During the initial period of our presence in Greece the supply trips, aside from occasional fire and mining of roads, were carried out without almost any interference by the enemy. In August 1944, after a 2 days supply trip to Igumenica. I returned unmolested to Nannina. During the following night the convoy, led by my Lieutenant Blecke (who died in Jugoslavian captivity), was attacked by bands (members of the Zervas band) on the return trip from Igumerica. In addition to several riders, two men from my company were killed in the defence of the convoy. One of them, already wounded, was found with a smashed skull, the other was burned to death on the machinegun car which had been set afire, In addition several drivers were wounded and two men missing, three vehicles were burned out and five trucks had been taken away by the bands.
The several statements contained on Pages 23 and 24 I do not want to read verbatim. I want to read only one passage which starts in the middle of Page 24, and I quote:
On the second morning the convoy proceeded on its course after the mountains, bordering the road, had been cleared of the enemy. After a distance of 10 kilometers the convoy entered a mountain pass which was obstructed by stone barricades and as a result of the burned out vehicles from a tank-truck convoy. This unit had been completely annihilated. The soldiers lay on the road murdered and partly burned. In judging the position of the bodies and the head injuries, the soldiers had been slain. An ambulance convly placed on the hills overlooking the mountain pass was also found with burned out vehicles. Aside from one body found, there was no trace of the drivers. Both units had been attacked one or two days prior to our arrival as the bodies were blue and bloated. Here too, the infantry provided protection and cleaned out the hills so that only during the following day the remaining 20 kilometers to Joannina could he covered. Moreover, during the afternoon low flying aircraft had attacked for an hour the trucks which were well concealed in the winding roads of the mountain pass which resulted in the blowing up of a vehicle loaded with ammunition.
This is the extent to which I want to read on Page 24. When Your Honors will read those parts which I have omitted, you will note that all these killed soldiers and ambulances were the victims of the partisans. I merely want to read the concluding sentence of the affidavit by Gruebel, which is on Page 25, the last paragraph. The affiant says the following about General Lanz: "In particular must I point to the fact that during discussions and also towards myself General Lanz pointed out that a good relationship should be maintained between the troops and the civilian population. This actually existed during my presence in Joannina. When Joannina was evacuated large stocks of clothing and food were left behind for the civilian population because there was no means of transportation. On 1 November 1944 I was separated from the 22nd Mountain Corps in Skolpy (Urkueb)."
This is the extent to which I want to read from the affidavit of Hans Gruebel. The affidavit is duly sworn to and properly certified.
This brings me to the next document No. 123, not No. 122. I shall skip that one. But Document No. 123, on Page 28, will be offered under Lanz Exhibit No. 48. This again, is an affidavit, and the affiant is Joseph Dudek. He was a non-commissioned officer, an Ordnance Sergeant, during the time between May, 1944, and August, 1944 and February till March, 1944. He was in a military hospital. He discusses here his experiences concerning the fighting of the partisans which was in contradiction to International Law. He stresses mainly the treatment of wounded partisans their uniforms etc. I would commend this document to the judicial notice of the Tribunal.
This brings me to Document No. 124, which is the following document on the next page, Page 29, of Document Book IV. It will be offered as Lanz Exhibit No. 49--four, nine. This affidavit was executed by Anton Mirlach, who lives in Upper Bavaria. According to his statements he was a Medical Staff Corporal during the period between 6 October 1944 and 7 Oct 1944. He, again, describes his experiences with the fighting methods of the partisans. I would recommend this affidavit to the judicial notice of the Tribunal.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If your Honors please, I submit that this exhibit and the preceding one both relate to events which originally concerned Serbia and not Greece.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The prior ruling will control. You may proceed.
DR. SAUTER: I recommend this document also, as I said, to the judicial notice of the Court.
This brings me to another document, which is Document No. 125--one, two, five--in the same document book, Lanz Document Dock IV, contained on Page 31. It was executed by the same witness as was the preceding one, Anton Mirlach. It will be offered under Lanz Exhibit No. 50. This affidavit also deals with the fighting methods of the partisans and the affiant describes his own observations.
Q Now, General Lanz, I would like to return to your examination What can you tell us, according to your own observations, about the relation between the civilian population and the partisans? What was the attitude of the civilian population towards the partisans?
A One part of the civilian population fought side by side with the partisans and supported them. Another part of the population however, refrained from participating in partisan activity and even tried to escape from partisan areas to reach such areas where there was no partisan activity. This applied to the EDES partisans, as well as to the Communist partisans. The Communist partisans had one additional factor, and that they forced the population, which did not voluntarily participate in their activity, to work for them. This pressure, to the best of my information, was not exercised by the EDES partisans to the same extent as it was by the Communist partisans, but even there a certain pressure was exercised on the civilians.
Q Witness, can you tell us something about the following: According to your experiences in your area did the partisans use whole localities for their activities, or was that not the case?
A That would depend on the fighting aims concerning at the time. The locality would be used in fightings when the partisans thought that was expedient or necessary for their purposes. I know of a number of cases where partisans stayed in villages and defended those villages. They made them strongholds and directed surprises attacks and attacks from such villages. All that would depend on whether or not the partisans thought this necessary and expedient There was no distinction in this connection, between the EDES partisans and the Communist partisans. The aim of the fighting would decide whether or not this pressure was taken.
Q Can you tell us something about in what districts in which vicinities the partisans would preferably make use of the villages of the civilian population and settle down there and use them as band strongholds? 6435
A The making use of such villages, if I may put it this way, was in the nature of things. The partisans, above all, took measures against our supply routes. That was the nature of their fighting. What they wanted to do was the endanger and barm us through their attacks and sabotag acts. Consequently, they would mainly start from such villages as were in the vicinity of those supply routes. After the localities near the supply routes were occupied by our own troops, in order to disperse the partisans from such villages, and after parts of these villages had been burned down, usually during combat actions with partisans, the partisans would then settle down farther away from these routes in the course of further fighting. Certain partisan groups were removed to mountain areas, and they chose unnegotiable terrain. The idea was to be in a locality which the German troops would not reach very soon. From such areas they would either join together or join other groups, as was necessary and expedient, and then they carried out some sort of action somewhere. Such mountain villages, mostly tiny villages dictated the needs. They were only some individual farms which were also easy to defend and secure. From such places one could overlook the whole terrain; seen from a military point of view, one could easily ascertain whether enemies were approaching or not. These places were easy to defend. They offered some sort of protection. That is how it happened that the partisans all by themselves turned to isolated areas which had the characteristics which I just described. From there they would wage their battles. All of this was in the nature of things.
Q Witness, you have described to us now why the partisans preferred to settle in the villages of the civilian population. According to your experiences did the civilian population react to this procedure?
In order to put the question a little more clearly, did the civilian population, consequently and as a general rule, remain in such villages?
Or did the civilian population voluntarily escape such localities? Or again, was the civilian population driven away by the partisans? How did this take place, according to your observations? I am always referring to your corps areas.
A The conduct of the civilian population was different in different cases. As I have said before, one part of the population joined the partisans; another part avoided doing that. If the partisans settled in such a village, the population reacted to the partisans always in accordance with their own attitude. Those people who wanted to remain with the partisans for all kinds of reasons -- they did not always have to be national reasons, or military reasons- they might have been other reasons -- those people, of course, remained because they promised themselves something from the stay and the fight of the partisans. The people who were more suspicious and were afraid of the consequences of such an action, tried to leave such a village and in some instances left such villages. The attitude of the civilian population became decisive only when the village concerned fell into the combat area. By this I mean if a fight ensued between the partisans and the German troops, or if the Edes partisans and the Zervas partisans fought each other, and that happened quite frequently.
Q Witness, you mentioned that the partisans particularly preferred to stay in villages or farms of the civilian population. If the village was occupied by the partisans, what were the details of this action? What I mean is, whom for instance, was ammunition hidden or how were certain positions built up, such as was usual during the first and second World bars? Were supply depots installed to house food, etc? Perhaps you can give us some details.
A This also would be different in different instances. I would like to say that there was no rule for this procedure. This would depend on the partisan group concerned and mainly on its leader - what his intentions were. There were localities where the partisans took up permanent questers, I might say, and nothing much happened in such villages. The partisans would merely stay there for some time and then they would go some place else. I said yesterday that the partisans fluctuated- they were in one locality at one time and in another a some other time.
That was part of their method of fighting and it was a natural sign. There were other villages where the partisans installed certain installations, those were villages where they wanted to fight in case it was attacked. There were fortifications; there were trenches in the many points where their shooting positions were erected, etc. Those were proper preparations for fighting. That would always depend on the situation. It quite frequently happened - I might almost say the general rule was that in many villages wore the partisans stayed, ammunition was hidden.
Q I beg your pardon, witness, how was it hidden?
A Mainly this was found out when such a village burned down, or a house burned down, or when a village was set afire; then all these ammunition depots would explode and there were quite some fireworks on such occasions. If one then searched such a village one would found out that in many houses ammunitions was hidden, explosives were hidden, etc., or weapons were hidden. There were all sorts of hiding places -- between the floor boards, or in attics, or in haylofts -anywhere - there were all kinds of possible places to hide things. What I wanted to say is that ammunition and food, above all ammunition, were hidden in such villages. As a rule the ammunition would not be stored in one house so that one could say -"this is the ammunition depot." Instead, the ammunition was divided up into various houses, for the very simple reason that they did not want this ammunition found and destroyed in one go. Therefore it was split up to several houses; that is quite comprehensible. Furthermore, food stores were commonly handled, during the months just before the winter or during the winter. At those times the partisans needed depots in order to supply themselves. They had canned goods of foreign origin - certain things which they had stored during a certain period of time. That is, in the main, the manner in which those villages were used by the partisans. It was quite a natural thing.
Q In this connection, witness, I would be interested in the following: From many reports and affidavits it has been shown that frequently the villages or farms of the civilian population had been evacuated at a time when the German troops occupied them. Before the German troops attacked, the civilian population, with all their possessions, with their cattle, etc., had left the village concerned. Were you able to observe that in your area also?
A That was a frequent, almost a natural occurence. This also is quite obvious and easily comprehensible. The reason was, as I mentioned yesterday, that the partisans had a very well organized intelligence service. This intelligence service was carried out by the shepherds, who could be found everywhere , and also by women and even children; also by those peasants who would go to Joannina to the market. To make it brief, the partisans had a very well working intelligence service, which again was in the nature of things. Consequently, we never succeeded in carrying out one single operation against the bands without the bands previously knowing about it. We often wondered about this and we tried several procedure to keep an operation secret but in actual fact we never succeeded in doing this. Somehow the truth trickled through and so the inhabitants and the partisans in a certain district against which an operation was intended, learned that tomorrow or the next day or some time, the Germans would come to fight against the partisans. For this reason the population, those who did not participate in the fighting in some shape or form, left the locality concerned and withdrew to some other district - into the woods, into the mountains, anywhere. Frequently they took all their possessions along, which were comparatively small and close together and quite frequently they took some of their cattle along. They just disappeared. I remember, for instance, from personal experience -- I interpolate this here, in order to give a practical example - I remember one occurence in October 1943. We had to open the so-called Mecephon Highway, which for a long time had been occupied by the partisans; in order to secure our own supplies for the winter, we wanted a good highway leading to Joannina.
This was the road which led from Joannina via Trikkala to Larissa. On the occasion of opening this road we reached one village, a larger locality, on this road, which was Mecephon. This place, had been described to us as a so-called winter spa. Since my mountaineers, riflemen, were all keen on winter sports, they were very much interested in getting on to this winter resort. It was quite a large locality, filled with stone houses - as was usual there - but when we arrived there, (I was closely behind the spearheads,) this locality had been almost completely evacuated by its inhabitants. There was almost nobody there. In the road there was a little church, on a hill, and there were two or three Greek priests who came to meet me. I made inquiries and talked to them through an interpreter and asked them were all the people were - the inhabitants - and the priest said that already yesterday they had all left - they had withdrawn to the mountains. I said "Well, why did they leave?" The priest said the people were afraid - they heard that the Germans were approaching and they were just afraid and therefore they had flown. There was no fighting about the village itself; there was nothing much happening there. I told them that nothing would happen to the people and I told them that I would vouch for it that nothing would happen to the inhabitants if they returned. The priest apparently had the conviction that it would be as I said and shortly afterwards he rang the church beels and a few hours later the inhabitants had returned and the locality was it populated as it had been before. I remember this example quite clearly, because at a later time I returned to that village, for discussions, and the inhabitants were all there; they were all well and nothing had happens to them. I am only describing this little incident to show you how we handled the civilian population.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: That will conclude the forenoon session. We will take a recess until 1:30.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION ( The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 20 November 1947.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Dr. Sauter.
HUBERT LANZ- Resumed.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. General Lanz, this morning we discussed the question of fighting the partisans. The last thing you dealt with was the way the partisans occupied villages. I am interested in the following in this connection. In the reports which were read here, there is frequently an item mentioned that in some operations villages were destroyed or burned down. What is the explanation of this? Was that connected with the method of combat, or what?
A. Where these reports mention that villages held by the bands were destroyed, it means roughly this: A village occupied by the partisans is being attacked by the troops in a fashion which is usual in a military attack. That is to say, first reconnaissance units are sent against the village and if they are fired at , or if they report that the enemy is prepared to defend himself in that village , then, as a rule, the village will be fired at with trench mortars or, in some cases, with artillery because normally you must have a target for your attack and you don't attack it without softening it up first with what is known as heavy weapons. By this action, particularly if Trench mortars are involved, the missiles of which are highly inflammable, it is easily possible and happens frequently, that the targets shot at will be set on fire. You might compare this, up to a point, to the dropping of bombs from an aircraft, where you know that thereby fires easily break out. As a rule, the houses in the area we are talking about, had thatched roofs. In many cases the houses were built from stone, that is to say, the walls had been built piling up stones and the roofs were almost all of them thatched.
Now it is easily understandable that if a shell hits a thatched roof, particularly in view of the considerable heat typical of the Greek climate, because , after all, in the middle of the day there you have temperatures up to 40 or 50 degrees, - that buildings of that sort will be set on fire relatively easily by these types of artillery shooting. Moreover, in these villages there usually are quantities of straw or hay in heaps, which also easily catch fire. Now, in the firing at villages of this type, if the officer in charge gains the impression that an attack on the village can be made without unnecessary loss, an attack by the infantry will be launched and the village will be captured.
Q. Witness, in these reports we frequently find the phrase, that a village was taken in an attack and that it was cleansed of the bandits. What , in military parlance, as used by the German Army, is meant by "cleansing" - a term used so frequently?
A. The military term "to cleanse" is to express that a locality has been cleared of the enemy. Let me put it in this general way. After all, you do not clear up only villages -- you clear up forests, parts of the mountain area, - and what is meant is that you clear the enemy out of it. Now , in these villages we have elements of the partisans. Among the partisans there are people who wear uniforms, some who don't, or wear part of a uniform; there are civilians among them and you never know whether these civilians have participated in the fighting with the partisans and you do not know, either, whether they are residents of that village or whether they come from somewhere else you never can tell. That usually gives the impression that when civilians are being shot or killed in combat as though the civilian population of that particular village had been killed. That is by no means necessarily so -- you cannot be certain. They are civilians or bandits or partisans or sympathizers of the bands - you can call them anything. In any case, they are people who roam about in civilian clothing and take part in the combat operation.
That is an essential aspect of partisan fighting. After all, we are not concerned here with a regular troop.
Q. Witness, in the reports we also find mention made of the fact that the bands or the inhabitants of these villages on which the bands have based themselves, shot at the German units, or that fighting took place within the village. What did the Wehrmacht have to do against such villages - what did they actually do? I mean villages where people shot at German troops or where fighting took place?
A Well, that depends always on local conditions. It depends also up to a point on the troops concerned. If there is bitter fighting for a village, then more losses will be suffered and more houses will be destroyed than would be the case when a village is being taken against small or no resistance at all, which surely stands to reason. As a general rule, if you want to make a hard and fast rule, I want to say this. If you find the enemy fighting, if in other words local fighting breaks out and if there is shooting in the village concerned, when from houses or any other buildings shots are fired, we would shoot back of course. Hand grenades probably would be thrown. All sorts of methods might be used and the enemy thus encountered will be shot, will be killed in combat and the term "combat" in this connection cannot be limited according to a definite fule or a stop watch.
Fighting might recede and might flare up again. A village might be fought for and one might suddenly find now all is well and then all of a sudden shots are fired somewhere and then fighting continues. You cannot establish a hard and fast rule. As for villages in which or for which fighting took place, that there must be partial destruction by fire, perhaps in some cases total destruction, especially in view of the type of buildings encountered there, should surprise no one. Even that houses in which ammunition blows up burn down, surely is no miracle.
Q Witness, if and when the Wehrmacht in your area encountered in those operations arms or ammunition in the houses or perhaps explosives which had been hidden there, what did the Wehrmacht do against such houses?
A Houses of that sort were frequently burned down as a reprisal measure, if we found hidden ammunition or explosives in these houses, because that proved that these houses were used as local bases for the enemy. Peaceful inhabitants do not hide ammunition.
Q Was this procedure as you saw it at the time in accordance with orders which the troops had received for cases of that sort?
A If I am informed correctly, the regulation covering band warfare said that the strong points of the bands, all things being equal, can be burned down. I believe the approval of an officer in the rank of a captain was necessary.
Q This regulation covering band warfare, if the Tribunal please, to which General Lanz has had reference just now, is obviously identical with the regulation contained in the Document Book III for Foertsch. On page 87 of that Document Book, it is Document No. 71. To repeat, Document Book Foertsch No. III, Document 71, on page 87.
Now witness, in reading all these reports one cannot help asking the following question: why did you have this struggle carried out in this manner and with these means? In other words, would it have been simpler and easier for you as the commanding and responsible general, to have these band strong points, the villages defended by bands, attacked by the Luftwaffe and eliminate them by incendiary and high explosive bombs, because after all, we the German civilian population, went through this in many German localities? Why did you not do that?
A It is very simple to answer. We didn't have the means. I would have preferred nothing more for the simple reason because I would have spared my own men thereby; but I had no Luftwaffe, no airplanes. In Greece, if I am correctly informed, we had just enough aircraft for making reconnaissance trips, particularly reconnaissance trips, over the sea, because we always expected an Allied landing. I myself went out on reconnaissance trips although I wasn't supposed to. I flew over my area, over the area infested by bands, to form an impression of the territorial conditions, but unhappily we had not airplanes at our disposal as the Allies had, for us to bomb villages or towns which were being defended by the enemy. Incidentally, generally these places weren't defended at all, and also by the way this method of bombing villages, one bomb would often have been enough for many a village. That would have had the added advantage that an attack on a village of that sort would not have been regarded as criminal which one endeavors to do nowadays, because the other side, after all, resorted to the method of bombing warfare.
Perhaps....
Q You are saying witness, if I understand you correctly, to eliminate these strong points of the bands by the Luftwaffe was not possible for you because you did not have enough aircraft or in fact no aircraft at all for that purpose, which is the reason why you had to fight the bands exclusively with troops on land. Is that correct?
A Yes, quite.
Q And let me ask you a typical Nurnberg question. Had you had enough aircraft, what would you have done then?
A I would have used them.
Q You would have employed aircraft?
A But of course.
Q And you would have had bombs dropped?
A Without doubt.
Q Witness, we have heard a Greek witness here, I believe he was called Tryandaphilidis -- and he asserted that the EDES bands, as a matter of principle, never defended villages so that the villages would be spared. Now according to your observations in your area, is that correct?
A No, it is not correct. I am of course in no position to judge whether my enemy of the day, General Zervas, on whom I shall have to say more later on, issued an order to the troops that no villages must be defended. That I don't know, but in actual fact the EDES partisans of course defended villages in certain cases if and when the tactical requirements made this necessary which is only too customary in war. I know of no war where villages or town were no being defended or where there was no fighting for villages or towns. That would be an entirely abnormal thing. That statement was, of course, made simply for reasons of expediency.
Q Now the same witness Tryandaphilidis sat here on 18 August 1947, asserting something which can be found on page 2139 of the German transcript. He said that the Germans had destroyed all villages in the Epirus, that is to say all villages in the area of your command. What can you tell us about that?
A I could say quite a bit about that but I only want to speak about two points. If that were true, then meanwhile those villages must have been reconstructed which were burned down last year by the Greek partisans in the Epirus as the newspapers reported. But apart from that. I know from my own personal experience that the bigger villages in the Epirus, all of which I know, first of all I know Jannina, Prevesa, Konica, Arta, Agrinion, Paramythia, Mitikas, Ethicon and there are many more -- these villages were undestroyed. It may be that this or that house was destroyed but only in very isolated instances. You really should say that these villages were completely undestroyed. Jannina, for instance, was completely intact. A large number of villages in the neighborhood of Jannina which I am familiar with were left undestroyed until the end. I saw that myself. Therefore, it is quite absurd to say that all villages had been destroyed.
Q. Witness, it seems to be a fact that in Epirus, in your area, a number of destroyed villages do exist. Could you tell us whether the destruction of these villages occured always in the course of fighting between the partisans and the German units or whether villages of a bigger size had been destroyed when you arrived in Epirus?
A. It is true and it is regrettable that villages in Epirus had been destroyed. They were destroyed in the course of military events ever since Greece turned and fought against the Italians coming from Albania. The area in which I was stationed Epirus, borders on Albania. This is the reason why in that very area in the north of Epirus, a large number of villages had been destroyed totally or in part. I might interpolate here, if one uses the word "destroyed," it does not mean that in those villages no stone had been left on the other. That would be the wrong impression to form.
Many of these villages were destroyed only in part and some of them were still inhabited. One also speakes in Germany of cities which are destroyed and still they are being inhabited. The destruction of villages was caused by a number of military events. First, the fight between the Italians and the Greeks-
Q. What year was that?
A. Well, I think that was in 1940 or 1941. Then there was a brief fight between the Greeks and the Germans. This happened in spring, 1941. We heard once before of a struggle against what was known as the Epirus army. That struggle quite obviously was brief and as a result I thing destruction must have been on a relatively small scale. This was followed by a period of occupation by the Italians lasting almost two years from spring, 1941, to the summer of 1943. In that period of time, fighting took place against the partisans and this or that village was probably destroyed also. Then this was followed by the period of time that I was down there from September 1943 to October 1944. There again a number of villages were destroyed in the fighting against the partisans.
Then we have the constant fighting between the ELAS and EDES partisans who fought each other. I frequently received reports that fighting could be heard to go on at such and such a place and when I asked why I was told "Well, it is nothing to do with us. The two partisan groups are fighting each other." Then we had fighting between the Albanian and Greek border population, violent and bitter fighting indeed, and in some cases there was fighting between the Moslems and the Greeks. In other words, a whole series of fighting went on through the years and it should be understandable under these conditions that in all this fighting, villages unfortunately were destroyed or damaged.
Q. Perhaps you can recall, witness, that in this Courtroom on 18 August 1947, a Greek witness called Papas was interrogated who reported the destruction of a village called Kumeno. This village lies south of Arta, that is to say in the southern part of the area under your command. The witness has testified that Kumeno was destroyed on 16 August 1943. Were you connected in any sense with the destruction of Kumeno?
A. Kumeno is not on the map which I have distributed. It is unhappily not recorded on that map. As you say, so rightly, it is about ton kilometers south of Arta. I must say that I didn't know anything about the village of Kumeno until the witness Papas talked about it, and thereupon I looked at a map which wasn't too good and looked for the village and I found it. I myself had nothing to do at all with the destruction of Kumeno because at that time I was not in. the Epirus. I was out in Salonika or in Germany on an official trip. In any case, I know nothing about this matter until the witness Papas mentioned it in this Courtroom and that was the time when I looked for the village on the map.
Q. The destruction of the village according to witness Papas took place on 16 August 1943 and will you tell us, witness, now when you took over your command in the Epirus?