of the then Captain Alois Eisl which has been duly sworn to and properly certified; because this document is so very important, I beg to be allowed to read it in full. It is contained in Document Book IV for Lanz on page 33, Document 126, affidavit by Alois Eisl, Document 126, page 33, Exhibit 56. In consideration of the special importance of this affidavit, I beg to be allowed to read it in full; it is about a page-and-a-half. The witness first states that he served under Lanz in his corps as Battalion Commander during the period between June 1943 until October 1944. That covers the time which was concerned in the action against Akmotopos. I am now reading from page 33 and I quote:
"On 1 October 1943, at 7 a.m. I was driving, by order of the 1st Mountain Div., with a convoy of 7 trucks and about 50 men, put together at Joannina, from the road block Joannina, Southern exit, in the direction of Prevesa. At about 3 km from the village of Klisura the road was, in a narrow curve that was difficult to survey, suddenly blocked by telephone wires pulled across the road, by stones piled up and sawn off poles. Furthermore, the road had also been made impassible by poles laid down in the same direction. A smashed in truck was lying about 30 meters away from the block, showing bullet marks on the fore-front. A renewed attack was likely, since armed men were clearly perceptible in the hills. Security patrols were sent out at once and the place of the raid was searched as to survivors and killed German soldiers. Close to the car we found the driver, in a distance of about 60 meters, Lt. Col. Salminger, Commander of the Mountain Inf. Reg. 96, both killed. Both bodies were taken to Prevesa. There I received, towards noon of 1 October 1943, the order from the division by radio to return at once to Klisura, in order to rid the hilly country to the East of Klisura of the enemy with additional forces (1st and 2nd comp.
of the Mount. Inf. Reg. No. 98 and 1 howitzer platoon of the 6th battery of the Mount. Art. Reg. No. 79) The enemy (here it was a strong Communist band) mostly harmlessly working in the fields as civilians, immediately took up the hidden arms, whenever a suitable opportunity was offered to them.
The road was usable only for several vehicles and for convoys in view of the continuous raiding. Special re-enforcements were sent into action in order to repair the disrupted communications by wire.
Towards the evening of 1 October 1943, the troops arrived near Klisura. On 2 October 1943 at 5 in the morning the combat group began the ascent in the direction of Jumnopolos-Akmotopos. The troops were fired at from the mountain tops, which was meant to stop the advance. The opposition was fought and the advance towards Akmotopos continued. When reaching this mountain village, the combat group met with sudden machine gun and rifle fire from 3 sides i.e., the mountain ranges surrounding the settlement closely, and most dangerous were the 2 enemy machine-guns firing out of the village, as they were hardly perceptible. Both the companies attacked with the assistance of their heavy grenade throwers under the direct fire of the howitzer platoon. Through the effect of the fire of these arms the village had been set on fire. The companies stormed the village and killed in the adjoining fight the baud members who were there defending themselves. Among them there were also civilians who had fought together with the bands. The majority of the inhabitants had fled to the mountains lying to the East. The village was destroyed as a strong point of the bands, in as far as it had not been burnt down during the fighting.
The following day mopping-up operations continued against various villages and ended in the evening of the 3 October 1943. The inhabitants reported as killed were members of the bands who had taken active part in the fighting with arms, or, who had been killed by the effect particularly of our heavy arms, when staying in the combat area."
The affiant who, at present, is thirty-five years of age and living in Miesbach has sworn his statement in due course.
Witness, just before you started to tell the Tribunal that at that time you yourself issued an order which was concerned with the incident Salminger, what were you talking about?
A On the day when I learned of Lt. Col. Salminger's murder, under the impression of this news which impressed me deeply, I issued a Corps order of the day which in its main features was an epilogue to the deceased Commander of the regiment.
Q This Corps order of the day which you mentioned just now--is that identical with the document submitted by the prosecution NOKW-867contained in Document Book 19 of the prosecution on page 128 of the German and page 104 of the English. I repeat--NOKW-867, Exhibit 452, Document Book 19, page 104 of the English text.
A Yes, that is the order.
Q This is a Corps order of the day--that is an order of the day which the Commander of an army Corps has issued. Can you tell the Tribunal whether that is an ordinary order and what is usually understood by an order or why this announcement of yours is called a Corps order of the day? Is it really an order which causes the troops to take certain action?
A I would like to put it this way. It is not a tactical order. The commitment of the troops, as is known, was regulated by so-called tactical orders. Aside from the tactical order, there is an order of the day and aside from the order of the day there is a staff order. Those are the three kinds of orders which are provided in the German service regulation. An order of the day as is the one concerned here, is issued on special occasions. These occasions can be of various kinds. They can be festive occasions or sad occasions. E.G. in order to praise certain soldiers, decorate them or celebrate an anniversary, present decorations or announce decorations.
To announce a congratulation or, as is the case here, in order to issue an epilogue for a killed comrade. In this sense of the word, it is not an order; it is an announcement in order to put it more generally.
Q You told us before that you wanted to honor the killed Regimental Commander in this order of the day and in a manner which is customary amongst soldiers you wanted to praise his name?
A That is right, that was my intention.
Q Did you yourself issue that Corps order? And sign it in your own handwriting?
A Yes, I signed it in my own handwriting.
Q Will you please take up now this Corps order of the day and explain to us why you added the concluding sentence to the epilogue contained in this order of the day?
A I added the last sentence because I thought it was necessary to do this at the time and even today I am of the same opinion in this respect. I am of the opinion that these attacks against the troops as described before should once and for all cease. A counter-measure had to be taken to finish these continuous attacks by the bands. I believed that I owed it to my men in this moment to announce a counter-measure that was to be taken against those bands. I could not in silence pass over these incidents. That was not possible. After all, that had not been the first incident. Several incidents had preceded this one. Something had to be done eventually.
Q General Lanz, it might be expedient-
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: At this time, Dr. Sauter, I think we will conclude the afternoon session and resume at nine-thirty in the morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned to 21 November 1947 at 0930 hours.)
6484a Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII, in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 21 November 1947, 0930, Judge Burke Presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please take their seats.
The Honorable, he Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain as to whether or not all defendants are present in the Court room.
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors, all the defendants are present in the Courtroom with the exception of General von Weichs, who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Sauter.
KARL HUBERT LANZ DIRECT EXAMINATION (continued) BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Witness, yesterday towards the end of the session we stopped when we were discussing the case Akmotopos. This is the the incident when after the murder of Regimental Commander Salminger, a mopping up operation had taken place and in the village of Akmotopos had been destroyed. Allegedly all inhabitants of this place had been killed. Yesterday you told us that that had been an independent order issued by the Commander of the 1st Mountain Division to whom the Regiment Salminger had been subordinate. Furthermore, you told us yesterday that you had issued a so-called corps order of the day in order to hold an epilogue for the deceased. I would now like to go on from here and ask you, witness, how did the Regiment of Lt. Col. Salminget take the murder of its commander?
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me just a minute, Dr. Sauter. Reference to this Order that was given by General Lanz, -- at least I didn't and I believe the other of the judges didn't get the particular reference to the Corps order you had in mind.
Will you kindly give us this Corps order you have been referring to so we may have knowledge of it and a record of it?
DR. SAUTER: Yes, I can give you the reference immediately.
May it please the Tribunal, this Corps order of the day of the defendant Lanz can be found in Document Book of the Prosecution, No. 19. This is exhibit, -- I beg your pardon, Document NOKW 867, which was given the exhibit number 453. The page in Document Book 19 is in the English version page 104 and page 128 of the German text. The Corps Order of the day is dated 1 October 1943, and is headed "Corps Order of the Day," and signed by General Lanz personally.
THE PRESIDENT: The reason I am making the inquiry, Dr. Sauter, is that we couldn't find it yesterday, and you gave us the exhibit number 454, -- at least we got the Exhibit number 454, so this clears it up, and thank you very much.
DR. SAUTER: I beg your pardon. That was a slip of the tongue.
Q Witness, I asked you just now a question which I would like you to answer, -- how did the Regiment take the murder of its Commander at that time? What effect on your own attitude did the news about the murder create in you?
A Lt. Col. Salminger had been a particular brave man, above all in Russia he had through his bravery and through his actions gained the highest esteem of the whole division. Not only was he an extraordinarily brave soldier, but he was also an unusually good superior. He showed any amount of feeling for the men under him in his regiment. He took great care of his soldiers, and I would particularly like to stress that he also took care of the relatives of those soldiers who had been killed. Therefore, he was quite rightly greatly esteemed and very popular. I might at this point say, out of my own, that I would like to show in this way my esteem and love of this comrade of mine. It was very tragic that this great man and soldier should die in this horrible manner. His Regiment was very excited and very shocked because of this incident, and that can be well understood.
The danger existed also that the indignation of the soldiers would find a let-out, which was not desirable. Therefore, it was necessary to deal with this matter in some way, so that it would not just rest within itself.
Q General, in this Corps order which you issued you talked of reprisal action; what purpose did you pursue with this notice that you put into your order?
A I would like to admit here that I wrote this order under the impression of the events, that after all I am only a human being. I was excited and disgusted about what had happened, and that we had lost such an extraordinarily good man. The words which today might be found very harsh words were at the time written by me. After all one can only understand such facts if one considers the circumstances under which they took place. I talked about a revenge, because I was indignant about what had repeatedly happened, about the terrible attacks, about the killing of my soldiers along this highway, and because matters could not go on like this. It had to stop sometime. Some time one's patience was bound to give way. I wanted to hit those elements whose fault these surprise attacks wore, and I wanted to eliminate them once and for all. That was the idea of the order.
Q Witness, what strikes me is that is this so-called corps order of the day in the concluding sentence of it you mentioned just now you did not use the expression "I order," as one would ordinarily expect that in orders of a Commander, Instead you said, and I quote laterally "I expect." Is there a certain reason for deviating from the usual expression "I order," and instead using "I expect."?
A Dr. Sauter I again have to confess here that at the time I did not formulate the order with such precision, as it is expected here in this court. Those were entirely different circumstances. I gave the order in accordance with the situation which I faced. I wrote at the time "I expect," instead of "I order." This is merely an order of the day. It is not a tactical order. As I said yesterday, in a tactical order one would write "I order." In an order of the day, which in this particular case is an epilogue for a killed comrade, this is only one sentence of many sentences. It is only a small part of the order, and I used the expression "I expect." If an order of the day is concerned one uses other language than one uses in a tactical order. In a tactical order one tails soberly, factually. In an order of the day, and in an epilogue one uses a completely different language, a more flowery language probably. That is the same in civilian life. If one publishes an obituary notice for someone one uses expressions which might not in detail stand up under criticism before a Court.
Q General Lanz, but possibly you can give us an explanation although you say that your expressions in the order were more or less rhetorical. They were not sober an factual. In this corps order of the day you say where you talk about the idea of a revenge action, about a local revenge action; can you recall the text from your own memory?
A You can be convinced, Dr. Sauter, that I know this order only too well in the meantime.
Q General, I would like you to tell the Court why, in your corps order of the day in the epilogue for Salminger, you made this local limitation of the revenge action, while on the other hand you considered such a revenge action a matter of course where the corps were concerned?
A I made this local limitation because to the best of my recollection today I assumed, and I think justifiably assumed, that the band groups which were guilty of those attacks would stay in the vicinity, and a little further from the road where the attack had occurred. That could be assumed. It was logical. These people were somewhere in a hidout in the mountains where they felt secure, and from these hideouts they could at the right moment carry out their surprise attacks. This is quite clear if one considers the conditions of the bands. This is one reason why I made the local limitation, and the other was that I didn't want it to happen somewhere far away in the country there would take place a reprisal action for Lt. Col. Salminger, in a district which was not connected with the incident. I wanted to avoid that.
DR. SAUTER: Your Honor, in this connection I would like to offer two affidavits, both of them are concerned with incident Akmotopos, the Incident concerning Lt. Col. Salminger. The first one of those documents which I am going to submit now is in Document Book III for Lanz. It is document No. 70, and page number 22. Document Book III Lanz, Document 70, page 22. I shall offer this document under exhibit number 57. This document is in affidavit by Wolf Christian von Loeben of Bremen. I may anticipate that this is the same witness from whom I have read an affidavit yesterday which was Document 60, which I had offered as Exhibit 12 in Document Book Lanz III, page 3. I repeat, Document Book Lanz III, page 3, Document 60, Exhibit 12. This was the document where the Prosecution objected because the document was not duly signed by Loeben. The same will apply to the document which I have just offered as an exhibit. I have now made inquiry with a competent authority and I have established that the manner of the certification which has been used by the same Notary in both documents is in order. In Prussia the Notary may, in the certification of such affidavits, use the manner as has been used in the document put to you just now, that is that the Notary by virtue of his office as an official certifies that the affiant has appeared before him, that the document has been read to him and that the affiant has duly signed the document.
The Notary has chosen this form according to these Prussian regulations, and as was used considerably in Prussia. He gave the affiant, Wolf Christian von Loeben a copy, where the Notary certified the copy and original were identical. I don't therefore believe, Your Honors, that those two documents which I have just mentioned, namely Document 60 and Document 70, in Document Book III, could be objected to. I would be obliged if the Prosecution would make a statement to the effect whether or not after my explanation, he agrees to the presentation of those two documents.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I made no objection to the proceeding document to which Dr. Sauter referred, and I of course have no objection to this one.
DR. SAUTER: This eliminates this formal difficulty, and I may road the document which I have offered as Exhibit, Document Book III, and it is Lanz Document 70, page 22. It is an affidavit by Wolf Christian von Loeben in Bremen, who states in the initial sentences of the document that during the war he was Ia with the 22d Mountain Corps during the period August 24, 1943 until June 25, 1944, and served under General Lanz, who is today a defendant before this Court. In his brief affidavit the affiant von Loeben states the following: