Such cases occurred rarely as I know from what other related but not from my own observation. If the Germans took measures against the partisan units by hemming them in, the latter broke up and scattered as civilian population. " The affiant in the next paragraph under VI describes an experience concerning their conduct in battle.
I shall read it:
"On the 23 December 1943 towards 14.30 hours my company on the march through a high wood in the region of CLOVO, stopped when it just reached an elevation. The platoon commander of the front platoon called me and I noticed that about 200 meters below the elevation a column, of women and children with pack animals was moving across in the direction of our march. Partisans who were armed with rifles and tommy guns joined this line of women and children. By getting into touch with the leaders of the units situated sideways from me I ascertained that it was a matter of a very big partisan unit, together and near of which were camouflaged by a procession of women and children."
Concerning their recruiting and the effect that it had on the civilian population, this is what he said:
"From the repeated descriptions of the Moslem country priests (HODSCHAS) I know the following about the recruiting methods of the partisans:
If Moslems called up by the partisans to enter their unit, refused to obey this call up, the partisans repeatedly acted according to the following customs:
1. Either the adults were immediately dragged along by force, in so far as it was possible for the partisans to do this.
2. If it was not possible to do this, they took the children of the people in question to carry food or ammunition until in this way the parents were forced to come with the partisans themselves because then the children would be liberated. This method was generally propagated particularly from the autumn of 1943 onward."
This affidavit was given in Regensburg on August 1, 1947. It has been sworn, to and duly certified.
The next document is Rendulic No. 61 of the same supplement book, which will be exhibit 38. This is an extract from the War Diary of General Kommando XV, Army Corps. It is a report of 8 April 1944. This is what the report says:
"Army orders that in the evacuation of the population in the island and coastal area, the purely human interests of the population of the friendly state of Croatia, should be taken into consideration in every respect and unnecessary hardships should be avoided."
A further document offered by me will be Rendulica No. 62, which is offered as Exhibit 39. May I draw the Court's attention to the Prosecution exhibit 338-A, This is the well known affair concerning the consolidation of the Croatian Armed Forces. The affidavit now submitted by me was given by the aide de camp of General Rendulic, Karl Luz Markus. The affidavit states that at the moment when this letter was sent out, No. 338-A, prosecution exhibit, the defendant General Rendulic was not present at headquarters. The affiant says the following about that:
"I can testify with certainty that General Rendulic was not in the Headquarters of the 2nd Armored Army in Vranja Banja in the time from the morning of September 16, 1932 until the afternoon of 20 September 1943."
The letter which I mentioned and has been submitted by the prosecution is dated 17 September 1943. The affiant then states and gives details as to why he remembers this so precisely, namely the absence of General Redulac from headquarters. The affidavit was sworn, to on 24 October 1947 in front of me here in Nurnberg.
The next document is Rendulac document 63, which will become exhibit 40, another affidavit by the aforementioned affiant Karl Luz Markus, Markus points out first in his affidavit that since August 1943 until the end of the war he was General Redulac's personal A.d.C. and as such was always in his immediate vicinity and he was therefore familiar with all these things.
I shall read the second, paragraph:
"So I was also present when General Rendulac spoke at conferences at Headquarters and when visiting the troops. On such occasions General Rendulac always pointed out that all hardships which were not essentially necessary in the battle against the partisans should be avoided.
"Within the closest circle he unmistakably expressed to the older commanders that he expected moderation from them with regard to the use of reprisal measures in spite of possible orders to the contrary."
This affidavit was sworn to on 21 October 1947 before me here in Nurnberg.
Then there are a few documents which are connected with the Southern Balkans and Norway. All I need to give there is simply an idea of their contents. It is the question of Bendulic's attitude towards excesses by the Party. I next offer Rendulic Document No. 64 as Exhibit 41, another affidavit by the aforementioned Karl-Luz Markus, the A.D.C. The witness states her the detail that General Bendulic took a strong attitude against the excesses by the Party, that he expressed strong criticism and that he did not hesitate to do so towards anybody. He finally points out that as far as Gauleiters were concerned this attitude was taken inasmuch as they interfered with Wehrmacht affairs.
The next document is Rendulic Document No. 65 which will become Exhibit 42. This is an affidavit by a former officer on the General Staff with the High Command of the Army Group Center which was later on renamed Army Group North. This affiant makes statements about the relations between Redulic and Party Bosses. In this case we are concerned with the relations to Gauleiter Koch about which the defendant himself made several statements on the witness stand. These statements are borne out here by this affiant. The affidavit has been sworn to on the 24th of September 1947 before a notary.
This brings us to the last document in this collection which is Rendulic Document No. 66 which will become Exhibit 43, an affidavit by Heinz Gyldedfeldt. Here again the same question is dealt with; namely, steps taken against Gauleiters. In this we are concerned with the period of time when Upper and Lower Austria were included in General Rendulic's area of command. On direct examination, these things were mentioned as far as the Gauleiter Eigruber and Uberleiter were concerned.
DR. FRITSCH: If the Tribunal please, may I ask the Tribunal whether Document Book II has reached the Tribunal yet in translation? It deals with Norway?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I think not.
DR. FRITSCH: I was assured yesterday that it would be available. Then perhaps I could interrogate a witness meanwhile and I hope that I will have the document book soon.
If it is agreeable to the Court, I shall now call the witness, General Herman Hoelter.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The Marshal will call the witness.
Hermann Hoelter, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The witness will raise his right hand and be sworn:
I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath).
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may be seated.
HERMANN HOELTER DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. FRITSCH (Counsel for defendant Rendulic):
Q Witness, will you please give us your full name?
A My name is Hermann Hoelter
Q Would you spell your last name?
A H o e l t e r.
Q When and where were you born?
A On the 31st of January 1900.
Q What is your profession?
A I am an active officer.
Q What was your last rank?
A Lieutenant General.(General Lieutenant)
Q General Hoelter, were you ever a member of the NSDAP?
A No.
Q Will you please briefly describe to us your military career?
A In 1917 as a cadet I joined the Infantry Regiment 180 and after the war I belonged to the Transitional Army was then taken over into the Reich Army into the Infantry Regiment 13 in Wuerttemberg where I remained until 1928. I was then transferred to the Army Sports School, first as a teacher and then as Adjutant and in the Spring of 1931 I made the Wehrkieis examination which I passed and I was then for three years in the training school for officers.
In the Spring of 1934 I was ordered to join the General Staff of the Army and in the Spring of 1935 I was transferred there. I belonged to the Army General Staff until the Autumn of 1937. I became then Company Commander in the Infantry. Regiment 45 in East Prussia and in the summer of 1937 I became Ia of the 34th Division to which I belonged until the Autumn of 1940. I went into the war with that division and then, as an instructor in tactics, I joined the War Military academy in Roumania where I remained until the Spring of 1941. I went there as Chief of the General Staff to the German High Command with the Finnish Armed Forces.
In the Autumn of 1941 I became Chief of Corps at the front in Lapland and in the Autumn of 1943 I stayed at the Arctic front. In March of 1944 I was the Chief of the Army in Northern Finland and Norway of the 20th Mountain Army.
Q Within what period of time, witness, and in what position were you with the 20th Mountain Army?
A From Autumn 1941 until the Spring of 1945 I was with the 20th Mountain Army.
Q Were you throughout that period of time, when General Rendulic was in command, Chief of Staff of the 20th Mountain Army?
A Yes.
Q When did Rendulic take over the command of the 20th?
A Rendulic took over the command by the end of June or July or 1944.
Q General, will you please wait until the question has been translated lest there be complications?
You spoke now of the period of time June-July 1944. In what area was the 20th Mountain Army located at the time?
A The 20th Mountain Army was then stationed in Northern Finland between Polujoki a river which flows into the Finnish Gulf and the Fisher Peninsula.
Q May I ask you, General, to tell us whether the proportion of forces which prevailed in the previous years was maintained in the summer of 1944 or whether it was changed?
A No, the proportion of forces was changed to our disadvantage. From Spring of 1944 onwards, the Russians were reinforced so that we were faced by a three-fold superiority on the part of the Russians.
Q In this tribunal we have frequently discussed the moment when the Finns left the war. My question to you, General is this: what was the position after the Fins left the war in which the 20th Mountain Army found itself?
A In the event of Finland leaving the war a disengaging movement had been prepared and worked out, the aim of which was to have the 20th Mounts in Army transferred to the most Northern part of Lapland to form a new front up there which would go from the place where the three countries met, namely Finland, Norway and Sweden, up to the Fisher Peninsula with the proviso to have in that front the nickel mines of Kolosjoki included and to have it guaranteed and guarded at all costs.
Q On that map which unfortunately is the only one I have at my disposal and it possibly is not adequate, could you nevertheless show us very briefly what areas these are?
A The 20th Mountain Army was stationed here. Its southern flank cannot be shown on this map. It is roughly between here and up there near the Fisher Peninsula. The northern frontier ran through Northern Kuen which is this peninsula there and they were joined by the command of the Norwegian Army which was based on Oslo. The threecountry corner which I mentioned just now is there with the result that the new front which the army was to take up was to reach from here and go in a large curve up to here to the Fisher Peninsula. In that region there is the nickel mine of Kolosjoki. I believe that is the most important part.
Q Thank you very much. General, what were the results which arose from these things as far as the two corps in the south were concerned?
A Both the two Southernmost corps, the 18th Mountain Corps and the 36th Mountain Corps had first to disengage themselves from the enemy. Then they had to disengage themselves, then go via the Rovanjevi area in order from there to make a turn to the north. Most of them along the Arctic road, a smaller part, a third perhaps, were to march along the Swedish frontier. During that movement the Southern flank of the army was exposed as the Finns had deserted us which constituted the danger of Russians moving across Finland exploiting the good road network and exploiting also the railway network. They would thus contact our southern flank in order to take from us the important road junction of Rovanjevi or perhaps even to overtake us in their pursuit along the Swedish frontier towards the direction of Luenfjoerd. What the Finns would do was unknown to us at that time.
Q Do you know, General, what terms were contained in the armistice concluded between Finland and Russia concerning the German forces in Finland?
A We were to leave Finland before the 14th of September. If not, the Finnis were under the obligation to interne us.
Q You refer to the 14th of September. Will you give us the date of the armistice agreement?
A. The armistice was concluded on the 2nd of September in the evening.
MR. RAPP: May I inquire whether or not the witness is reading his testimony from pretyped sheets or whether he is giving his testimony without this aid?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I think that is something you can interrogate him about from cross examination. If you care to -- if he is -I think you can ask him that if you want to.
BY MR. RAPP:
Q Witness, are you using any aid in your testimony: Are you looking at notes?
A Yes, I am.
Q What is the nature of these notes?
A. These are notes connected with this interrogation.
Q You made them all yourself?
A But certainly.
Q Does it contain the questions and the answers?
A In the form of notes, yes.
Q How could you make them yourself if you would know ahead of time what the questions are going to be?
DR. FRITSCH: If the Tribunal please, I object to this manner of interrogation of this witness at this point. The prosecution may certainly discuss these things on cross examination and may also cross examine him as far as his reliability of memory is concerned but I believe that a witness is at liberty to make notes which he needs to support his memory. I do not hesitate to state that, of course, I discussed things with the witness beforehand. The prosecution is aware of that.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: There is no question of your right to interview the witness ahead of time. We will permit you to proceed and the prosecution can in cross examination make investigation of the notes and source of his knowledge as they care to make.
Q General, we were speaking about the armistice and I had asked you to tell me when the armistice agreement between Russia and Finland was concluded after you had said before that you had a time of grace to evacuate Finland before the 14th of September. Would you please give us the date of the armistice?
A The date of the armistice agreement was the 2nd of September.
Q Now, I want to speak about the clause in the armistice concerning the evacuation. What was the effect which this clause of the agreement had in relations between the German and Finnish troops? Were there any clashes which were of decisive influence on the measures taken later on?
AAfter the armistice there had to be fighting between the Germans and Finns which in fact occured roughly as September changed into October. This fighting found its climax in the extremely bloody battle of Keni or Tonio. We had to improvise and take all sorts of measures in order to intercept the surprise blow of the Finns into our back. We succeeded in this and finally we could disentangle ourselves from the Finns without there having been any serious danger of a large scale operations on the part of the Finns.
Q Why was the original intention not pursued; namely, to have the 20th Mountain Army stationed in Northern Lapland to protect the nickel mine of Kolosjoki?
A We of 20th Mountain Army were motivated by two reasons here: (1) the numerical superiority of the Russians. The Russians alson the Arctic front opposed us with enormous superiority, were highly agile in difficult terraine. After the Finnish front had collapsed, they could oppose us with any number of units they wished to and additionally they had also the Finns who had joined our enemies.
The other reason was that supplies in this area which I have just pointed out on the map was no longer guaranteed, because the Western powers were completely in control both of the sea and of the air over the North Sea and the Arctic Sea.
The OKW to whom we had made presentations finally subscribed to our view and ordered on 4 October, that Northern Lapland be given up. Also Northern Norway right down to the Luenenfjord with the proviso that in that operation all artificial buildings, roads, harbors installations -- in one work, all those objectives which were of military importance be destroyed; and the population of military age was to be taken along. That order which came in on 4 October addressed to us was on the same day and in the same sense passed on to the 19th Mountain Corps in the Arctic front.
Q General, you spoke of the Russian superiority. What was the proportion of forces between the Russians and the 20th Mountain Army late in the summer of 1944?
A The Russians in the late summer of 1944 had a three-fold or four-fold superiority over us.
Q. Was this unhappy proportion yet worse at certain places, or was that the worst of which you can think?
A. No, that was the over-all proportion. At places where the Russians attacked and fighting ensued the proportion was, of course, yet more to our disadvantage.
Q. Was this numerical superiority of the Russians maintained?
A. On the whole, yes. By and by the proportion changed to our disadvantage because we were given the order to send units home to the Reich as quickly as possible.
Q. When did you hear for the first time that the units had to be sent home?
A. The first order, reached us by the end of September or the beginning of October that we should hand over one division at first. By the end of October we had to hand over yet more units, a total of five divisions, in fact, and one commander. That meant more than half of the forces of the entire Army.
Q. General, let us go back to the disengaging movement. Was the Operation "Birke" maintained? Will you tell us something about that?
A. The Operation Birke, without delay, was changed into the Operation "Nordlicht" (Nordic Light). We could not afford to stop and stay there. After all, we had to continue the operation, without any preparations, as far down as the Lyngen-fjord, and every day without ice and snow which we could use was, for all practical purposes, equivalent to a successful battle.
Q. You spoke of Operation "Birke" and operation "Nordlicht". What was Operation Nordlicht, briefly?
A. Operation "Nordlicht" was the operation which the OKW had ordered on the 4th of October. That is to say, it was the disengaging movement from Lappland and Northern Norway right across the Lyngen-fjord.
Q. Now, what was the effect which this order had on the Arctic Front?
A. The Arctic Front was to be held, at first, until such time when the two southern Corps reached a point up North, so that they should from among the forces of the XIXth Corps not be held up any longer and be involved in fighting. That was the moment when the XIXth Corps, was as it were, a sort of butt pointing to the East and was also to be set in motion and disengage itself in the direction of Norway.
Q. Now, General, did the Russians give you sufficient time for your disengaging movement? Could you do as you wanted to?
A. No, the Russians attacked earlier than we liked. They quite obviously endeavored to prevent an orderly and proper disengaging movement, such as had been possible with the two southern Corps. The Russians over-ran a division which protected the southern flank of that corps, and thus they pushed into the back of the front simultaneously from the Fischer Penninsula, and they carried out an operation armed at the rear of the front. And that was how the XIXth Corps faced an extremely difficult position.
Q. You've given us some of the reasons. Can you describe for us the situation in which the XIXth Corps found itself? Can you be a little clearer on that point?
A. The XIXth Corps was divided into a number of combat units, which was caused by this Russian operation. At many points the Corps was in extremely tight corners, and it would not have been able to get out of them by itself. We were forced to reinforce the Corps with forces which we could release from the Finnish area, in the area near Tornia.
We could send them there on trucks over a distance of roughly 800 Km. We also had to use forces of a division which came back from Kandalakscha, and send them there also on lorries and trucks. This was how it was finally possible to give the Corps that support which it needed in order to prevent its being destroyed. In those days along the Arctic Front there was extremely severe fighting, and losses were suffered by both sides. We had to sacrifice and leave behind much material along the front sector which, because of the Arctic winter, had to be supplied for many months ahead. The Corps fought in those days for its naked life. The Russians decided the speed of the operations, and it became clear to us that the Russians not only wanted to wipe out the XIXth Corps, but they wanted to intercept the forces which were marching along to the North, along the arctic Road, and after their destruction they wanted to invade Finnmark.
Q. How do you conclude this latter fact?
A. Mainly from the way in which the Russians fought. To begin with, they used their forces in a strongly concentrated manner. Where ever the Russians managed to make a gap, they immediatey pursued rughlesslessly. From their extremely skillful maneuvers and the appearance of a new group of forces in the area southwest of Murmansk, one could conclude that they were anxious to have a decisive operation directed against the XXth Mountain Army inasmuch as it was within their grip.
Q. General, would you, once again, give us the exact date of these events?
A. These things occurred by the middle and end of October.
Q. As far as OKW was concerned did they do anything at the time in order to influence these events or even control them?
A. Yes, it was in that situation the order burst in on us, which was dated the 28th of October and ordered the evacuation and destruction of Northern Norway, in contrast to our proposition, but they were basing themselves, it would appear, on the suggestion made by the Reich Commissar for Norway.
Q. About this order--I mean the teletype letter from the OKW dated the 28th of October---was there a telephone conversation or any other type of conversation with the OKW?
A. Yes, there was a telephone conversation between the Commander in Chief and General Jodl concerning that order.
Q. Were you present during that telephone call?
A. I'm not quite sure, whether I actually listened in to the conversation or whether General Rendulic told me what the conversation was about.
Q. Will you please tell us the contents of that telephone conversation held between General Jodl of the OKW and General Rendulic, as far as you can remember it?
A. General Rendulic wanted to get General Jodl to leave matters as they stood in the order of the 4th of October. General Jodl said that it was too late now and that the Fuehrer had ordered all those measures, that is to say, the evacuation and the complete destruction of Northern Norway. General Jodl expressed on the occasion that the Fuehrer was annoyed concerning the slack manner in which matters had been carried out appertaining to the first order to the XXth Army.
Q. May it please the Tribunal, may I suggest that it is a good moment for the recess?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Yes, we'll take our afternoon recess at this time.
I might say, Dr. Fritsch, that Document Book II was delivered to us just a few moments ago.
DR. FRITSCH: Thank you, Your Honor.
(A Recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom please take their places.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. General, before the recess we discussed the order of the 28th of October, and we discussed the fact that in view of this order there was a telephone conversation between General Jodl of the OKW and General Rendulic. And finally you had talked about the fact that on the occasion of this telephone conversation, General Jodl informed General Rendulic of the fact that Hitler was indignant because of the alack carrying out of the evacuation. What I would like to ask you now, General, is did you consider the date -- that is the end of October 1944 -- very suitable and did you consider that at that time the evacuation was indicated?
A. On principle, yes, I did, For several reasons.
Q. And what are the reasons?
A. One reason is the climate and the terrain and, secondly, the enemy and his method of fighting which he up till then had shown us.
Q. Will you please comment on these problems? First of all, General, how was it that the terrain and the climate influenced the operations?
A. The 20th Mountain Army had, for the anticipated operation, been exposed to the climate and to the terrain. That country is very sparcely populated. Every soldier who had fought in this arctic area had realized that even a heatable tent presented a means against the cold and against the winter, and solid quarters meant an even greater means of fighting against this winter and climate. Beyond their significance as just quarters, they also represented a means of fighting. Therefore, we had to drive at the following. We had to deprive the enemy of this means in his fight against us, and for this reason we were particularly interested in the destruction of all settlements. The enemy had, above all, on the occasion of the fightings which I have described when I talked about the 19th Corps proved that he could master even the most difficult terrain with the most modern equipment.
He was very clever in sending his operations cross-country and across the Tundra and he maneuvred in a very clever manner. By no means did he keep to the highways in his operations. Instead he let his operations enter the free country, the Tundra, and out in the open he tried again and again to encircle us and to catch up with us and overtake us. Apart from this, we knew from these fights and also from the battles which had taken place in preceding years that the Russians had special units at their disposal which were particularly suitable for the warfare in this desert country. They were organized for this kind of warfare and particularly trained and were specially suitable for this arctic warfare.
Q. General, let's talk about figures once more. How many men did you have to lead back?
A. The army comprised more than 200,000 men and of these 200,000 the bulk of them more than 120,000 men, were led back along Highwar 50. The smaller part of the army was led along a highway which ran along the Swedish border. This highway joined Highway 50 near the LyngenFjord.
Q. General, if now the bulk of the army marched along one highway only, was it not sufficient then to destroy just that highway?
A. No. In my opinion, that was not sufficient because as I have stated just now the Russians did not merely keep to the highways but instead waged battles away from the highways out in the open in the plains. The Russians used all built-up areas outside of the highway for their purposes.
Q. You were then talking about special units which the Russians had at their disposal. Can you name a few of these units?
A. Yes, there were ski units, there were reindeer units, who carried all their equipment on reindeers, and besides they worked with light equipment such as cars etc. All these were special units which had in preceding years trained in the plains, in the Tundra, and had been tested in their organization.
Q. Is the fact of the actual mobility of the Russians in this area and of their numerical superiority to be brought into any connection militarily with the fact that the army could in the main only move along one highway and to a smaller extent along a secondary highway?
A. Yes, because the Russians were the enemy who threatened us beyond the extreme tip of Norway of Kirkenes and threatened to catch up with us there and therefore he was the one who could soonest catch up with Highway 50 where the mass of the army moved.
Q. And what would stoppages along that Highway 50 have meant?
A. They would have had a great significance because to keep the disengaging movement of this large unit mobile is hardly possible at all, and if road blocks had arisen, then it would have been possible for a cleverly maneuvering enemy to push into this movement and that would have been very dangerous for the army concerned.
Q. How could these road blocks come about?
A. They could come about through snow lawines, through air attacks on the road concerned, through traffic jams, through shooting of this highway from the sea, through sabotage acts, and through guerilla warfare by the population, and special danger sources for such road blocks would have been the numerous junctions on the road. There is, above all, the Lyngen-Fjord. which is more than 16 kilometers wide and the army had to be sent across that fjord because it interrupted the highway. These places were particularly exposed to danger because of enemy attacks from the air and sea. If traffic jams had arisen near these fjord, then more than a hundred kilometers back this would have influenced the movement of the army, to their disadvantage.
Q. What made up the rear troops of the army for all practical purposes? Where they mainly motorized columns or how was the necessary equipment for the army carried along?
A. Of course, we sent all motorized units which we could spare along with the movement of the infantry and mountain divisions. We let them precede these movements. The units concerned had horse-drawn vehicles with them. Therefore, these divisions which marched one after the other are, for all practical purposes, a long worm crawling along the street and they were most vulnerable against all attacks irrespective of whether they came from land or sea or from the air. And this army worm was most vulnerable to all these attacks which threatened it.
Q. General, here is one other point I would like to refer back to. You have talked about having originally wanted to stick to the so-called "little" solution. Can you give us the reasons of the army for this decusion?
A. Originally we had decided on the "little" solution by which I mean that we wanted to concentrate the population in as small an area as possible, and we only wanted to destroy those built-up localities, which were no longer needed by this concentrated population. We were of the opinion that the carrying along of these people who were not organized for a winter march could only be carried out under most difficult circumstances and, therefore, we say in the carrying along of these people nothing but a special burden for the troops because the troops had to take care of these people. They had to carry them along on their own vehicles. And they had to look after them to the extent to which these people could not supply themselves.
Q. Am I correct in understanding you, General, that you say that these were not so much considerations of principles but it was merely a question of organizing such an affair?
A. We were mainly concerned with the fact that the organization of this winter trek would have presented a particular difficulty to us and for this reason we had origanally decided to stick to the "little" solution.