DR. FRITSCH: On this point, your Honor, I have to object to something;I think that it is only allowed to ask questions about matters arising from the re-examination. Otherwise, this thing would never come to an end. Up till now, this has been the practice and this question was not mentioned by me in re-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: I think your statement, Dr. Fritsch, is correct but you may proceed on this one question and limit it to that alone and a semblance at least applicable to the matter which was gone into on cross-examination.
MR. RAPP: Very well, your Honor.
BY MR. RAPP:
Q. Witness, was the 20th Mountain Army in a position to defend itself successfully in the event combined Russian-Finnish forces were to follow up and attack?
A. When?
Q. At the time you expected them to do that. That is the winter of 1944-45.
A. We were ready to defend ourselves but not to defend ourselves successfully. We would have been destroyed.
Q. The element of destruction which was ordered and which was carried out was at no time as far as you know possibly supported or in some way borne out by the fact that there was some vengeance in it, was there?
A. Vengeance by whom?
Q. From you.
A. No.
Q. Merely on the basis by saying if we can't have Finnmark we want to make sure that nobody else gets it?
A. No. These considerations never played any part at all with us.
DR. FRITSCH: I have no further questions, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: You have no questions, Judge Carter? Judge Burke, You may be excused.
DR. FRITSCH: With the permission of the Tribunal, I then call the witness General Vogel.
EVIL VOGEL, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. The witness will raise his right hand and be sworn. I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath)
You may be seated.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. Witness, please state your full name.
A. My name is Emil Wilhelm Vogel.
Q. When and where were you born?
A. I was born on the 20th of July, 1894, in Zwickan in Saxony.
Q. And what is your profession?
A. Officer
Q. And since when has this been your profession?
A. Since the beginning of the First World War, the 1st of August, 1914.
Q. And were you ever a member of the NSDAP?
A. No.
Q. Witness, please-
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I object. The witness is using notes. The witness appears here for the purpose of testifying to what he knows and the facts he Knows and I don't think that it is customary for him during an examination as a witness to refer to his notes.
THE PRESIDENT: That may be a matter which you can comment upon in cross-examination if you so desire.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. General, then please describe quite briefly your military career.
A. At the beginning of the First World War I was in the Royal Bavarian Army as a cadet and I served in the First World War as an officer at the front primarily on the Western front. At the end of the war I was taken over into the 200,000 men army and later on into the 100,000 men army. For three years, I trained as an officer-assistant and then for three years I led a Company in Lindau and then I served in various general staff positions of the troop general staffs until 1942. On the 1st of September, 1942, I became Commander of the 101 Rifle Division and fought in the Caucasus, the Kuban bridgehead, on the Dniepr and the Dniestr. On the 1st of August, 1944, I was entrusted with the leadership of the 36th Mountain Corps, and I was in charge of this until the end of the war.
Q. And what was your final rank?
A. General of Mountain Troops.
Q. And where are you residing at the moment?
A. At the moment, I am a British prisoner-of-war in the Nurnberg jail. I was transferred to Germany from Great Britain for the purpose of helping with the historical division.
Q. And where is this historical division stationed?
A. In Neustadt.
Q. General, since when did you have official contact with General Rendulic?
A. Since the 13th of August, 1944.
Q. And what was the position you took over at that time?
A. At that time, I took over the 36th Mountain Corps which was stationed in Lappland and that was employed with two divisions as a corps troops and this was on the heights of Kandalachka west of Murmansk.
Q. And this corps belonged to the 20th Mountain Army?
A. Yes, this corps belonged to the 20th Mountain Army.
Q. How strong were the Russian forces opposing you?
A. The Russians were materially superior to our forces. We estimated about three-fold.
Q. General, please would you speak a little slower?
A. Yes.
Q. And what about the fighting power of the Russians?
A. This was extraordinarily great. In the war my experience was that Russian divisions as regards strength as well as their fighting power were rather different in certain cases. Those forces facing my corps in Lappland belonged to the beat troops which I ever learned to know during the war. They were especially extremely good fighters in the forces and my corps was in a large jungle zone.
Q. And how did this fighting power of the Russians become visible?
A. Essentially through their great activity and through the numerical superiority. In the jungle warfare the superiority of the weapons played less of a part than the superiority of the number of the soldiers, and this superiority was existent specially amongs the Russians.
Q. And did other enemy forces play a part there?
A. Yes, the Finns. They fought on our side and on the 2nd of September, 1944, they left the war.
Q. And did a special situation arise particularly for your corps from this?
A. Yes. The situation was one of the most difficult which I ever experienced during the war, because the Finns left, the Russian forces were of course left free which had formerly been faced by the Russian forces on the Karelian front, and for us this of course had to create a particularly difficult position because in this way the numerical superiority was even greater.
Q. And were there any kinds of encirclement attempts at that time?
A. Yes. With my corps from the very beginning, the situation was unfavorable in so far as the Russians had tried to encircle the right flank of my corps. One had to take into account the fact that the 36th Mountain Corps had no contact with German troops. This attempt at encirclement of the right flank was on the whole repelled when the Finns left but there were already indications that the Russians were trying to encircle the left flank of my corps in a large circle and this seemed to us to be rather impossible because of the terrain.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our noon recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 1330 hours.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q General, before the recess we had discussed the comparison between the strength of the Russians and your own forces. You stressed particularly the strength of the Russian forces, you had talked about the Russians having tried to circumvent your left flank; did I understand you correctly that you said that the Russians succeeded in spite of the difficult terrain to encircle the left flank of your corps?
A. Yes, that is correct. In spite of the enormous terrain difficulties I mentioned, the Russians succeeded in doing this, although there were no roads and highways through the jungle. The Russians managed to circumvent my left flank corps with considerable forces and thus reach the area of Salla and invade the left of my flank.
Q General, to talk about something else; what was General Rendulic's position among his troops?
A The General had only for a short period been with the army, but quite soon we discovered his great experience in warfare which particularly he had gained in the eastern campaign. The troops felt the great care which he took for them and the men realized how very interested he was in everything that concerned the life of his men. After the battles had started, we also felt how calm he was and how sure he was in his leadership. All that together made the General very much esteemed among his men.
Q Did this esteem have any effect or show in any form among the opponents?
A This is a question that is difficult to answer. As a rule, I have experienced that the Russians whenever they encountered a considerable leader among the enemy, they endeavored by means of propaganda to split up the good relationship between that enemy leader and his men. I recall that was also the case where General Rendulic and we were concerned. The Russians, by radio propaganda, when we were concerned.
The Russians, by radio propaganda, when we were still in our old position, and also through leaflets, attempted to spread the rumor that the General who was an Austrian was trying to let his army fall into the hands of the Russians.
Q Did this propaganda effect or influence the troops in any way?
A Propaganda always finds some foolish people who believe in it. In this case also one can say "semper ali qui ero". One has to consider that the General after all had been only a very short time with the army. We knew his military capabilities, but with regard to that other side of his character of course, the troops did not yet know it. So summarizing I can say that the Russians succeeded if only to a limited extent in bringing insecurity among the troops. One also must consider the fact that at the time we were still under the influence of the propaganda which had been spread in connection with the attempt on Hitler's life of 20 July 1944 and which propaganda was spread particularly in direction of the generals in the East.
Q Did not the troops enter the battles under the influence of this propaganda connected with their retreat would you please answer, General?
A Now the troops did not enter the battles under the influence of this propaganda, because in the meantime there was a fundamental change in the situation when General Rendulic received the golden badge, which was recognized by the men as a proof of the highest leadership's confidence in Rendulic.
Q General, well now once again deal with the question of the Russian's superiority; did this superiority also show up in the retreat?
A Yes, it did considerably see because when Finnish units became available on the Karolian front, the situation was thus. All corps in the large area of Finland fought in isolated places. The decision had to_ be made in order to preserve these three corps, which fought individually, from Russian destruction and to concentrate them in smaller areas and therefore the order was issued that all three corps were to be grouped in the north of Finland in such a way that (a) an attack of the Russians on this front could he defeated and that (b) the nickel mines of Kollessioki would further be available for the war effort and could be made use of.
Q General, when did you receive the order for the evacuation of the Finnish area, where after all your corps was stationed?
A This decision was made on 4 October 1944. The order must have been received very shortly after that.
Q And what order did you receive as a leader of your corps in particular?
A I was to lead my corps via Karasjok back to Northern Finland, that was my first order.
Q And within the scope of the whole design, what was the place your corps took?
A My corps, was to be led to the area of Northern Finland, after all these retreat battles had been concluded. In the course of these battles we had succeeded in evading encirclements which had originally been directed against my flank and then we were even in a position to free forces which could be led to the front on which the 19th corps was fighting valiantly on the Artic Sea Front.
Q General, at this point may I interrupt you, what was the position of your corps within the scope of the withdrawal movement, what was the place that your corps took, was it within the center group or where was it?
A My corps was in the middle of the three Finnish corps and the 18th and 36th corps had to be withdrawn, that is, they had to be separated from enemy forces.
Q And what was the position of your corps after that?
A Then this corps was marched up to Northern Finland.
Q Is it correct, General, that you were a leader of the rear guards?
Q. And in what area were these destructions to take place?
General, would you please wait a moment after I have put my question?
Do you still remember ay question?
A. "In what area were the destructions to be carried out?" From the line Karasjak, Laks-Elf to the Lyngen Fjord.
Q. General, would you please be kind enough to show us these localities on the map?
A. Here is Karasjok. Here is Laks-Elf. Here is Highway 50 and here is the Lyngen Fjord, and that was the district up to where the destruction was to be carried out.
Q. If I understood you correctly, General, you moved along this line which you showed us just now on the map.
A. Yes, that is so.
Q. You yourself experienced the winter up there in the extreme north. Can one in those areas live without houses?
A. Without houses? No. It is under all circumstances essential to have a heated accommodation.
Q. Can one have provisional quarters there and can these be quickly manufactured up there?
A. No, one cannot dig into that soil because after a thin layer of earth there is rocky ground. In contrast to Finland which has many words, there is in Finmark almost no wood at all. The woodland only starts in the area near Alta. Therefore, the building of accommodations which demands transport of timber was not possible up there.
Q. Now, how about building snow huts?
A. Snow huts can be constructed if there is sufficient snow available. However, at that season there was sufficient snow as a rule. Besides, we must consider that snow huts can only mean a temporary accommodation for small units, not for larger units or even for army bodies such as divisions or corps.
Q. In those areas through which you marched was the population still present?
A. No. The evacuation had started much earlier than that. It was carried out by the evacuation staff of the army headquarters which included a representative of the Reich Commissioner.
Q. Did your troops help in the supply of the evacuated population?
A. In individual instances, yes. Inasmuch as my troops go in contact with the evacuated population, those were mainly parts of columns which had been led back at an early date, supply installations, et cetera. In such cases the troops helped whenever possible. They helped by putting trucks at the disposal of the evacuees. They helped transporting the old and sick people, women and children and they put medical equipment and doctors at their disposal, et cetera. Trucks and ambulances were put at their disposal; food, hot drinks, et cetera were given to the evacuees. I also know that even troop kitchens were put at the disposal of the evacuees.
Q. General, you were then in charge of the roar guards, weren't you? Did it income known to you that individual inhabitants tried to evade the ordered evacuation?
A. Yes, that was unfortunate and there were individual instances where some people -- in some instances, even women and children -- evaded the well planned evacuation and hid in the mountains or in other hideouts.
Q. Did you order anything to counter these incidents or how did your troops cope with the situation?
A. I learned these incidents only after the reports of the troops had already been passed on. The troops coped with the situation by evacuating those people which they happened to find still in their houses. They made them leave their houses and allowed them to take the most essential things with them and then these refugee were transported in the trucks of the destruction troops, evacuated and delivered to the collection places.
Q. It has been asserted that the inhabitants quite frequently had to witness their houses being burned down.
Can you tell us anything about this from your own experience?
A. Those can only have been cases where people on their own risk had evaded the evacuation and, unfortunately, it was not possible to avoid that they became witnesses of their houses being burned down on the occasion of those incidents which I have just described. This, however, could have been avoided if these people had complied with the well meaning intentions of the German commanders and agencies and if they had not tried to dodge this planned evacuation.
Q. I am correct in understanding you, am I, if I understand you to say that these were only individual cases and not the general rule?
Is that correct?
A. Yes, it is. As I said, those were a few individual people.
Q. Were there any buildings which were not to be destroyed?
A. Yes churches were exempted by us from the destruction.
Q. It has been asserted here that in the course of the destructions which were actually carried out churches also were destroyed. You as leader of the rear guard, can you tell us anything about this?
A. I recall one incident which took place when we were still in Finland. When it was reported to me that a church had been burned down. I ordered a court martial investigation. On the occasion of this procedure it could not be ascertained that intentional arson had been committed. The Divisional Commander himself reported this to me. If one takes into consideration the fact that in Finland and even in Northern Norway the only building material was timber, there is the possibility that when houses are being burned down by some unfortunate circumstance sparks can fly over to the church or that the winds are unfavorable and that thus churches or a church can burn down without any intent on the part of the troops.
Q. General, did you consider it militarily necessary that the destructions were not only to be carried out along Highway 50 but also away from that highway, particularly where built up areas and settlements near the fjords were concerned?
A. Yes, I did think that was absolutely necessary from the military point of view.
Q. Can you give us your reasons for that?
A. If the Russians had followed up our withdrawal movement then they had to, under all circumstances, not only use the accommodations along Highway 50 but also, in view of the general lack of accommodations, use every possible accommodation anywhere and, therefore, of course, also make use of those quarters which were away from Highway 50. Just those localities away from Highway 50, which sometimes were situated in hidden valleys, offered to the Russians an ideal possibility for quartering their troops. These troops could have been important, if used for the support of strong point and for the formation of bands. At the time we still expected the Russians to land either on the west or north coast of Finland. On this occasion such an operation would have been supported very strongly if bands or smaller units, which could have been located in these hidden valleys, had been in a position to disturb the withdrawal movements through attacks and surprise attacks and especially by burning down those snow tunnels which were most necessary for the army.
For all these reasons I thought it was an absolute military necessity and I would have not have carried the responsibility not to destroy also those built-up areas which were away from Highway 50.
Q. Was it possible for the Russians and the Finns even to reach these localities which were off Highway 50 after the roads had been destroyed? What I mean by this is, could these dispersed localities have been made use of at all by the Russians?
A. Yes, with units mobile in wintertime they could undoubtedly have reached those localities. Besides, in such a situation one also had to count on troops parachuting down and these hidden valleys which had no defense possibility would have been most Suitable for such an action.
Q When and where, General, did you have the last contact with the Russians?
A My last contact with the Russians was in the border area of Karasjok between Skokanvare and Karasjok and that must have been at the beginning of November 1944. I also know that the Russians followed up the 19th Corps and, to the best of my recollection, entered the area of Tana.
Q When did you become convinced that the Russians would not move any further?
A During the whole time we were never quite sure that the Russians would not keep moving. If, to begin with, the Russians did not advance that was to me only a confirmation of the fact that the stronger measures had become effective. But in this situation we had to assume that the Russians would not only pursue us from the valleys but that through landing operations and through parachutists they would do everything in order to disturb our retreating movements; and this day it is still a mystery to me why the enemy did not make use of this opportunity to destroy our army in this difficult situation. At that time we had, of course, to assume that the most likely decision of the enemy would be that decision which was the most unpleasant one for us. That would have been not only a moving up of the enemy's front but a combined action which would have taken effect in the front in landing operations and in parachuting down troops. Maybe even by troops coming in from the Swedish frontier highway and attacking us.
Q General, I am quite sure at that time you discussed all these matters with higher officers, commanders and officers of the troops.
Is that correct?
A Of course, we discussed all these questions in great detail.
Q What is the opinion that prevailed?
A You mean the opinion concerning the necessity of destruction?
Q Yes.
A The necessity for the destruction was felt by the troops just as much as it was felt by me, because these destructions were necessary in the interests of the troops and the troops themselves realized how important accommodations in this Arctic zone were.
Of course, we discussed these questions but one thing we all agreed on and that was that material destructions could be replaced but that, of course, loss of life could never have been given back which would have had to be sacrificed if in this situation we had not carried out the material destruction and thus had given the enemy the possibility to carry out an operation which would have destroyed us all.
Q General, if I may put one concluding question arising from your last answer, from the point of view of that time and from your point of view today, if you look at those things in retrospect, was it in your opinion absolutely militarily necessary to carry out the measures ordered for destruction and for the evacuation in the Finmark?
A I can only answer this question to the effect that these destructions were carried out in the interest of the tasks which were put to us.
DR. FRITSCH: I have no further questions to put to the witness in direct examination at this point.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any questions for direct examination by other defense counsel?
Apparently not. You may cross examine.
MR. RAPP: Thank you, your Honor.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. RAPP:
Q Witness, you told us about these isolated huts which could he of use to parachutists. Have you ever made any estimate prior to the destruction as to how many shelters per man these houses would provide?
A I had no other information but the maps. The map shows at the best the number of those isolated huts but the accommodation does not depend only on the number but also on the size of those huts and that, of course, could not be seen from the map and it was not possible for me to get any other material.
Q Could you judge in numbers the combined Finnish-Russian strength that you would figure could follow you by land if they had decided to do this in force?
A That is difficult to say. Generally, of course, the enemy would not tell us how many forces he could commit for an intended operation but we had to expect that if an operation was carried out against us then the front would be followed up by strong forces, at least several divisions, and the same would apply to landing operations; what I mean is several divisions would be involved, two or three, and then we also have to bount on everything that was marching from Finland along high-way 50.
Q I appreciate the fact that the Russians would not tell you their exact numbers but the German army, like any other army, have a Ic section and it was the job of the Ic section to estimate the capabilities of the enemy. Is that correct?
A That is correct but at the same time you will admit that it was a matter of the army and not a matter of the commanding general of the 36th Mountain Corps.
Q I do not dispute that fact, witness. I say, however, that that estimate of strength of the combined Russian-Finnish forces was not kept top secret by General Rendulic, was it? He must have had that passed down to you to make logical arrangements for your defense, did he not?
A That is right. May I answer you?
Q Please.
A If you had seen the picture which we received through our Ic Department of the superiority of the enemy then you realize how necessary every single measure was which we ordered for our own protection.
Q. Very well, Witness. Now, tell me your estimate of the enemy situation in numbers which you, as a Commanding General, had to do pertaining to the strength of the combined Finnish and Russian forces opposing you, approximately.
A. At least 250 to 300 thousand.
Q. Now, tell me, if you can, what percentages of that total force could have been billeted in the existing Norwegian fisher huts.
A. If we had left those fisher huts standing, then the Russians could have accommodated as many troops in those houses as we did. And the strength of the troops which we accommodated there was 220 thousand men. In addition to that there were also some troops which marched further down to the South and which had already been committed in Northern Norway. Therefore, the accommodation of a strong Russian-Finnish combined Army could have been possible in those huts which we were talking about.
Q. Are you familiar with the total number of the population in the province of Finnmark at that time?
A. Yes, I am -- 63 thousand.
A. You billeted, in other words, in the same houses that the Norwegians had 63 thousand people in there, how many of your own troops?
A. Two hundred and twenty thousand.
Q. You put 220 thousand soldiers into these huts plus the 63 thousand which were living there, so that you have a total of 283 thousand people who were living in these installations?
A. I am afraid you made an error in your calculation. That was just why we had previously evacuated the Norwegian population so we could make use of these accommodations.
Q. And you had them all there and you didn't burn a single house did you? You had your troops all in these billets and none were destroyed by you?
A. As long as the troops were still in movement these houses were not destroyed.
I am afraid you've a wrong picture of the situation. The destructions were carried out only after the rear guard movement had been completed, and they were carried out by individual destruction groups which had to deal with these unpleasant tasks.
Q. When you talk about these installations do you include installations--do you include your own installations, that is, the barracks you yourself constructed, and are you aware of the fact that I am only referring to the dwellings owned by the Norwegians? I just want to get that straight.
A. Yes, I included everything that was available there in the way of accommodations which was habitable and could be heated and made use of at all.
Q. Well, I just mean the Norwegian-owned dwellings, not those which the German Army constructed.
A. I don't understand the question.
Q. Very well. You told me that you could billet 220 thousand troops of the XXth Mountain Army in the province of Finnmark. And now I ask you if you include in this number such installations which were constructed by the German Army or whether you had only reference to Norwegian-owned huts and cities and houses.
A. No, as I have said previously, I refer to all quarters and, therefore, I also mean those which were constructed by the German Armed Forces in Finnmark. For quartering our troops we used our own constructed barracks and the dwellings of the population as well.
Q. Now, forgetting for a moment those which you constructed yourself, how many Russian soldiers could be bivouaced in Norwegianowned property?
A. As a rule one can calculate that in one house where one family lived with about six or eight members, one can at least accommodate sixty to seventy men. If, therefore, 60 thousand Norwegians lived in one house, in this Arctic winter, it is quite possible to accommodate four to five times as many people or even more yet, if this is an emergency accommodation for war purposes.
Because then the soldiers would not sleep in beds; they would just sleep in one little corner on the floor, and all that matters is that there is a stove in the room, that the room is heated, and that they have a roof over their heads.
Q. Witness, now just for one moment to go back to these parachutists: In order to drop parachutists you need plane. Isn't that right?
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Now, we were told that the weather up there was so bad at all times that you couldn't even fly proper reconnaissance. How did you expect the Russians to accomplish the miracle of dropping parachutists?
A. This opinion surprises me. That would not have been a miracle. I can only tell you that my own son flew in a reconnaissance squadron near the Northern Cape and right into the depth of the winter he had to carry out reconnaissance flights of something like eight hours to Murmansk etc. And through discussions with the captain of the squadron and through discussion with my own son I have arrived at the conclusion that this is quite possible. The reconnaissance which was necessary in order to drop troops is a much more simple task because this dropping of parachutists would only have been possible in those hidden valleys. There in the winter nights there are lights in the windows and the flyers see those lights and so they can drop the men. I don't see any particular difficulty in that.
Q. I did not either, Witness, but General Hoelter who testified here as a witness did not agree that the weather was perfect that one could fly. Witness, did you know General Rendulic well?
A. I knew General Rendulic, as I have already stated, since August through our official contact.
Q. Did you ever discuss ideological affairs with General Rendulic or his attitude towards the church?
A. The General, on the few occasions where I had the honor and the privilege of seeing him, was filled with other worries than that of discussing the church or ideological matters. The measures and the tasks which he carried out in his very restricted time had reference to completely different things, purely military matters and, of course, we discussed the military situation as a whole.
Q. Since he did not discuss these matters with you, were you present when he discussed it with somebody else?
A. No.
Q. Your memory is clear on that point? Is that right?
A. Yes, my memory is quite clear.
Q. Were you interrogated under oath on this point by the Prosecution on the 3rd of September 1947?
A. I was interrogated here. I don't know whether it was the 3rd of September or not.
Q. Did you read and sign the interrogation transcript on that occasion?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you state the following facts in that interrogation? And I shall quote them in German.
(READING IN GERMAN)
"Q. What political and ideological attitude had Rendulic?
A. We did not at any time discuss National Socialist and ideological problems etc. The longest conversation which I ever had with Rendulic took place when I first came to him. At this occasion he talked about political matters and voiced his opinion, such as, "You'll see some day, even within the next three months, that the first large power will collapse." I thought about this statement and asked him whom he meant by this. He said "Well, you'll see." And he made no other comments. This assertion could only be caused by his optimistic opinion that the differences between the Western Powers and the Russians were so great that he expected that it would come to an agreement between the Germans and the Western Powers.
At that time he said that England will not stand for the Russians to gain ground in the Mediterranean area. But where ideological matters were concerned, such as questions of confession or religion or church we did not discuss these things."
Q. Do you now reaffirm that statement?
A. Yes, that is a confirmation of my testimony. That is nothing but plainly a confirmation of what I said.
Q. Witness, I hand to you a document which I ask you to identify if possible.
(THE COURT PAGE WALKS TO THE WITNESS STAND AND HANDS A DOCUMENT TO THE WITNESS.)
Will you tell us what that document is?
A. Yes, these are diary notes of a personal nature.
Q. Will you now turn to the entry in the diary for the 12th of August 1944 and tell us whether or not you made this entry in your own handwriting?