Q. General, when you mentioned the telephone conversation with General Keitel, you told us that Hitler had now demanded that the operation Northern Light (Nordlicht) be carried out consequently. This operation was demanded in view of the fact that the Russians were pursueing you. Did the Russians actually pursue you?
A. The Russians were moving up by the Kirkenes area and they followed our movements. They pursued us up to the Tana River. They Tana River is where I pointed to the fronter before.
Q. Please show it to us on the map. Perhaps you can show us Kirkenes first.
A. Kirkenes is here (indicating on map). I showed it wrong before. This is not the Fisher Peninsula; it is the Wardia Peninsula, and the other one is further to the East. I am showing now the Tana River which is the River which separates Finland from Norway.
Q. Will you give us the dale please when the Russians pressed forward to the Tana River?
A. That must have been towards the end of October.
Q. Did you expect the Russians to pursue you beyond the Tana River?
A. Yes, until the operation Northern Light was concluded -- that is until we had crossed the Lyngen-Fjord. We expected the Russians to pursue us. Above all, we were afraid that the Russians could overtake us by a movement at sea, and this in connection with, and with the help of, allied forces on sea and allied shipping means and also supported by air forces of the Western allies. The overall situation of the 20th Mountain Army was most inviting an Anglo-American-Russian joint operation against us. If the enemy wanted to achieve the destruction of the 20th Mountain Army up there in that arctic territory.
DR. FRITSCH: May it please the Tribunal, I would like to put an interim question. I had intended to submit photostats in Document Book II of the maps in which we are interested here. May I ask whether these maps are contained in Document Book II.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: No, the maps are not included. It seems that some mistake was made in them and they will not be delivered until tomorrow or the next day.
DR. FRITSCH: Thank you, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: We do have one copy of a map of Norway, here, however.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I just wanted to submit them at the same time as evidence and, therefore, I had asked for photostates to be made and a few days ago I gave them to the competent offices for inclusion in the document books, but I am afraid another mistake must have occurred here.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. General, just before we had talked about the pursuit of the Russians, beyond the Tana River, now when you realized that the Russians at that moment did not intend to pursue further, were not the dangers eliminated at that moment?
A. No. I believe I just stated that we had, above all, to expect a pursuit by the Russians on the sea route, and this overtaking operation on the sea would have been more or less independent of the land highway because the forces necessary for this overtaking operation could have been transported on the sea route and the supplies later as well.
Q. And you had at that time to expect such an operation?
A. Yes, we had always counted on such an operation until the time when we had crossed the Lyngen-Fjord.
Q. Were the German troops also threatened with a pursuing operation by the Fins? If, for this answer, you would make use of the map, General, I would be obliged.
A. After the fights in the South, that is on the Bottnik Bay, had been concluded and after we had managed to separate ourselves from the Fins there, the Fins pursued us on two highways. One is along the arctic route which would be on this map if this map was complete. It would go from this point to the North and it would end near this red arrow and then they were pursuing us.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Just a moment, please. The suggestion has been made that the points ought to be named in the transcript. It doesn't mean much when it says "from here to there." If you can state the places on the map as well as point them out -
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. General, would you be in a position to toll us the names and show them on the map, although I am afraid they are not all contained on that map?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, will you do it from now on, please, so that the record contains the necessary information?
A. I shall repeat then. After conclusion of the German-Finnish battles in the area Rovanjevi and in the area Kemi-Tornia, the Fins pursued us on two routes; for one on the arctic route in direction Porsamer Fjord, and secondly, along the Swedish-Finnish frontier in direction towards the Lyngen-Fjord.
Q. General, you were just now talking about the Swedish frontier. Was there any particular danger from that side and if so what was that danger?
A. We expected or at least thought it extremely probable that the Russians would carry out an operation of overtaking us through Sweden, thus making use of the ore railroad which led via Kiruna to the gates of Narwik. This consideration was close at hand because at the start of the Eastern campaign, German forces also had come from Norway via Sweden to Finland. May I say then, why shouldn't one favor which was given us by the Swedes also be granted in turn to the Russians?
Q. General, another question concerning tho Finns; what was the military strength of the Finns with respect to this Artic climate and this terrain concerned with their troops.
A. The Finns after all were fighting in their own country. That is they were fighting under conditions which they knew well as peasants, forresters, sportsmen and etc. They were particularly masters of battles in the jungles and in deserts, and I don't have to stress that they are particularly well versed in skiing. Every Finnish division and every Finnish brigade is completely mobile on skiis. Such an enemy was facing us at this winter-time and was particularly dangerous to us.
Q. General, do you mean to tell us that the distruction of a highway did not particularly impede these mobile soldiers?
A. No, of course the Finns also would have moved very much faster and they could overcome these destructions in summer as well as in winter, because in their whole organization, in their vehicle equipment they were not so much dependent on the highways as was any other Army. I have mentioned similar special units when I talked about the battle of the 19th corps on the Artic Sea Front.
Q. Now, if there had been no quarters available would that have had any particular influence on these soldiers?
A. Yes, of course it would because these soldiers if they wanted to survive at all in this winter, battle,they either had base this battle on a few built up areas, or else they had to carry along heatable tents forever individual person, and that would have meant for a unit mobile on skiis a considerable burden, because these tents would have to be transported by reindeer or some similar means.
Q. Now, lets turn once again to the reasons for this evacuation General; apart from the reasons which you have mentioned, and which I would like to designate as military reasons here, were there any other reasons for the Finnmark evacuation and for tho destruction which was carried out there?
A. Yes, I as a soldier was of course mainly moved by the military reasons, but I also know that the OKW also had political reasons.
The OKW wanted to prevent another Norway from developing, which would not have been occupied and controlled by us.
Q. Now, in consideration of the sparse population would this population have been a help or hindrance for the enemy?
A. These people would have meant a considerable help, because they all were people who knew every inch of the area, they knew the peculiarities of the climate up there on the Norwegian Fjord Coast. They knew of all the difficulties of this winter climate, of the snow storms and snow drifts which in the interior of the country were not as important as they were near the coast, and all these people where the terrain was concerned and also where the highways were concerned were a considerable help for any enemy that was in pursuit.
Q. General Hoelter, do you know anything about destructions of the town and harbour of Kirkenes and if so do you know anything about the effect of the destruction or who carried out the destruction?
A. Well, I know Kirkenes from my activity as Chief of the Corps on the Artic Sea Front. Kirkenes had in the preceding years always been the target for enemy air attacks, particularly the harbour installations, the industrial installations and the vicinity of these installations. Therefore, even before tho battles around Kirkenes had taken place this town had been destroyed to a considerable extent. What damage was caused later on when the actual battles around Kirkenes took place and to what extent tho destruction of all installations of military importance was extended over to the town area I am in no position to say.
Q. The battles around Kirkenes were rather swift, weren't they?
A. Yes, in the course of the fighting which I have described when I talked about the 19th Corps we had to give up Kirkenes a good deal quicker than we would have liked to do. We wanted to evacuate a lot of the material which we had stored there to the area of Narwik and further South, but the Russians did not leave us time to carry out these evacuations of material.
As I have described before the troops were waging a battle for their very existence so they had neither time for this evacuation nor did they even think about it. This was how it happened that a lot of material had to be destroyed in the Kirkenes area, and that an evacuation of the population and a destruction of domiciles and houses for the purpose of not letting it fall into the hands of the enemy in a usable state was not carried out as far as I know.
Q. Was it at any time known to you that the Russians transported some troops toward the South, and if so when was it?
A. Towards the end of November we learned through information from the OKW that the Russians transported individual units from the Karelia front to the Baltic Front and used them there.
Q. What was the influence that this transport of Russian forces had on the evacuation and the destruction in Finnmark?
A. The appearance of Russian forces which had originally confronted us and then appeared on the Baltic Front had no longer any influence on our own measures, because at that time the battles were for all practical purposes concluded. Besides we knew at the time the forces were no longer there. What we did not know was what the Russians still kept in the extreme North and what they had up their sleeves against us.
Q. General, I would like to put an entirely different question. What would the corresponding season be in central Europe at the end of November to that area about which we are talking now?
A. A comparison with mid-European conditions is not possible at all. The middle of November up there is extreme winter. The days only last a very few hours and during that time you can no longer sec the sun, and there is always twilight. The temperature is around 30 degrees and that happens already the end of October and the beginning of November.
Q. What was the strength of the Finns numerically?
A. You mean all the Finns.
Q. Yes.
A. The Finnish armed forces comprised several hundred thousand men.
Q. How many Finnish divisions had become available through Finland leaving the common war on the Russian front?
A. Without any trouble the Finnish could have used 20 to 30 divisions against us after the Russian front for all practical purposes had ceased to exist.
Q. And how strong was this mountain army, I mean numerically, you gave this to us before?
A. The 20th Mountain Army comprised about ten divisions.
Q. Do you in this include the divisions for the protection of the coast?
A. No, it was where the divisions which were committed for battle in the open and all these units were quite mobile.
Q. General, you talked about the possibility of a Russian landing; did you also count on landings of the Anglo-American forces and maybe of a joint action?
A. We always considered this possibility and expected it to occur and the fear that such an operation of the Russians combined with Anglo-American forces and on the part of the latter particularly toward the area of Narwik had almost become a fexed idea with the supreme headquarters, the supreme leadership.
Again and again the area of Narwik was pointed our to us, its significance as a R-boat base was repeatedly stressed, suitable also for the operations of our own submarines against the convoys from the west to east and the other way around. We knew that in the spring of 1945 from this base there wore to be operations of our most modern submarines.
Q. Did you also count on a landing in the province of Finnmark?
A. I have already stated that we counted particularly on a movement of overtaking our troops on the part of the Russians by the sea route. This opinion would have necessarily led to a landing operation in the province of Finmark.
Q. General, what about the attitude of the Finnish population when the Russian pursued and can you give us a comparison; for instance the attitude of the Norwegan population on the Arctic sea front?
A. For the Norwegian population in the area of Kirkenes, I would like to say they remained passive and let all events pass. From fighting action from the persuing Russians the Finnish population escaped in panic from all those areas where they expected the Russians to invade. For practical purposes that mean they left the entire area of Lappland, north of the Olo River and only in the very closest coastal areas of the Bottnik Bay did those people remain who were closest to the railway lines or where they could cross the Bottnik Bay with small vessels and thus escape the Russians.
Q. General, did you also expect a later Russian offensive? We have discussed the fact that the Russians pursued you up to the Tana River and what did you expect after this?
A. Since the winter meant an impediment to every operation up there and since it was a difficult season, we expected above all that Russian operation would start against the Lynjon Front as of the spring of 1945.
Q. And now let us turn back to the other date we mentioned, the end of October. General Jodl who was heard here as a witness and whom you mentioned previously as a commander of the 19th corps testified that he personally did not necessarily count on the Russians to follow up.
You were the chief of the 20th Mountain Army; was General Jodl in a position to judge this situation correctly?
A. Undoubtedly General Jodl was not in a position to do that at that time as he was commanding general of the 19th corps and he did not have the necessary information for the overall appraisement of the whole situation of the Mountain Army.
Q. A Norwegian general who was heard here as a witness testified that the winter it is not possible at all to move troops in Finnmark, because the frequently mentioned Highway 50 could not be kept free of snow; is this assumption correct from a military point of view?
A. I previously stated that the winter makes it difficult for all troops to fight, even if it is well versed in the methods of winter fighting, but that movements - and by this I mean movements of large troop bodies - can also take place under these winter conditions in this area was proved by us, I believe when we in winter carried out this operation "Northern Light" up there. On the occasion of this operation we mainly moved along Highway 50. I admit that winter was kind to us and that up to Christman there was not very much snow.
Q. Now during the evaluation were the Naval Forces subordinated to the 20th Mountain Army and thus also to General Rendulic?
A. When we are talking about the naval forces we have to distinguish between those forces which are land bound, for instance the many coastal batteries and on the other hand we have the real naval forces, which are serving at sea. Only those parts of the navy which were land bound had to be subordinate to us, because they had to be included in the movement on the supply routes and on Highway 50 and these parts of the navy were subordinate to us with respect to their movements and of course they would also have been subordinate to us if there had been a battle. All those forces which operated on sea remained subordinate to the Navy High Command Norway, they had to secure the sea flank and in their move ments and operations on the sea they had to be in tune with the movements on land carried out by the 20th Mountain Army.
Q. General, what was the enor of command? May I assume that you of the 20th Mountain Army wanted to use a vessel which is part of the naval forces for evacuation purposes? Were you in a position to give direct orders to the Commander of the vessel?
A. May I say the following? The execution of the evacuation was in the hands of the Generals of the 19th Mountain Corps and of the 71st Corps. These generals were subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the 20th Mountain Army and were responsible for the execution of the evacuation. If they had needed naval vessels, let us say, for the evacuation of a locality which could not possibly be carried out by land route or for the evacuation of an island, then these agencies would have requested the corresponding agencies of the navy to put these vessels at their disposal and then these boats of the navy would carry out the transport of these people.
Q. General, I would like to make it even more simple and clarify the problem. Could the Commander-in-Chief of the 20th Mountain Army give orders to any individual vessel or to any unit at sea?
A. No.
Q. General, does Colonel Hermann mean anything to you?
A. I know Colonel Hermann as an Army Adjutant of long standing. He was Army Adjutant at the time when I became Chief of the Army. Colonel Hermann was known as an expert of the Norwegian conditions and he was also known as a very moderate officer of the old school and as such he was charged with the affairs of the evacuation staff.
Q. In this connection -- I mean with his being in charge of the evacuation staff- did he ever come to see you?
A. Colonel Hermann reported after he had been made through our order of the 28th of October the leader of the evacuation staff to the Corps Headquarters. He reported to the Commander-in-Chief and to me.
Q. General, can you remember the discussion which you had with Colonel Hermann and can you briefly give us the main contents of this discussion?
A. His request was mainly to get directives for the evacuation. I do not remember details of this discussion. I do know, though, that I stressed particularly that the evacuation should be carried out under all consideration of the people hit by this measure.
Q. General, I would now like to talk of a different problem. Before you showed us on the map the nickel mine Kolosjoki. what was the significance of this mine?
A. The nickel mine Kolosjoki which is located in the extreme north of Lapland was to the best of my knowledge the only considerable nickel source in Europe. To own this mine was for the German armament industry of vital importance.
Q. On whose instructions did that mine work?
A. The mine was run on the instructions of the Minister for Armament and War Production. It was our function to protect the mine militarily against attacks from land and from air.
Q. At the beginning of September, then Finland left the war. How was the mine transferred from Finnish to German hands after that event?
A. When Finland left the alliance the Fins gradually withdrew their interests from the mines. The left the mining management as well as the actual production process. The mine could only be maintained with auxiliary forces and could he kept going under German management only to the extent of not suffering any damage in its technical installation. The most important thing was, above all, not to let the smelting pots get cold. We demanded special formations for this purpose from the Reich units who were versed in the maintaining of mines and with their help the mine was to be fully operated again.
Q. General, the prosecution has submitted a document which is document NOKW-064, Exhibit 508, Document Book XXII, on page 22 of the German text and 26 of the English document book. In this document it says that you had suggested to General Rendulic that when difficulties occurred with a view to the war importance of this mine you were to seize Baron Wrede, the manager, and, under threat of shooting him, force him to issue orders for the delivering up of the mine.
It further says in the document that General Rendulic agreed to this. Is that correct? I may add that this is a war diary entry. Are these remarks in the war diary correct, especially as far as they concern you?
A. I cannot remember the literal text of this suggestion which I made to the Commander in Chief. I don't know either whether the wording of the war diary entry is the same as the words used by me, but one thing is obvious. In a very clear and explicit manner, in this tense situation when we were to remain up there at that time I told him that this mine had under all circumstances to be kept running because otherwise the operation "Birke" of the 20th Mountain Army would lost all its meaning. I believe in such situations it may be expedient to voice a threat upon occasion even if one is convinced that this threat might for practical purposes never be carried out.
Q. And what was your agreement with the Baron later after all this? Was there a peaceful agreement on both sides?
A. Yes, we agreed fully. He himself approached us and he came to see us and we had dinner together and after that General Rendulic made it quite clear to him that this mine had to be kept going and could be kept going with the German special units which I had mentioned previously; and then we made a gentlemen's agreement which made it possible for us to keep the mine going to the fullest extent.
That there was no threat on that occasion and no unpleasantness can be seen from the fact that a lady who is a mutual acquaintance was invited with me to a farewell dinner where we all participated.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will recess until ninethirty tomorrow morning.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess until nine-thirty tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal recessed until 0930 hours 5 November 1947.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 5 November 1947, 0930, Judge Wennerstrum, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the Courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain as to whether or not all the defendants are present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please, Your Honors, all defendants are present in the courtroom except the defendant Speidel, who is excused, and the defendant von Weichs, who is in the hospital.
You may proceed Dr. Fritsch.
HERMANN HOELTER DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. FRITSCH: (for General Rendulic)
Q. General, yesterday we had talked about Norway and during the last question we discussed the order to carry out the evacuation of 8 October. We had discussed a few reasons which in your opinion contributed this a military necessity. Now I would like to discuss in this connection a few general problems with you. To begin with, will you please tell me what were the relations between the German Armed forces and the Norwegian population?
A. The relationship between the German armed forces and the Norwegian population was more than correct, one must call it a good relationship. To prove this ascertion, I would like to give you one example.
In Northern Norway we felt so secure we never felt it necessary to use convoys of vehicles, automobiles or trucks. We would go across the country for several hundred kilometers all alone and only in those places were the area was open to Russian attacks, as in the Veranger peninsula, up there we had to move our vehicles in convoys.
Q. And what was General Rendulic's attitude toward the Norwegian population?
A. General Rendulic took up a very responsible attitude toward the Norwegian population. He felt himself to be a trustee of their interests. He admonished us again and again not to do anything to hurt the population and to take all measures in such a way that it would not allow the Norwegian population to become obstinate. All he wanted was to maintain the good relations, which had existed for four years between the Norwegians and the German soldiers, whom we were retreating from the area.
Q. Did General Rendulic voice these ideas of his even in public?
A. Yes, shortly after General Rendulic took over command he gave an interview to the press. In this interview he expressed the fact that he felt himself to be a trustee for the Norwegian population. He appealed to the reasonableness of the Norwegian population. In this interview he also expressed the fact that he was opposed to any harshness.
Q. Did the Reich Commissar Terboven share this attitude?
A. I don't believe he did. I believe that the Reich Commissar was more of a representative of the idea of power.
Q. General, you were chief of staff and for a long period you were in the immediate surrounding of General Rendulic; what was the opinion you gained of General Rendulic as a military leader?
A. Although it is unusual that a soldiers evaluates publically a former superior. I shall do that in this case. I know General Rendulic as an excellent troop leader, he was a man of great personality, with clearness and foresight. He realized these things which were vital and important. Above all I have to mention his foresight with regard to our military operations and although the army found itself in an extremely difficult position at the time and although the whole responsibility for the destruction or existence of the army was in his hands, ho always maintained calmness and this calmness was felt by all his subordinates and also the men.
Q. Could this attitude and achievement be explained on the military measures taken at the time?
A. No, even from a human and psychological point of view, General Rendulic understood it perfectly to lead the army cleverly and subtly. It was usual in this isolated position in which the army found itself that people would be possimistic and stood up for men as well as officers who were looking anxiously over to the great Eastern front where the events with respect to Army group middle took such a bad course. At that time General Rendulic understood it with simple plain words to give comrades and men confidence and guidance for the future. Beyond this the men very soon realized that he took good care of them, he could take care of them in this situation because we had an abundance of material. There was no soldier at that time who did not have good food, plenty to smoke, etc. Beyond that the men realized that General Rendulic took an interest in purely human affairs. He would always take an interest in judicial matters and matters of complaints, etc.
Q. General, was there a particular harshness which you ever noticed in General Rendulic's attitude toward the civilian population and toward his soldiers?
A. General Rendulic of course demanded energetically that his orders be carried out promptly. If one calls that harsh, then he was a hard man, firm in a crisis and a superior kind of commander in chief. In all other questions which were part of the human problems he was just toward his soldiers and I might oven say occasionally he was even soft. Toward the civilian population also I never noticed any unnecessary harshness, which he might have shown.
Q. Did the N.S. guidance officers play a particular part in the 20th Mountain Army?
A. No, they did not play any other part then that which was prescribed for them by the directives and orders of the O.K.W.
Q. And what was General Rendulic's relations to the Reich Commissar Terboven?
A. This relation had to be called a very reserved one and it was tense. From the very first day of collaboration with the Norwegian agencies, General Rendulic rejected every interference of the Reich Commissar in affairs of the armed forces.
Q. Did he ever make any detailed comments about this to you?
A. Yes, on repeated occasions he told me: These people have to be shown their place and I must admit that I was somewhat worried at the time how this relationship might develop between these two men, who were important people in Norway. Occasionally I warned General Rendulic, I told him to be careful, especially in his utterances and I told him not to underestimate the backing which Terboven would receive from the highest agencies.
Q. General, when you consider the execution of the order of the 28th October 1941 now in retrospect would you even today at this point answer the question of the military necessity to the affirmative?
A. May I put to you a counter-question; if I were in the same position today and did not know about the actual consequences?
Q. That is how I mean it.
A. I would answer this question in the affirmative. A Military necessity can only be judged properly from the circumstances prevailing at the time and according to the particular situation. When this problem was under discussion, the question was this: Were we at the time dealing with an emergency and this is what I would now like to talk about; every military situation which one evaluates and judges has to be clearly defined as to three points: What am I to do? What is my task? Our task Was at the time to get the 20th Mountain Army as completely as possible out of a desperate situation and to lead as strong and as complete a unit as possible back to the Reich. The second point, which we saw ourselves faced with was: What can the enemy do and what are the enemies intentions. At that time we had to assume that the enemy wanted to destroy us. Could he do that? I believe in my statements of yesterday, I have spoken in detain what the dangers were that threatened us. From the east, from the Artic sea superior Russian forces were moving up on us, from the South, the Finns were moving up on us. The Artic sea was one large question mark and there at any time the Angle-American forces could appear with air and sea forces. The third question was: What could we do against that.
All we could do was march, march and march again and we had to burn our bridges behind us in the real sense of the word and within this scope the destruction and evacuation has to be considered in what we had to do and that was to rob the enemy of their accommodations and thus keep them away from us. Looking back on it now, what I would like to say is if one considers matters from our armchair point of view and knows everything that has happened, one should not and cannot in my opinion properly evaluate the question of a military necessity.
Q. There are no further questions which I would like to put in direct examination to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: You may cross-examine, Mr. Rapp.
Cross - Examination BY MR. RAPP:
Q. Very well, Your Honor.
Witness, during your career as chief of staff of the 20th Army in Finland, at the time that General Rendulic succeeded General Dietl, did the 20th Army take Finnish hostages?
A. Finnish hostages were taken after the Finns had taken up open hostilities against us and after in the course of these combat actions the Finns had carried out attacks on German hospitals in Tornie.
Q. Witness, were you at any time interrogated about this point by the Prosecution in a pre-trial interrogation?
A. Concerning the fact whether or not hostages were taken in Finland, I was not interrogated.
Q. During this interrogation were you under oath?
A. Partially.
Q. Would you explain what you mean by partially?
A. I was not under oath when I was interrogated by Mr. Rapp and I was not under oath on the occasion of the first interrogation which Mr. Kaufmann carried out.
Q. Now, if I would count this up, you would not have been under oath at all, because you were only two times interrogated , once by myself and once by Mr. Kaufmann; would you tell me which times you were under oath?
A. I was interrogated by Mr. Kaufmann on several occasions I know and I think the records of Mr. Kaufmann's interrogations will show when I was under oath and when I was not.
Q. Were you ever asked in connection with this interrogation whether the 20th Mountain Army took hostages and no locality was mentioned as to whether it was in Finmark or Finland? It was merely stated the 20th Mountain Army?