The other reason was that supplies in this area which I have just pointed out on the map was no longer guaranteed, because the Western powers were completely in control both of the sea and of the air over the North Sea and the Arctic Sea.
The OKW to whom we had made presentations finally subscribed to our view and ordered on 4 October, that Northern Lapland be given up. Also Northern Norway right down to the Luenenfjord with the proviso that in that operation all artificial buildings, roads, harbors installations -- in one work, all those objectives which were of military importance be destroyed; and the population of military age was to be taken along. That order which came in on 4 October addressed to us was on the same day and in the same sense passed on to the 19th Mountain Corps in the Arctic front.
Q General, you spoke of the Russian superiority. What was the proportion of forces between the Russians and the 20th Mountain Army late in the summer of 1944?
A The Russians in the late summer of 1944 had a three-fold or four-fold superiority over us.
Q. Was this unhappy proportion yet worse at certain places, or was that the worst of which you can think?
A. No, that was the over-all proportion. At places where the Russians attacked and fighting ensued the proportion was, of course, yet more to our disadvantage.
Q. Was this numerical superiority of the Russians maintained?
A. On the whole, yes. By and by the proportion changed to our disadvantage because we were given the order to send units home to the Reich as quickly as possible.
Q. When did you hear for the first time that the units had to be sent home?
A. The first order, reached us by the end of September or the beginning of October that we should hand over one division at first. By the end of October we had to hand over yet more units, a total of five divisions, in fact, and one commander. That meant more than half of the forces of the entire Army.
Q. General, let us go back to the disengaging movement. Was the Operation "Birke" maintained? Will you tell us something about that?
A. The Operation Birke, without delay, was changed into the Operation "Nordlicht" (Nordic Light). We could not afford to stop and stay there. After all, we had to continue the operation, without any preparations, as far down as the Lyngen-fjord, and every day without ice and snow which we could use was, for all practical purposes, equivalent to a successful battle.
Q. You spoke of Operation "Birke" and operation "Nordlicht". What was Operation Nordlicht, briefly?
A. Operation "Nordlicht" was the operation which the OKW had ordered on the 4th of October. That is to say, it was the disengaging movement from Lappland and Northern Norway right across the Lyngen-fjord.
Q. Now, what was the effect which this order had on the Arctic Front?
A. The Arctic Front was to be held, at first, until such time when the two southern Corps reached a point up North, so that they should from among the forces of the XIXth Corps not be held up any longer and be involved in fighting. That was the moment when the XIXth Corps, was as it were, a sort of butt pointing to the East and was also to be set in motion and disengage itself in the direction of Norway.
Q. Now, General, did the Russians give you sufficient time for your disengaging movement? Could you do as you wanted to?
A. No, the Russians attacked earlier than we liked. They quite obviously endeavored to prevent an orderly and proper disengaging movement, such as had been possible with the two southern Corps. The Russians over-ran a division which protected the southern flank of that corps, and thus they pushed into the back of the front simultaneously from the Fischer Penninsula, and they carried out an operation armed at the rear of the front. And that was how the XIXth Corps faced an extremely difficult position.
Q. You've given us some of the reasons. Can you describe for us the situation in which the XIXth Corps found itself? Can you be a little clearer on that point?
A. The XIXth Corps was divided into a number of combat units, which was caused by this Russian operation. At many points the Corps was in extremely tight corners, and it would not have been able to get out of them by itself. We were forced to reinforce the Corps with forces which we could release from the Finnish area, in the area near Tornia.
We could send them there on trucks over a distance of roughly 800 Km. We also had to use forces of a division which came back from Kandalakscha, and send them there also on lorries and trucks. This was how it was finally possible to give the Corps that support which it needed in order to prevent its being destroyed. In those days along the Arctic Front there was extremely severe fighting, and losses were suffered by both sides. We had to sacrifice and leave behind much material along the front sector which, because of the Arctic winter, had to be supplied for many months ahead. The Corps fought in those days for its naked life. The Russians decided the speed of the operations, and it became clear to us that the Russians not only wanted to wipe out the XIXth Corps, but they wanted to intercept the forces which were marching along to the North, along the arctic Road, and after their destruction they wanted to invade Finnmark.
Q. How do you conclude this latter fact?
A. Mainly from the way in which the Russians fought. To begin with, they used their forces in a strongly concentrated manner. Where ever the Russians managed to make a gap, they immediatey pursued rughlesslessly. From their extremely skillful maneuvers and the appearance of a new group of forces in the area southwest of Murmansk, one could conclude that they were anxious to have a decisive operation directed against the XXth Mountain Army inasmuch as it was within their grip.
Q. General, would you, once again, give us the exact date of these events?
A. These things occurred by the middle and end of October.
Q. As far as OKW was concerned did they do anything at the time in order to influence these events or even control them?
A. Yes, it was in that situation the order burst in on us, which was dated the 28th of October and ordered the evacuation and destruction of Northern Norway, in contrast to our proposition, but they were basing themselves, it would appear, on the suggestion made by the Reich Commissar for Norway.
Q. About this order--I mean the teletype letter from the OKW dated the 28th of October---was there a telephone conversation or any other type of conversation with the OKW?
A. Yes, there was a telephone conversation between the Commander in Chief and General Jodl concerning that order.
Q. Were you present during that telephone call?
A. I'm not quite sure, whether I actually listened in to the conversation or whether General Rendulic told me what the conversation was about.
Q. Will you please tell us the contents of that telephone conversation held between General Jodl of the OKW and General Rendulic, as far as you can remember it?
A. General Rendulic wanted to get General Jodl to leave matters as they stood in the order of the 4th of October. General Jodl said that it was too late now and that the Fuehrer had ordered all those measures, that is to say, the evacuation and the complete destruction of Northern Norway. General Jodl expressed on the occasion that the Fuehrer was annoyed concerning the slack manner in which matters had been carried out appertaining to the first order to the XXth Army.
Q. May it please the Tribunal, may I suggest that it is a good moment for the recess?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Yes, we'll take our afternoon recess at this time.
I might say, Dr. Fritsch, that Document Book II was delivered to us just a few moments ago.
DR. FRITSCH: Thank you, Your Honor.
(A Recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom please take their places.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. General, before the recess we discussed the order of the 28th of October, and we discussed the fact that in view of this order there was a telephone conversation between General Jodl of the OKW and General Rendulic. And finally you had talked about the fact that on the occasion of this telephone conversation, General Jodl informed General Rendulic of the fact that Hitler was indignant because of the alack carrying out of the evacuation. What I would like to ask you now, General, is did you consider the date -- that is the end of October 1944 -- very suitable and did you consider that at that time the evacuation was indicated?
A. On principle, yes, I did, For several reasons.
Q. And what are the reasons?
A. One reason is the climate and the terrain and, secondly, the enemy and his method of fighting which he up till then had shown us.
Q. Will you please comment on these problems? First of all, General, how was it that the terrain and the climate influenced the operations?
A. The 20th Mountain Army had, for the anticipated operation, been exposed to the climate and to the terrain. That country is very sparcely populated. Every soldier who had fought in this arctic area had realized that even a heatable tent presented a means against the cold and against the winter, and solid quarters meant an even greater means of fighting against this winter and climate. Beyond their significance as just quarters, they also represented a means of fighting. Therefore, we had to drive at the following. We had to deprive the enemy of this means in his fight against us, and for this reason we were particularly interested in the destruction of all settlements. The enemy had, above all, on the occasion of the fightings which I have described when I talked about the 19th Corps proved that he could master even the most difficult terrain with the most modern equipment.
He was very clever in sending his operations cross-country and across the Tundra and he maneuvred in a very clever manner. By no means did he keep to the highways in his operations. Instead he let his operations enter the free country, the Tundra, and out in the open he tried again and again to encircle us and to catch up with us and overtake us. Apart from this, we knew from these fights and also from the battles which had taken place in preceding years that the Russians had special units at their disposal which were particularly suitable for the warfare in this desert country. They were organized for this kind of warfare and particularly trained and were specially suitable for this arctic warfare.
Q. General, let's talk about figures once more. How many men did you have to lead back?
A. The army comprised more than 200,000 men and of these 200,000 the bulk of them more than 120,000 men, were led back along Highwar 50. The smaller part of the army was led along a highway which ran along the Swedish border. This highway joined Highway 50 near the LyngenFjord.
Q. General, if now the bulk of the army marched along one highway only, was it not sufficient then to destroy just that highway?
A. No. In my opinion, that was not sufficient because as I have stated just now the Russians did not merely keep to the highways but instead waged battles away from the highways out in the open in the plains. The Russians used all built-up areas outside of the highway for their purposes.
Q. You were then talking about special units which the Russians had at their disposal. Can you name a few of these units?
A. Yes, there were ski units, there were reindeer units, who carried all their equipment on reindeers, and besides they worked with light equipment such as cars etc. All these were special units which had in preceding years trained in the plains, in the Tundra, and had been tested in their organization.
Q. Is the fact of the actual mobility of the Russians in this area and of their numerical superiority to be brought into any connection militarily with the fact that the army could in the main only move along one highway and to a smaller extent along a secondary highway?
A. Yes, because the Russians were the enemy who threatened us beyond the extreme tip of Norway of Kirkenes and threatened to catch up with us there and therefore he was the one who could soonest catch up with Highway 50 where the mass of the army moved.
Q. And what would stoppages along that Highway 50 have meant?
A. They would have had a great significance because to keep the disengaging movement of this large unit mobile is hardly possible at all, and if road blocks had arisen, then it would have been possible for a cleverly maneuvering enemy to push into this movement and that would have been very dangerous for the army concerned.
Q. How could these road blocks come about?
A. They could come about through snow lawines, through air attacks on the road concerned, through traffic jams, through shooting of this highway from the sea, through sabotage acts, and through guerilla warfare by the population, and special danger sources for such road blocks would have been the numerous junctions on the road. There is, above all, the Lyngen-Fjord. which is more than 16 kilometers wide and the army had to be sent across that fjord because it interrupted the highway. These places were particularly exposed to danger because of enemy attacks from the air and sea. If traffic jams had arisen near these fjord, then more than a hundred kilometers back this would have influenced the movement of the army, to their disadvantage.
Q. What made up the rear troops of the army for all practical purposes? Where they mainly motorized columns or how was the necessary equipment for the army carried along?
A. Of course, we sent all motorized units which we could spare along with the movement of the infantry and mountain divisions. We let them precede these movements. The units concerned had horse-drawn vehicles with them. Therefore, these divisions which marched one after the other are, for all practical purposes, a long worm crawling along the street and they were most vulnerable against all attacks irrespective of whether they came from land or sea or from the air. And this army worm was most vulnerable to all these attacks which threatened it.
Q. General, here is one other point I would like to refer back to. You have talked about having originally wanted to stick to the so-called "little" solution. Can you give us the reasons of the army for this decusion?
A. Originally we had decided on the "little" solution by which I mean that we wanted to concentrate the population in as small an area as possible, and we only wanted to destroy those built-up localities, which were no longer needed by this concentrated population. We were of the opinion that the carrying along of these people who were not organized for a winter march could only be carried out under most difficult circumstances and, therefore, we say in the carrying along of these people nothing but a special burden for the troops because the troops had to take care of these people. They had to carry them along on their own vehicles. And they had to look after them to the extent to which these people could not supply themselves.
Q. Am I correct in understanding you, General, that you say that these were not so much considerations of principles but it was merely a question of organizing such an affair?
A. We were mainly concerned with the fact that the organization of this winter trek would have presented a particular difficulty to us and for this reason we had origanally decided to stick to the "little" solution.
Q. General, when you mentioned the telephone conversation with General Keitel, you told us that Hitler had now demanded that the operation Northern Light (Nordlicht) be carried out consequently. This operation was demanded in view of the fact that the Russians were pursueing you. Did the Russians actually pursue you?
A. The Russians were moving up by the Kirkenes area and they followed our movements. They pursued us up to the Tana River. They Tana River is where I pointed to the fronter before.
Q. Please show it to us on the map. Perhaps you can show us Kirkenes first.
A. Kirkenes is here (indicating on map). I showed it wrong before. This is not the Fisher Peninsula; it is the Wardia Peninsula, and the other one is further to the East. I am showing now the Tana River which is the River which separates Finland from Norway.
Q. Will you give us the dale please when the Russians pressed forward to the Tana River?
A. That must have been towards the end of October.
Q. Did you expect the Russians to pursue you beyond the Tana River?
A. Yes, until the operation Northern Light was concluded -- that is until we had crossed the Lyngen-Fjord. We expected the Russians to pursue us. Above all, we were afraid that the Russians could overtake us by a movement at sea, and this in connection with, and with the help of, allied forces on sea and allied shipping means and also supported by air forces of the Western allies. The overall situation of the 20th Mountain Army was most inviting an Anglo-American-Russian joint operation against us. If the enemy wanted to achieve the destruction of the 20th Mountain Army up there in that arctic territory.
DR. FRITSCH: May it please the Tribunal, I would like to put an interim question. I had intended to submit photostats in Document Book II of the maps in which we are interested here. May I ask whether these maps are contained in Document Book II.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: No, the maps are not included. It seems that some mistake was made in them and they will not be delivered until tomorrow or the next day.
DR. FRITSCH: Thank you, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: We do have one copy of a map of Norway, here, however.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I just wanted to submit them at the same time as evidence and, therefore, I had asked for photostates to be made and a few days ago I gave them to the competent offices for inclusion in the document books, but I am afraid another mistake must have occurred here.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. General, just before we had talked about the pursuit of the Russians, beyond the Tana River, now when you realized that the Russians at that moment did not intend to pursue further, were not the dangers eliminated at that moment?
A. No. I believe I just stated that we had, above all, to expect a pursuit by the Russians on the sea route, and this overtaking operation on the sea would have been more or less independent of the land highway because the forces necessary for this overtaking operation could have been transported on the sea route and the supplies later as well.
Q. And you had at that time to expect such an operation?
A. Yes, we had always counted on such an operation until the time when we had crossed the Lyngen-Fjord.
Q. Were the German troops also threatened with a pursuing operation by the Fins? If, for this answer, you would make use of the map, General, I would be obliged.
A. After the fights in the South, that is on the Bottnik Bay, had been concluded and after we had managed to separate ourselves from the Fins there, the Fins pursued us on two highways. One is along the arctic route which would be on this map if this map was complete. It would go from this point to the North and it would end near this red arrow and then they were pursuing us.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Just a moment, please. The suggestion has been made that the points ought to be named in the transcript. It doesn't mean much when it says "from here to there." If you can state the places on the map as well as point them out -
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. General, would you be in a position to toll us the names and show them on the map, although I am afraid they are not all contained on that map?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, will you do it from now on, please, so that the record contains the necessary information?
A. I shall repeat then. After conclusion of the German-Finnish battles in the area Rovanjevi and in the area Kemi-Tornia, the Fins pursued us on two routes; for one on the arctic route in direction Porsamer Fjord, and secondly, along the Swedish-Finnish frontier in direction towards the Lyngen-Fjord.
Q. General, you were just now talking about the Swedish frontier. Was there any particular danger from that side and if so what was that danger?
A. We expected or at least thought it extremely probable that the Russians would carry out an operation of overtaking us through Sweden, thus making use of the ore railroad which led via Kiruna to the gates of Narwik. This consideration was close at hand because at the start of the Eastern campaign, German forces also had come from Norway via Sweden to Finland. May I say then, why shouldn't one favor which was given us by the Swedes also be granted in turn to the Russians?
Q. General, another question concerning tho Finns; what was the military strength of the Finns with respect to this Artic climate and this terrain concerned with their troops.
A. The Finns after all were fighting in their own country. That is they were fighting under conditions which they knew well as peasants, forresters, sportsmen and etc. They were particularly masters of battles in the jungles and in deserts, and I don't have to stress that they are particularly well versed in skiing. Every Finnish division and every Finnish brigade is completely mobile on skiis. Such an enemy was facing us at this winter-time and was particularly dangerous to us.
Q. General, do you mean to tell us that the distruction of a highway did not particularly impede these mobile soldiers?
A. No, of course the Finns also would have moved very much faster and they could overcome these destructions in summer as well as in winter, because in their whole organization, in their vehicle equipment they were not so much dependent on the highways as was any other Army. I have mentioned similar special units when I talked about the battle of the 19th corps on the Artic Sea Front.
Q. Now, if there had been no quarters available would that have had any particular influence on these soldiers?
A. Yes, of course it would because these soldiers if they wanted to survive at all in this winter, battle,they either had base this battle on a few built up areas, or else they had to carry along heatable tents forever individual person, and that would have meant for a unit mobile on skiis a considerable burden, because these tents would have to be transported by reindeer or some similar means.
Q. Now, lets turn once again to the reasons for this evacuation General; apart from the reasons which you have mentioned, and which I would like to designate as military reasons here, were there any other reasons for the Finnmark evacuation and for tho destruction which was carried out there?
A. Yes, I as a soldier was of course mainly moved by the military reasons, but I also know that the OKW also had political reasons.
The OKW wanted to prevent another Norway from developing, which would not have been occupied and controlled by us.
Q. Now, in consideration of the sparse population would this population have been a help or hindrance for the enemy?
A. These people would have meant a considerable help, because they all were people who knew every inch of the area, they knew the peculiarities of the climate up there on the Norwegian Fjord Coast. They knew of all the difficulties of this winter climate, of the snow storms and snow drifts which in the interior of the country were not as important as they were near the coast, and all these people where the terrain was concerned and also where the highways were concerned were a considerable help for any enemy that was in pursuit.
Q. General Hoelter, do you know anything about destructions of the town and harbour of Kirkenes and if so do you know anything about the effect of the destruction or who carried out the destruction?
A. Well, I know Kirkenes from my activity as Chief of the Corps on the Artic Sea Front. Kirkenes had in the preceding years always been the target for enemy air attacks, particularly the harbour installations, the industrial installations and the vicinity of these installations. Therefore, even before tho battles around Kirkenes had taken place this town had been destroyed to a considerable extent. What damage was caused later on when the actual battles around Kirkenes took place and to what extent tho destruction of all installations of military importance was extended over to the town area I am in no position to say.
Q. The battles around Kirkenes were rather swift, weren't they?
A. Yes, in the course of the fighting which I have described when I talked about the 19th Corps we had to give up Kirkenes a good deal quicker than we would have liked to do. We wanted to evacuate a lot of the material which we had stored there to the area of Narwik and further South, but the Russians did not leave us time to carry out these evacuations of material.
As I have described before the troops were waging a battle for their very existence so they had neither time for this evacuation nor did they even think about it. This was how it happened that a lot of material had to be destroyed in the Kirkenes area, and that an evacuation of the population and a destruction of domiciles and houses for the purpose of not letting it fall into the hands of the enemy in a usable state was not carried out as far as I know.
Q. Was it at any time known to you that the Russians transported some troops toward the South, and if so when was it?
A. Towards the end of November we learned through information from the OKW that the Russians transported individual units from the Karelia front to the Baltic Front and used them there.
Q. What was the influence that this transport of Russian forces had on the evacuation and the destruction in Finnmark?
A. The appearance of Russian forces which had originally confronted us and then appeared on the Baltic Front had no longer any influence on our own measures, because at that time the battles were for all practical purposes concluded. Besides we knew at the time the forces were no longer there. What we did not know was what the Russians still kept in the extreme North and what they had up their sleeves against us.
Q. General, I would like to put an entirely different question. What would the corresponding season be in central Europe at the end of November to that area about which we are talking now?
A. A comparison with mid-European conditions is not possible at all. The middle of November up there is extreme winter. The days only last a very few hours and during that time you can no longer sec the sun, and there is always twilight. The temperature is around 30 degrees and that happens already the end of October and the beginning of November.
Q. What was the strength of the Finns numerically?
A. You mean all the Finns.
Q. Yes.
A. The Finnish armed forces comprised several hundred thousand men.
Q. How many Finnish divisions had become available through Finland leaving the common war on the Russian front?
A. Without any trouble the Finnish could have used 20 to 30 divisions against us after the Russian front for all practical purposes had ceased to exist.
Q. And how strong was this mountain army, I mean numerically, you gave this to us before?
A. The 20th Mountain Army comprised about ten divisions.
Q. Do you in this include the divisions for the protection of the coast?
A. No, it was where the divisions which were committed for battle in the open and all these units were quite mobile.
Q. General, you talked about the possibility of a Russian landing; did you also count on landings of the Anglo-American forces and maybe of a joint action?
A. We always considered this possibility and expected it to occur and the fear that such an operation of the Russians combined with Anglo-American forces and on the part of the latter particularly toward the area of Narwik had almost become a fexed idea with the supreme headquarters, the supreme leadership.
Again and again the area of Narwik was pointed our to us, its significance as a R-boat base was repeatedly stressed, suitable also for the operations of our own submarines against the convoys from the west to east and the other way around. We knew that in the spring of 1945 from this base there wore to be operations of our most modern submarines.
Q. Did you also count on a landing in the province of Finnmark?
A. I have already stated that we counted particularly on a movement of overtaking our troops on the part of the Russians by the sea route. This opinion would have necessarily led to a landing operation in the province of Finmark.
Q. General, what about the attitude of the Finnish population when the Russian pursued and can you give us a comparison; for instance the attitude of the Norwegan population on the Arctic sea front?
A. For the Norwegian population in the area of Kirkenes, I would like to say they remained passive and let all events pass. From fighting action from the persuing Russians the Finnish population escaped in panic from all those areas where they expected the Russians to invade. For practical purposes that mean they left the entire area of Lappland, north of the Olo River and only in the very closest coastal areas of the Bottnik Bay did those people remain who were closest to the railway lines or where they could cross the Bottnik Bay with small vessels and thus escape the Russians.
Q. General, did you also expect a later Russian offensive? We have discussed the fact that the Russians pursued you up to the Tana River and what did you expect after this?
A. Since the winter meant an impediment to every operation up there and since it was a difficult season, we expected above all that Russian operation would start against the Lynjon Front as of the spring of 1945.
Q. And now let us turn back to the other date we mentioned, the end of October. General Jodl who was heard here as a witness and whom you mentioned previously as a commander of the 19th corps testified that he personally did not necessarily count on the Russians to follow up.
You were the chief of the 20th Mountain Army; was General Jodl in a position to judge this situation correctly?
A. Undoubtedly General Jodl was not in a position to do that at that time as he was commanding general of the 19th corps and he did not have the necessary information for the overall appraisement of the whole situation of the Mountain Army.
Q. A Norwegian general who was heard here as a witness testified that the winter it is not possible at all to move troops in Finnmark, because the frequently mentioned Highway 50 could not be kept free of snow; is this assumption correct from a military point of view?
A. I previously stated that the winter makes it difficult for all troops to fight, even if it is well versed in the methods of winter fighting, but that movements - and by this I mean movements of large troop bodies - can also take place under these winter conditions in this area was proved by us, I believe when we in winter carried out this operation "Northern Light" up there. On the occasion of this operation we mainly moved along Highway 50. I admit that winter was kind to us and that up to Christman there was not very much snow.
Q. Now during the evaluation were the Naval Forces subordinated to the 20th Mountain Army and thus also to General Rendulic?
A. When we are talking about the naval forces we have to distinguish between those forces which are land bound, for instance the many coastal batteries and on the other hand we have the real naval forces, which are serving at sea. Only those parts of the navy which were land bound had to be subordinate to us, because they had to be included in the movement on the supply routes and on Highway 50 and these parts of the navy were subordinate to us with respect to their movements and of course they would also have been subordinate to us if there had been a battle. All those forces which operated on sea remained subordinate to the Navy High Command Norway, they had to secure the sea flank and in their move ments and operations on the sea they had to be in tune with the movements on land carried out by the 20th Mountain Army.
