And I didn't think about the return of individual people, of course, in my answer. I was only thinking about the entire return, and the fact that the return of individual people was not welcomed is, naturally a matter of course because those are the sources of propaganda which one had to avoid, and which I have also stated here.
Q. Now, general, let's look at the next paragraph:
"All this is neither in the interests of my army nor in the political interests of the Reich. For this purely political reason I approved of the measures taken by the Army Abteilung Narvik and cannot permit the action which is now contemplated. I leave therefore taken steps for the salbaging of scarce goods from the evacuated territories to be carried out through the offices of the army and navy and for these goods to be put at the disposal of your office in Tromsoe."
Then the last paragraph says:
"I require of my generals and other leaders that, within the sphere of their activities they always take into consideration and represent the political interests of the Reich. It goes without saying that I myself act according to the same principles. The close intermingling of political points of view with the tasks of the Wehrmacht do not, therefore, make it possible in this sense to acknowledge any exclusive competency in the political sphere."
Now, I would say that this letter you wrote then doesn't entirely give with your testimony you just gave us a few minutes ago.
A. Yes, it agrees insofar as with former statement I meant that a general had to obey orders without allowing himself to be influenced by political considerations. I mean, in the carrying-out of his orders. But the fact that in his actions, when not acting on orders, can and must be influenced by the political interests of the Reich is a matter of course, but only in the carrying out of orders he must not allow himself to be influenced by political considerations. Only when he acts independently. And furthermore this is a friendly letter to the Reich Commissioner which shows the circumstances I was in.
Q. And you got away with it, didn't you?
A. Of course.
Q. Now, general, I have reference to German document book or, rather, to the Document Book 23, page 89 in the English, 83 in the German. 89 in English, 83 in German.
Hour Honors it won't be too tremendously important at this time if you have it here or not. Are you now on page 83, witness?
A Yes.
Q Norway Exhibit 522. It seems that you didn't quite understand why this document was an exhibit and it is indicative that you thought this document was held against you because you signed it "Long Live the Fuehrer."
A Yes; this is rather obvious.
Q That wasn't our intention at all. However, the purpose, and I just want to explain that to you, that this document has been included is because it fixes the exact date, that is to say the 18th of December 1944 on which you, General Rendulic, became Armed Forces Commander Norway, and as of that day you are consequently responsible for all matters which were undertaken by the German Armed Forces until such day that you relinquished that command. It was only for that purpose that we have included this document to fix the day when you became Armed Forces Commander. It wasn't in there because we thought that it was criminal to say "Long Live the Fuehrer." I thought I owed you this explanation.
A Yes, I understand that, but I don't understand why it was never doubtful that I had become Armed Forces Commander Norway on the 18th of December and otherwise your interpretation is not correct if you say that from this period onwards I was responsible for all the actions of the Wehrmacht in Norway; I was responsible for all the actions of the 20th Mountain Army and my tasks as Armed Forces Commander rested merely in the preparation for the defense of the country and in this connection I had corresponding rights over other parts of the Wehrmacht. My tasks consisted further in the direction of the defense of the country, here also with the corresponding rights in regard to the other parts of the Wehrmacht, but as to my responsibility, I was only and entirely responsible as far as my Army was concerned.
Q You see, Witness, you say that you were only responsible as far as the 20th Army was concerned, but as Armed Forces Commander in personal union Commander in Chief of the 20th Mountain Army you were also in fact senior Armed Forces Commander in Norway were you not?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q I have no further questions, Your Honor, on cross examination.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
- REDIRECT EXAMINATION
Q General, there are only a few questions I want to clarify in redirect examination, I would like to begin with Norway. There was mention made here of Hammerfest. You talked about progressive destrictions. My question is: was Hammerfest only damage in the course of the destructions carried out by the German Wehrmacht, was Hammerfest also attacked by Allied units?
A There were a few air attacks, but as far as I know they were unimportant. The destructions were carried out for the most part by the Wehrmacht.
Q And when did the last destructions take place. Do you know?
AAccording to the documents in February 1944.
Q Might I just ask you here when you gave up your command as Armed Forces Commander in Norway.
A On the 13th of January 1944.
Q Excuse me, which year.
A 1945.
Q I think, General, you said it wrongly before?
A Yes, it was February 1945.
Q And now I would like to deal quite briefly with Exhibit No. 610 the letter to the Reich Commissar. Have you still got the letter there?
A No, But I know it quite well.
Q Do you know whether this letter by you was preceded by some letter or action on the part of the Reich Commissioner or something of that kind?
A Yes, I know that when Colonel Hermann reported his agreement he had entered upon with the Reich Commissar, I forbade him to carry it out and I forbade police and individual persons to salvage scarce goods from the evacuated areas.
Of course, Hermann had to inform the Reich Commissioner to this effect, whereupon the Reich Commissioner sent me a teletype reproaching me for mixing myself up in this affair and this letter was my answer.
Q And in this letter did he reproach you or did he establish that these were political affairs which were entirely for him to handle?
A Yes, those remarks were no doubt made otherwise there would have been no reason for me to answer him.
Q General, with regard to the question whether such letters were usual I would like to ask you one question: Did you sign this letter yourself?
A I think it is a teletype. Does not that show from the document.
Q Yes, it is a teletype. Then I will withdraw this question. - I now submit to you Prosecution Exhibit 606 again and first of all General, I would ask you to tell us again when you were Divisional Commander of the 52nd Infantry Division in Russia.
A The division was in Russia under my command from the 26th of June 1941 until the 22nd of October 1942.
Q Then in this document which has already been discussed by Mr. Rapp there is particular mention of the Partisans. At that time, did you have hard fightings with the Partisans?
A The fight against the Partisans in Russia was one of the greatest burdens for the Army and meant a great danger for all the rear installations of the Army. We had continual fights with the Partisans.
Q And now were there also Commissars among the Partisans? Or was the term "Commissar" as it is mentioned in daily orders confined to the Russian troops?
A The fact that Commissars were also to be found amongst Russian Partisans as Commissars of the Partisans is not known to me but amongst the Partisans there were also Russians who had escaped from captivity and also Russian Commissars, and this can be seen from this document. In this document there is a certain entry, the report of the column leader, the supply officer 152, where he talks about the shooting of a Commissar.
Q Might I just ask you to state where this passage is for the purpose of the record.
A It is not the shooting of a Commissar in the sense of the Fuehrer order according to which all Commissars were to be shot, but this Commissar is correspondingly characterized in this report. The report states local inhabitants reported a Russian to the unit who had the position of a Commissar of the Communist Party in the supreme supervisory council and he was said to have shot at German soldiers. The information gained through the interrogation of many witnesses and through the finding of his weapons which he had hidden, gave proof for the accusation. It was known to him as well as to all the witnesses that a civilian who was found with his weapon in his hand during the fighting is a franctireur and according to International laws is to be shot.
By reason of the presentation of evidence the facts of the case were given and I had the man shot," In my opinion the execution was justified, thought did not know anything about it, but in no case was it a shooting by reason of the Commissar Order according to which a commissar captured during fighting is to be shot.
Q. General, please look at the order of the 6th September 1941 or rather the report under that date that is on the next page, page 3 of the document at the top. We had a short time before discussed that commissars went over to the partisans, that is they escaped from German captivity and went over to the partisans, did these commissars then fight on the side of the partisans, do you know of any such cases?
A. Of course they always then fought on the aide of the partisans.
Q. And is there anything about this on the report quoted by me of 6 September 1941?
A. Yes, it is quite clear, because that report states that Communist functionaries, 2 commissars and 36 partisans were captured and shot near Meulikehi, and these commissars who were shot here also weren't commissars within the meaning of the Fuehrer Order. That is, they were also not commissars captured and shot during regular combat, but they were partisans and as they had previously been commissars, it is particularly mentioned here. But they were not shot because they were commissars, they were shot because they were partisans. I think these are the only two points, in which commissars are mentioned at all in this long report. I would also like to stress here that my testimony and the affidavits of the two regimental commanders which were also read, are not connected at all with this document, because here partisans are being shot and not commissars. The fact that they formerly had been commissars has nothing to do with the fact that they were being shot as partisans.
DR. FRITSCH: I have no further questions on redirect examination.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I have no recross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any further questions on the part of counsel for the defense?
Apparently not. The witness may be excused.
Pardon me just a minute. Do either of my associates desire to make any inquiries?
JUDGE CARTER: I have none.
JUDGE BURKE: I have none.
THE PRESIDENT: You may be excused.
( Witness excused.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I now intend to call the witness Freiherr von Varnbuhler and to examine him here. I would like to ask for the permission of the Tribunal to have this witness called.
THE PRESIDENT: I am informed that this witness is now not accessible, and it will take several minutes to get him up here. Perhaps we should take our recess at this time.
We will recess for 15 minutes.
THE MARSHAL: Court will be in recess for 15 minutes.
(Thereupon a 15 minute recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
FREIHERR von VARNBUEHLER, a witness? took the stand and testified as follows:
THE PRESIDENT: The witness will raise his right hand and be sworn.
I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
You may be seated.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. Witness, will you please tell the Tribunal your full name?
A. Freiherr von Varnbuehler.
Q. Would you please be kind enough to spell your name?
A. Von Varnbuehler.
Q. When and were were you born?
A. On the 1st of May, 1907 in Ulm on the Danube.
Q. And were are you now residing?
A. I am a British P.W. under American custody and at present I am stationed in a camp in Neustadt near Marburg.
Q. Kerr von Varnbuehler, were you at any time a member of the Nazi party?
A. No.
Q. Will you please describe quite briefly your military career?
A. In 1926 I became a soldier in a Cavalry Regiment, there I was Chief of a Squadron. Then I attended the War Academy. During, the war I was leader of a company and besides I had various assignments in the General Staff of the troops. Among the assignments was the one of Chief of the 68th Corps in September 1944. My last assignment was that of a Chief of Staff of an Army.
Q. And since what date did you have any official contact with General Rendulic?
A. Since the time when he took over the 35th Corps in Russia, that was in the fall of the year 1942.
At that time I was Ia of an Infantry Division, subordinate to the 35th Corps.
Q. Were you also subordinate to General Rendulic in the Balkans?
A. Yes, since the 5th of July 1943 I was Ia of the 2nd Panzer Army. General Rendulic commanded this Army since the date when the army arrived in the Balkans, that was the end of August 1943.
Q. What was your task as the Ia of an army, in this case as the Ia of 2nd Panzer Army?
A. The Ia of an Army was in charge of the Operational Department of the Army High command. The I-c was subordinate to him as expert on the enemy situation, not in his capacity as intelligence officer. The Ia was in charge of the Operational Department, the troop leadership and the organizational questions with regard to operational troops, sub-divisions, training, accommodations, transfers of all kinds. The army Ia was subordinate to the Chief of Staff and acted also as his deputy.
Q. What was your last military rank?
A. Since the 1st of April I was a Colonel in the General Staff.
Q. Herr von Varnbueler, the area of your Army towards the end of 1943 was Croatia, wasn't it? Did you consider the troops at the command of the 2nd Panzer Army adequate to occupy the area which was under the jurisdiction of the Army?
A. Yes, together with the forces of the allied Croatia, it seemed to me that our forces were adequate for area under our jurisdiction at that time.
Q. According to what principles did the 2nd Panzer Army conduct the fight against the partisans?
A. In accordance with purely military principles, the aim was to smash the fighting strength of the partisans. For this purpose smaller and largo scale operations were carried out constantly.
Q. Colonel, since not in every locality there was a German unit present where there in these inaccessible territories certain areas where partisans could gather together, if yes what did the 2nd Panzer Army and the Corps do against these gatherings of the partisans?
A. Also with regard to these areas operations were constantly planned and carried out. The aim was to get the bands to confront us in open battle and to destroy their supply bases.
Q. Were these operations successful?
A, On the whole they were, especially when we succeeded in getting the band to confront us in open battle which was difficult in the roadless and, to a large extent, mountainous territory. The destruction of existing supply bases and communication was almost in all instances successful so that especially with a view to war material the partisans had to rely on current supplies by the Allies. These supplies were for the most part sent by way of airplanes from the south and from the cast.
Q. Colonel, did the 2nd Panzer Army or the units subordinate to it have the possibility to reach all localities in their area?
A. Yes, by all means. Every German battalion did in the autumn of of 1944 reach every locality it wanted to reach through the whole area of the Army, This was proved by the operations against the partisans where, amongst others, we frequently succeeded in conquering Tito's headquarters.
Q. Did the designations sometimes used in Germans reports as "divisions" and "brigades" -- were these designations correct compared with the German concept of a division or a brigade?
A. No, they weren't . The stength f.i. of the so-called divisions changed frequently. At the best, they reached a strength of about 3,000 men whereas they quite frequently only counted about a few hundred men. However, in order to gain a proper picture of the enemy situation, it was expedient to use the same terms as were used by the enemy.
Q. Is it known to you that the OKW issued an order to the effect that these terms, brigades, etc. should not be applied?
A. I remember that these terms were not to be applied.
Q. Now, with respect to the partisans I would like to ask you another question. Were the partisans led in a uniform manner?
A. No, they weren't. There were several groups, independent groups and these groups fought against the Germans and even against other partisans.
Q. Did the partisans wear uniforms?
A. In many cases they wore individual pieces of military clothing of all kinds of nations. Most of them did not wear a proper uniform. In any case, they did not do that before the end of the year 1944.
Q. Did the partisans observe the laws and usages of war?
A. No, they did not. For instance, with respect to the treatment of prisoners, protection of the Red Cross, plunders and lootings, protection of the civilian population, et cetera, they did not observe the rules of war.
Q. We'll turn to that at a later point. At the moment I want to ask you another question.
Did the partisans wear their arms openly?
A. This would have been in contradiction with the principles of partisan warfare.
Q. Now, what was the attitude of the bands towards the population?
A. Every band supressed that part of the population which did not happen to be in sympathy with the band concerned.
Q. What I am interested in is the general attitude of the German agencies towards the policy of Dr. Ante Pavelic. What was the attitude of the German Envoy in Zagreb, Kasche, towards the policy of Pavelic?
A. He supported Pavelic's policy and also the policy of the Ustasha without any reservation.
Q. Can you give us one particular example with respect to this policy of Dr. Pavelic?
A. Could you please repeat the question?
Q. With respect to this policy as carried out by Dr. Pavelic towards these parts of the population which you mentioned, can you give us one specific characteristic?
A. A particular characteristic of this policy was the strong opposition against the Pravoslavs who lived in Croatia.
Q. Did General Rendulic agree with the attitude of the German Envoy Kaschce and with the attitude of Dr. Pavelic in this particular respect?
A. No, he didn't. General Rendulic considered his task to keep the country pacified and peaceful. For this purpose he had to prevent every persecution on one part of the population against another part of the population and he rejected these persecutions.
Q. What were General Rendulic's relations with the German Envoy in Zagreb, Kasche like?
A. For the reasons mentioned, it was not a good one. I myself witnessed one occasion in the headquarters where General Rendulic and Kasche had a conference. This conference ended without any result.
The differences of opinion were so great that the discussions did not always stick to actual facts.
Q. Before we were talking about one characteristic of this policy which was persued by Pavelic and which was supported by Kasche and you talked about his policy towards the Pravoslavs. Maybe you can tell us in one sentence what kind of policy this was and what General Rendulic's attitude was towards this policy.
A. General Rendulic regarded the Pravoslavic policy as a danger of inciting some parts of the population against other parts of the population in the area of his Army and he took strict measures against this possibility. I remember that he took steps against the instigational proclamations of newspapers which were directed against the Pravoslavs. He made representations with the Government and with the German Envoy in Zagreb. He threatened to confiscate the newspapers in his Army area in the event that the newspapers would continue their policy.
Q. Could the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Panzer Army give directives to the Croatian Government?
A. No, he could not. Croatia was a sovereign state.
Q. I will now turn to another set of questions and that is the Italian problem. May I assume that it is know to you that the Italians left the alliance in September? Did you at any time have negotiations with the Italians which later resulted in the capitulation of the Italians?
A. No. I myself made no negotiations of this kind but I was present when the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Panzer Army, General Rendulic, negotiated with the Italians. These negotiations were conducted in order to secure an orderly capitualtion by the Italians.
Q. When and where did these negotiations take place?
A. As far as I remember, they took place on the 10th of September 1943, in the Hotel Dalti in Tirana.
Q. And who conducted the negotiations on the part of the Italians?
A. General Dalmazzo. He was the Commander-in-Chief of the 9th Italian Army and therefore he was a legitimate negotiator.
Q. And how did these negotiations develop?
A. The Italian Commander-in-Chief, General Dalmazzo, appeared in company of a few other officers in answer to an invitation which he had received in the morning. He appeared on the afternoon of the 10th of September, 1943, in the hotel which I mentioned in Tirana. He was received by General Rendulic. This was done with all military tact and everything was done not to hurt the soldierly honor of the Italians.
Q. Are you in a position to give us an example for this manner in which the Italians were treated?
A. Yes, I remember quite clearly how General Rendulic personally got rid of a few too insistant film reporters and had them expelled from the room where the negotiations took place. These reporters were to film the negotiations for the news reels. I can appreciate such a gesture, especially since I personally experienced a similar situation in May, 1945, carried out on the part of an American General in Ludwigslust.
Q. What was the tenor of the negotiations, Colonel?
A. It was only natural that the negotiations were concluded in a formal manner, but in an absolutely correct manner. The individual items were first of all translated into the Italian language and subsequently they were commented on. On that occasion, it was particularly pointed out that the exact carrying out of the conditions especially with respect to the delivering up of arms and motor vehicles, was in the foremost interest of the Italians, since only then could the transport of the Italians take place in an orderly manner from the far away stations.
Q. Colonel, I believe we can talk just a little faster. Now on the part of the Italians, was any particular request voiced.
A. Yes, I remember that, for instance, General Dalmazzo attached particular importance to the fact that he retained his guard of honor. Of course, he was allowed to do that.
Q. Did the Italian representative accept the conditions then, and if so how?
A. Yes. He signed the conditions.
Q. Were there any provisions contained in the capitulation for the event that the Italians would not observe the conditions of the capitulation?
A. Yes. Amongst others, in case that the Italians would render we weapons and motor vehicles unusable or would sell them or would let them fall into the hands of the bands special sanctions wore provided.
Q. And what kind of sanctions were provided?
A. In certain quotas which I no longer remember, shooting were threatened.
Q. And for what reason did the Germans attach importance to this provision?
A. It had to be avoided that the partisans would be strengthened by these military instruments which were so very valuable to them.
On the other hand, the Italians also attached importance to the fact that they could keep their hand weapons and could make further use of their motor vehicles. This was of importance to them because they had to load all their instruments on special railway stations and the terrain was difficult to negotiate.
Q. Did you leave to expect and did you expect the Italians to fight against the German Armed Forces either alone or together with the partisans?
A. Yes, we had to expect this, at least with respect to parts of the Italian soldiers.
Q. Colonel, did anything become known to you about sanctions actually having been carried out?
A. I remember no such case.
Q. Did the Italian Army Group d'Est carry out the concluded capitulation terms?
A. Yes, with the exception of the Division Bergamo near Split, and the troops which were under General Roncaglia's command; General Roncaglia refused to carry out the capitulation which had been ordered to him by General Dalmazzo. General Dalmazzo stated that he could not force General Roncaglia, and this of course resulted in a very dangerous situation. The example of General Roncaglia could easily be followed by others.
Q. One other question. Was General Roncaglia subordinate to General Dalmazzo?
A. Yes, he was.
Q. And what was the situation which resulted from the conditions you described just now for the 2nd Panzer Army?
A. The Second Panzer Army which was separated by hundreds of kilometers from the place of the incident learned about these events mostly only briefly by radio messages.
According to these reports, the situation seemed quite a dangerous one to us, because also the Division Taurinense rejected the capitulation. This division was in Potgorica and was subordinate to Roncaglia. It was necessary that this situation be changed immediately and this could be done by eliminating General Roncaglia.
Q. And will you please tell us now what it was that General Rendulic actually ordered?
A. General Rendulic, as far as I remember, consented to the shooting of General Roncaglia which was demanded by the Divisional Commander concerned. However, he made the reservation that General Roncaglia should only be shot if: (a) General Roncaglia insisted on his opposition, and (b) if it was not guaranteed that he could securely be transported into a prisoner-of-war camp.
Q. Now to deal with Division Bergamo near Split, Colonel, this division as you said was the second source of opposition against Dalmazzo. What were the events connected with this division?
A. This Division Bergamo near Split did not carry out the capitulation terms. It joined the partisans in that area in their fight against us; because of this fact and because of the fact that the territory was so difficult to negotiate we only succeeded after strong reinforcements and after a long period of time and under high losses of our own forces to break this opposition and to capture the division.
Q Herr von Varnbueler, do you still remember how many officers and men were taken prisoner?
A There might have been roughly about 300 officers and 8,000 men.
Q And what happened to the 300 officers?
A I remember that the troops, which were embittered by the hard fighting which had caused high losses, intended to shoot the 300 officers as had been ordered by the Fuehrer.
Q Was this Fuehrer order carried out?
A Not, it was not. A summary court martial procedure was carried out, and in accordance with this procedure the persons who bore most of the guilt, which was about one-sixth of the total number, were sentenced to death, and, as far as I remember, were shot.
Q Do you know, Herr von Varnbueler, who it was who prevented that all of the 300 officers be shot?
A Who caused this shooting not to be carried out, this shooting which had been orderly by the Fuehrer, I cannot tell you any longer today. But without doubt this amendment of the Fuehrer order must have been done on the instigation and decision of a superior agency.
Q Do you know whether it was General Rendulic who ordered that?
A I don't know it for certain any longer, but I would assume that it was he because his consent was necessary for this amendment.
Q Colonel, I will now show you Document No. NOKW-509, which is Prosecution Exhibit 340. This is on page 11 of the German text abd Page 15 of the English text. The Document Book is No. XIV. This is an order of who Second Panzer Army, dated the 15th of September 1943. Can you tell us briefly how this order came about?
A The order originates from a period when the second Panzer Army started its activities in the Balkans. The second Panzer Army, at that time, did not know whether all troops subordinate to it in this area conducted the fight against the partisans in accordance with uniform directives.
Besides the Second Panzer Army had to take steps to insure that further units which arrived newly in the area would get the proper directions with respect to the warfare against the partisans. That is the reason why the order which we have in front of us here was issued. All it means is that it is a summary of the regulations which existed before the Second Panzer Army took over the command.
Q In this same Document Book, Colonel, and under the same Exhibit number, but on Page 15 of the German text and Page 21 of the English text, we have another order.
A Yes, I have it.
Q Would you look at Paragraph 2, under Figure 1 of this order, where it says, "The Army has issued orders that captured members of bands, hostages, and evacuees are not to be transferred until further notice." How did this order come about?
A The very conscientious working LXIXth Reserve Corps, under General Dehner, says, in the first part of this first paragraph, expressly that it refers to the order of the Second Panzer Army, dated the 15th of September. For this reason it is not possible that in the period between the 15th of September and the period when the order of the LXIXth Corps appeared, which was the 6th of October 1943, that another order had been issued, which ordered that captured members of bands, hostages, evacuees, etc. were not to be transferred until further notice.
Q Do you still remember this army order in its details?
A No, I can only reconstruct the facts from this order here and from the mention of these two dates.
Q Colonel, with regard to the question of the evacuation of the islands I shall show you Document Book XVI of the Prosecution. We are concerned with Document No. NOKW-674, which is on Page 104 of the German text and on Page 33 of the English text, Prosecution Exhibit 381.