Can you tell us anything about this from your own experience?
A. Those can only have been cases where people on their own risk had evaded the evacuation and, unfortunately, it was not possible to avoid that they became witnesses of their houses being burned down on the occasion of those incidents which I have just described. This, however, could have been avoided if these people had complied with the well meaning intentions of the German commanders and agencies and if they had not tried to dodge this planned evacuation.
Q. I am correct in understanding you, am I, if I understand you to say that these were only individual cases and not the general rule?
Is that correct?
A. Yes, it is. As I said, those were a few individual people.
Q. Were there any buildings which were not to be destroyed?
A. Yes churches were exempted by us from the destruction.
Q. It has been asserted here that in the course of the destructions which were actually carried out churches also were destroyed. You as leader of the rear guard, can you tell us anything about this?
A. I recall one incident which took place when we were still in Finland. When it was reported to me that a church had been burned down. I ordered a court martial investigation. On the occasion of this procedure it could not be ascertained that intentional arson had been committed. The Divisional Commander himself reported this to me. If one takes into consideration the fact that in Finland and even in Northern Norway the only building material was timber, there is the possibility that when houses are being burned down by some unfortunate circumstance sparks can fly over to the church or that the winds are unfavorable and that thus churches or a church can burn down without any intent on the part of the troops.
Q. General, did you consider it militarily necessary that the destructions were not only to be carried out along Highway 50 but also away from that highway, particularly where built up areas and settlements near the fjords were concerned?
A. Yes, I did think that was absolutely necessary from the military point of view.
Q. Can you give us your reasons for that?
A. If the Russians had followed up our withdrawal movement then they had to, under all circumstances, not only use the accommodations along Highway 50 but also, in view of the general lack of accommodations, use every possible accommodation anywhere and, therefore, of course, also make use of those quarters which were away from Highway 50. Just those localities away from Highway 50, which sometimes were situated in hidden valleys, offered to the Russians an ideal possibility for quartering their troops. These troops could have been important, if used for the support of strong point and for the formation of bands. At the time we still expected the Russians to land either on the west or north coast of Finland. On this occasion such an operation would have been supported very strongly if bands or smaller units, which could have been located in these hidden valleys, had been in a position to disturb the withdrawal movements through attacks and surprise attacks and especially by burning down those snow tunnels which were most necessary for the army.
For all these reasons I thought it was an absolute military necessity and I would have not have carried the responsibility not to destroy also those built-up areas which were away from Highway 50.
Q. Was it possible for the Russians and the Finns even to reach these localities which were off Highway 50 after the roads had been destroyed? What I mean by this is, could these dispersed localities have been made use of at all by the Russians?
A. Yes, with units mobile in wintertime they could undoubtedly have reached those localities. Besides, in such a situation one also had to count on troops parachuting down and these hidden valleys which had no defense possibility would have been most Suitable for such an action.
Q When and where, General, did you have the last contact with the Russians?
A My last contact with the Russians was in the border area of Karasjok between Skokanvare and Karasjok and that must have been at the beginning of November 1944. I also know that the Russians followed up the 19th Corps and, to the best of my recollection, entered the area of Tana.
Q When did you become convinced that the Russians would not move any further?
A During the whole time we were never quite sure that the Russians would not keep moving. If, to begin with, the Russians did not advance that was to me only a confirmation of the fact that the stronger measures had become effective. But in this situation we had to assume that the Russians would not only pursue us from the valleys but that through landing operations and through parachutists they would do everything in order to disturb our retreating movements; and this day it is still a mystery to me why the enemy did not make use of this opportunity to destroy our army in this difficult situation. At that time we had, of course, to assume that the most likely decision of the enemy would be that decision which was the most unpleasant one for us. That would have been not only a moving up of the enemy's front but a combined action which would have taken effect in the front in landing operations and in parachuting down troops. Maybe even by troops coming in from the Swedish frontier highway and attacking us.
Q General, I am quite sure at that time you discussed all these matters with higher officers, commanders and officers of the troops.
Is that correct?
A Of course, we discussed all these questions in great detail.
Q What is the opinion that prevailed?
A You mean the opinion concerning the necessity of destruction?
Q Yes.
A The necessity for the destruction was felt by the troops just as much as it was felt by me, because these destructions were necessary in the interests of the troops and the troops themselves realized how important accommodations in this Arctic zone were.
Of course, we discussed these questions but one thing we all agreed on and that was that material destructions could be replaced but that, of course, loss of life could never have been given back which would have had to be sacrificed if in this situation we had not carried out the material destruction and thus had given the enemy the possibility to carry out an operation which would have destroyed us all.
Q General, if I may put one concluding question arising from your last answer, from the point of view of that time and from your point of view today, if you look at those things in retrospect, was it in your opinion absolutely militarily necessary to carry out the measures ordered for destruction and for the evacuation in the Finmark?
A I can only answer this question to the effect that these destructions were carried out in the interest of the tasks which were put to us.
DR. FRITSCH: I have no further questions to put to the witness in direct examination at this point.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any questions for direct examination by other defense counsel?
Apparently not. You may cross examine.
MR. RAPP: Thank you, your Honor.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. RAPP:
Q Witness, you told us about these isolated huts which could he of use to parachutists. Have you ever made any estimate prior to the destruction as to how many shelters per man these houses would provide?
A I had no other information but the maps. The map shows at the best the number of those isolated huts but the accommodation does not depend only on the number but also on the size of those huts and that, of course, could not be seen from the map and it was not possible for me to get any other material.
Q Could you judge in numbers the combined Finnish-Russian strength that you would figure could follow you by land if they had decided to do this in force?
A That is difficult to say. Generally, of course, the enemy would not tell us how many forces he could commit for an intended operation but we had to expect that if an operation was carried out against us then the front would be followed up by strong forces, at least several divisions, and the same would apply to landing operations; what I mean is several divisions would be involved, two or three, and then we also have to bount on everything that was marching from Finland along high-way 50.
Q I appreciate the fact that the Russians would not tell you their exact numbers but the German army, like any other army, have a Ic section and it was the job of the Ic section to estimate the capabilities of the enemy. Is that correct?
A That is correct but at the same time you will admit that it was a matter of the army and not a matter of the commanding general of the 36th Mountain Corps.
Q I do not dispute that fact, witness. I say, however, that that estimate of strength of the combined Russian-Finnish forces was not kept top secret by General Rendulic, was it? He must have had that passed down to you to make logical arrangements for your defense, did he not?
A That is right. May I answer you?
Q Please.
A If you had seen the picture which we received through our Ic Department of the superiority of the enemy then you realize how necessary every single measure was which we ordered for our own protection.
Q. Very well, Witness. Now, tell me your estimate of the enemy situation in numbers which you, as a Commanding General, had to do pertaining to the strength of the combined Finnish and Russian forces opposing you, approximately.
A. At least 250 to 300 thousand.
Q. Now, tell me, if you can, what percentages of that total force could have been billeted in the existing Norwegian fisher huts.
A. If we had left those fisher huts standing, then the Russians could have accommodated as many troops in those houses as we did. And the strength of the troops which we accommodated there was 220 thousand men. In addition to that there were also some troops which marched further down to the South and which had already been committed in Northern Norway. Therefore, the accommodation of a strong Russian-Finnish combined Army could have been possible in those huts which we were talking about.
Q. Are you familiar with the total number of the population in the province of Finnmark at that time?
A. Yes, I am -- 63 thousand.
A. You billeted, in other words, in the same houses that the Norwegians had 63 thousand people in there, how many of your own troops?
A. Two hundred and twenty thousand.
Q. You put 220 thousand soldiers into these huts plus the 63 thousand which were living there, so that you have a total of 283 thousand people who were living in these installations?
A. I am afraid you made an error in your calculation. That was just why we had previously evacuated the Norwegian population so we could make use of these accommodations.
Q. And you had them all there and you didn't burn a single house did you? You had your troops all in these billets and none were destroyed by you?
A. As long as the troops were still in movement these houses were not destroyed.
I am afraid you've a wrong picture of the situation. The destructions were carried out only after the rear guard movement had been completed, and they were carried out by individual destruction groups which had to deal with these unpleasant tasks.
Q. When you talk about these installations do you include installations--do you include your own installations, that is, the barracks you yourself constructed, and are you aware of the fact that I am only referring to the dwellings owned by the Norwegians? I just want to get that straight.
A. Yes, I included everything that was available there in the way of accommodations which was habitable and could be heated and made use of at all.
Q. Well, I just mean the Norwegian-owned dwellings, not those which the German Army constructed.
A. I don't understand the question.
Q. Very well. You told me that you could billet 220 thousand troops of the XXth Mountain Army in the province of Finnmark. And now I ask you if you include in this number such installations which were constructed by the German Army or whether you had only reference to Norwegian-owned huts and cities and houses.
A. No, as I have said previously, I refer to all quarters and, therefore, I also mean those which were constructed by the German Armed Forces in Finnmark. For quartering our troops we used our own constructed barracks and the dwellings of the population as well.
Q. Now, forgetting for a moment those which you constructed yourself, how many Russian soldiers could be bivouaced in Norwegianowned property?
A. As a rule one can calculate that in one house where one family lived with about six or eight members, one can at least accommodate sixty to seventy men. If, therefore, 60 thousand Norwegians lived in one house, in this Arctic winter, it is quite possible to accommodate four to five times as many people or even more yet, if this is an emergency accommodation for war purposes.
Because then the soldiers would not sleep in beds; they would just sleep in one little corner on the floor, and all that matters is that there is a stove in the room, that the room is heated, and that they have a roof over their heads.
Q. Witness, now just for one moment to go back to these parachutists: In order to drop parachutists you need plane. Isn't that right?
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Now, we were told that the weather up there was so bad at all times that you couldn't even fly proper reconnaissance. How did you expect the Russians to accomplish the miracle of dropping parachutists?
A. This opinion surprises me. That would not have been a miracle. I can only tell you that my own son flew in a reconnaissance squadron near the Northern Cape and right into the depth of the winter he had to carry out reconnaissance flights of something like eight hours to Murmansk etc. And through discussions with the captain of the squadron and through discussion with my own son I have arrived at the conclusion that this is quite possible. The reconnaissance which was necessary in order to drop troops is a much more simple task because this dropping of parachutists would only have been possible in those hidden valleys. There in the winter nights there are lights in the windows and the flyers see those lights and so they can drop the men. I don't see any particular difficulty in that.
Q. I did not either, Witness, but General Hoelter who testified here as a witness did not agree that the weather was perfect that one could fly. Witness, did you know General Rendulic well?
A. I knew General Rendulic, as I have already stated, since August through our official contact.
Q. Did you ever discuss ideological affairs with General Rendulic or his attitude towards the church?
A. The General, on the few occasions where I had the honor and the privilege of seeing him, was filled with other worries than that of discussing the church or ideological matters. The measures and the tasks which he carried out in his very restricted time had reference to completely different things, purely military matters and, of course, we discussed the military situation as a whole.
Q. Since he did not discuss these matters with you, were you present when he discussed it with somebody else?
A. No.
Q. Your memory is clear on that point? Is that right?
A. Yes, my memory is quite clear.
Q. Were you interrogated under oath on this point by the Prosecution on the 3rd of September 1947?
A. I was interrogated here. I don't know whether it was the 3rd of September or not.
Q. Did you read and sign the interrogation transcript on that occasion?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you state the following facts in that interrogation? And I shall quote them in German.
(READING IN GERMAN)
"Q. What political and ideological attitude had Rendulic?
A. We did not at any time discuss National Socialist and ideological problems etc. The longest conversation which I ever had with Rendulic took place when I first came to him. At this occasion he talked about political matters and voiced his opinion, such as, "You'll see some day, even within the next three months, that the first large power will collapse." I thought about this statement and asked him whom he meant by this. He said "Well, you'll see." And he made no other comments. This assertion could only be caused by his optimistic opinion that the differences between the Western Powers and the Russians were so great that he expected that it would come to an agreement between the Germans and the Western Powers.
At that time he said that England will not stand for the Russians to gain ground in the Mediterranean area. But where ideological matters were concerned, such as questions of confession or religion or church we did not discuss these things."
Q. Do you now reaffirm that statement?
A. Yes, that is a confirmation of my testimony. That is nothing but plainly a confirmation of what I said.
Q. Witness, I hand to you a document which I ask you to identify if possible.
(THE COURT PAGE WALKS TO THE WITNESS STAND AND HANDS A DOCUMENT TO THE WITNESS.)
Will you tell us what that document is?
A. Yes, these are diary notes of a personal nature.
Q. Will you now turn to the entry in the diary for the 12th of August 1944 and tell us whether or not you made this entry in your own handwriting?
A. Which one is that? Which one is the one you mean?
(Mr. Rapp walks to the witness stand and points out to the witness the entry in question.)
Q. Did you make that entry in your own handwriting?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Is the whole diary in your own handwriting, Witness?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And you identify it to be your own personal diary? Is that correct?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Will you now turn to the next page appearing behind the 12th of August 1944, which has been narked by me with an "X"? Do you find that?
A. Yes, I have it.
Q. Will you now read this entry in the German language aloud until you come to the next "X" on the following page? I think it starts: "Es gab einen vorzueglichen Mokka der irrsinning stark war."
A. I'm afraid I can't read it because I haven't my glasses here.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Proceed.
MR. RAPP: Is it agreeable to the Tribunal, in view of the fact that the witness doesn't have his spectacles here, that his Defense Counsel shall read this part for him?
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You can read it yourself, can't you? Can't you read it?
MR. RAPP: Very well. (Retrieves the copy from the witness.)
I am referring to the entry under the 12th of August.
(Reading in German.)
"We had excellent Mokka coffee which was awfully strong. And there was a very pleasant and unrestrained conversation. Besides me, General Hoelter, Lt. Col. Uebelhack, Colonel Dirmeyer, as well as Reinold, were also present. Of course, ideological problems were also discussed where the Austrian "R" behaved as a wild enemy of the clergy, for whom he had a deadly hatred, whereby Hoelter assisted him. I stressed other problems and held a different opinion which I supported with statements of the Fuehrer, quoted in "Mein Kampf." On the whole "R" is no imposing personality, which could be compared to Dietl, made in one caste, or could be compared to Model who is the personified dynamics. He is no organ entirely at all a synthesis composed of diplomatic cunning and soldiership. Much is pose and make-believe. One might almost consider it showing off. A personality one could just as little imagine without a mirror as without a propaganda chief, out without doubt he is clever and energetic and possesses sure instincts."
Q. Will you tell us who the "Ostmaerkler R" is?
A. That's quite Obvious.
Q. Just a minute, Witness. Will you please tell me who the "Ostmaerkler R" is? That's all I asked you right now.
A. You know whom I meant.
Q. Are you refusing to give me this answer, Witness, despite the fact that you know it?
A. No.
Q. Then, give it.
A. It is General Rendulic.
Q. I have no further questions, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Frankly I didn't get the gist of it. You kept reading it, and the Interpreter was interpreting, and it was just a jumble so far as I'm concerned.
We couldn't hear the Interpreter and the reading at the same time.
MR. RAPP: Do you suggest that we re-do the interpretation, Your Honor?
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: If you'd have the Tribunal know what it's about, we would.
(Mr. Rapp takes the document in question to the court German-English interpreter)
THE COURT GERMAN-ENGLISH INTERPRETER: Do you want the English text read again, Your Honor--the English version?
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I wouldn't be particularly interested in the German.
THE COURT GERMAN-ENGLISH INTERPRETER: The English translation of this reads: "We had excellent Mokka coffee which was awfully strong. And there was a very pleasant and unrestrained conversation. Besides me, General Hoelter, Lt. Col. Uebelhack, Col. Dirmeyer, as well as Reinold, were also present. Of course, ideological problems were also discussed whereby the Ostmaerkler "R" behaved as a wild enemy of the clergy, for whom he had a deadly hatred, whereby Hoelter assisted him. I stressed other problems and held a different opinion which I supported with statements of the Fuehrer which he quoted in "Mein Kampf." On the whole "R" is no imposing personality, which could be compared to Dietl, who is made in one caste, or could be compared to Model, who is personified dynamics. He is no organic entirely at all but a synthesis composed of a diplomatic cunning and soldiership. Much is pose and makebelieve. One might almost call it showing off, a personality one cannot imagine without a mirror nor without a propaganda chief.
But without doubt he is clever and energetic and possesses sure instincts."
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The German word that was used there in your translation, what does that mean?
THE COURT GERMAN-ENGLISH INTERPRETER: The word "Ostmark" means "Eastern province," and I believe was applied to Austria in the German designation. Austria was called "Ostmark," and "Ostmaerkler" is an inhabitant of the "Ostmark."
DR. FRITSCH: May I, first of all, ask to be shown this photostat for a short period? (Mr. Rapp hands the document to Dr. Fritsch.)
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. General, you stated that this is your handwriting?
A. Yes.
Q. May I, first of all, ask you whether these are official diary entries, or, if not, of what nature are these diary entries?
A. These are very personal notes which were meant purely for my own use and which were never supposed to find their way into publicity.
Q. Did you give this diary to the Prosecution?
A. No, this diary was taken from me by a British officer after the capitulation. It was taken out of my luggage.
Q. Was the 12th of August the day on which, for the first time, you reported to General Rendulic?
A. Yes, that was the day. On the 12th of August I say General Rendulic for the first time, and, therefore, I could not possibly have had a correct impression of his personality. That I changed my impression of General Rendulic later on considerably cannot by any meany be doubted.
Q. Did you know General Rendulic from any other connections from a former period?
A. No, I had never seen him before. I had never seen General Rendulic.
Q. Did you previously discuss with anybody else the personality of General Rendulic?
A. No.
Q. When, on the 12th of August, did you arrive in Rovanjemmi?
A. I arrived in the evening of the 11th of August, or it might have been the 12th. I don't know. In any case I arrived in Rovanjemmi and met General Rendulic at dinner, and after dinner we all sat together, out I still believe that it was the day before the 12th of August.
Q. For how long did you all stay together?
A. We all had dinner that lasted maybe half an hour or threequarters of an hour, and then we adjourned to his apartment. That might have taken another three to four hours.
Q. How do you explain the discrepancy between your statement --when you were interrogated on the third of September, which interrogation was mentioned to you by Mr. Rapp and where you said that ideological questions were never discussed--and this diary entry.
A. I had explicitly pointed out to Mr. Rapp before I was interrogated that a long period had elapsed and that in many things I would not be sure of my memory. Then Mr. Kaufmann said to me that those things which he wanted to know from me would refer to imnressions which were unforgettable to anybody and that was quite correct where military Operations were concerned but I really don't remember this particular incident because, after all, it is not such a very impressive fact that we discussed over an after dinner cup of coffee matters which included ideological factors.
Q. General, there can be no doubt, can there, that these notes which you laid down in your diary were of derogatory type?
A. Yes, that is so.
Q. Did you feel that you were, after you had for two or three hours talked to the man, in a position to give such an opinion?
A. I would have never voiced such an opinion to anybody else but if I write down my own impressions which I made, that was certainly meant just for my own personal use, and therefore they were made under the impression which I gained through the conversation.
Q. General, I am not at the moment interested in the purpose of the diary entry. I am mainly concerned with the fact whether or not you at a later time still maintained that opinion.
Q. As I have already said, at that time I couldn't even know the General properly and what I wrote down under this first impression wasn't even correct, and in essential points my own opinion changed in the course of our collaboration.
Q. Did you only have mocca to drink on that evening?
A. I believe yes, but I am afraid I can't answer that one.
Q. But I would still like to know. After all, it is not all that far back.
A. I am fairly sure that in a house which was run as General Rendulic's house was run there would be something else to drink as well.
Q. General, I would really be very pleased if you could strain your memory a little. After all, you don't have to be ashamed of anything.
A. No, but after all I am under oath here and all I can say is I don't quite know what we had to drink that evening but I am fairly sure we had alcoholic drinks too.
Q. And then the conversation went a little far afield, did it? I beg your pardon, General, you reported there you were invited for dinner. Then you talked for three hours or so, as you said, and apparently you were in very good company. That is, you had a lively conversation. And then you said when you started your diary entry you had mocca to drink. Now my question is very simple and it is the following was it only mocca you had to drink or were there alcoholic drinks too at your disposal in that house?
A. Yes, there were other drinks too.
Q. And if you try to call these things back to memory on the basis of those diary notes, do you now believe that this conversation might have been under the influence of this little festivity which you had there?
A. Oh yes, that is quite sure. Certainly it did.
Q. At a later date, General, did you again meet General Rendulic?
A. On two occasions.
Q. On these two occasions was there any talk about highly po litical matters as they are called here?
A. Not to the best of my recollection.
Q. In the interrogation, by the prosecution, you talked about this discussion - whether one or the other great power would not continue to fight. You called this subject a highly political one. Was that quite unusual that one discussed these things at the time?
A. No, by no means.
Q. And if I may now refer back to the ideological side of the conversation, now you have had a little time to think back about these things. What was actually discussed?
A. You mean ideologically?
Q. No, I mean when you reported at the beginning of August, 1944, ideologically.
A. If my recollection is correct, I had touched upon the question that according to the party program, religious freedom was somehow absolutely secured. And in connection with this problem somebody else must have had a contrasting opinion. I remember that now by looking at that diary entry.
Q. I am not quite clear what you mean. Do you mean that General Rendulic said that the party program wasn't quite so secure in all its fundamentals?
A. He said that it was out of date.
Q. What you mean is that the party didn't feel itself bound to these principles?
A. Yes, it must have been a remark of that sort.
Q. That would have been a remark against the party, wouldn't it?
A. I believe that we talked about a change which had taken place in the party program which was much debated at the time. After all, it is quite certain that in the party program religious freedom was assured but in many respects this point of the party program had not been properly carried out in actual practice, but I am very sorry I don't really know any details.
Q General, I don't want any details, All I want to know is what was the direction, the tendency, of General Rendulic's remark? I would like to put the question a little more precisely. Did he, for instance, state that it was unfortunate-
MR. RAPP. Your Honor, I think defense counsel is somewhat leading his own witness. I object to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Overruled.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. Did General Rendulic state that it was unfortunate that the party had changed its direction where the party program concerning the religious freedom was concerned? That is one possibility, or did he welcome this point of view of the party?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritsch, you can ask him what he said, I think that would get to the actual facts.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I tried that but the witness says that he cannot remember the exact words and now I would like to at least ascertain the tendency of this conversation.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if he doesn't know, he is not able to state, is he?
DR. FRITSCH: May I put the question again please, a little differently?
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q Witness, can you remember the tenor of this conversation? What I mean is what was the point of view which General Rendulic maintained? Was he on the side of religion or was he on the other side?
A. He was on the side of the restriction of political influence of church agencies.
Q And you, in your diary, used a little stronger expression, didn't you?
A. Undoubtedly, at first under the impression of this first meeting, I wrote down this prejudiced opinion.
Q. And just about when did your point of view change?
A. It changed through the close contact which I had in my work with General Rendulic.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I have no further questions to put.
THE PRESIDENT: Any further examination?
MR. RAPP: I only have one point, your Honor, and I would ask if we could have the recess now that I could check this particular one point.
THE PRESIDENT: All right, we will recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)