A. I said once before that I did so on 9 September 1943, in the afternoon.
Q. That is to say three weeks after the event. Well another aspect of the whole problem of fighting the bands--did the EDES partisans accept open engagements in battle or was that not the case?
A. Since summer 1944, or to speak more precisely roughly from the middle of July, the EDES partisans regarded themselves to be strong enough for them to engage us now and again at least in open battle. I recall two occasions, one took place in the neighborhood of Paramythia and also in the neighborhood of Philippias which is situated along the big road from Jannina to Arta. This soldierly behavior which I took a very good view of was caused by the fact that General Zervas, with my knowledge and up to a point through my indulgence, had received considerable reinforcements of regular troops. For one thing, he had been reinforced by British troops. I believe there were about 600 men and then also by troops of the Greek exile government, Greek troops in other words, who apparently were stationed in the Middle East where they had been formed and were sent as regular troops, trained, equipped, to Greece to the two small harbor towns Parga and Amuzia, all of which I knew. This is Southeast of Korfu. I knew this.
I even had orders in about August or September that I should attack these troops, which is entirely proper in war of course, but I did not carry out this order because at that time in view of the war situation in August, 1944, I wanted to save the lives of my units. The attack would not have made any difference in the overall situation.
Q. Now, General Lanz, we can leave the problem of fighting the bands, and shall turn to a few specified points in the indictment. First, under Paragraph 5J of the Indictment,--there we are concerned with the case that on 30 September 1943, a few weeks after your arrival in Epirus, 17 civilians were executed allegedly in reprisal for acts of sabotage committed against telephone lines. This refers to Prosecution Document NOKW 909, which is Exhibit 454 contained in Prosecution Document Book 19, on page 132 of the German and page 111 of the English; have you got the document in front of you? Will you please give us your comments? Did you order this affair?
A. I would like to correct something first. This report does not say that people were executed. It says they were shot.
Q. Witness, the term "executed" has not been chosen by me, but is contained in the translation of the indictment, and of course I have adhered to the definition of the Prosecution in order to give you the opportunity to give us the benefit of your comments; did you order this act?
A. No, I did not order it.
Q. Did you know of this shooting when it was carried out?
A. No, I did not know it.
Q. Did you, at that time, make investigations afterwards, were you informed about it after the event?
A. Although I have seen this incident mentioned in the indictment, it is so long ago I cannot recall the incident itself. It is unknown to me.
Q. General Lanz, do you remember acts of sabotage which are connected with this case or do you remember any acts of sabotage directed against telephone cables?
A. Yes, certainly I remember a large number of acts of sabotage but I don't think I would be in a position to enumerate the various cases, because there were so many. Interruptions in telephone lines are one of the most popular acts of sabotage which one can think of.
In the case of internal unrest or revolt this is always done, that you cut telephone lines and disrupt long-distance connections. In our area one might almost call it a daily event.
Q. Was the maintenance and functioning of these telephone lines important from a military point of view, or were these telephone lines serving only the civilian population?
A. They were, of course, military lines.
Q. If the Tribunal please, about that problem I shall read an affidavit which is contained in Document Book Lang No. III on page 64, where it is Document 97. To repeat, on page 64 in Volume III, and it is Lanz Document 97. It is offered as Exhibit 51. This is an affidavit by Hugo Ledorer, a resident of Munich, who tells us that the position he held was that of a troop leader with the Corps Signal Detachment 422, between September 1943 and October 6, 1944. He was down there for more than a year under General Lanz's command. The affiant says on page 64:
My activity as Troop leader was related to the telephone and I was assigned to an anti-disturbance unit. The disturbances were traceable almost exclusively to sabotage of the resistance groups and bands and their attacks upon the former German Wehrmacht. The type of disturbances were sawed-off telephone poles and stealing of material; cable which had been cut or dug out.
At the beginning of my activity, by the end of 1943, the destruction came almost daily and increased to an incredible amount until the retreat. Often we had to install the electric wiring two and three times daily and more often. I especially noted the destruction of 1 September 1943. In the morning of that day, north of Filippia 160 poles were sawed down and cable and bells were stolen. In connection with this same action, tho former Lt. Col. SALMINGER was attacked by night in his car and killed, as well as his driver.
When the wires were being installed in the night of 29-30 of July 1944, there was strong enemy shooting at coastal road Sarande Borsch.
Upon returning the following night, also heavy shooting, in another unit, to which I was attached, 1 dead, 3 wounded.
On 18 August 1944 while safe-guarding the wires from destruction and at the same time while searching for a troop of our company which had not returned, on the stretch Jannina-Minia Tsuka, attack by bandits, 3 dead and 2 vehicles lost.
Upon pushing forward with reinforcements, we found the place where the missing troop had been ambushed, no trace of the people, only the two completely plundered vehicles. The whole thing was connected with an attack of the bands upon the place Minia Tsuka, in which small parts of German units were stationed. After freeing the few still living, I came here. There was a horrible sight awaiting me. Complete devastation and plundering of the quarters. The deadaround 90 men-were not buried, they were all undressed and already beginning to decay.
I personally experienced what I have described. I would like to remark that I do not know of any reprisal measures on our part for this.
The following I did not personally experience: 23 May 1944 a troop of our company was ambushed. 3 dead in this attack. One wounded man (he was later killed in Hungary) who was able to hide, told us that women and children took part in the ambush, who with the yell: "Partisan nordio" swarmed ever the vehicle and plundered it. From a wounded man who lay in his vicinity, they took off the boots and laid a hand grenade on his head, which tore him to pieces. We found him like that. Through my activity as telephone operator, we were always on the run and thus we knew about everything that happened in our section. Attacks upon strong points, truck columns, even medical columns, were matters of daily report.
I especially remember the report about an attack on a strong point, in which bandits, disguised as women, carried out the ambush coming along the road with donkeys. It must have happened in September 1944.
I would further like to remark that we were forbidden to take anything away from the property of the Greeks, even fruit from the large plantations, and were punished by military courts. We were directed to treat the population considerately and to be on good terms with them.
The affiant has sworn to the statement and it is properly certified.
Q. Witness, did these sabotage acts of which we have heard so much lead to any special security measures to prevent further acts of sabotage?
A. Naturally we tried everything to stop these continuous acts of sabotage, or at least to make them more difficult. These constant disruptions of our most important tactical signal communications was a difficulty for the leadership and might well lead to the most serious consequences to our wireless network, which I should mention here was not good enough for the requirements. There were a large number of technical disruptions. It was extremely difficult to obtain batteries and spare parts, and the mountainous area and atmospheric conditions were in themselves highly unfavorable, and throughout that period of time it lead to much annoyance and many difficulties. The result was that our telephone lines became completely indispensable to us. Above all if you imagine that the units were distributed over a fairly large area so that they could carry out the assignments. In actual fact we were not able down to the last day to find an effective means against these acts of sabotage against our telephone lines. We brought many services in for this purpose, particularly the special detachments and we lost a great number of pieces of equipment and material. What we did was to have along the most important stretches, particularly between Joannine and Arta, a "blocked" area, as we called it. That is to say on either side of the road a zone was marked where after dark nobody was allowed to walk without the risk of being shot at immediately by the patrols in the area. This zone, which was blocked off, was known to all people concerned, including the troops. We had flying controls too. They were mechanized. If I remember this rightly they would have anti-tank guns and machine guns which were mounted on lorries, and they also had search lights on trucks. This flying column would, at irregular intervals after dark patrol the roads. If anybody was encountered on these trips apart from the villages, where the troops were stationed, this man was shot at without any further adieu.
Q. You mean encountered in the zone which was blocked off?
A. Yes, that is what I am talking about.
Q. Now, on the basis of your knowledge of the conditions of the time and locality, General, do you assume that the civilians mentioned in the report of 30 September 1943 as shot, not executed, were shot for the reason that they were encountered within the blocked-off area, or do you assume anything else?
A. As I told you, I don't remember the incident itself, but I have had the communications by an officer who was involved in this incident, to the effect that the civilians, as they were called, were surprised by one of the patrols in this special zone and were thereupon shot.
Q. This action, which you did not order and which later came to your knowledge, you think is a justifiable action on the part of the German authorities, is that what I understand you to say?
A. Well, if you establish a special zone and block it off and announce it as such the people will have to pay attention to this. After all, there are special zones in peace, not only in wartime, which have to be respected, and if they are not respected the patrols or guards are fully justified in using their arms. This happens in peacetime, and not only in wartime.
DR. SAUTER: If the Tribunal, please, the defendant General Lanz has just had reference made to a statement by an officer serving in that area at that time. This statement is contained in Lanz Document Book III, page 12. It is Document 66, which is offered as Exhibit Lanz No. 52. It was given by one Captain Rall, Carl George Rall of Garmisch-Partenkirchen in upper Bavaria, who says on the subject matter that, -- "The radio message to the 1st Mountain Division dated 30 September 1943, 1315 hours:" Then comes the verbatim quotation, "'96th Mountain Infantry Regiment: At dawn so far 17 civilians were shot to death as an expiatory measure for the wire sabotage.'" May I draw the Tribunal's attention to the fact that the terms used there is only "shot" not "executed," whereas the indictment on page 7 of the German version under paragraph J uses the term "executed" by mistake.
Captain Rall says, under oath, as follows:
"As former captain and regimental adjutant of the 98th Mountain Infantry Regiment I state the following particulars:"
I am reading from page 12 in Document Book Lanz No. III.
"The incident referred to above involved no shotting of hostages or an otherwise arbitrary shooting of civilians, on the contrary, the facts are as follows: For the German Wehrmacht in Greece the following order was effective due to the increase of the guerilla warfare and acts of sabotage noticeable during the months of July, August, and September 1943:
"a) Individual travel by vehicle was fundamentally prohibited:
"b) All travel was supposed to take place by means of the convoysystem, the columns being formed at separate points of departure - in this case Jannina and Prevesa;
"c) Driving at night (one hour before nightfall until one hour after dawn) was prohibited even for convoys. This curfew on the axes of supply was effective also for the civilian population, as it had been announced and forwarded to civilian authorities through the appropriate area commanders for publication. Anybody encountered in the open country within the curfew hours was attacked with arms."
The Affiant, continues on page 13:
"The axis of supply leading from Jannina to Prevesa through a country full of rocks, ravines, and gorges, was secured by our 98th regiment by means of a system of strong points. Through acts of sabotage occurring almost daily as well as also through attacks on the weaker watch base crews we on our part were induced to take more severe measures.
"A motorized scout squad equipped with searchlight, self-propelled artillery mount, and an armored reconnaissance car was activated at irregular hours during the night in order to curb guerilla warfare in the gorges, and at the same time to establish the connection between the watch bases at lease once in the course of the night.
"The crews of the strong points had order to establish connection between each other shortly before dawn through small but well-armed scout squads, to clear away destructions or obstacles and to protect and support the signal corps men employed in line construction. As no village or inhabited place was located in the immediate vicinity of the road where it led through mountains, and as the entire peaceable civilian population had withdrawn to the plans or the larger communities, it was impossible that any peaceable citizen could be found in that region.
"Any civilian encountered in the curfew area was therefore suspicious as a presumptive partisan and was treated as an enemy by the soldiers.
"The harrassing of the strong points that was going on almost every night was the reason why the fighting, was inevitably most intense at dawn, i.e. the civilians were attacked and pursued; in most cases they offered armed resistance.
"The fighting tactics of the partisans, however, generally aimed at avoiding open fight, and if surprised they after a short fire fight sought escape through fleeing into the trackless mountain country.
3.) At a similar attack in the curfew area at dawn on 30 September 1943, the 17 civilians mentioned in the message were caught in an act of wire sabotage in the area near the road from Jannine to to Prevesa and shot to death.
Such actions were termed "reprisal measures" on our part, since we had, in almost all such cases to do not with troops in uniform, but with civilians;
In fact, however, as it can also be gathered from my explanations, it was a question of security measures directed against the increasing number of guerrilla attacks.
Carl Rall, the affiant, has signed his affidavit and he has duly sworn to it and his signature has been properly certified.
May I, in this connection, Your Honors, point out, which you probably know, already, that in internment camps and American prisoner camps in some cases curfew zones and blocked--off zones of this sort are established. As far as we know, any one is being fired at who without authority is found within that special zone. I could offer proof of this point that in the American case, that civilians were shot on repeated occasions because they were unauthorized to go into these special zones. I shall offer these affidavits later on.
This brings me to the end of discussing point 5-J of the indictment and I shall deal with another point in the indictment which is 5-L. The indictment, under that paragraph, holds you responsible, General Lanz, for the alleged execution of five hostages allegedly in reprisal for an attack on a motorcycle escort somewhere in October of 1943.
The document referred to is document NOKW 909, which is exhibit 454, to repeat 909 which is exhibit 454 in volume 19 of the prosecution on page 135 of the German, page 115 of the English version. Do you recall that document, General? Let me hand it to you. Having read the document, perhaps you can answer my questions whether it was you who had ordered the shooting of those four hostages or as it says in the other report the shooting of four civilians?
AAs you said yourself, one report says four hostages and the other report says four civilians. I don't know why these reports mention the same thing in a different way. As for the incident itself, I might give you my comments briefly.
I should like to state first that I did not order that these four people be shot. The incident concerned was a surprise attack by the bands on my own escort, of which I knew nothing. On the 3rd of October in the morning I went from Joannina to Provesa to the funeral of Lt. Col. Salminger, who had been killed by the bands shortly before that. On that trip, I had taken along a small escort because of the danger from the bands, lest I run the danger of disappearing without trace. Some of the escort had a break-down in their motor cars, whore as the remainder went along with me. I did not know anything about their breakdown and the ones who remained behind were ambushed by the bands.
Q When was it, General, that you heard about this incident; you said that you did not order this, when was it that you hoard about it?
A I cannot tell you that with absolute certainty, because it would be quite impossible to remember all those small details and incidents. I heard about it either in provesa after the funeral I suppose or I heard about it in Agrinion, because after the funeral I went on to Agrinion.
Q When was the attack on your escort made, what time of the day roughly?
A I think it must have been nine in the morning, judging by the report. I believe the report says at nine in the morning.
Q It says, "in the course of the morning." You are saying that either in Provesa or in Agrinion this was reported to you. What time of the day did you leave Provesa?
A Well the funeral in Provesa took place at 10:30, I think. I suppose I might have learned about it around lunch time in Provesa and if I heard about it in Agrinion, that would have been in the evening because it takes about at least three hours to reach Agrinion from Provesa.
As I used these trips to control and check-up on our strong points and to make sure that all was in order, it possibly took longer even. I reached Agrinion in the evening, but what time of the day I don't know.
Q The city of Provesa, which you just mentioned where you arrived about lunch time, is situated south of Agrinion, according to the map and to the west of the gulf of Arta, is that correct?
A Yes, it is.
Q And the village of Agrinion, which you reached in the evening, is situated in the southern tip of your area. Messelongien lies still further down and to the north of it on the big road through Agrinion where you stayed the evening?
A Yes, that was part of the area of the 4th division to which I went.
Q Can you tell us roughly, because you cannot see that from the map, and much depends on the quality of the road in these things, how long it takes you on the average, to reach Provesana from Agrinion?
A Well, I think that would have taken about three hours.
Q And how long does it take in your sort of car, with the escort, to go back from Prevesa by automobile around the Gulf of Arta down to Agrinion?
AAbout four hours, of course, I had to adjust my speed to the slowest car.
Q Now, what was it that they reported to you either at luncheon time in Prevesaor in the evening in Agrinion, how was it described to you, particularly as far as the killing of these people was concerned?
A I no longer recall the details of the report. What I do remember is that a surprise attack on some of my escort had been made, that is the only thing I remember.
Q General Lanz, when you made these overland trips, did you take along hostages on these trips to be protected from attacks by the bands? Hostages, that is to say, who were to be shot if attacks were made by bands on you; did you do anything like that?
A No. I never took hostages along.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: At this time we will take our afternoon recess.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Witness, we had discussed the so-called four hostages as they are called in the indictment of the prosecution. I now ask you the following question: What is your impression today if this whole matter after you have seen and read all the documents concerning it? Would you today assume that they were hostages who, as it says further in the indictment, were executed immediately or what is it that you assume today?
A. The shooting of hostages was not known to me personally and in the documents which were accessible to me. I could not find anything about that clearly. The two reports speak of different things in a different manner. I don't know what the troops who reported at the time meant by these hostages. I can only assume that those were four civilians who had taken pare in the attack in some way or other and who, when the attack was being defeated -- or in connection with the attack -were shot. There is no other explanation which I can give.
DR. SAUTER: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I would like to offer an affidavit. It can be found in Document Book III for Lanz. The number of the document is 68 and the page number is 20. This affidavit will be offered under Exhibit No. 53. It is an affidavit from the very same Dr. Karl-Heinz Rothfuchs who executed affidavits in a different connection, one of which we have already seen during this trial.
The affiant, Dr. Karl-Heinz Rothfuchs was, according to his statements, Ic with the 1st Mountain Division during the period from June 1942 until the end of the war. He held this position, therefore, at the time with which we are now concerned.
I don't have to read this affidavit. It is identical with the statements made by the defendant, General Lanz. We attach particular importance to this affidavit because the Ic of the division is mainly informed of such matters. I, therefore, recommend this affidavit to the judicial notice of the Tribunal.
Q. Following up this problem, I would like to ask you the following question, witness; in the report to your staff dated the 3rd of October 1943 it says:
"Further counter measures on the part of the troops are about to be taken."
Can you tell us what these further counter measures consisted of or what they could have been?
A. I did not know anything about these further counter measures until I read this document. I have now endeavored to establish what could be meant. In a photostat of a daily report of the 1st Mountain Division dated the 3rd of October 1943 I found that at that time a platoon, a small unit of a troop unit of the 1st Mountain Division, was commissioned to clean up the area of the attack and to get the partisans out of that particular district. When that platoon reached the spot designated it found itself under such strong fire from the partisans that the platoon could not fulfill its task. After that it was ordered that two companies be committed in order to disperse the partisans there and I have to assume that the further measures reported here concerned the platoon which could not fulfill its task because of the strong enemy resistance.
As I said, this knowledge I derived from the documents after the acts had occurred. In this connection I might add that the whole incident of the attack on the convoy with the four civilians did not play any important part at all in the course of all the incidents at the time.
Surprise attacks were almost a daily routine and I had to deal with more important matters and I had other things on my mind than to concern myself with such minor matters as this one. That was not part of my task.
DR. SAUTER:
Before we leave this count of the indictment, I would like to offer two more affidavits to the Tribunal which deal with attacks of the bands on General Lanz's convoy on the 3rd of October 1943. Both these affidavits are contained in Document Book III for Lanz which is the same document book which contains the affidavits read before. One of the affidavits in Document No. 67 on page 15 of the Document Book Lanz III and the other one is Document No. 69 on page 21 of Document Book III for Lanz. Document 67 will be offered under Exhibit No. 54 and Document 69 will be offered under Exhibit No. 55. Document No. 67, Exhibit 54, is an affidavit duly sworn to and properly certified and executed by Curt Mueller. In the initial sentences of this affidavit the affiant states that he was a master sergeant of the military police in the military police troop A, motorized 422, during the period from September 1943 until June 1945. I am only rending a few excerpts from this affidavit and I recommend the balance of the document to the judicial notice of the Tribunal. I will first of all read from the beginning of the second paragraph on page 15 towards the middle of the page where the affiant says:
"As far as I recall, already a week after our reporting for duty with the staff of the 22nd Mountain Army Corps in Jannina, an escort had to be supplied by the military police troop 422 for the commanding general, General Lanz.
It was probably for the trip on 3 October 1943."
I skip the following sentences and read the first sentence from the next paragraph and I quote:
"The very same morning a message of a guerrilla attack on part of the escort approximately 12 kilometers south of Jannina reached those of us left in the garrison."
I skip the next sentences and read from page 16, the second paragraph, which starts: "The following explanations." I quote:
"The following explanations I can render only as they were given by the other fellows that were overtaken by the attack, after their return to the garrison and as I have preserved them in my memory."
I am skipping the next part of it. The witness there describes the attack by bands on the vehicle which remained behind which belonged to one secort of General Lanz and the affiant says that the two damaged vehicles driving back slowly were attacked with gunfire from ambush while climbing a winding road.
On the bottom of page 1b I am reading the following passage:
"Having passed the curve they met the passenger car waiting here and, according to the account of NCO of the military police Hess, he only now discovered that the side-car was empty, that Corporal of the military police Meinel, who had been sitting there, was missing.
"How Meinel had left the sidecar Hess was unable to explain as he at the sudden opening of fire had ducked his head, thinking of nothing but keeping the machine rolling and bringing it safely through the next curve. As the now 4 or 5 soldiers then tried to find out what had become of their lost comrade, they were again exposed to heavy fire and had to drive on with the passenger car only, leaving the immobile motorcycle behind.
After a drive of approximately 1 kilometer they stopped, and now a motor truck arrived from the direction of Jannina carrying about 10 soldiers of the signal corps 422 and a lieutenant as a commanding officer; they had been out as trouble shooters. As far as I am able to recall the account, the soldiers that had been attacked returned to the place of the attack together with the soldiers from the signal corps. The abandoned motorcycle had disappeared completely from the road. As they advanced further, they found the missing Corporal MEINEL lying on the road; he had been completely stripped and robbed and was already dead, the body was in a miserable condition.
Towards noon, on 3 October 1943 a motor truck -- probably the truck of the signal corps - arrived in Jannina, carrying the body of Corporal MEINEL, I was able to convince myself of the horrible state of the body. MEINEL was completely stripped and had been robbed of all his belongings. On the body 4 face shots were found obviously discharged at the shortest range. The belly had been slashed, and the entrails were hanging from the abdomen. Regarding the condition of the corpse of MEINEL Dr. LINDNER, at that time chief surgeon, might be able to state further particulars. He examined the body."
I skip the following sentences of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice and I continue reading on page 18, the last paragraph, which reads, and I quote:
"General LANZ cannot have been informed of the attack on the two motor vehicles belonging to the escort prior to his return to Jannina, but at the earliest time possible after his arrival in Prevesa. As stated above the two damaged vehicles were already on their return trip to Jannina as the attack took place, whereas the escort had already continued its drive to Prevesa, that means it was driving in the opposite direction at a place far away from the place of the attack."
On page 19 the affiant says;
"Not one single case of shooting of hostages in connection with the attack is known to me. Shootings of hostages did not take place during the time of my assignment to the staff of the XXII Mountain Army Corps neither there nor in the garrison district of Jannina.
"Neither was any case of shootings of hostages at any time mentioned by soldiers of the divisions with which I came into contact."
This affidavit, if it please the Tribunal, is dated the 14th of October 1947. It has been duly sworn to by Curt Mueller Master Sergeant of the military police and properly certified.
The other affidavit which I gave Exhibit number 55 is the next but one document in the same document book, page 21 in Document Book Lanz No. III. It is document No. 69 and the exhibit number is 55. It is quite brief. It was executed by Matthias Starl who is at present residing in Lindau on the Lake of Constance and who has already executed one other affidavit which has been exhibited here. He was a capttain and administrative officer with the 22nd Mountain Corps during the period from 3 September 1943 until 14 November 1943. As such he was one of the closest collaborators of General Lanz.
He says in his affidavit dated the 5th of October 1943, which was properly sworn to and certified, the following about the attack on the escort:
"Nothing is known to me pertaining to the shooting of hostages as a result of the attack on 1 October 1943 on the escort of the commanding general south of Jannina by local guerrillas on which occasion 1 noncommissioned officer of the military police was killed.
"General Lanz never carried hostages in his escort. Apparently the four civilians alleged to have been shot must have been members of the guerilla group that were shot in the beating off of the guerrilla attack."
If your honors please, I notice just now that the witness in this affidavit is talking about a surprise attack on the 1st of October 1943. I don't know whether it is a typographical error in my copy or whether the same mistake is contained in the original but I don't think it is necessary to correct this because the statements of the affidavit show very clearly that he is talking about that attack which was carried out on General Lanz's escort irrespective of whether it took place on 1st of October 1943.
I have just had a look at the criminal and in the original it says, "3 October 1943," as it should read. If the English copy also reads, "1 October 1943," I would ask your honors to correct it.
PRESIDENT JUDGE BURKE: The correction will be made.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you, your Honor.
Q. General Lanz. that concludes this particular count of the indictment. We have dealt with it and cleared it up to the best of our capacity on the basis of the available material.
I would now like to turn to the next count of the indictment as far as it concerns you and this is point 9 of
PRESIDENT JUDGE BURKE: There is another correction, perhaps, that should be made in the English document. The date of the affidavit is given as, "Lindau 5 October 1943."
DR. SAUTER: Just a moment, please.
PRESIDENT JUDGE BURKE: Page 21 of Exhibit 55.
DR. SAUTER: I will have a look at the original in a moment. I just notice, your Honors, that, strangely enough, even the original says: "5 October 1943." Of course, it should read "5 October 1947."