PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: That will conclude the forenoon session. We will take a recess until 1:30.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION ( The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 20 November 1947.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Dr. Sauter.
HUBERT LANZ- Resumed.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. General Lanz, this morning we discussed the question of fighting the partisans. The last thing you dealt with was the way the partisans occupied villages. I am interested in the following in this connection. In the reports which were read here, there is frequently an item mentioned that in some operations villages were destroyed or burned down. What is the explanation of this? Was that connected with the method of combat, or what?
A. Where these reports mention that villages held by the bands were destroyed, it means roughly this: A village occupied by the partisans is being attacked by the troops in a fashion which is usual in a military attack. That is to say, first reconnaissance units are sent against the village and if they are fired at , or if they report that the enemy is prepared to defend himself in that village , then, as a rule, the village will be fired at with trench mortars or, in some cases, with artillery because normally you must have a target for your attack and you don't attack it without softening it up first with what is known as heavy weapons. By this action, particularly if Trench mortars are involved, the missiles of which are highly inflammable, it is easily possible and happens frequently, that the targets shot at will be set on fire. You might compare this, up to a point, to the dropping of bombs from an aircraft, where you know that thereby fires easily break out. As a rule, the houses in the area we are talking about, had thatched roofs. In many cases the houses were built from stone, that is to say, the walls had been built piling up stones and the roofs were almost all of them thatched.
Now it is easily understandable that if a shell hits a thatched roof, particularly in view of the considerable heat typical of the Greek climate, because , after all, in the middle of the day there you have temperatures up to 40 or 50 degrees, - that buildings of that sort will be set on fire relatively easily by these types of artillery shooting. Moreover, in these villages there usually are quantities of straw or hay in heaps, which also easily catch fire. Now, in the firing at villages of this type, if the officer in charge gains the impression that an attack on the village can be made without unnecessary loss, an attack by the infantry will be launched and the village will be captured.
Q. Witness, in these reports we frequently find the phrase, that a village was taken in an attack and that it was cleansed of the bandits. What , in military parlance, as used by the German Army, is meant by "cleansing" - a term used so frequently?
A. The military term "to cleanse" is to express that a locality has been cleared of the enemy. Let me put it in this general way. After all, you do not clear up only villages -- you clear up forests, parts of the mountain area, - and what is meant is that you clear the enemy out of it. Now , in these villages we have elements of the partisans. Among the partisans there are people who wear uniforms, some who don't, or wear part of a uniform; there are civilians among them and you never know whether these civilians have participated in the fighting with the partisans and you do not know, either, whether they are residents of that village or whether they come from somewhere else you never can tell. That usually gives the impression that when civilians are being shot or killed in combat as though the civilian population of that particular village had been killed. That is by no means necessarily so -- you cannot be certain. They are civilians or bandits or partisans or sympathizers of the bands - you can call them anything. In any case, they are people who roam about in civilian clothing and take part in the combat operation.
That is an essential aspect of partisan fighting. After all, we are not concerned here with a regular troop.
Q. Witness, in the reports we also find mention made of the fact that the bands or the inhabitants of these villages on which the bands have based themselves, shot at the German units, or that fighting took place within the village. What did the Wehrmacht have to do against such villages - what did they actually do? I mean villages where people shot at German troops or where fighting took place?
A Well, that depends always on local conditions. It depends also up to a point on the troops concerned. If there is bitter fighting for a village, then more losses will be suffered and more houses will be destroyed than would be the case when a village is being taken against small or no resistance at all, which surely stands to reason. As a general rule, if you want to make a hard and fast rule, I want to say this. If you find the enemy fighting, if in other words local fighting breaks out and if there is shooting in the village concerned, when from houses or any other buildings shots are fired, we would shoot back of course. Hand grenades probably would be thrown. All sorts of methods might be used and the enemy thus encountered will be shot, will be killed in combat and the term "combat" in this connection cannot be limited according to a definite fule or a stop watch.
Fighting might recede and might flare up again. A village might be fought for and one might suddenly find now all is well and then all of a sudden shots are fired somewhere and then fighting continues. You cannot establish a hard and fast rule. As for villages in which or for which fighting took place, that there must be partial destruction by fire, perhaps in some cases total destruction, especially in view of the type of buildings encountered there, should surprise no one. Even that houses in which ammunition blows up burn down, surely is no miracle.
Q Witness, if and when the Wehrmacht in your area encountered in those operations arms or ammunition in the houses or perhaps explosives which had been hidden there, what did the Wehrmacht do against such houses?
A Houses of that sort were frequently burned down as a reprisal measure, if we found hidden ammunition or explosives in these houses, because that proved that these houses were used as local bases for the enemy. Peaceful inhabitants do not hide ammunition.
Q Was this procedure as you saw it at the time in accordance with orders which the troops had received for cases of that sort?
A If I am informed correctly, the regulation covering band warfare said that the strong points of the bands, all things being equal, can be burned down. I believe the approval of an officer in the rank of a captain was necessary.
Q This regulation covering band warfare, if the Tribunal please, to which General Lanz has had reference just now, is obviously identical with the regulation contained in the Document Book III for Foertsch. On page 87 of that Document Book, it is Document No. 71. To repeat, Document Book Foertsch No. III, Document 71, on page 87.
Now witness, in reading all these reports one cannot help asking the following question: why did you have this struggle carried out in this manner and with these means? In other words, would it have been simpler and easier for you as the commanding and responsible general, to have these band strong points, the villages defended by bands, attacked by the Luftwaffe and eliminate them by incendiary and high explosive bombs, because after all, we the German civilian population, went through this in many German localities? Why did you not do that?
A It is very simple to answer. We didn't have the means. I would have preferred nothing more for the simple reason because I would have spared my own men thereby; but I had no Luftwaffe, no airplanes. In Greece, if I am correctly informed, we had just enough aircraft for making reconnaissance trips, particularly reconnaissance trips, over the sea, because we always expected an Allied landing. I myself went out on reconnaissance trips although I wasn't supposed to. I flew over my area, over the area infested by bands, to form an impression of the territorial conditions, but unhappily we had not airplanes at our disposal as the Allies had, for us to bomb villages or towns which were being defended by the enemy. Incidentally, generally these places weren't defended at all, and also by the way this method of bombing villages, one bomb would often have been enough for many a village. That would have had the added advantage that an attack on a village of that sort would not have been regarded as criminal which one endeavors to do nowadays, because the other side, after all, resorted to the method of bombing warfare.
Perhaps....
Q You are saying witness, if I understand you correctly, to eliminate these strong points of the bands by the Luftwaffe was not possible for you because you did not have enough aircraft or in fact no aircraft at all for that purpose, which is the reason why you had to fight the bands exclusively with troops on land. Is that correct?
A Yes, quite.
Q And let me ask you a typical Nurnberg question. Had you had enough aircraft, what would you have done then?
A I would have used them.
Q You would have employed aircraft?
A But of course.
Q And you would have had bombs dropped?
A Without doubt.
Q Witness, we have heard a Greek witness here, I believe he was called Tryandaphilidis -- and he asserted that the EDES bands, as a matter of principle, never defended villages so that the villages would be spared. Now according to your observations in your area, is that correct?
A No, it is not correct. I am of course in no position to judge whether my enemy of the day, General Zervas, on whom I shall have to say more later on, issued an order to the troops that no villages must be defended. That I don't know, but in actual fact the EDES partisans of course defended villages in certain cases if and when the tactical requirements made this necessary which is only too customary in war. I know of no war where villages or town were no being defended or where there was no fighting for villages or towns. That would be an entirely abnormal thing. That statement was, of course, made simply for reasons of expediency.
Q Now the same witness Tryandaphilidis sat here on 18 August 1947, asserting something which can be found on page 2139 of the German transcript. He said that the Germans had destroyed all villages in the Epirus, that is to say all villages in the area of your command. What can you tell us about that?
A I could say quite a bit about that but I only want to speak about two points. If that were true, then meanwhile those villages must have been reconstructed which were burned down last year by the Greek partisans in the Epirus as the newspapers reported. But apart from that. I know from my own personal experience that the bigger villages in the Epirus, all of which I know, first of all I know Jannina, Prevesa, Konica, Arta, Agrinion, Paramythia, Mitikas, Ethicon and there are many more -- these villages were undestroyed. It may be that this or that house was destroyed but only in very isolated instances. You really should say that these villages were completely undestroyed. Jannina, for instance, was completely intact. A large number of villages in the neighborhood of Jannina which I am familiar with were left undestroyed until the end. I saw that myself. Therefore, it is quite absurd to say that all villages had been destroyed.
Q. Witness, it seems to be a fact that in Epirus, in your area, a number of destroyed villages do exist. Could you tell us whether the destruction of these villages occured always in the course of fighting between the partisans and the German units or whether villages of a bigger size had been destroyed when you arrived in Epirus?
A. It is true and it is regrettable that villages in Epirus had been destroyed. They were destroyed in the course of military events ever since Greece turned and fought against the Italians coming from Albania. The area in which I was stationed Epirus, borders on Albania. This is the reason why in that very area in the north of Epirus, a large number of villages had been destroyed totally or in part. I might interpolate here, if one uses the word "destroyed," it does not mean that in those villages no stone had been left on the other. That would be the wrong impression to form.
Many of these villages were destroyed only in part and some of them were still inhabited. One also speakes in Germany of cities which are destroyed and still they are being inhabited. The destruction of villages was caused by a number of military events. First, the fight between the Italians and the Greeks-
Q. What year was that?
A. Well, I think that was in 1940 or 1941. Then there was a brief fight between the Greeks and the Germans. This happened in spring, 1941. We heard once before of a struggle against what was known as the Epirus army. That struggle quite obviously was brief and as a result I thing destruction must have been on a relatively small scale. This was followed by a period of occupation by the Italians lasting almost two years from spring, 1941, to the summer of 1943. In that period of time, fighting took place against the partisans and this or that village was probably destroyed also. Then this was followed by the period of time that I was down there from September 1943 to October 1944. There again a number of villages were destroyed in the fighting against the partisans.
Then we have the constant fighting between the ELAS and EDES partisans who fought each other. I frequently received reports that fighting could be heard to go on at such and such a place and when I asked why I was told "Well, it is nothing to do with us. The two partisan groups are fighting each other." Then we had fighting between the Albanian and Greek border population, violent and bitter fighting indeed, and in some cases there was fighting between the Moslems and the Greeks. In other words, a whole series of fighting went on through the years and it should be understandable under these conditions that in all this fighting, villages unfortunately were destroyed or damaged.
Q. Perhaps you can recall, witness, that in this Courtroom on 18 August 1947, a Greek witness called Papas was interrogated who reported the destruction of a village called Kumeno. This village lies south of Arta, that is to say in the southern part of the area under your command. The witness has testified that Kumeno was destroyed on 16 August 1943. Were you connected in any sense with the destruction of Kumeno?
A. Kumeno is not on the map which I have distributed. It is unhappily not recorded on that map. As you say, so rightly, it is about ton kilometers south of Arta. I must say that I didn't know anything about the village of Kumeno until the witness Papas talked about it, and thereupon I looked at a map which wasn't too good and looked for the village and I found it. I myself had nothing to do at all with the destruction of Kumeno because at that time I was not in. the Epirus. I was out in Salonika or in Germany on an official trip. In any case, I know nothing about this matter until the witness Papas mentioned it in this Courtroom and that was the time when I looked for the village on the map.
Q. The destruction of the village according to witness Papas took place on 16 August 1943 and will you tell us, witness, now when you took over your command in the Epirus?
A. I said once before that I did so on 9 September 1943, in the afternoon.
Q. That is to say three weeks after the event. Well another aspect of the whole problem of fighting the bands--did the EDES partisans accept open engagements in battle or was that not the case?
A. Since summer 1944, or to speak more precisely roughly from the middle of July, the EDES partisans regarded themselves to be strong enough for them to engage us now and again at least in open battle. I recall two occasions, one took place in the neighborhood of Paramythia and also in the neighborhood of Philippias which is situated along the big road from Jannina to Arta. This soldierly behavior which I took a very good view of was caused by the fact that General Zervas, with my knowledge and up to a point through my indulgence, had received considerable reinforcements of regular troops. For one thing, he had been reinforced by British troops. I believe there were about 600 men and then also by troops of the Greek exile government, Greek troops in other words, who apparently were stationed in the Middle East where they had been formed and were sent as regular troops, trained, equipped, to Greece to the two small harbor towns Parga and Amuzia, all of which I knew. This is Southeast of Korfu. I knew this.
I even had orders in about August or September that I should attack these troops, which is entirely proper in war of course, but I did not carry out this order because at that time in view of the war situation in August, 1944, I wanted to save the lives of my units. The attack would not have made any difference in the overall situation.
Q. Now, General Lanz, we can leave the problem of fighting the bands, and shall turn to a few specified points in the indictment. First, under Paragraph 5J of the Indictment,--there we are concerned with the case that on 30 September 1943, a few weeks after your arrival in Epirus, 17 civilians were executed allegedly in reprisal for acts of sabotage committed against telephone lines. This refers to Prosecution Document NOKW 909, which is Exhibit 454 contained in Prosecution Document Book 19, on page 132 of the German and page 111 of the English; have you got the document in front of you? Will you please give us your comments? Did you order this affair?
A. I would like to correct something first. This report does not say that people were executed. It says they were shot.
Q. Witness, the term "executed" has not been chosen by me, but is contained in the translation of the indictment, and of course I have adhered to the definition of the Prosecution in order to give you the opportunity to give us the benefit of your comments; did you order this act?
A. No, I did not order it.
Q. Did you know of this shooting when it was carried out?
A. No, I did not know it.
Q. Did you, at that time, make investigations afterwards, were you informed about it after the event?
A. Although I have seen this incident mentioned in the indictment, it is so long ago I cannot recall the incident itself. It is unknown to me.
Q. General Lanz, do you remember acts of sabotage which are connected with this case or do you remember any acts of sabotage directed against telephone cables?
A. Yes, certainly I remember a large number of acts of sabotage but I don't think I would be in a position to enumerate the various cases, because there were so many. Interruptions in telephone lines are one of the most popular acts of sabotage which one can think of.
In the case of internal unrest or revolt this is always done, that you cut telephone lines and disrupt long-distance connections. In our area one might almost call it a daily event.
Q. Was the maintenance and functioning of these telephone lines important from a military point of view, or were these telephone lines serving only the civilian population?
A. They were, of course, military lines.
Q. If the Tribunal please, about that problem I shall read an affidavit which is contained in Document Book Lang No. III on page 64, where it is Document 97. To repeat, on page 64 in Volume III, and it is Lanz Document 97. It is offered as Exhibit 51. This is an affidavit by Hugo Ledorer, a resident of Munich, who tells us that the position he held was that of a troop leader with the Corps Signal Detachment 422, between September 1943 and October 6, 1944. He was down there for more than a year under General Lanz's command. The affiant says on page 64:
My activity as Troop leader was related to the telephone and I was assigned to an anti-disturbance unit. The disturbances were traceable almost exclusively to sabotage of the resistance groups and bands and their attacks upon the former German Wehrmacht. The type of disturbances were sawed-off telephone poles and stealing of material; cable which had been cut or dug out.
At the beginning of my activity, by the end of 1943, the destruction came almost daily and increased to an incredible amount until the retreat. Often we had to install the electric wiring two and three times daily and more often. I especially noted the destruction of 1 September 1943. In the morning of that day, north of Filippia 160 poles were sawed down and cable and bells were stolen. In connection with this same action, tho former Lt. Col. SALMINGER was attacked by night in his car and killed, as well as his driver.
When the wires were being installed in the night of 29-30 of July 1944, there was strong enemy shooting at coastal road Sarande Borsch.
Upon returning the following night, also heavy shooting, in another unit, to which I was attached, 1 dead, 3 wounded.
On 18 August 1944 while safe-guarding the wires from destruction and at the same time while searching for a troop of our company which had not returned, on the stretch Jannina-Minia Tsuka, attack by bandits, 3 dead and 2 vehicles lost.
Upon pushing forward with reinforcements, we found the place where the missing troop had been ambushed, no trace of the people, only the two completely plundered vehicles. The whole thing was connected with an attack of the bands upon the place Minia Tsuka, in which small parts of German units were stationed. After freeing the few still living, I came here. There was a horrible sight awaiting me. Complete devastation and plundering of the quarters. The deadaround 90 men-were not buried, they were all undressed and already beginning to decay.
I personally experienced what I have described. I would like to remark that I do not know of any reprisal measures on our part for this.
The following I did not personally experience: 23 May 1944 a troop of our company was ambushed. 3 dead in this attack. One wounded man (he was later killed in Hungary) who was able to hide, told us that women and children took part in the ambush, who with the yell: "Partisan nordio" swarmed ever the vehicle and plundered it. From a wounded man who lay in his vicinity, they took off the boots and laid a hand grenade on his head, which tore him to pieces. We found him like that. Through my activity as telephone operator, we were always on the run and thus we knew about everything that happened in our section. Attacks upon strong points, truck columns, even medical columns, were matters of daily report.
I especially remember the report about an attack on a strong point, in which bandits, disguised as women, carried out the ambush coming along the road with donkeys. It must have happened in September 1944.
I would further like to remark that we were forbidden to take anything away from the property of the Greeks, even fruit from the large plantations, and were punished by military courts. We were directed to treat the population considerately and to be on good terms with them.
The affiant has sworn to the statement and it is properly certified.
Q. Witness, did these sabotage acts of which we have heard so much lead to any special security measures to prevent further acts of sabotage?
A. Naturally we tried everything to stop these continuous acts of sabotage, or at least to make them more difficult. These constant disruptions of our most important tactical signal communications was a difficulty for the leadership and might well lead to the most serious consequences to our wireless network, which I should mention here was not good enough for the requirements. There were a large number of technical disruptions. It was extremely difficult to obtain batteries and spare parts, and the mountainous area and atmospheric conditions were in themselves highly unfavorable, and throughout that period of time it lead to much annoyance and many difficulties. The result was that our telephone lines became completely indispensable to us. Above all if you imagine that the units were distributed over a fairly large area so that they could carry out the assignments. In actual fact we were not able down to the last day to find an effective means against these acts of sabotage against our telephone lines. We brought many services in for this purpose, particularly the special detachments and we lost a great number of pieces of equipment and material. What we did was to have along the most important stretches, particularly between Joannine and Arta, a "blocked" area, as we called it. That is to say on either side of the road a zone was marked where after dark nobody was allowed to walk without the risk of being shot at immediately by the patrols in the area. This zone, which was blocked off, was known to all people concerned, including the troops. We had flying controls too. They were mechanized. If I remember this rightly they would have anti-tank guns and machine guns which were mounted on lorries, and they also had search lights on trucks. This flying column would, at irregular intervals after dark patrol the roads. If anybody was encountered on these trips apart from the villages, where the troops were stationed, this man was shot at without any further adieu.
Q. You mean encountered in the zone which was blocked off?
A. Yes, that is what I am talking about.
Q. Now, on the basis of your knowledge of the conditions of the time and locality, General, do you assume that the civilians mentioned in the report of 30 September 1943 as shot, not executed, were shot for the reason that they were encountered within the blocked-off area, or do you assume anything else?
A. As I told you, I don't remember the incident itself, but I have had the communications by an officer who was involved in this incident, to the effect that the civilians, as they were called, were surprised by one of the patrols in this special zone and were thereupon shot.
Q. This action, which you did not order and which later came to your knowledge, you think is a justifiable action on the part of the German authorities, is that what I understand you to say?
A. Well, if you establish a special zone and block it off and announce it as such the people will have to pay attention to this. After all, there are special zones in peace, not only in wartime, which have to be respected, and if they are not respected the patrols or guards are fully justified in using their arms. This happens in peacetime, and not only in wartime.
DR. SAUTER: If the Tribunal, please, the defendant General Lanz has just had reference made to a statement by an officer serving in that area at that time. This statement is contained in Lanz Document Book III, page 12. It is Document 66, which is offered as Exhibit Lanz No. 52. It was given by one Captain Rall, Carl George Rall of Garmisch-Partenkirchen in upper Bavaria, who says on the subject matter that, -- "The radio message to the 1st Mountain Division dated 30 September 1943, 1315 hours:" Then comes the verbatim quotation, "'96th Mountain Infantry Regiment: At dawn so far 17 civilians were shot to death as an expiatory measure for the wire sabotage.'" May I draw the Tribunal's attention to the fact that the terms used there is only "shot" not "executed," whereas the indictment on page 7 of the German version under paragraph J uses the term "executed" by mistake.
Captain Rall says, under oath, as follows:
"As former captain and regimental adjutant of the 98th Mountain Infantry Regiment I state the following particulars:"
I am reading from page 12 in Document Book Lanz No. III.
"The incident referred to above involved no shotting of hostages or an otherwise arbitrary shooting of civilians, on the contrary, the facts are as follows: For the German Wehrmacht in Greece the following order was effective due to the increase of the guerilla warfare and acts of sabotage noticeable during the months of July, August, and September 1943:
"a) Individual travel by vehicle was fundamentally prohibited:
"b) All travel was supposed to take place by means of the convoysystem, the columns being formed at separate points of departure - in this case Jannina and Prevesa;
"c) Driving at night (one hour before nightfall until one hour after dawn) was prohibited even for convoys. This curfew on the axes of supply was effective also for the civilian population, as it had been announced and forwarded to civilian authorities through the appropriate area commanders for publication. Anybody encountered in the open country within the curfew hours was attacked with arms."
The Affiant, continues on page 13:
"The axis of supply leading from Jannina to Prevesa through a country full of rocks, ravines, and gorges, was secured by our 98th regiment by means of a system of strong points. Through acts of sabotage occurring almost daily as well as also through attacks on the weaker watch base crews we on our part were induced to take more severe measures.
"A motorized scout squad equipped with searchlight, self-propelled artillery mount, and an armored reconnaissance car was activated at irregular hours during the night in order to curb guerilla warfare in the gorges, and at the same time to establish the connection between the watch bases at lease once in the course of the night.
"The crews of the strong points had order to establish connection between each other shortly before dawn through small but well-armed scout squads, to clear away destructions or obstacles and to protect and support the signal corps men employed in line construction. As no village or inhabited place was located in the immediate vicinity of the road where it led through mountains, and as the entire peaceable civilian population had withdrawn to the plans or the larger communities, it was impossible that any peaceable citizen could be found in that region.
"Any civilian encountered in the curfew area was therefore suspicious as a presumptive partisan and was treated as an enemy by the soldiers.
"The harrassing of the strong points that was going on almost every night was the reason why the fighting, was inevitably most intense at dawn, i.e. the civilians were attacked and pursued; in most cases they offered armed resistance.
"The fighting tactics of the partisans, however, generally aimed at avoiding open fight, and if surprised they after a short fire fight sought escape through fleeing into the trackless mountain country.
3.) At a similar attack in the curfew area at dawn on 30 September 1943, the 17 civilians mentioned in the message were caught in an act of wire sabotage in the area near the road from Jannine to to Prevesa and shot to death.
Such actions were termed "reprisal measures" on our part, since we had, in almost all such cases to do not with troops in uniform, but with civilians;
In fact, however, as it can also be gathered from my explanations, it was a question of security measures directed against the increasing number of guerrilla attacks.
Carl Rall, the affiant, has signed his affidavit and he has duly sworn to it and his signature has been properly certified.
May I, in this connection, Your Honors, point out, which you probably know, already, that in internment camps and American prisoner camps in some cases curfew zones and blocked--off zones of this sort are established. As far as we know, any one is being fired at who without authority is found within that special zone. I could offer proof of this point that in the American case, that civilians were shot on repeated occasions because they were unauthorized to go into these special zones. I shall offer these affidavits later on.
This brings me to the end of discussing point 5-J of the indictment and I shall deal with another point in the indictment which is 5-L. The indictment, under that paragraph, holds you responsible, General Lanz, for the alleged execution of five hostages allegedly in reprisal for an attack on a motorcycle escort somewhere in October of 1943.
The document referred to is document NOKW 909, which is exhibit 454, to repeat 909 which is exhibit 454 in volume 19 of the prosecution on page 135 of the German, page 115 of the English version. Do you recall that document, General? Let me hand it to you. Having read the document, perhaps you can answer my questions whether it was you who had ordered the shooting of those four hostages or as it says in the other report the shooting of four civilians?