Q. General, what was the enor of command? May I assume that you of the 20th Mountain Army wanted to use a vessel which is part of the naval forces for evacuation purposes? Were you in a position to give direct orders to the Commander of the vessel?
A. May I say the following? The execution of the evacuation was in the hands of the Generals of the 19th Mountain Corps and of the 71st Corps. These generals were subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the 20th Mountain Army and were responsible for the execution of the evacuation. If they had needed naval vessels, let us say, for the evacuation of a locality which could not possibly be carried out by land route or for the evacuation of an island, then these agencies would have requested the corresponding agencies of the navy to put these vessels at their disposal and then these boats of the navy would carry out the transport of these people.
Q. General, I would like to make it even more simple and clarify the problem. Could the Commander-in-Chief of the 20th Mountain Army give orders to any individual vessel or to any unit at sea?
A. No.
Q. General, does Colonel Hermann mean anything to you?
A. I know Colonel Hermann as an Army Adjutant of long standing. He was Army Adjutant at the time when I became Chief of the Army. Colonel Hermann was known as an expert of the Norwegian conditions and he was also known as a very moderate officer of the old school and as such he was charged with the affairs of the evacuation staff.
Q. In this connection -- I mean with his being in charge of the evacuation staff- did he ever come to see you?
A. Colonel Hermann reported after he had been made through our order of the 28th of October the leader of the evacuation staff to the Corps Headquarters. He reported to the Commander-in-Chief and to me.
Q. General, can you remember the discussion which you had with Colonel Hermann and can you briefly give us the main contents of this discussion?
A. His request was mainly to get directives for the evacuation. I do not remember details of this discussion. I do know, though, that I stressed particularly that the evacuation should be carried out under all consideration of the people hit by this measure.
Q. General, I would now like to talk of a different problem. Before you showed us on the map the nickel mine Kolosjoki. what was the significance of this mine?
A. The nickel mine Kolosjoki which is located in the extreme north of Lapland was to the best of my knowledge the only considerable nickel source in Europe. To own this mine was for the German armament industry of vital importance.
Q. On whose instructions did that mine work?
A. The mine was run on the instructions of the Minister for Armament and War Production. It was our function to protect the mine militarily against attacks from land and from air.
Q. At the beginning of September, then Finland left the war. How was the mine transferred from Finnish to German hands after that event?
A. When Finland left the alliance the Fins gradually withdrew their interests from the mines. The left the mining management as well as the actual production process. The mine could only be maintained with auxiliary forces and could he kept going under German management only to the extent of not suffering any damage in its technical installation. The most important thing was, above all, not to let the smelting pots get cold. We demanded special formations for this purpose from the Reich units who were versed in the maintaining of mines and with their help the mine was to be fully operated again.
Q. General, the prosecution has submitted a document which is document NOKW-064, Exhibit 508, Document Book XXII, on page 22 of the German text and 26 of the English document book. In this document it says that you had suggested to General Rendulic that when difficulties occurred with a view to the war importance of this mine you were to seize Baron Wrede, the manager, and, under threat of shooting him, force him to issue orders for the delivering up of the mine.
It further says in the document that General Rendulic agreed to this. Is that correct? I may add that this is a war diary entry. Are these remarks in the war diary correct, especially as far as they concern you?
A. I cannot remember the literal text of this suggestion which I made to the Commander in Chief. I don't know either whether the wording of the war diary entry is the same as the words used by me, but one thing is obvious. In a very clear and explicit manner, in this tense situation when we were to remain up there at that time I told him that this mine had under all circumstances to be kept running because otherwise the operation "Birke" of the 20th Mountain Army would lost all its meaning. I believe in such situations it may be expedient to voice a threat upon occasion even if one is convinced that this threat might for practical purposes never be carried out.
Q. And what was your agreement with the Baron later after all this? Was there a peaceful agreement on both sides?
A. Yes, we agreed fully. He himself approached us and he came to see us and we had dinner together and after that General Rendulic made it quite clear to him that this mine had to be kept going and could be kept going with the German special units which I had mentioned previously; and then we made a gentlemen's agreement which made it possible for us to keep the mine going to the fullest extent.
That there was no threat on that occasion and no unpleasantness can be seen from the fact that a lady who is a mutual acquaintance was invited with me to a farewell dinner where we all participated.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will recess until ninethirty tomorrow morning.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess until nine-thirty tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal recessed until 0930 hours 5 November 1947.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 5 November 1947, 0930, Judge Wennerstrum, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the Courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain as to whether or not all the defendants are present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please, Your Honors, all defendants are present in the courtroom except the defendant Speidel, who is excused, and the defendant von Weichs, who is in the hospital.
You may proceed Dr. Fritsch.
HERMANN HOELTER DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. FRITSCH: (for General Rendulic)
Q. General, yesterday we had talked about Norway and during the last question we discussed the order to carry out the evacuation of 8 October. We had discussed a few reasons which in your opinion contributed this a military necessity. Now I would like to discuss in this connection a few general problems with you. To begin with, will you please tell me what were the relations between the German Armed forces and the Norwegian population?
A. The relationship between the German armed forces and the Norwegian population was more than correct, one must call it a good relationship. To prove this ascertion, I would like to give you one example.
In Northern Norway we felt so secure we never felt it necessary to use convoys of vehicles, automobiles or trucks. We would go across the country for several hundred kilometers all alone and only in those places were the area was open to Russian attacks, as in the Veranger peninsula, up there we had to move our vehicles in convoys.
Q. And what was General Rendulic's attitude toward the Norwegian population?
A. General Rendulic took up a very responsible attitude toward the Norwegian population. He felt himself to be a trustee of their interests. He admonished us again and again not to do anything to hurt the population and to take all measures in such a way that it would not allow the Norwegian population to become obstinate. All he wanted was to maintain the good relations, which had existed for four years between the Norwegians and the German soldiers, whom we were retreating from the area.
Q. Did General Rendulic voice these ideas of his even in public?
A. Yes, shortly after General Rendulic took over command he gave an interview to the press. In this interview he expressed the fact that he felt himself to be a trustee for the Norwegian population. He appealed to the reasonableness of the Norwegian population. In this interview he also expressed the fact that he was opposed to any harshness.
Q. Did the Reich Commissar Terboven share this attitude?
A. I don't believe he did. I believe that the Reich Commissar was more of a representative of the idea of power.
Q. General, you were chief of staff and for a long period you were in the immediate surrounding of General Rendulic; what was the opinion you gained of General Rendulic as a military leader?
A. Although it is unusual that a soldiers evaluates publically a former superior. I shall do that in this case. I know General Rendulic as an excellent troop leader, he was a man of great personality, with clearness and foresight. He realized these things which were vital and important. Above all I have to mention his foresight with regard to our military operations and although the army found itself in an extremely difficult position at the time and although the whole responsibility for the destruction or existence of the army was in his hands, ho always maintained calmness and this calmness was felt by all his subordinates and also the men.
Q. Could this attitude and achievement be explained on the military measures taken at the time?
A. No, even from a human and psychological point of view, General Rendulic understood it perfectly to lead the army cleverly and subtly. It was usual in this isolated position in which the army found itself that people would be possimistic and stood up for men as well as officers who were looking anxiously over to the great Eastern front where the events with respect to Army group middle took such a bad course. At that time General Rendulic understood it with simple plain words to give comrades and men confidence and guidance for the future. Beyond this the men very soon realized that he took good care of them, he could take care of them in this situation because we had an abundance of material. There was no soldier at that time who did not have good food, plenty to smoke, etc. Beyond that the men realized that General Rendulic took an interest in purely human affairs. He would always take an interest in judicial matters and matters of complaints, etc.
Q. General, was there a particular harshness which you ever noticed in General Rendulic's attitude toward the civilian population and toward his soldiers?
A. General Rendulic of course demanded energetically that his orders be carried out promptly. If one calls that harsh, then he was a hard man, firm in a crisis and a superior kind of commander in chief. In all other questions which were part of the human problems he was just toward his soldiers and I might oven say occasionally he was even soft. Toward the civilian population also I never noticed any unnecessary harshness, which he might have shown.
Q. Did the N.S. guidance officers play a particular part in the 20th Mountain Army?
A. No, they did not play any other part then that which was prescribed for them by the directives and orders of the O.K.W.
Q. And what was General Rendulic's relations to the Reich Commissar Terboven?
A. This relation had to be called a very reserved one and it was tense. From the very first day of collaboration with the Norwegian agencies, General Rendulic rejected every interference of the Reich Commissar in affairs of the armed forces.
Q. Did he ever make any detailed comments about this to you?
A. Yes, on repeated occasions he told me: These people have to be shown their place and I must admit that I was somewhat worried at the time how this relationship might develop between these two men, who were important people in Norway. Occasionally I warned General Rendulic, I told him to be careful, especially in his utterances and I told him not to underestimate the backing which Terboven would receive from the highest agencies.
Q. General, when you consider the execution of the order of the 28th October 1941 now in retrospect would you even today at this point answer the question of the military necessity to the affirmative?
A. May I put to you a counter-question; if I were in the same position today and did not know about the actual consequences?
Q. That is how I mean it.
A. I would answer this question in the affirmative. A Military necessity can only be judged properly from the circumstances prevailing at the time and according to the particular situation. When this problem was under discussion, the question was this: Were we at the time dealing with an emergency and this is what I would now like to talk about; every military situation which one evaluates and judges has to be clearly defined as to three points: What am I to do? What is my task? Our task Was at the time to get the 20th Mountain Army as completely as possible out of a desperate situation and to lead as strong and as complete a unit as possible back to the Reich. The second point, which we saw ourselves faced with was: What can the enemy do and what are the enemies intentions. At that time we had to assume that the enemy wanted to destroy us. Could he do that? I believe in my statements of yesterday, I have spoken in detain what the dangers were that threatened us. From the east, from the Artic sea superior Russian forces were moving up on us, from the South, the Finns were moving up on us. The Artic sea was one large question mark and there at any time the Angle-American forces could appear with air and sea forces. The third question was: What could we do against that.
All we could do was march, march and march again and we had to burn our bridges behind us in the real sense of the word and within this scope the destruction and evacuation has to be considered in what we had to do and that was to rob the enemy of their accommodations and thus keep them away from us. Looking back on it now, what I would like to say is if one considers matters from our armchair point of view and knows everything that has happened, one should not and cannot in my opinion properly evaluate the question of a military necessity.
Q. There are no further questions which I would like to put in direct examination to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: You may cross-examine, Mr. Rapp.
Cross - Examination BY MR. RAPP:
Q. Very well, Your Honor.
Witness, during your career as chief of staff of the 20th Army in Finland, at the time that General Rendulic succeeded General Dietl, did the 20th Army take Finnish hostages?
A. Finnish hostages were taken after the Finns had taken up open hostilities against us and after in the course of these combat actions the Finns had carried out attacks on German hospitals in Tornie.
Q. Witness, were you at any time interrogated about this point by the Prosecution in a pre-trial interrogation?
A. Concerning the fact whether or not hostages were taken in Finland, I was not interrogated.
Q. During this interrogation were you under oath?
A. Partially.
Q. Would you explain what you mean by partially?
A. I was not under oath when I was interrogated by Mr. Rapp and I was not under oath on the occasion of the first interrogation which Mr. Kaufmann carried out.
Q. Now, if I would count this up, you would not have been under oath at all, because you were only two times interrogated , once by myself and once by Mr. Kaufmann; would you tell me which times you were under oath?
A. I was interrogated by Mr. Kaufmann on several occasions I know and I think the records of Mr. Kaufmann's interrogations will show when I was under oath and when I was not.
Q. Were you ever asked in connection with this interrogation whether the 20th Mountain Army took hostages and no locality was mentioned as to whether it was in Finmark or Finland? It was merely stated the 20th Mountain Army?
A. In all these interrogations I was never even asked ab out any events which took place in Finland. The questions which were put to me always referred to the Nordlicht, Northern Light, and that is the withdrawal from Lappland and Northern Norway via Lyngen-ford.
Q. Witness, you did not answer my question. I asked you whether during such interrogations you were asked generally whether or not the 20th Mountain Army ever took any hostages and during such interrogations neither Finland or Finmark was mentioned; you merely asked about the 20th Mountain Army and you know that the 20th Mountain Army was in Finland as well as in Finmark?
A. I know quite well where the 20th Mountain Army was and I only considered this question which was put to me as referring to Norway.
Q. Witness, will you explain to us whether or not you were rather favorably impressed by the skill and equipment the Russians showed when they met you first in Finland and later on in Finmark?
A. The Russians were particularly suitably equipped for this warfare in the Tundra. The Nucleus of the troops which confronted us were old Karelian units which were well versed in winter warfare and had tested this skill in the war with the Finns in this theater of war.
Q. Witness, will you tell us whether it is true that at first -that is, at the very beginning of October -- out of tactical considerations the 20th Mountain Army was only in favor of destroying lines of communications, bridges and such means of transportation which were not necessary for the fishing, that is, with the exception of small fishing smacks and cutters and also all the barracks and installations which were constructed by the German Army and were more or less owned by the German Army? Did you at first intend to confine your destruction only to those four mentioned installations, that is, at the very early beginning of October?
A. We believed that we could concentrate the population and that we could then destroy those quarters which were no longer used and, apart from that, of course, we wanted to carry out all those destructions which were militarily speaking absolutely necessary, By this I mean highways, bridges, air bases, port installations and the like.
Q. Is it correct that the order for the total destruction and evacuation of the Finmark which you received from Colonel General Jodl of the OKW was dated the 29th of October 1944? Is that correct?
A. Yes, this order was dated the 28th of October.
Q. Did you say during your direct examination that this order was to some extent possibly the result of Terboven's -- may we call it -"pressure" or "intervening" with Hitler and the OKW?
A. Yes, because in the OKW order which gave the instructions for the destructions this fact is actually contained in so many words.
Q. Terboven, if I understand correctly, was the Reich Commissioner for Norway.
A. Yes, he was.
Q. That was a purely political field, was it not?
A. I don't understand the question. What was a purely political field?
Q. His job was a political job; it was not a military job. Is that correct?
A. Yes, it was a political job; that is correct.
Q. Isn't it thus quite clear that all that which the 20th Mountain Army at the beginning of October suggested in doing in the line of what should be destroyed could rightfully be called "military necessity", anything which was incorporated into the order of the 18th of October 1944 at the suggestion of Terboven and thus went beyond that what the 20th Army considered militarily necessary? It was done for political considerations only?
A. In my last answer which I gave to defense counsel on direct examination I stated the reasons why we regarded the instructions of the OKW as a military necessity and recognized them as such. Whether or not this order beyond that was also given for political reasons or whether, from the point of view of the Reich Commissioner-it was given mainly for political reasons or even whether the Fuehrer gave it for political reasons, does not represent a decisive factor, in connection with the fact that we recognized its military justification.
Q. Mow, witness, let's go over this again and maybe you are kind enough to give me the answer again rather than refer me to your previous testimony. I wanted to know from the following: you are prepared to destroy certain installations for reasons of military necessity at the beginning of October, were you not?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. On the 28th of October, or thereabout you received an OKW order, or a Fuehrer Order in this particular instance, telling you to destroy all of Finmark and, if necessary, evacuate the indigenous population forcibly. Is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. The order of the 28th of October went way beyond that what you intended to do at the beginning of October. Is that also correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. You told us, and you even referred us to the order, that it is apparent that Terboven had his fingers in that particular "pie."
Is that correct?
A .Yes, it is.
Q. You furthermore told us that Terboven was the political representative of the Reich and was not a qualified military expert.
A. Yes, I said that.
Q. Nevertheless, the OKW , for reasons unknown to us at this time, seemed to have followed his suggestions and incorporated political considerations into this destruction order. Is that correct?
A. Yes, I am quite sure political reasons were also considered.
Q. Isn't it true that, in view of that, all those things which were destroyed , or which had to be done for political reasons upon the suggestion of Terboven could not clearly be called military necessity despite the fact that you got this order from a military office; namely, the OKW?
A. Well, that is a debatable point. At that time we were of the opinion that this order was a military necessity and we in the beginning decided on the "minor" solution because we anticipated particular difficulties in the leading back of these people. The OKW order was undoubtedly basically a measure which was completely accepted by us.
Q. When you received this order -- I am referring to the one of the 28th of October -- you told us that your Commanding General defendant Rendulic, got in touch with the OKW and wanted to get further explanations, if possible, that he even tried to play down the severity of the order. Is that correct?
A. I testified yesterday that the General tried to stick to the original direction of the OKW order of the 4th of October.
Q. Just when did you try that?
A. After this order had been received by us as a teletype.
Q Up to that time, in other words, none of you, including your Commanding General, were convinced that it was a military necessity; otherwise, he wouldn't have telephoned, would he?
A From the very beginning we realized that a racial measure -- by this I mean an evacuation and subsequent destruction of the accommodations -- would be most secure measure to keep the enemy from us. We did not on our own initiative carry it out because we considered the human factors. We considered the Norwegian population and we did not want to put them in such a position with winter coming.
Q Witness, any time that you can afford to let human consideration enter into your judgment, if you even play with that thought, in reference to a severe military necessity then the word "military necessity" is not applied in its proper sense. Either it is a military necessity or it is an arbitrary decision; it can only be one of the two?
A It always remains a military necessity. Not every military necessity has to be carried out.
Q Witness, that brings us to the next point. Was this order carried out because it was a direct Fuehrer order?
AAfter the discussion of matters between General Rendulic and General Jodl there was no further talk about this subject. The order had been clearly given and it was carried out by us.
Q Will you answer my question, please, witness, whether or not you carried out this order because it was a Fuehrer order? I know that you carried it out. I just want to know why.
A Soldiers are used to carry out definite orders which are given to them.
Q In other words, if I understand you right, it was carried out because it was a Fuehrer order. Is that right?
A The order was carried out just because it was an order.
Q And where did the order come from?
A The order came from the OKW.
Q Is that the same as the Fuehrer?
A The Fuehrer is one person. The OKI is a Command Agency.
Q Who was the supreme commander of the German armed forces?
A The supreme commander of the German armed forces was the Fuehrer.
Q Was the OKI subordinate to him?
A How do you mean that?
Q -
A Yes, of course.
Q Was every Fuehrerbefehl of military necessity?
A I don't know that.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the question again? I didn't got it?
Q Was every Fuehrer order a military necessity?
A If military necessities were concerned, then yes; but there are Fuehrer orders which were issued in an entirely different sphere.
Q Witness, I am obviously talking about Hitler in his capacity as supreme commander of the armed forces. I am not interested in his position as chief of the Nazi Party or any other jobs he held. I am still trying to have you tell me whether or not you put a military necessity on the same basis as a Hitler order.
A In this particular instance the Fuehrer order was for us a military necessity.
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, I would like to ask the Tribunal to instruct the defendant Rendulic to refrain from prompting the witness. I have on two occasions now noticed that the defendant Rendulic nodded his head at very critical points.
THE PRESIDENT: If the statement made by the prosecution is correct, I feel that the defendant Rendulic should desist. This witness can take care of himself and I am sure that the defendant has no desire, and I hope no intention of conducting himself in a manner which would be prejudicial.
You may proceed.
MR. RAPP: Thank you, your Honor.
Q Witness, in view of the fact that the Russians were well equipped and well trained, wasn't it quite apparent to you that if they had chosen to invade the province of Finmark during that time of the year they could have done so any time they pleased whether you destroyed these fishing huts and small villages or not?
A Settlements of any kind represent in this Arctic area a means of fighting, in the fight against the enemy, winter and cold, and in order to take this means of fighting away we had to do these things.
Q Did you ever think about the fact that the Russians may have guessed that you would apply a scorched earth policy if it became apparent to you that they would follow you up and consequently that they made preparations as far as equipping their troops is concerned, accordingly?
A The units which operate in that area have to be equipped accordingly because every military operation up there has more the characteristics of an expedition than the characteristics of an operation and that if of an expedition to the Arctic area and equipment has to be according and the equipment has to include means of accommodation if the houses are destroyed and it can include less such equipment if the houses are still standing.
Q Would you say that the destruction of Finmark and the evacuation of the native population had a palliative result or did it actually permanently prevent the Russians from following you up?
A It would have certainly made things a good deal more difficult for them irrespective whether or not they would have pursued on the land route or on the sea route; besides, this measure was not taken up there the first time. The Russians, the time when we entered Karelia burned down everything and the Finns did exactly the same when they had to evade the Russians in the winter war.
Q Witness, do you believe that the destruction of Finmark and the forceful evacuation of the native population made the Russians change their mind not to follow up?
A I don't know that.
Q What was the furtherest advance the Russians penetrated into Finmark?
A Up to the Tana River.
Q Was the in the nature of a reconnaisance or by force?
A The Russians moved up to the 19th Corps so quickly because the destructions in the Kirkenes area and in the Varanger Peninsula allowed this. We considered the Russian spearheads at the Tana River and as the spearheads of the enemy who was pursuing us.
Q What happened to your air reconnaisance?
A Our air reconnaisance was carried out as far as this was possible around that time of the year. I described this session yesterday; twilight and only a very few hours of daylight, et cetera.
Q Did the Russians actually penetrate beyond the Tana River that winter?
A I don't know that.
Q When did they reach the Tana River?
A That was around the end of October, roughly around that time. It might have been during the first days of November.
Q You were the Chief of Staff of the 20th Mountain Army under the successor to the defendant Rendulic, General Boehme? Is that correct?
A Yes, it is correct.
Q Right up to the surrender of the German forces in Norway in May 1945 -- is that right?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q Just how long did the destruction of Norway continue under the 20th Mountain Army led by General Boehme?
A I don't know whether at this late date any destructions of importance were carried out at all. The only outposts could have been concerned from which material of importance could have to be secured. I could not imagine any other reasons.
Q. Well, first of all, you ought to know them as Chief of Staff, Certainly I didn't suggest to you any time factor. Will you now tell me just how late destructions were still carried out?
A. I'm afraid I can't answer that. Will you please give me any details as to area or to date?
Q. The only suggestion I can give you in the State of Norway. And the only time factor I can give you is around the 6th or 7th of May. Now, up to that time you have to help yourself.
A. Around that time, you are saying, there were destructions in Finnmark?
Q. I don't think you followed my question, Witness. I will repeat it. I'm now talking about all of Norway, including the province of Finnmark, destructions by the XXth Mountain Army when you were Chief of Staff, when you were there. Until when did the destructions last?
A. Up to now we've talked about destructions within the scope of the Operation Northern Light.
Q. Now, pardon me, Witness. I'm not asking you about that. I gave you a specific question. I have reasons to ask you that question.
A. Well, with the best will in the world I don't know what you are driving at with this question.
Q. You must leave that up to me. I'm asking you a question. If you can answer it I think you ought to answer it; if you cannot answer it because you do not know the facts...
A. I cannot answer that question because I do not know what you're asking of me.
Q. All right, I'll give it to you now for the third time. You were Chief of Staff of the XXth Mountain Army up to the surrender of the German forces in Norway. Is that correct or not?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. And at that time the XXth Mountain Army was commanded by General Boehme who succeeded General Rendulic. Is that correct?
A. Yes, that is also correct.
Q. You told us previously that the Russians did not go beyond the Tana River. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And what date did you fix for that?
A. The beginning of November and the end of October 1945.
Q. You didn't mean 1945 but 1944.
A. I'm sorry; I mean the end of October or the beginning of November, 1944.
Q. Now, you have got all the facts on which we agree. Now, my question: How long did the XXth Mountain Army continue destructions in Norway?
A. Apart from destructions within the scope of the Operation Northern Light I do not know what was done in that way by us at any later date, up to the spring of 1945.
DR. FRITSCH (Counsel for the Defendant Rendulic): May I point out a mistake in the translation which might have influenced the answer? It has been translated "What destructions were you to carry out?" I believe the question which Mr. Rapp asked was slightly different.
MR. RAPP: I'm somewhat at a loss, but I think the Witness answered the question in any event.
THE PRESIDENT: I take it that the statement made by the Counsel for the Defendant was repeated so that the Witness now understands what was said and the suggestion made by Counsel; and, if, in the light of that, he wishes to make any change or make any further statement he's privileged to do so.